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Summary 
This thesis aims to understand the 1987-99 food crisis in the DPRK. We begin by 
establishing the fact that the country faced several previous food shortages, 
including the 1945-46 urban food crisis, the 1954-55 rural food crisis and the 
1970-73 food shortage, all of which triggered and motivated corresponding 
institutional changes in agriculture. And we find that in order to overcome 
repeated food shortages the country has developed several distinctive economic 
institutions such as administrative/quantitative production control in agriculture, 
state grain marketing, food rationing, central monopoly of agricultural trade and 
supplementary food supply institutions. 
On the basis of this finding, we proceed into the analysis of the food crisis. 
Specifically, three controversial issues are examined. First, did it escalate into 
famine? If it did, how severe was the famine? Second, what was the causation of 
the famine? How did it unfold and what features did it have? Third, did the food 
crisis change the DPRK agriculture? 
With respect to the first issue we estimate the number of excess deaths 
during the food crisis using official population figures. It shows that there existed 
a famine that claimed 688 thousand excess deaths in 1994-99. For the second 
issue we argue that the famine had several unique features. First it was `absolute 
food availability decline (FAD) famine' in which no policies were feasible to 
prevent it. Second, it was urban famine where industrial population in the north- 
eastern part of the country suffered most. Third, it was `famine-in-slow motion' 
that victims persistently weakened for a long period rather than perished in a 
short space of time, due to the mixed result of massive FAD and systematic 
national coping strategies. Concerning the final issue we show that it is not 
necessarily true that the food crisis genuinely changed the DPRK agriculture as 
generally conceived. 
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I. Introduction 
This thesis examines food shortages and the development of agricultural institutions 
in the DPRK. It primarily intends to understand the country's recent food crisis and 
draw some lessons about its economic changes caused by the crisis. To do this we 
study how its agricultural institutions are organised and why they came into being. 
This study will show that the DPRK food crisis was the result of the country's rather 
unique agricultural institutions and thus it has quite different features from most other 
food shortages in market economies and even in other socialist countries. 
Scope of problem 
The DPRK food crisis in the 1990s has raised various international concerns. To those 
having humanitarian interests it seemed one of the greatest famines in human history 
in which millions of people might have died of starvation. To policy makers dealing 
with the DPRK issues it was a challenge and opportunity to embrace and change this 
isolated, but seemingly aggressive, country into a responsible member of international 
society. To researchers studying the DPRK economy it was the most compelling 
evidence that this only remaining Stalinist command economy has finally collapsed 
and so should change in order to survive. Reflecting those concerns, more than 2 
million MT of international food aid was poured into the country between 1995 and 
1998. And many western countries, including Great Britain, opened new diplomatic 
relations with the DPRK to support its economic reforms and new political relations 
with neighbouring countries such as South Korea (henceforth ROK), Japan and the 
US. It has been also reported that the DPRK is really changing due to the crisis. The 
first North-South Korean summit meeting was held in 2000, and the DPRK 
government has frequently announced its willingness to participate in the world 
economy and even introduce market mechanisms for its agriculture. 
Despite the concerns, however, surprisingly little is known about the food 
crisis. We know that the country suffered extreme food shortages in the 1990s. But we 
do not know exactly when and why the shortages happened, how severe they were, 
how different they were from those in other countries, what consequences they had, 
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and even whether they have ended yet. The primary purpose of this thesis is to answer 
these questions. 
Our starting point is a simple fact that food shortages in the DPRK were not 
unique in the 1990s. For the last five decades the country has experienced at least four 
different food shortages, all of which have been interestingly accompanied by 
corresponding institutional changes in agriculture. In the early 1970s, for instance, the 
DPRK authorities officially admitted the failure of agricultural production and 
reduced state food rations, which was immediately followed by the creation of so- 
called Juche Nongbub [Juche farming methods] that transformed the existing 
decentralised agriculture into the centralised current one. And this current agriculture 
has been reportedly decentralised again since the country began to suffer another food 
shortages in the 1990s. In other words, food shortages have triggered institutional 
changes in agriculture and at the same time agricultural institutions have prepared and 
featured food shortages. 
To understand the recent DPRK food crisis, therefore, we consider three 
related working issues. One concerns the historical contexts in which food shortages 
and agricultural institutions have influenced each other. Another is about the main 
features of the recent food crisis. That is, how different is the crisis from those in 
other countries? And how was it affected by the current agricultural institutions? And 
the final issue is about the institutional changes caused by the crisis and their 
implications. 
Composition of Study 
This thesis consists of four parts. The first part that comprises chapter 2 studies basic 
relation between food shortages and agricultural institutions in the DPRK. In this part 
we find that the current DPRK agricultural institutions are organised in order to 
resolve the country's on-going food shortages. And this finding provides the basis for 
the discussion of the recent DPRK food crisis in the third part of this thesis. 
The second part concerns the historical evolutions of agricultural institutions 
in relation to historically reported food shortages. Chapter 3 examines the early 
agricultural institutions in 1945-53 and discuses their relation with the 1945-46 urban 
food crisis. Chapter 4 studies the appearance of new agricultural institutions in 1957- 
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62, which primarily constitute the current institutions, showing that they were the 
results of the 1954-55 food crisis and the ongoing agricultural resource shortage after 
the Korean War. And chapter 5 deals with the period of 1973-87, the final completion 
stage of the current agricultural institutions, during which the central government 
established Juche Nongbub and centralised agricultural planning after the 1970-73 
food shortages. 
The third part of the thesis discusses the DPRK food crisis in the 1990s. To do 
this, chapter 6 presents a brief chronicle of the crisis and addresses three controversial 
issues surrounding it. First, did the food crisis develop into famine? If so, how severe 
was the famine? Second, what were the main features of the famine? Was it different 
from those of other countries? Third, did the food crisis change the DPRK 
agriculture? Of these issues, chapter 7 deals with the issue of the existence of the 
famine. In this chapter we find that the country faced a national famine that claimed 
688 thousand excess deaths between 1994 and 1999. On the basis of this finding, 
chapter 8 discusses the detailed aspects of the famine, including its causation, 
development paths, main victims and national coping strategies. In this chapter we 
argue that the famine was rather unique in the sense that it was `absolute FAD (food 
availability decline) famine', `urban famine' and `famine in slow motion', discussing 
how these features were generated by the current DPRK agricultural institutions. 
Chapter 9 examines the institutional changes induced by the food crisis, showing that 
it is not necessarily true that the country has genuinely changed or really reformed its 
agricultural institutions. 
The final part comprising chapter 10 summarises the discussions of the 
previous chapters and presents a brief remark on the limit of this thesis. 
Data and literature 
A common belief among the DPRK students is that official DPRK statistics and 
literature are extremely hard to obtain and even available few are not reliable. This is 
perhaps the reason why most previous studies about the DPRK economy avoided 
using statistics or relied on the statistics and information independently made by 
outside institutions and researchers. We do share this belief in some degree. 
Nonetheless we would point out that, as far as the DPRK agriculture, particularly its 
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institutions and food shortages, are concerned, official statistics and literature are not 
as rare as generally conceived. Indeed this thesis is heavily dependent on official 
DPRK statistics and literature. 
Consider the availability. In case of agricultural institutions there are four 
kinds of DPRK literature (information) available. First, the country's economic 
decrees are available. Those between 1945 and 1967 are compiled by the ROK 
government, ' and some important decrees between 1946 and 1961 are also available 
from such DPRK journals as Chosun Joongang Nyungam [DPRK Central 
Yearbook]. 2 Although no decrees are available since the 1960s, it should not cause 
great difficulties because the DPRK agricultural institutions have not fundamentally 
changed since, except for the fact that Juche Nongbub was introduced in the 1970s. 
Second, official agricultural history is available. Two history textbooks, Chosun 
Jonsa [The whole history of Korea] Vol. 22-34 and Chosun Nongupsa [The 
agricultural history of Korea] vol. 4, constitute one source. And Kim Il Sung's 
addresses and articles in Kim Il Sung Jojakjip [Collected Works] provide another 
source. Third, some DPRK documents about agricultural policies are available. The 
Korean Workers' Party Conference documents from its first conference to the fifth are 
compiled by the ROK government, being made recently available to public. There are 
also the DPRK Supreme Assembly documents from 1947 to 1982. Fourth, various 
individual DPRK books and papers have been available too. 
Concerning food shortages there are two different official statistics available. 
One is the statistics released in official publications such as Chosun Joongang 
Nyungam between 1946 and 1962. Though not abundant and detailed, they cover a 
wide range of issues from population to grain production. Another is the statistics that 
the DPRK government has submitted to various UN aid organisations since 1995. The 
submitted statistics normally cover the period from 1990 to present, providing 
relatively detailed information about population, food production, distribution and 
trade etc. Of course, official statistics are missing for the period of 1963-1988. Yet 
this difficulty does not pose a serious constraint when we focus on the DPRK food 
' These decrees are available from Bukhan Bubryungjip [Collected North Korean Laws], edited by 
Jeong Gyung Mo and Choi Dal Gon, Seoul, Daeryuk Research Institute, 1990. The economic decrees 
used for the thesis are from this source unless otherwise stated 
2 The decrees between 1946 and 1956 are also available from the Korean Workers' Party Central 
Committee, Gyuljongjip [Decrees], various years. 
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crisis in the 1990s, and when we use other non-official DPRK statistics such as 
media-released-figures as well as outside estimates. 
What about the reliability? The available DPRK literature such as economic 
decrees does not seem to raise a serious credibility concern. Yet, the reliability of the 
official DPRK statistics could matter. It is controversial how accurate the statistics are 
and even whether they are intentionally falsified or not. 3 The difficulty is that there 
are no enough statistics and information to evaluate this reliability problem. 
Considering this difficulty, we utilise official DPRK statistics and literature in 
the following manners. First, we use all the available statistics and literature. Second, 
however, in case of the statistics we normally use them only to identify trends, giving 
little attention to the absolute levels of the figures. Third, when we use the statistics, 
we also consider other related figures made independently by outside institutions and 
researchers in order to check out the reliability of the trends that the statistics yield. 
3 For instance, see Appendix II about official DPRK grain statistics 
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II. Food Shortages and Agricultural Institutions 
in the DPRK 
2.1. Introduction 
We begin by describing current agricultural institutions in the DPRK and examining 
why and how the institutions came into being. In its history of around five decades the 
country has experienced four major food shortages, including the current food crisis, all 
of which have brought about fundamental changes in agricultural institutions. In other 
words, the DPRK agricultural institutions have evolved so as to resolve the country's 
repeated food shortages, and the final outcome of this evolution is the current 
institutions. To our knowledge, however, there is no detailed previous research about 
the DPRK agricultural institutions. Thus, this basic relation between the institutions and 
food shortages is not widely known. 4 
To put the current agricultural institutions into the context, therefore, we ask 
three questions. First, why has the country been vulnerable to food shortages? Second, 
what has been the idea to resolve that vulnerability? Third, how has the idea been 
materialised in the form of agricultural institutions? 
To answer these questions the remaining parts of this chapter are organised as 
follows. Section 2.2 reviews the historically reported food shortages in the DPRK, 
finding that the country has been vulnerable to periodic food shortages ironically due to 
its own strategy to increase food production. On the basis of this finding, we describe 
the current DPRK agricultural institutions in section 2.3. We particularly focus on the 
underlying idea of the institutions that the central government should control all 
economic activities concerning food production, distribution, consumption and trade in 
order to maintain national food balance. Section 2.4 considers relation between food 
shortages and agricultural institutions in historical context. In this section we find that 
all the DPRK food shortages happened with sudden reduction in agricultural resources 
4 All previous studies about the DPRK agricultural institutions are very brief introductory ones. For 
instance, see Chung (1974: ch. 2); Scalapino and Lee (1972: ch. 13); Ko Seung Hyo (1993: p. 209-219); 
Ko Ryo Jung (1988: p. 122-157); Kim Woon Keun (1996a: p. 93-106) etc. 
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and so agricultural institutions have developed in an attempt to increase agricultural 
resource supply. Finally section 2.5 summarises the discussion of this chapter. 
2.2. The DPRK Food Problem 
Historically the DPRK agriculture has emphasised foodgrain production in order to 
achieve national food self-sufficiency. Indeed its food production had increased 
significantly, exceeding population growth at least until the mid 1980s. Despite this 
increase however the country has faced repeated food shortages. In this section we 
consider why it has been vulnerable to food shortages. 
2.2.1. Periodic Food Shortages 
It is in 1995 that the DPRK government admitted its precarious food situation to 
outside world for the first time in its history, appealing for international food aid. But 
food shortages are not recent in the DPRK. Indeed the country has experienced food 
shortages almost periodically. For instance, there was an urban food shortage in the 
winter of 1945-46 shortly after the communists took over the country [see table 2-1 ]. In 
the winter of 1954-55 another food crisis took place in which defectors reported the 
occurrence of small-scale famine in rural areas. Between 1969 and 1972 it was 
officially admitted that grain production failed to catch up population growth, which 
was soon followed by the reduction in food rations and the introduction of birth control 
policy. And a well-known food crisis occurred in the 1990s, which has been reportedly 
still going on. 
A common feature of the DPRK food shortages is that they happened with 
external shocks, including natural disasters, war, political conflicts with neighbouring 
countries and sudden population movements, which led to either temporal collapses in 
agricultural production or unexpected increase in food demand or both. For instance, 
the 1954-55 crisis was preceded by the production fall in 1954 due to deteriorated 
agricultural conditions after the Korean War, being triggered by the harsh state grain 
collection campaign between November 1954 and February 1955 to meet increasing 
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urban food demand generated by post-war population movement into cities. The food 
shortage in the early 1970s was related to both military confrontation with the US 
Table 2-1. Historically Reported DPRK Food Shortages 
Scale Grain Production Causation Source 
In the winter Unknown fell by 10-50 percent, confusion after DPRK literature, 
of 1945-46`) compared to normal level the liberation DPRK cabinet 
from the Japanese decrees etc 
rule etc 
In the winter small scale rural lowest since 1948 
of 1954-55b) famine 
Ruined 
agriculture after 
the Korean War 
Defector 
statements 
1970-73') Unknown the production in 1969-72 
failed to catch up 
population growth 
bad weather, 
increasing 
military build-up, 
industrial 
stagnation 
DPRK literature 
Sine 1987dß National famine unknown for 1987-88, Collapse of trade Official 
in 1994-99 but kept falling since (the with the USSR, admittance of 
production of 1997 was industrial food shortages, 
less than one third of the stagnation, international food 
1993 level) bad weather etc aid since 1995 
Note: For details, see section 3.2.1 for a, section 4.2.1 for b, section 5.2.1 for c, and chapter 6-8 for d. 
(and the ROK), which worsened labour shortages in agriculture, and decelerated 
industrial development. Bad weather and rapid population growth also worsened food 
balance. The food shortage in the 1990s is similar. Due to the disintegration of the 
USSR the country suffered agricultural input shortages, which were worsened by 
ongoing industrial stagnation. Further, there were a great flood in 1995 and 
subsequent natural disasters. 
It is not rare in many developing countries facing long-term agricultural 
stagnation that external shocks cause production failures, leading to food shortages. Yet 
the DPRK does not seem to fall into this category. Let us look at table 2-2. Between 
1947 and 1993 the DPRK population grew around two times while its grain production 
increased almost five times. Agricultural machinery and fertiliser supply also increased 
sharply. And this progress was accompanied by the corresponding industrial 
development, as illustrated by a drastic increase in industrial population share. Of 
course the progress was suddenly transformed into total collapse of agriculture in the 
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mid/late 1990s. 5 Nonetheless it seems difficult to say that the DPRK has suffered a 
long-term agricultural stagnation throughout its history. 
Why has then the country been vulnerable to repeated food shortages? To 
answer this question we consider three factors of the DPRK agriculture: the goal, 
constraints and development strategy. 
Table 2-2. The DPRK Agriculture: 1946 vs. 1993 
1946(A) 1993(B) A/B 
Population (million) 
Total 9.25 21.21 2.29 
(agriculture) 6.86 8.02 1.17 
(Non-agriculture) 2.39 12.50 5.23 
Sown Area (1,000 ha) 
Total 1934 N. A - 
(rice) 388 579** 1.49 
(Maize) 174 653** 3.75 
Grain Production (1000 MT) 
Total 1898 9000 4.74 
(rice) 1052 4750 4.51 
(Maize) 156 3940 25.26 
Per Capita Production (kg) 487 4243 8.71 
Agricultural Input 
Number of tractors in use 0 75000 
Chemical Fertiliser (ton) 260* 781000 3004 
* 1948 figure, ** 1995 figure 
Source) 1. For 1946 (& 48), Chosun Joongang Nyungam, various years. 
2. For the 1993 population, DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics (1995) 
3. For the 1995 sown area, DPRK's submission to FAO/WFP (6 Dec 1996) 
4. For the 1993 grain production (total), Pyongyang media announcement 
available from Hirata (1998) 
5. For the 1993 grain production (rice and maize), DPRK's submission to 
DPRK/UNDP (1998a) 
6. For the number of tractors and chemical fertiliser in 1993, FAO statistical 
Database 
5 For the collapse of grain production in the 1990s, see chapter 6 
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2.2.2. Goal, Constraints and Development Strategy in Agriculture 
It is well known that the DPRK has pursued an autarkic economy called Juche Gyungje 
[self-reliance economy]. 6 In order for this economy to operate properly, food self- 
sufficiency is necessary. Indeed national food self-sufficiency has been the utmost goal 
of the DPRK agriculture since the country's independence in 1945.7 
6 For Juche Sasang [Juche Idea], the leading ideology of the DPRK, see Kim Jong 11(1982); DPRK 
Social Science Academy (1985); Park Il Bum (1985); Kim Chang Won (1985). For the official 
explanation of Juche Gyungje, see Park Young Keun et al (1992). 
7 To show the importance of national food self-sufficiency, we construct DPRK's food self-sufficiency 
ratio (FSR) using both officially released figures and FAO data set between 1960 and 1997 as below. 
As expected FSR had been usually as high as above 95 percent until the 1980s, demonstrating that not 
only the country had pursued but also actually achieved national food self-sufficiency before the recent 
food crisis in the 1990s occurred. Using the USDA data set, Nam Sung Wook (1998) has also reached 
the same conclusion. 
[Grain Import, Production and Self-sufficiency Ratio in the DPRK: 1960-97] 
(1000 MT) 
60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 
Net Import (A) 53 455 87 59 27 187 344 393 84 112 
Production Official - (B) 3803 4830 5000 5000 5000 na 4405 5110 5672 na 
FAO -(C) Na 3583 3725 4053 4212 3707 4073 3787 3662 4378 
Self-Suff. (B)/[(A)+(B)] 98.63 91.39 98.29 98.84 99.46 na na 92.76 92.87 98.55 
Ratio (%) (C)/[(A)+(C)] Na 88.73 97.72 98.57 99.36 95.21 92.22 90.61 97.77 97.50 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 
Net Import (A) 239 187 421 1113 772 93 137 -70 -262 76 
Production Official - (B) Na na na 5343 7000 7700 8000 8500 7870 9000 
FAO -(C) 4364 4499 4309 4816 5068 5246 5490 5798 5798 6006 
Self-Suff. (B)/[(A)+(B)] Na na na 82.76 90.07 98.81 98.31 100.8 103.4 99.16 
Ratio (%) (C)/[(A)+(C)] 94.82 96.01 91.09 81.22 86.79 98.26 97.56 101.2 104.7 98.75 
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 
Net Import (A) 283 456 375 230 50 0 153 438 838 376 
Production Official - (B) na na na na 10000 na 10059 9490 
FAO -(C) 5752 6254 6523 6707 7128 7096 7650 7558 7517 7824 
Self-Suff. (B)/[(A)+(B)] na na na na 99.50 na 95.83 96.19 
Ratio (%) (C)/[(A)+(C)] 95.31 93.20 94.56 96.68 99.30 100.0 98.04 94.52 89.97 95.41 
0 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 
Net Import (A) 553 1560 1149 1544 555 1010 1107 1451 
Production Official - (B) 9000 8900 8800 9000 7100 3500 2500 2700 
FAO -(C) 8071 8836 8681 9137 7215 3787 2596 2866 
Self-Suff. (B)/[(A)+(B)] 94.21 85.09 88.45 85.36 92.75 77.61 69.32 65.05 
Ratio (%) (C)/[(A)+(C)] 93.58 84.99 88.31 85.55 92.86 78.95 70.11 66.40 
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Initially food self-sufficiency was pursued for an economic reason to encourage 
domestic food supply under the situation that traditional food trade between North and 
South Korea collapsed. In the 1950s and 60s it was reinforced for military and political 
reasons. The Korean War ended without any peace treaty: hence the country should 
prepare for the possible reoccurrence of the war. In addition, intensified US economic 
blockage made it difficult for the country to access to many food exporters in 
international market. In the early 1970s, as so-called Juche Idea was announced as the 
leading guideline of the country, an ideological reason appeared: the principle of food 
self-sufficiency was officially incorporated into Juche Gyungje. Since the mid 1970s 
food self-sufficiency has been enforced by another economic reason that the country 
defaulted in international financial market. 
But the agricultural conditions of the DPRK have not been favourable for food 
self-sufficiency. Above all, its natural and geographical conditions have imposed a 
serious constraint on agriculture, particularly on foodgrain production. Of total land of 
12 million hectares, only about 14 percent is arable while somewhat 80 percent is 
mountainous. 8 Because the country is exposed to cold winds from Siberia, growing 
season is short and the possibility of cold snaps during growing season is real. Annual 
rainfalls are volatile, leading to frequent floods and droughts. Traditionally, therefore, 
the production of main foodgrains such as rice, which requires long summer growing 
season and enough rainfalls, had been of relatively little importance in many northern 
provinces of Korea peninsular. 
Economic conditions have been unfavourable, too. The DPRK inherited an 
underdeveloped agriculture from the Japanese rule in which more than 70 percent of 
farm households had not been self-sufficient on food. 9 Moreover, as in many other 
socialist countries, the new DPRK leadership attempted to industrialise the country as 
rapidly as possible, In consequence, agricultural investment has been always under 
stress while there has been a permanent increase in urban food demand. As shown by 
table 2-2, the share of non-agricultural population increased from 26 percent of total 
Source) 1. For official grain production, see table 6-3 in chapter 6 
2. For others, FAO statistical database 
8 Kim, Lee & Sumner (1998: p. 521-522) 
9 DPRK Social Science Academy, Chosun Jonsa [The Whole history of Korea : henceforth Chosuii 
Jonsa] Vol. 24, p. 129 
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population in 1946 up to 59 percent in 1993, and this trend was not reversed in any 
single year. 
Political environment has imposed another constraint. Since the Korean War the 
country has faced political and military confrontations with the ROK and the US: hence 
sudden resource shifts from agriculture to military sector have been real and frequent. 
Given these constraints, the DPRK authorities have developed several 
interesting agricultural policies to achieve national food self-sufficiency. 10 First, the 
authorities have reorganised agriculture to maximise the share of foodgrain production. 
Regional food self-sufficiency has been the main policy to expand foodgrain 
production. " All farm households have been enforced to be self-sufficient on food. 
And local administrators in provinces and counties who have actually controlled farm 
operations have been given the responsibilities to feed urban population in their 
jurisdictions. 
Secondly, to maximise the yield of foodgrain production the authorities have 
encouraged producers to specialise in only two high-yield grain items, rice and maize 
[see the change in crop composition presented by table 2-2]. 
Thirdly, the authorities have pursued to maximise agricultural input supply for 
foodgrain production. A series of land expansion programs have been launched 
throughout the country's history, and so-called four agricultural modernisation 
programs, including mechanisation, electrification, irrigation and chemical isation, have 
been in the centre of all agricultural policies. 
Fourthly, the authorities have emphasised the positive linkage between industry 
and agriculture in order to maximise non-labour input supply in agriculture. 
12 When 
industry was underdeveloped, agricultural resources were transferred to industry. In this 
case, however, the priority in industry was given to those sectors producing agricultural 
inputs such as agricultural machinery, fertiliser and chemicals etc. By contrast, when 
industrial development accelerated, industry financed state investment in agriculture, 
including massive-scale land expansion programs and irrigation projects. 
10 For the detailed discussion of the strategy, see section 6.3 in chapter 6 
" Park Young Ho (1994) p. 224-225 
12 Kim Chun Sung (1989: p. 20) and DPRK Social Science Academy (1973: p. 16-17) 
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2.2.3. The DPRK Food Problem 
As shown by table 2-2, these policies had made significant progresses in agriculture by 
the 1980s. At the same time however they have generated a structural food problem 
too. Perhaps the most adverse effect of the policies is that foodgrain production is 
increasingly subject to unfavourable natural conditions. To increase arable land, for 
instance, forests have been destroyed and mountains cut into terraced fields. In 
consequence, natural resistance against floods and droughts has gradually weakened. 13 
Mono cropping of rice and maize has destroyed traditional double/triple cropping of 
other grains that had prevented soil exhaustion: hence land conditions also have been 
deteriorated. Furthermore, as foodgrain production has spread to colder and more 
mountainous areas, it has been vulnerable to even a small change in weather or other 
natural conditions. 
To prevent this adverse effect the authorities have emphasised non-labour input 
supply. For instance, irrigation facilities have been provided even to terraced fields in 
mountains. More chemical fertilisers have been mobilised to increase grain yield 
against deteriorating soil conditions. More agricultural machinery and chemicals have 
been utilised to cultivate frozen land and protect seeds from coldness. But the supply of 
non-labour inputs has been easily disrupted by external shocks such as industrial 
stagnation, political tensions with neighbouring countries and the cessation of import 
from other socialist countries etc. 14 It means that foodgrain production itself has been 
increasingly vulnerable to external shocks. 
Moreover, the economy has become more unaffordable to even temporal 
stagnation in agriculture. The DPRK agricultural policies institutionalise or presuppose 
persistent labour shifts from agriculture to industry, and so urban food demand has been 
on permanent increase. Therefore, when there is a disruption in foodgrain production, 
the economy falls easily into food crisis. 
From the above discussion we can identify a structural food problem in the 
DPRK. To achieve food self-sufficiency the country focused on foodgrain production, 
which was heavily dependent on non-labour input supply in agriculture. As the input 
13 Lee Shin Wha (1997: p. 7) 
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supply has increased, however, natural conditions for foodgrain production have been 
deteriorated while urban food demand has continually risen. When the input supply 
increases fast enough, the adverse effects of the natural degradation and increasing food 
demand on the country's food situation might be mitigated. But the input supply has 
been volatile due to unstable economic and political factors such as industrial 
stagnation and military build-up etc. In consequence, the country's food situation has 
been structurally vulnerable to the shocks that have adverse impacts either on natural 
conditions or on agricultural input supply. Historically this vulnerability did not 
disappear even when foodgrain production had a long-term increasing trend, generating 
periodic food shortages. 
2.3. Current Agricultural Institutions 
Current agricultural institutions in the DPRK are designed to solve the country's food 
problem. 15 The underlying idea of the institutions is simple but powerful: the central 
government should and could control all economic activities concerning food 
production, distribution, consumption and trade in order to keep national food self- 
sufficiency and prevent food shortages at the same time. Owing to this idea the 
institutions have highly centralised and administrative features. In this section we 
summarise the features as quantitative planning in production, state grain marketing in 
14 According to FAO and WFP, for instance, chemical fertiliser consumption in the DPRK fell by 
almost 90 percent in 1990-96 due to the combined effects of industrial stagnation and the breakdown of 
the USSR (FAO/WFP: 29 June 1999) 
15 We define `the current institutions' as those that had dominated the DPRK agriculture until the 
country faced the recent food shortages in the late 1980s/90s. From 1987 to present, we shall see in 
chapter 9, the DPRK authorities have several emergency measures to increase domestic food 
production and consumption, which are quite contradictory to the existing agricultural institutions. But 
the problem is whether we can call those measures `institutional changes'. Let us take an example. In 
1957 the authorities announced an economic decree to prohibit private grain trade and so since then 
there had been no grain markets until the 1980s [see section 4.3.2.1 in chapter 4]. In the early 1990s, 
however, private grain trade was effectively tolerated in farmers' markets; and the ROK Ministry of 
Unification (Dec 1999) showed that the DPRK food refugees and defector families had relied on 
private grain trade in farmers markets for 6-70 percent of their total food consumption in the mid/late 
1990s. But there has been no official approval for private grain trade: hence it is still illegal. Moreover, 
the authorities frequently stopped private grain trade in farmers markets when food situation improved 
even temporarily. It seems therefore difficult to say that private grain trade was newly institutionalised 
in the DPRK in the 1990s. Rather it seems more appropriate to conclude that the DPRK institutions has 
still prohibited private grain trade but they have not worked properly because the country has been 
facing severe food shortages. In this reason we regard the agricultural institutions before the recent 
food shortages as `the current institutions' in the DPRK. 
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distribution, food rationing in consumption, central monopoly in trade, and the 
existence of supplementary food supply channels 
2.3.1. Administrative Production Control: Quantitative Planning Institutions 
The current institutions stand on a belief that the central planner could and should plan 
farm outputs in quantitative terms. The primary objective of quantitative planning is to 
increase foodgrain production in such speed to balance planned increase in food 
demand. The imposition of output targets and administrative resource allocation by 
higher-authorities are two major policies to control farm outputs. The operation of 
production unit is tightly controlled and supervised by state agricultural agencies that 
are organised along administrative hierarchies. And the performance of both production 
unit and state agencies is assessed according to their fulfilment of output targets. 
cooperative farm and CCMC 
Agricultural production is carried out by cooperative farms. Although state farms are 
also engaged in agricultural production, they largely specialise in other products than 
grain such as industrial crops, fruits and animals, having relatively little importance in 
food production. A cooperative farm is established to incorporate all farm households, 
land and other agricultural and social properties in village. Formally it is owned by 
member households, not by the government: hence the member households are 
distributed farm outputs, not receiving salary from the government. But it does not 
mean that the farm operates independently. On the contrary, all the farm decisions from 
crop selection to output distribution and to farm marketing are made by County 
Cooperative Management Commission [CCMC], state agricultural agency in county. 
According to official terminology CCMC constitutes management unit 
[gyungyong danwi] in agriculture while cooperative farm is production unit [sangsan 
danwi]. 16 It means that CCMC is effectively running cooperative farm. Indeed CCMC 
has all the powers and responsibilities to operate cooperative farm, including: 1) 
allocation of state output targets; 2) supplying all necessary resources and technologies 
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for farm operation; 3) supervising all farm activities such as production, consumption, 
income distribution, marketing, financial activities and so forth. In this sense the 
relation between CCMC and cooperative farm is similar to that between management 
board and department/factory in a large-scale state enterprise. In order to meet state 
output targets CCMC (management board) allocates specified tasks (roles) and 
resources among cooperative farms (departments), supervising and monitoring their 
operations. Cooperative farms (departments) are responsible for their performance to 
CCMC (management board), but at the same time CCMC is also responsible for the 
performance of county (of the enterprise) to its higher authorities. 
Three official explanations are offered to the reasons why CCMC controls 
cooperative farm. First, CCMC owns all state assets in county that are necessary for 
cooperative farm to operate, including machine tractor station, water supply station, 
farm equipment repair stations, milling station, state shops and so forth. Second, 
CCMC provides all the necessary technical supports for production from new 
technologies and seed varieties to the operation of farm machinery and the supply of 
agricultural specialists. Third, it is necessary to harmonise commercial interests of 
cooperative farm with the national interest of food self-sufficiency. '7 
The basic task of CCMC (and cooperative farm) is to meet various state output 
targets. Of them, the most important is grain production target. Every CCMC is 
categorised into four different grades, which give different financial and administrative 
rewards, according to grain production level. 18 Although CCMC bureaucrats are state 
officials, their salaries are also affected by the level of grain production in their 
jurisdictions. 
PREC and regional planning 
A difference between agriculture and industry is that agricultural production is 
primarily biological process whereas industrial production is technical/mechanical 
process. Due to this difference quantitative planning is likely to entail more errors in 
16 For the relation between CCMC and cooperative farms in the DPRK agricultural planning 
institutions, see chapter 4 of the Korean Workers Party Publisher (1963). 
" Oh Dae Ho (1989), p. 66-67 
18 Cabinet decree no. 116, On rewarding honours to co-operative farms, cities, townships (districts) that 
sell more grains to the state, 20 July 1961 
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agriculture. For instance, it is more difficult in agriculture to define technical input- 
output relations that are necessary for quantitative planning. It is even impossible in 
agriculture to plan some important input factors such as weather. 
Perhaps this difficulty is one of reasons why agricultural production in the 
DPRK is organised in such a large scale i. e. at county/village 19 But the most 
important measure taken to resolve the difficulty of quantitative planning in agriculture 
is to establish regional planning institutions in which provincial administrators control 
agricultural planning and resource allocation independently. Regional planning 
institutions with real powers are particularly important because the country's natural 
and geographical conditions vary greatly by regions from flat South West with mild 
weather to mountainous North East with cold weather. Indeed all agricultural planning 
related powers and functions that the central government had exercised were transferred 
to Provincial Rural Economic Commission (PREC), state agricultural agency in 
province, in the early 1960s. Since then, as far as agriculture is concerned, PREC has 
operated like a central planner in each province. 
PREC functions as follows. 20 First, based on the planning guidelines of State 
Planning Commission (SPC), the central planning agency in Pyongyang, it plans farm 
outputs, imposes output targets on CCMC and cooperative farms, and monitors their 
performance. Second, it establishes scientific and technological standards such as 
relevant technologies, . seed varieties, crop selections 
by land conditions, types of 
fertilisers and so forth. Third, it supervises resource allocation in agriculture. To do this 
it owns 'provincial resource supply company', exclusively supplying agricultural inputs 
to counties and cooperative farms. 
By contrast, Agricultural Commission, agriculture ministry in Pyongyang, has 
little power to influence agricultural planning and resource allocation. Its role is 
confined to organising research projects with national importance and providing the 
cabinet with professional advice for long-term agricultural development. It is true that 
19 In fact the DPRK authorities have believed that in order to minimise planning errors in agriculture its 
biological production process should be transformed into more industry-like technical process governed 
by such mechanical factors as machinery, electricity, chemicals and artificial water supply. It has been 
also emphasised that the basic planning unit in agriculture should be as self-sufficient as possible so that, 
even when there are planning errors by higher authorities, the adverse effects could be minimised (Ahn 
Hyuk Jin, 1993: pp. 25-27). In this respect the large scale of planning unit has been a necessary condition 
for the DPRK agricultural planning. 
20 For details, see section 4.2.2 in chapter 4. 
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PREC should report to Agricultural Commission. In practice however PREC directly 
belongs to the cabinet, operating like a separate central ministry. 
As mentioned above, the primary objective of agricultural planning is to 
increase food production so as to meet planned food demand. But how does the 
government keep the balance when provincial administrators with different natural and 
geographical conditions control agriculture separately? The answer is simple: the 
central government imposes food self-sufficiency on every province and makes PREC 
responsible for it. In fact, as we shall discuss in chapter 4, regional food self-sufficiency 
has been one of the most important policies to increase the country's food production 
and achieve national food self-sufficiency since the early 1960s. To realise regional 
food self-sufficiency PREC has three specified tasks: 1) maximising two major 
foodgrain (rice and maize) production; 2) developing new grain varieties fitted to local 
conditions; 3) maximising the amount of marketed grain and bringing all the marketed 
grain under state control. 
Juche Nongbub and central control 
In terms of administrative organisation the DPRK agriculture is largely decentralised. 
Nonetheless, the intervention of the central government has been paramount. For 
instance, the standard charter of cooperative farm states that cooperative farm must 
execute the commands of the DPRK leaders, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, with the 
first priority, suggesting that the central government could and does control even daily 
farm operation. 21 Given seemingly limited roles of Agricultural Commission, however, 
how does it make this intervention? 
There are two ways the central government controls both local administrators 
and cooperative farms: Juche Nongbub and the unified and detailed planning. 22 
Juche Nongbub refers to nationally standardised farming processes in the 
DPRK. As its literal meaning indicates, it entails certain technical aspects in which 
traditional farming skills are mixed with new agricultural technologies. But the most 
important feature of Juche Nongbub is that it decomposes complicate biological 
farming processes into numerous simple labour processes [sebu gongjung: detailed 
21 Oh Dae Ho (1989), p. 11-12 
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process] and defines a mechanical input-output relation for each simple labour process. 
Moreover, it standardises all agricultural labour processes by lands, crops, seasons and 
even cooperative farms. In case of ploughing, for instance, it decomposes the process 
into digging, transferring earth, stockpiling earth and so on, defining a standard output 
for each activity, say, how deep and how many lines per m2 for digging. A standard 
combination of input factors, for instance, how many labourers and tractors per m2, is 
also given for each simple labour process with possible substitution ratio between the 
factors. Finally the exact timing and period of ploughing are specified according to 
areas, farms, lands, and crops. 
The idea of Juche Nongbub looks simple. But it has far reaching effects. Above 
all, it has deprived producers of any powers in farm production: now there is no basic 
difference between farm labourer and industrial worker. Similarly, local planning and 
resource allocation processes have gone under the control of the central government. 
Because all agricultural activities must be now conducted according to Juche Nongbub, 
the central government that finally interprets Juche Nongbub could control the activities 
in any degree. 
Figure 2-1. The DPRK Production Institution 
consulting 
State Planning Commission 4 0,1 Agricultural Commissio 
Planning Guideline '' 
command' Juche Nonub 
technical support Juchei ongbub 
Provincial Branch Province Rural Economy Commissio 
monitor 
Juche Nongbul: ) 
commandT 
Agricultural Plan 
technical support 
county Branch º County Cooperative Management Commissio 
monitor 
production Command 
Cooperative Cooperative 
22 For the detailed discussion of Juche Nongbub, see section 5.2.2 in chapter 5 
Cooperative 
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The unified and detailed planning in agriculture has developed on the basis of 
Juche Nongbub. It refers to the principle that the centralised planning agencies should 
plan all detailed farm operations from production to marketing in a nationally unified 
way. In practice however it means that SPC, the central planning agency, should 
supervise and monitor local agricultural planning. To do this SPC has established its 
own branches in provinces and counties, which provide PREC and CCMC with 
technical supports but at the same time report local plans to SPC and cabinet. 
Fig. 2-1 illustrates the DPRK agricultural planning institutions. The basic 
function of the institutions is to set up quantitative output targets and organise 
corresponding farm operations. In Pyongyang, SPC and Agricultural Commission are 
responsible for the planning: they make overall planning guidelines that local planning 
agencies should follow. It is however PREC that has all the planning-related- powers 
and so actually controls resource allocation. PREC makes real output targets for 
producers to fulfil, establishes scientific and technological standards in farm operation, 
and oversees resource allocation. It is the responsibility of CCMC to execute the PREC 
plan. To do this not only does CCMC own all state resources in county but also have 
institutional powers to effectively run cooperative farms. Finally cooperative farms 
carry out actual production according to the operational plans imposed by CCMC. 
Although agricultural planning proceeds mainly at local levels, the central 
government could and does control the process. It is mainly due to the fact that all 
agricultural practices in the DPRK, from the planning works of PREC to the field 
works of cooperative farms, are based on Juche Nongbub the contents of which is 
established by Agricultural Commission. 
2.3.2. Food Rationing and State Grain Marketing 
The corollary of quantitative planning in production is state food rationing in 
consumption and state grain marketing in distribution. State food rationing covers the 
whole population, including grain producers, and state grain marketing controls all 
grain circulation in the economy. Using both institutions the central government plans 
the country's food consumption up to household level. 
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State food rationing 
State food rationing system consists of two sub-institutions: public distribution system 
(PDS) and food rationing mechanism in cooperative farms. 
All non-farm households are entitled to state food rations provided by PDS. It 
refers to the administrative hierarchies overseeing public food supply: Procurement and 
Food Administration Division in People's Service Commission in Pyongyang ---> its 
branches in Administration and Economy Committees in provinces and cities/counties 
-ý food warehouses in labour districts. Although PDS looks highly centralised, it 
operates separately by provinces with regionally available food reserves. 23 Each 
Province Administration and Economy Committee is finally responsible for feeding the 
population and organises the rationing procedures independently. Nonetheless it is still 
important to note that the central government sets up the national rationing norms and 
arranges provincial food trade in order to enforce the norms to all provinces. 
Those who are entitled to PDS rations buy their rations biweekly at assigned 
state shops or food warehouses at official prices. Standard ration quantities are fixed by 
law and have not changed frequently. But actual rations have varied greatly according 
to food situation: since 1973, for instance, every household has been officially deducted 
four days of rations from their monthly rations; and even those reduced rations have not 
been fully provided in many provinces since the early 1990s. 
Unlike non-farm households, farm households are not entitled to PDS rations. 
Instead, they receive food rations from their cooperative farms. 24 There is a mechanism 
in cooperative farm to adjust the difference between grain distribution among member 
households and their food rations. Like PDS, cooperative farms define a standard ration 
for each farm household: the ration for adult farm labourer usually corresponds to the 
PDS ration for heavy industrial worker. When a farm household is distributed more 
grain than the standard ration, the cooperative farm procures and sells the difference to 
state procurement agencies. In contrast, when the grain distribution is lower than the 
ration, the farm provides the difference in the form of either grain loan or aid from 
23 The rationing system has not basically changed since its establishment in 1946, though its recipients 
gradually expanded to cover the whole population and the standard ration quantities have varied. See 
section 3.4 of chapter 3 for the basic operation of the system. 
24 See section 4.3.2.2 of chapter 4 
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communal funds. Just like non-farm households, therefore, farm households have 
neither more nor less grains than their rations. 
Compared with PDS, the rationing mechanism in cooperative farms has two 
differences. First, it supplies farm households with their annual rations at once shortly 
after autumn harvest is completed. Second, it operates separately by cooperative farms. 
Hence, when a cooperative farm does not produce enough grain, it would in principle 
fail to provide the rations to its member households even while other cooperative farms 
and PDS still supply assigned rations to their recipients. 
State grain marketing 
To maintain state food rationing system all grain marketing is carried out exclusively 
by state procurement agencies. 25 That is, the government plays as the only grain trader 
in the economy. It is strictly prohibited for any other economic agencies to purchase 
grain from cooperative farms. In addition, both farm and non-farm households are not 
allowed to grow grain in their private plots, and all grain markets have been banned 
since 1958. To unify food procurement and rationing, the administrative hierarchy that 
runs PDS also controls state procurement agencies. 
2.3.3. Central Monopoly of Food Trade 
The central government directly controls food trade too. All food trade has been 
exclusively carried out by state trade agencies under the directives of Foreign Trade 
Commission in Pyongyang. And it has been prohibited for both local governments and 
producers to be engaged in foreign trade since the establishment of the communist 
regime in 1946.26 The primary purpose of this central monopoly is to keep the balance 
in foreign food trade. 
Given that the country has pursued national food self-sufficiency, it is 
understandable for the authorities to try to keep the balance in food trade. Indeed, as 
shown by table 2-3, the country recorded a small amount of surplus in food trade in 
25 See section 4.3.2.1 of chapter 4 
26 Provisional People's Committee decree No. 93, decree on free grain trade, 4 October 1946 
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1975-85 even while its overall foreign trade suffered a huge deficit. But a question is: if 
trade balance is the objective, why is the trade itself necessary? 
Table 2-3. The DPRK Grain Trade (total): 1975-1985 
Quantity (1000 MT) Value (million dollar) 
I. Grain Trade 
Import 5076 926 
(Rice) 4 14 
(Wheat) 4565 853 
(other) 507 59 
Export 3707 1007 
(Rice) 2507 859 
(maize) 1200 148 
(other) 0 0 
Balance -1369 81 
II. Trade - Total 
Import 14031 
Export 12444 
Balance -1587 
Source) 1. For grain trade, FAO statistical Database 
2. For total trade, Choi Su Young (1992), p. 312-313 
The answers are twofold. First, since the DPRK agriculture specialises in two 
main foodgrains of rice and maize, it is necessary to exchange domestic food items with 
other foreign items so as to diversify the country's food diet. In 1975-85, for instance, 
the DPRK exported only rice and maize and imported wheat and other minor grains. 
And this trade pattern has remained unchanged throughout the DPRK history. 
Second, the DPRK could increase domestic food supply by foreign trade even 
while it was maintaining food trade balance. Let us look at table 2-3 again. In 1975-85 
the DPRK recorded a surplus in food trade in dollar terms, but it was still a net grain 
importer of around 124 thousand tons on annual average in physical terms. It means 
that, on the one hand, the country achieved food self-sufficiency in dollar terms but, on 
the other hand, increased domestic food supply by physically importing more grain 
from abroad. The strategy was to exploit international price differences between 
domestically specialised grain items, mainly expensive rice, and importable foreign 
items, cheaper wheat. During this period the country imported wheat for the average 
price of 187 US dollar per MT and other grains for 116 dollar. In return it exported rice 
for 342 dollar per MT and maize for 123 dollar, respectively. Interestingly the export 
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price of rice was higher than the import price of wheat, and the export price of maize 
was higher than the import price of other grains. In contrast, the export price of maize 
was significantly lower than the import price of wheat. Using this international price 
structure the country linked the import of wheat with the export of rice, and the import 
of other grains with the export of maize. 27 Undoubtedly this strategy required a careful 
plan and control of trade, which was possible under the centrally monopolised trade 
institutions. 
However the importance of this strategy should not be exaggerated. The net 
import of grain in 1975-85 was only around 2 percent of domestic production. 
Moreover, as we shall see in chapter 6, this strategy has completely disappeared since 
the late 1980s as the country's food production began to fall. In this respect it seems 
fair to say that the primary objective of the DPRK food trade is to diversify the 
country's food diet while pursuing national food self-sufficiency i. e. keeping trade 
balance. 
2.3.4. Supplement Food Supply Institutions 
When the central government controls all food production, distribution, consumption 
and trade, a risk is that if the government fails to provide appropriate food supply, it 
would lead to an immediate health crisis of the whole population. To mitigate this risk 
27 Indeed, as shown below, both the import of wheat and the export of rice continued in 1975-85 while 
the export of maize stopped soon after the import of other grains ceased. In consequence, the DPRK 
enjoyed favourable price differences between domestically specialised food items and imported foreign 
items throughout this period. Using IMF trade statistics, not FAO statistics, Eberstadt (1998) have also 
reached the same conclusion. He calls this strategy of the DPRK food trade "calorie substitution". 
[The DPRK Grain Trade: 1975-85] (1000 MT) 
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 
total 621 530 500 350 510 510 720 585 350 200 200 
Import rice 40 
Wheat 300 430 450 350 470 510 720 585 350 200 200 
other 321 100 50 
total 528 393 570 612 434 227 264 210 120 150 200 
Export Maize 200 300 300 200 200 
rice 328 93 270 412 234 227 264 210 120 150 200 
Balance -93 -137 70 262 -76 -283 -456 -375 -230 -50 0 
Source) FAO Statistical Database 
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several institutions are put in place, providing additional opportunities for the 
population to obtain food. For their purpose we call them `supplement food supply 
institutions'. Note however that those institutions apply only to non-grain foodstuffs. 
Daean Work System 
Daean Work System refers to the collective management principle of the DPRK state 
enterprise that factory party committee plays the traditional role of manager. 28 An 
important feature of the System is that it imposes on state enterprises the responsibility 
to supply all necessary foodstuffs to their employees except grain, creating the position 
of the second vice chairman who is solely responsible for this task. Due to this System 
virtually all urban population in the DPRK are engaged in farming activities. 
Above all, state enterprises have their own food production facilities. It was 
already reported in the 1960s that Daean Electric Factory where the System was born 
had 70 chungbo of land for vegetable production, another 80 chungbo for fruit 
production, a chicken factory with the production capacity of 45,000 eggs per day, and 
a similar scale of pig factory, feeding about 5,000 employees. In addition, industrial 
workers are officially allocated farming hours to cultivate either their private plots 
individually or their factories' lands jointly. They could also freely purchase foodstuffs 
that cooperative farms supply to their factories under commercial contract. 
Independent farm marketing, private plots and farmers' markets 
As far as non-grain food items are concerned, both cooperative farms and farm 
households are given a significant degree of freedom in production and marketing. For 
these items, after fulfilling state delivery quotas, cooperative farms could sell their 
products either to state enterprises or to individual consumers in markets. It is also 
possible for farm households to produce and trade those items privately. They have 
private plots with maximum of 50 pyung, a small number of animals, farm implements 
28 For an description of Daean Work System in English, see Brun & Hersh (1997), p. 351-357 
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and additional grain for animal fodder under private possession. 
29 The products from 
such private assets are at free disposal of farm households either for their consumption 
or for markets. 
To encourage the production and circulation of non-grain foodstuffs, 
agricultural markets called `farmers' markets' are established in almost every city and 
county, operating either daily, weekly or biweekly. 3° Farmers' markets are run by 
administrative organisations: City/County Administration and Economy Committee is 
responsible for providing all necessary resources for the operation of market, including 
places, communal facilities, security, state shops and so forth. Nonetheless, market 
prices are determined solely according to supply and demand. The role of 
administrative organisations is confined to collecting market fees and preventing the 
circulation of illegal items such as grain and industrial goods. 
2.3.5. The DPRK Agricultural Institutions: Summary 
The DPRK agricultural institutions are designed to bring food production, 
distribution, consumption and trade under state control so that the central government 
could keep the economy from falling into unexpected food shortages. 
In production, state agricultural agencies make detailed farm output targets and 
resource allocation plans, effectively running cooperative farms. Although private 
production exists, it is under state influences too. For it is up to state agricultural 
agencies how much, of total resources in agriculture, should be mobilised for 
cooperative farms and thus how much for private production. In consumption, state 
food rationing system covers the whole population. There are private food supply 
channels as well: private production and markets. But their influences are minimal 
because private food supply is confined to non-grain items. In distribution, all grain 
marketing is conducted by state procurement agencies. Although farmers' markets exist 
to circulate private production, their operations are also controlled by administrative 
organisations. In food trade, the central government monopolises the trade in order to 
maintain trade balance more effectively. 
29 Agricultural Cooperative Standard Charter Making Committee, Standard Charter of Agricultural 
Cooperatives, 24 November 1958 [henceforth Standard Charter of Agricultural Cooperatives, 24 
November 1958] 
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Fig. 2-2 summarises the institutions. To show state control of food production, 
public production function OP is drawn in quadrant A where the government 
mobilises r out of total resource 1, producing food m. Because r is mobilised for 
public production, the remaining resource 1-r is utilised for private food production n 
based on private production function OQ in quadrant B. In this economy the 
population is not allowed to participate in foreign trade: hence private food production 
is the only source for the population to obtain additional food other than public food 
supply. It is shown by the fact that private food supply is depicted also by n in 
quadrant C. 
Public 
Public 
Supply 
Private 
Production 
(Supply) 
Figure 2-2. DPRK Agricultural Institutions 
30 Kim Chun Sung (1989), p. 114-124 
Resource 
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There is food trade: the government exchanges public production with other 
foreign foodstuffs before the production is supplied to the population. But the 
government pursues the balance in foreign trade, and consequently total public food 
supply does not differ from public production even after foreign trade. To show this 
point, a 45 degree line from origin is drawn in quadrant D, transforming public 
production m into the equal amount of public food supply. 
Following these procedures, the total food consumption of the economy is 
depicted by the point S (m, n) in quadrant C. At point S, however, it is difficult to 
graphically measure the size of total food consumption. Hence another 45 degree line 
is drawn through point S to obtain the point X, the distance of which from origin 
represents the size of total food consumption. 
2.4. Food Shortages and Evolution of Agricultural Institutions 
So far we have seen that the current agricultural institutions in the DPRK provide a 
solution to the country's food problem. In this section we put the issue in historical 
perspectives. That is, we examine how the institutions have evolved in relation to 
food shortages. 31 
2.4.1. Evolution of Agricultural Institutions 
The DPRK agricultural institutions have developed into the current ones through three 
different stages: 1) private farming in 1945-53; 2) local planning in 1953-73; 3) 
central planning in 1973-87. And the current institutions have been under the great 
pressure of change since 1987. 
Private farming era: 1945-53 
Between 1945 and 1953 agriculture sector consisted of a vast number of private farm 
households that owned 1.6 chungbo of small land on average and carried out 
31 From now on we do not consider food trade institutions because until very recently they had not 
changed at all and, as mentioned in section 2.3, food trade had had relatively little importance due to 
the principle of national food self-sufficiency. 
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independent farming either for their own consumption or for market. This structure 
was the result of land reform that redistributed nearly 50 percent of total farmland 
between March and June 1946. 
This stage started with the 1945-46 urban food crisis that highlighted two 
major issues in agriculture. One was how to establish stable food supply channels for 
newly established socialist sector. Another was how to break the adverse linkage 
between scarce resources and low productivity in agriculture. To deal with the issues 
two centralised administrative organisations were established: Ministry of Food 
Administration (MFA) and Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) in Pyongyang and their 
branches in local governments. 
It was the responsibility of the MFA hierarchy to provide adequate food 
supply to socialist sector. This task was carried out through three channels. First, 
agricultural tax-in-kind was imposed on all crops with a unitary tax rate of 25 percent 
of harvest. Second, a voluntary procurement principle was established in which 
Consumer Association traded industrial goods with agricultural products on behalf of 
the government. Third, on the basis of those two channels, the government provided 
state food rations to urban socialist workers. 
The remaining products after paying agricultural tax-in-kind were freely 
traded in farmers' markets. The markets were particularly important for those in non- 
socialist sector that accounted for around 75 percent of total population but were still 
excluded from state food rationing. 
The MOA hierarchy was responsible for increasing agricultural resources and 
productivity. To do this, it monopolised agricultural resource supply such as fertiliser, 
water, farm equipment and so forth. And it imposed quantitative production quotas on 
rural villages/farm households with detailed production guidelines, including sown 
areas by crops, seed varieties, technologies involved. Unlike those in later stages, the 
quotas were not compulsory. Nonetheless they were still important because they 
constituted the basis for the MOA hierarchy to allocate state agricultural resources. To 
fulfil the quotas it was also encouraged for farm households to form various 
production teams that seasonally pooled labour, animals and farm implements to 
conduct joint farming. 
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New agricultural management system and local planning: 1953-73 
Following the Korean War, agriculture was cooperativised between 1953 and 1958. 
The Korean War ruined economic grounds of private farming system. Nearly 70 
percent of farm households fell into the category of poor farmers who could not carry 
on farming activities without the help of the government. And this ruined agriculture 
caused a rural food crisis in 1954-55, demonstrating that agriculture was in urgent 
need of new farming style. In this circumstance agricultural cooperativisation was 
accomplished successfully without any bloodshed or production failures. 
The 1954-55 food crisis and the appearance of collective farming changed the 
existing agricultural institutions from the bottom. 
First, state grain marketing institutions were established. Both private grain 
production and trade were prohibited, and the grain marketing of cooperative farms 
was carried out only by state procurement agencies. Farmers' markets continued to 
exist. but their operation was discouraged and confined to non-grain items that were 
still allowed to grow privately. 
Second, state food rationing expanded to the whole population, including farm 
households. In addition, as far as non-grain items are concerned, the practices that 
both farm and non-farm households privately grow food during the Korean War were 
institutionalised to supplement state food rations. 
Third, state agricultural planning started in 1957 and in order to organise the 
planning process new agricultural management system was established in 1961. The 
MOA hierarchy was replaced by decentralised administrative organisations in which 
provincial administrators had all planning-related-powers and responsibilities: 
Agricultural Commission --> PREC - CCMC. The new system imposed quantitative 
production targets on cooperative farms, making local bureaucrats to effectively run 
cooperative farms. 
Juche Nongbub and central planning: 1973-87 
From 1973 to the mid 1980s agricultural planning was highly centralised. Both Juche 
Nongbub and the principle of the unified and detailed planning were added to new 
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agricultural management system so that the central government intensified its control 
over local administrators and producers. 
Between 1970 and 1973 another food shortages hit the DPRK due to grain 
production failures. During this period agricultural input supply plummeted, weather 
was bad, and agricultural resources were transferred to industry and military sectors. 
Yet the DPRK leaders believed that the main reason for the production failures was 
the inefficiency of local bureaucrats in charge of agricultural planning, which led to 
the personal intervention of Kim Il Sung in agriculture. From 1973 he began to 
emphasise new farming practices, which were later aggregated as Juche Nongbub. 
Since then Juche Nongbub has appeared as the only farming practice in the country. 
In order to realise Juche Nongbub in agricultural planning and resource allocation, 
Agricultural Commission established Staff Department in 1979, beginning to directly 
control local planning processes as well as actual farming activities in cooperative 
farms. 
Agricultural planning went under the influence of SPC as well. In 1978 the 
unified and detailed planning was introduced in agriculture, giving local SPC 
branches the power and responsibility to supervise the operation of state agricultural 
agencies and monitor their planning processes. 
The era of institutional crisis or confusions: from 1987 to present 
Through the above three stages, four basic agricultural institutions -quantitative 
planning in production, food rationing in consumption, state grain marketing in 
distribution and supplementary food supply channels- have had the current forms. But 
these current institutions have been under great stress since 1987. 
The period from 1987 to present is characterised by the ongoing food 
shortages that eventually led to the great food crisis in the mid/late 1990s. To 
overcome the shortages the authorities took various emergency measures that are 
quite contradictory to the existing institutions. In production, many cooperative farms 
have been allowed to own farm machinery and necessary facilities, freely choose their 
production items and organise production procedures independently. In consumption, 
the roles of state food rationing have been played down and, instead, private grain 
production has been tolerated and even encouraged. In distribution, state grain 
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marketing has largely collapsed as farm households have been allowed to keep a part 
of their surplus grains and trade them in farmers' markets. Concerning supplementary 
food supply channels, the existence and even expansion of illegal private plots have 
been tolerated and all the regulations on farmers' markets have been effectively lifted. 
Undoubtedly those measures have weakened the current institutions in which 
the central government is supposed to control all economic activities concerning food. 
Along with the measures, however, the authorities have taken other contradictory 
measures to reinforce the existing institutions. For instance, a centralised ministerial 
system (the MOA hierarchy) re-emerged in 1998, strengthening central control over 
agriculture. Another Juche Nongbub campaign, which is quite similar to that in the 
1970s which intensified central intervention in agriculture, has been launched. Illegal 
private plots and grain trade in farmers markets have been greatly discouraged 
whenever food situation improved. And the authorities have made repeated efforts to 
revitalise state food rationing, in spite of its diminished roles. 
It seems therefore risky to make any robust conclusion about the institutional 
changes in this period. Nonetheless it is certain that the current agricultural 
institutions have faced the need of great changes due to the ongoing food shortages 
since 1987. 
2.4.2. State Control and Resource Supply 
in the Evolution of Agricultural Institutions 
From the above discussion it seems evident that the evolution of agricultural 
institutions in the DPRK has been largely motivated by repeated food shortages. A 
question is: how successful was this evolution? Of course, all historical institutional 
stages have failed to prevent food shortages: hence so far the institutional evolution 
has not seemed so successful. But how did each institutional change affect foodgrain 
production? 
Table 2-4. Agricultural Institution, Grain Production and Resource Supply by Stage 
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1946-1953 1953-1973 1973-1987 Since 1987 
Agricultural private collective farming, collective farming, collective farming, 
Institutions farming local control, central control, decentralisation, 
private production private production private production 
and market and market and market 
discouraged discouraged encouraged 
Grain Production 
(annual average 
growth rate, %) 
Official claim 2.9 4.2 4.6 -12.3 
FAO estimate --3.3 -9.2 
Fertiliser Supply 
(annual average, n. a 232 671 534 
1000MT) 
Source: 1) For the growth rates of grain production, table 6-3 and 4 in chapter 6 
2) For the average fertiliser supply, FAO statistical database. 
Table 2-4 presents annual average growth rate of grain production by four 
different institutional stages. Interestingly, the rate had steadily increased as 
agricultural institutions had changed so as to intensify state control over agriculture by 
the late 80s. More interestingly, the rate has fallen dramatically since the institutions 
reportedly began to be liberalised and decentralised in 1987. It means that the DPRK 
agricultural institutions were more successful when they were more centralised and 
administrative. 
It is well known that state control frequently undermined agricultural 
performance in many socialist countries. In the Soviet Union, for instance, the Stalin 
era during which agriculture was planned by a centralised administrative hierarchy 
was most vulnerable to famine. 32 China also suffered low agricultural productivity 
during the Commune era when bureaucrats directly controlled farm operations. 33 Why 
has it been not the case in the DPRK? 
A possible explanation is that in the DPRK the degree of state intervention has 
been proportionate to the level of state resource supply in agriculture. Initially the 
32 During the Stalin era, for instance, the Soviet Union experienced three or four famines (Eilmann: 
1999) while there has been no reported famine since Khrushchev's agricultural reform 
33 See Lin(1990)'s assessment on China's agricultural productivity by periods. 
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DPRK agriculture started with extremely poor resources leading to low productivity, 
and even few available resources were scattered among a vast number of poor farm 
households. Hence the only way to increase agricultural production was to increase 
state resource supply to farm households. The situation worsened as most farm 
households were deprived of their private assets during the Korean War. Hence 
agriculture was cooperativised to intensify state resource supply by increasing state 
investment in agriculture and transferring private resources to state resources. This 
trend continued in the 1970s and 1980s when Juche Nongbub intensified state control 
over agriculture and at the same time made agriculture more dependent on non-labour 
inputs exclusively provided by the government. As the result, the level of state 
intervention and the degree of state resource supply in agriculture had tended to 
increase simultaneously by the late 80s. Since then, however, the situation has 
fundamentally changed. Due to ongoing industrial stagnation the state can not afford 
to increase its resource supply in agriculture. According to FAO statistics, for 
instance, fertiliser supply that has been monopolised by the government since 1946 
had rapidly increased by the late 80s but suddenly fell since. In this circumstance the 
authorities have decentralised and liberalised agriculture, encouraging private 
production. 
If there is a positive relation between state resource supply in agriculture and 
farm outputs and if state intervention is made to increase the resource supply, it would 
not be so surprising even if intensified state control helps to increase farm outputs. 
This is the basic reason why more centralised and administrative institutions have had 
more successful results in the DPRK agriculture. 
2.4.3. Food Shortages and the Evolution of Agricultural Institutions 
The above discussion provides a hint to understand basic relation between food 
shortages and the evolution of agricultural institutions in the DPRK. As mentioned 
briefly earlier, all food shortages in the DPRK happened from sudden resource 
contraction in agriculture, more correctly, external shocks adversely affecting resource 
availability in agriculture. In order to overcome the shortages, however, the authorities 
in some cases intensified state control over agriculture and in other cases liberalised it. 
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Why? We believe that the reason is the feasibility of state/private resource supply in 
agriculture. 
Consider the 1945-46 food crisis. After the Japanese rule private resources in 
agriculture were extremely limited. This was in part because most farm households 
were too poor even to feed themselves properly, in part because the 1946 land reform 
act, as shall be discussed in chapter 3, prohibited private land trade, effectively 
preventing private investment in agriculture. The only option to overcome the food 
crisis was therefore to increase state resource supply in agriculture. Indeed the 
government either nationalised or monopolised all important agricultural resources, 
established official resource allocation channels in agriculture, and organised farm 
operations in more collective ways that farm households pooled their labour, animals 
and farm equipment in order to mobilise existing resources more efficiently. As the 
result, although private farming system remained unchanged, state intervention in 
agriculture was already paramount in the mid/late 1940s. 
How about the 1953-54 food crisis? During the Korean War most farm 
households were further impoverished and the still remaining small-scale private sector 
in industry was almost completely ruined. In this regard, private investment was not a 
feasible option to overcome the crisis again. To resolve this difficulty, on the one hand, 
the government intensified cooperativisation drive in agriculture. On the other hand, it 
launched a series of local industrialisation programs that local government established 
local factories and provided agricultural inputs to newly emerging cooperative farms. 
Due to both policies the government appeared as the only economic agent to run 
agriculture. Indeed private grain production was prohibited and all the production of 
cooperative farms was marketed by state procurement agencies. Farmers' markets were 
either closed or heavily regulated, and even farm households' food consumption was 
controlled by state food rationing system. 
The 1970-73 food shortages provide a similar case. Due to ongoing heavy 
regulations on private production in agriculture there were no significant resources left 
in private hands. Meanwhile, agricultural production was becoming more intensive and 
thus more dependent on such inputs as farm machinery, chemicals and fertilisers 
supplied by large state industries under the control of the central government. In this 
circumstance the government focused on increasing industrial investment in agriculture 
in order to overcome the food shortages. However, as the investment increased, the 
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central control over local agricultural administrators and cooperative farms intensified 
accordingly. Indeed the central government introduced Juche Nongbub and announced 
the unified and specified agricultural planning, controlling all the activities of local 
administrators and cooperative farms. 
The food crisis in the 1990s however occurred in quite opposite circumstances. 
Between the late 1980s and the mid 1990s the country experienced a series of economic 
shocks undermining state resource supply in agriculture. The breakdown of the USSR 
led to immediate shortages of fuel, machinery and advanced technologies, which 
resulted in a drastic decline in industrial outputs. For three consecutive years from 1993 
to 1996, for instance, industrial production declined by 30 percent every year. It was 
therefore not feasible for the government to increase industrial investment in agriculture 
to overcome the food crisis. In addition, there were successive natural calamities such 
as the great flood of 1995 that damaged almost 60 percent of arable land. Hence, it was 
also difficult to mobilise even existing state resources in agriculture. 
Reflecting these circumstances, state response to the crisis was quite different 
from those to previous food shortages. Above all, the government played down its roles 
in agriculture. The management of cooperative farm was liberalised and, at the same 
time, decision-making processes within agricultural administrative hierarchies were 
also decentralised. State food rations were drastically with increasing emphasis on food 
self-sufficiency at enterprise and household level. On the other hand, the government 
encouraged private resource mobilisation for food production. Private grain production 
was tolerated and even urban population was given private plots for foodgrain 
production. In addition, all existing regulations on farmers' markets were effectively 
lifted so that people could freely trade all agricultural products, including foodgrain. In 
consequence, private farming and profit-pursuing activities in agriculture flourished for 
the first time since it was cooperativised in the late 1950s. 
To sum, all the food shortages in the DPRK have commonly occurred from 
sudden resource contraction in agriculture, but their impacts on agricultural institutions 
varied, depending on the feasibility of state/private resource supply. When food 
shortage occurred in a situation that private resource mobilisation was not feasible, it 
led to intensified state intervention in agriculture aiming to increase state resource 
supply. Agricultural institutions had evolved in this way by the early/mid 1980s. 
Conversely, when there was little chance to increase state resource supply, food 
36 
shortage weakened state intervention while encouraging private resource mobilisation 
in agriculture. It is the reason why the DPRK agriculture was reportedly liberalised and 
decentralised during the food crisis in the 1990s. 
2.6. Conclusion 
The discussion of this chapter could be summarised as the following four findings. 
1. The DPRK has developed its agriculture in a way to make food production more 
vulnerable to external shocks. As the result, the country has faced periodic food 
shortages even for the period that the production had a clear increasing trend. This 
vulnerability constitutes the DPRK food problem. 
2. All the agricultural institutions in the DPRK are designed to solve the country's 
food problem. The idea is that the government should control all economic activities 
concerning food in order to keep national food self-sufficiency and prevent food 
shortages at the same time. To realise this idea four major institutions have been put 
in place: quantitative planning of farm outputs, state food rationing, state grain 
marketing, central monopoly of food trade and some supplement food supply 
institutions. 
3. In historical perspectives the DPRK agricultural institutions have evolved in order 
to increase resource availability in agriculture. It closely related to the fact that all the 
food shortages in the DPRK have happened from sudden resource contraction in 
agriculture. To increase the resource availability the authorities have intensified state 
control over agriculture when they were capable of increasing state resource supply 
but conversely, when such resource supply was not feasible, they liberalised 
agriculture and encouraged private resource mobilisation. 
4. The DPRK agricultural institutions have developed through four stages: private 
farming in 1946-53, local planning in 1953-73, central planning in 1973-87 and the 
era of change since 1987. For the first three stages, increasing state intervention 
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dominated institutional development. In contrast, the last stage saw various signs of 
institutional liberalisation and decentralisation. 
On the basis of these findings, the next three chapters examine the country's first 
three institutional development stages in detail. The final stage will be discussed in 
chapter 9 as an effort to understand the implications of the recent food crisis on the 
future of the DPRK agriculture. 
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III. Land Reform, the 1945-6 Food Crisis and the 
Early Agricultural Institutions: 1946-1953 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the development of the DPRK agricultural institutions from the 
country's independence in 1945 to the eve of agricultural collectivisation in 1953. 
This period was unique in the DPRK history in which state control has been 
paramount both in agricultural production and marketing. Although the authorities 
influenced farm outputs through state resource allocations, all the basic farming 
decisions were still made by individual farm households who were the owners of their 
land. In addition, as the authorities restrained coercive measures in farm marketing, a 
large amount of rural surplus was freely circulated in increasing number of markets. 
Hence the agricultural institutions of this period were completely different from the 
current ones. 
Nonetheless, this period was of great importance in two respects. First, the 
agricultural institutions of this period were formed to resolve the country's ongoing 
food pressures and agricultural resource shortages. These two purposes of the 
institutions have not changed until this time. Second, it was the only period that 
private farming dominated agriculture in the DPRK history. Assuming that the current 
DPRK agriculture is changing into private farming, this period have many 
implications for its future. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 studies the farming style of this 
period in which numerous small-scale owner farm households carried out independent 
farming. It provides the background knowledge for the agricultural institutions of this 
period. And section 3.3 examines the evolution of agricultural marketing institutions in 
relation to the 1945-46 food crisis. In section 3.4 we consider why state food rationing was 
introduced and how it worked. Section 3.5 studies another main issue of this chapter, the 
relation between agricultural planning institutions and agricultural resource shortage. Finally 
section 3.6 summarises the discussion of this chapter. 
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3.2. Land Reform and Small-scale Owner Farming System 
Between 1946 and 1953 the DPRK agricultural institutions were based on small-scale 
owner farming system in which each farm household owned 1.6 chungbo of land on 
average, which was not tradable, and carried out independent farming. This farming 
system was the result of the 1946 land reform that influenced 54 percent of total arable 
land and 68 percent of total farm households. 
3.2.1. Land problem 
At the end of the Japanese rule the DPRK was primarily an agrarian society. 
Agriculture employed nearly 70 percent of total population and produced around two- 
thirds of national outputs. 34 But this agriculture was in need of immediate reform due 
to a great inequality in land ownership that produced the land tenancy with extremely 
high farm rents prevailing in rural area. 
During the Japanese rule there had been a gradual, but persistent, shift in the 
nature of land ownership that turned owner-farmers into tenants and farm labourers. In 
Korea as a whole, the share of owner farmers declined to 17.8 percent of total farm 
households in 1941 from 21.7 percent in 1941 while that of tenant farmers increased 
from 35.9 percent to 53.6 percent. The northern part of Korea was not an exception. In 
1942, for instance, 46 percent of North Korean farm households were categorised as 
pure tenants and another 22 percent as owner-tenants i. e. part owners and part tenants, 
showing that land tenancy was the dominant farming style in North Korea. This land 
tenancy was the result of increasing inequality in land ownership. Indeed more than 58 
percent of total arable land was owned by a small number of landlords who made up 
only 4 percent of total farm households in 1945. By contrast, a majority of peasants 
comprising for 57 percent of total farm households owned just 4 percent of total arable 
land. 35 
34 Chung (1974), p. 121 
" Chosun Jonsa, Vol. 24, p. 130 
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This lopsided distribution of land, coupled with scarcity of arable land and 
growing population, had brought extremely high farm rents. Under the Japanese rule 
farm rents averaged from 50 percent to 60 percent of harvest, often mounting up to 70 
3 percent. ý' In addition, tenant farmers were solely responsible for 58 kinds of land 
taxes, compulsory state grain collection and mandatory hard labour. 
Not surprisingly this land tenancy with high farm rents had caused much 
unrest in rural area. Many poor farm households who were deprived of their land were 
forced either to migrate to Manchuria or to join frequent farm strikes against 
landlords. In particular, though discouraged by the colonial government, the tenancy 
disputes had drastically increased since the early 1930s as the number of tenant 
farmers began to sharply rise. In 1937, for instance, the number of reported tenancy 
disputes reached 1,527 in South Pyongan, 1,575 in North Pyongan and 1,378 in 
Hwanghae; and other provinces also had more than a thousand disputes. 37 The Korean 
communist movement under the Japanese rule greatly inspired these tenancy disputes, 
and particularly the communist-led peasant union movement had a fairly strong 
following in the northern part of Korea. In this reason, when the communists took 
over the country in 1945, they immediately pledged a through land reform in 
agriculture. 
Table 3-1. Farm Households by land ownership pattern: 1942 
Owner Owner- tenant Tenants Fire-filed Farm Total 
farmer farmer labourer 
Households 264,220 222,629 459,613 46,590 14,419 1,007,451 
Ratio (%) 26.2 22.1 45.7 4.6 1.4 100 
Source: Kim Sung Bo (1997), p. 35 
3.2.2. The 1946 Land Reform 
The pressures for land reform were paramount particularly when Provisional People's 
Committee (PPC), the first central government in the DPRK, was formed on 26 
36 Lee, Chongsik (1963), p. 66 
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February 1946. Province people's committees that had exercised the country's 
sovereignty before PPC had already begun to confiscate the land owned by Japanese 
and Korean national traitors. And numerous local communist groups had initiated a 
series of mass peasant movements, calling for immediate land reform. To consolidate 
and control such pressures PPC announced Land Reform Act (LRA) on 6 March 
1946, launching a centrally organised land reform program. 
LRA stipulated that the reform has three purposes: 1) cleansing out colonial 
factors in rural economy; 2) abolishing tenancy system; 3) eliminating landlords as a 
class. 38 On this basis it proclaimed the direction of the reform as follows. First, all the 
land owned by Japanese, Korean national traitors and those who co-operated with the 
Japanese imperialists should be confiscated without compensation and nationalised 
(article 2). Second, all the land owned by Korean landlords who had more than 5 
chungbo should be confiscated without compensation and redistributed free of charge 
to farm households with no or little land (article 3). Farm households should have the 
ownership of the redistributed land, but it should not be allowed to trade the land in 
any reason. Third, all the other properties of the landlords whose land was 
confiscated, including animals, farm equipment, houses, land belonging to houses, 
should be confiscated without compensation, being redistributed (article 11). Fourth, 
all existing debts of tenant farmers and farm labourers to landlords should be 
cancelled (article 9). 
To implement those reform programs `land reform committee' was established 
from Pyongyang to every county in the country. In village `rural committee' was 
formed, being in charge of the reform. Land reform committee consisted of the 
bureaucrats sent by local people's committees and the delegates of the North Korean 
Peasant Federation, the communist-led national peasant organisation. But the 
committee's role in the reform was limited. It did not take part in the process of land 
confiscation and redistribution. Instead it helped organise rural committees, 
propagandised LRA, maintained social order, provided administrative staff to rural 
committees, and gave official approval when the reform was completed. 
37 Kim Sung Bo (1997) 
38 Land Reform Act, in Minjok Tongil Chulpansa, Bukhan Gyungje Jaryojip [Collected materials of the 
DPRK Economy], 1996, p. 14-15 
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In this sense it was rural committee that set up the concrete rules of land 
reform and actually confiscated and redistributed land. 39 A rural committee consisted 
of 5-9 members who were elected in village conference led by village peasant 
federation. And it had six brigades for the execution of the reform: land survey, 
propaganda, activist, self-defence, communication, and security brigade. In principle a 
committee was formed in a village, but it often represented a number of villages or 
only a fraction of village according village size. During the reform there were more 
than 11,500 rural committees that had 90,697 members across the country. 40 
Land confiscation and redistribution were completed in a month with fast 
speed but through number of gradual steps. Above all, rural committees conducted 
village land surveys in order to locate land by households and determine land bands 
according to fertility. Village household surveys also followed to establish the number 
of village members who were entitled to land redistribution. On the basis of those two 
surveys, rural committees decided the extents and contents of properties that were 
subject to confiscation and redistribution. All the properties to be confiscated, 
including land and other properties possessed by landlords, were forced to be 
registered to rural committees with the formal statements of owners that they would 
neither sell nor damage the properties until the redistribution was completed. 
The redistribution of land was determined by three factors: 1) the number of 
family members; 2) the priority of existing tenant farmers; 3) previous living 
conditions. In village each household was given its household points according to the 
number, sex, and age of family members by a point assigning system as shown by 
table 3-2. And each rural committee calculated total village points collected by all 
entitled households in its village. The size of land redistribution to each household 
was determined by the share of its household points in total village points with the 
limit of 5 chungbo at maximum. Once the size was determined, the committee 
considered other two factors in order to decide `which land to whom'. If the 
household was a tenant, it was distributed the land it previously cultivated under the 
tenancy. If the household was not a tenant or if its tenanted land was smaller than the 
39 The Korean Workers' Party Publisher, Kim Il Sung Jojakjip [Collected Works], Vol. 5, p. 341 
[henceforth Kim Il Sung Jojakjip] 
40 Chosun Jonsa, Vol. 24, pp. 154-155 
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assigned size of redistributed land, other land was given to the household according to 
its previous living condition: more fertile land to poorer household. 
Table 3-2. Land Point By Sex and Age 
Sex Age Points 
Adult Male 18-60 1 
Female 18-50 1 
Youth Male and female 15-17 0.7 
Child Male and female 10-14 0.4 
Child Male and female Below 9 0.1 
Aged male Over 61 0.3 
female Over 51 0.3 
Source: Minjok Tongil Chulpansa, Bukhan Gyungje Jaryojip 
[Collected Material for North Korean Economy], 1996. P. 264 
After- the above steps were taken, rural committees proceeded into actual 
confiscation and redistribution. The procedure was quite simple but effective. Each 
rural committee held `village land reform conference' where the chairman of the 
committee read LRA, declared the list of confiscated land and properties, and 
disclosed its decision of redistribution by households. Animals, farm equipment and 
other properties were physically confiscated and redistributed in the conference. And 
the land was registered to village land books in the names of new owners, which were 
then submitted to local people's committees for approval. The procedure effectively 
ended at the end of March 1946, but formally ended between 22 May and 20 June 
1946 when province people's committees issued the statements of land ownership to 
new owners. 
3.2.3. The Establishment of Small-Scale Owner Farming system 
The scope of land reform is presented by table 3-3. During the reform 1,000,325 
chungbo of land, which amounted to 53.8 percent of total arable land, was confiscated 
and, of the confiscated land, 981,390 chungbo was redistributed. The landlords whose 
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land was confiscated accounted for 26.5 percent of total farm households while 41 
percent, 740,616 households with no or little land, benefited from the redistribution. 
Apart from the land, 4,774 cows and horses, 14,477 buildings and houses, all seed 
grains, farm equipment, fertilisers possessed by landlords were also confiscated and 
redistributed. 
Table 3-3-A. The Scope of land reform: land confiscation 
Area 
Chungbo ratio (%) 
Households 
chungbo ratio (%) 
Land owned by Japanese 112,623 11.3 12,919 3.1 
Land owned by traitors etc. 13,272, 1.3 1,366 0.8 
Land owned by landlords with more than 5 237,736 23.8 29,683 7.0 
chungbo 
Land owned by those who rent all their land 263,436 26.3 145,688 34.5 
Land owned by those continuously rent the land 358,053 35.8 288,866 54.1 
Land owned by temples, churches, religious 15,195 1.5 4,124 1.0 
organisations 
Total 1,000,325 100 482,646 100 
3-3-B. The Scope of land reform: land redistribution 
Area 
Chungbo ratio (%) 
Households 
chungbo ratio (%) 
To farm labourers 22,387 2.3 17,137 2.4 
To peasants without land 603,407 61.5 442,978 61.1 
To peasants with little land 345,974 35.3 280,501 38.0 
To relocated landlords 9,622 1.0 3,911 0.5 
Land held by people's committees 18,935 1.9 - - 
Total 981,390 100 744,527 100 
Source: DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics (1961) 
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Table 3-4. Farm Households by the land holding size after land reform: 1946 
(Chungbo) 
0-0.5 0.5-1 1-1.5 1.5-2.5 2.5-3.5 3.5-5 above 5 Total 
Number 120381 229212 257669 235248 208206 59743 10782 1121295 
ratio(%o) 10.7 20.4 23.0 21.0 18.6 5.3 1.0 100 
Source: Research Institute for Asian Culture, Bukhan Gyungje Tonggye Jaryojip [Collected 
Materials for North Korean Economic Statistics], 1994, p. 34 
The reform brought basic changes in rural land distribution. Before and after 
the reform the share of farm households with more than 5 Chungbo of land declined 
from 6.8 percent of total farm households to mere 1 percent, and those with less than 
1 Chungbo also fell from 55.7 percent to 31.1 percent. In contrast, the share of farm 
households with 1-5 Chungbo rose up to 67.9 percent from 37.5 percent. 41 In terms of 
land holding size, therefore, most `poor' and `rich' farm households turned into 
`middle' ones. 
The most important result of the reform was however that it established small- 
scale owner farming system. Due to the land reform former tenants, owner-tenants, 
farm labourers and even a part of landlords were all transformed into owner-farmers, 
and consequently owner-farmers appeared as the only form of farm households in 
rural economy. Newly emerging owner-farmers had relatively small land, 1.63 
chungbo on average, but they were free from all existing debts and landlords' 
intervention in their land. Like private farm households in market economy, therefore, 
they could organise all farming activities independently under their own decisions and 
risks. In this sense the DPRK agriculture in 1946-53 was primarily a private farming 
system. But this system did have two basic constraints that do not exist in market 
economy. 
First, farm households could not invest in land and so their farming scale 
could not exceed the boundary of their family labour force. LRA prohibited the 
redistributed land from any kind of trade. The land that had not been subject to the 
41 Kim Han Ju (1960), p. 44. 
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redistribution was in principle tradable. But the trade also must win the approval of 
province people's committee that did not give the approval unless the buyers proved 
that they were able to cultivate additional land with their own family labour force. In 
consequence, the small scale of family farming remained as the most underlying 
feature of agriculture until it was collectivised in the 1950s. 
Second, farm households were under some degree of administrative control in 
both production and marketing. Immediately after the land reform, as discussed later, 
the authorities began to impose output targets on farm households. Though not 
compulsory, the targets affected farm households for two reasons: 1) due to the land 
reform and subsequent nationalisation of industry government appeared as the sole 
supplier of agricultural inputs such irrigation, fertiliser, farm equipment etc; 2) the 
output targets imposed by the authorities constituted the basis on which the 
government allocated its agricultural resources. And farm households had to fulfil 
state grain demands as well as faced various regulations on grain market. 
3.3. The 1945-46 Food Crisis and Agricultural Marketing Institutions 
When the new socialist government was formed in 1946, the country faced a serious 
urban food shortage. The initial response of the government was to launch a 
compulsory grain collection campaign in rural areas. However, as small-scale owner 
farming system was established, this compulsory campaign was replaced with more 
permanent and stable food collection channels. In his section we consider how and 
why these channels came into being. 
3.3.1. The 1945-46 urban food crisis 
Although the DPRK was an agrarian society, it had faced chronic food 
shortages under the Japanese rule, particularly in rural areas. According to the official 
DARK statistics 77 percent of total farm households faced the depletion of food 
before harvest in 1940 and 47 percent was in the constant borrowing of food. 42 Indeed 
42 Chosun Jonsa, Vol. 24, p. 129 
47 
it was common in most rural areas that people gathered wild foods and grass roots to 
survive annually repeated lean season. 43 These chronic food shortages however turned 
into a real food crisis in 1945 when the country became independent. 
The year of 1945 saw a disastrous decline in grain production. Compared to 
the normal level, the production fell by 50 percent in North Hamgyung, 40 percent in 
South Hamgyung, 30 percent in South Pyongan, and 10 percent in Kangwon. 44 The 
reason for this decline is not clear. It might be due to bad weather or the social and 
economic confusion after the end of Japanese rule or other factors. What is certain 
however is that this decline in grain production caused a severe food shortage across 
the country in the winter of 1945-46 when the socialist government was first formed. 
After the liberation the population of North Korea was about 9,257,000 (at the beginning of 1946) 
while the grain production of 1945 was only around 11,100 thousand sok. In North Hamgyung the 
estimated population was 115,8000 and the normal production level was 1,031,132 sok.... Hence, 
even with the normal production the amount of food shortage reached 438,213 sok. Furthermore, 
because the production of 1945 dropped by 50 percent, the food situation was more serious. 45 
Interestingly the shortage hit urban areas first. At the end of the Japanese rule 
state grain reserves were almost empty. The colonial government had sent out most 
state reserves to the front army while food supply from rural areas almost stopped due 
to the collapse of the colonial collection system and the production fall in 1945. By 
43 Food availability had persistently fallen during the Japanese era. In Korea as a whole, per capita 
annual food consumption declined from 2.03 sok in the late 191Os to 1.52 sok in the early 1940s. The 
decline was mainly due to coercive grain exports to Japan that had dramatically increased since 1930 
when the Japanese government transformed Korea into a main food supplier for the Japanese army 
during the Second World War. In consequence, food shortages were chronic across the country 
between the early 1930s and the early 1940s, particularly in rural areas where farm households had 
faced `wartime grain collection [junsi gongchul]' (Kim Seung Jun, 1988, p. 74-77). 
<The Food Availability Under the Japanese Era> 
(unit: sok) 
Production Net Export Total Per Capita 
(average) Consumption Consumption 
1915-19 36,733,369 3,080,187 33,870,677 2.03 
1920-24 38,842,608 3,777,452 34,724,097 1.98 
1925-29 38,221,485 2,635,199 34,404,344 1.81 
1930-36 41,700,841 8,858,905 33,958,148 1.64 
1937-42 43,583,199 5,190,832 35,067,073 1.52 
Source: Chosun Eunhaeng, Chosun G)yungje Yonbo [Economic Yearbook of Korea], various years. 
as Chosun Jonsa, Vol. 23, p. 400 
45 Pyongbuk Shinbo (Pyongbuk Newspaper), 13 Feb 1946, quoted in Chosun Jonsa, Vol. 23, p. 400 
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contrast, state food requirement increased sharply. Shortly after the country's 
independence the new socialist government nationalised major industries46 and 
supplied food rations to their employees who comprised around 20 percent of total 
population in 1946. Moreover, the government should meet the food requirement of 
the Soviet military forces in the country, which accounted for more than 6 percent of 
total grain production in 1946.47 Those who were returning from Manchuria and 
Eastern Russia also added up the pressure. Most of them returned to urban areas and 
many of them have priorities in state rations due to their career of anti-Japanese 
struggle. 
Facing the collapse of government food balance, the authorities prohibited 
private grain trade in urban areas and procured all the grain possessed by grain 
merchants in October 1945. In return, they supplied food rations to all urban dwellers. 
But the rations were minimal: daily standard ration for adult was 500 grams, which 
was the lowest in the DPRK history except in the 1990s. And those minimal rations 
were not supplied fully. 
To resolve this urban food shortage the authorities launched a harsh grain 
collection campaign [yanggok sungchul undong] in the winter of 1945-46. Even 
before the central government was formed, province people's committees had 
imposed compulsory grain delivery quotas on all farm households. The quotas were 
made in a simple way. Farm households were allowed to keep minimal foodgrain, 500 
grams per person per day, for their own consumption. In return, they should sell all 
the remaining grain to state. 48 Peasant conference was held in every village, surveying 
farm households' grain reserves and allocating state delivery quotas. Not only private 
grain trade was prohibited in rural areas but also even using grain without permission 
for other purposes such as animal fodder was not tolerated. 
And this local collection campaign was endorsed as an official state policy on 
27 February 1946 when PPC adopted the decree of emergency food policies: 
46 It was in August 1946 when the authorities officially announced the nationalisation of major 
industries. From August 1945, however, local people's committees already began to take over the 
industries and firms owned by the Japanese government, people and organisations and de facto 
nationalised them. 
47 According to Kim Sung Bo (2000: p. 244) the Soviet military forces in the DPRK demanded 111,283 
tons of foodgrain in 1946. It was around 6.3 percent of total grain production in that year. Though it is 
not clear how much grain was actually delivered to the Soviet army, it seems obvious that the Soviet 
food requirement was a huge burden to the DPRK authorities. 
48 Chosun Jonsa, Vol. 23, pp. 403-404 
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Article 6. Landlords and peasants deliver the unfulfilled quotas by the 30 `h of March according to 
their quotas already announced. Pay the appropriate prices for the grains that landlords and peasants 
submitted. If landlords and peasants do not accomplish the submission by the above period and 
their surplus grains are found, the grains will be confiscated . 
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According to this decree 'emergency food committee' was established from 
Pyongyang to all counties, being in charge of the collection, delivery and custody of 
grain. In village actual actions were taken by `collection team' in which the members 
of peasant federation, labour union and other social organisations participated. Its role 
was to search and confiscate all the remaining grain in village. 
The campaign was completed in a very short space of time before the 1946 
spring planting, but in an extremely harsh manner. Those who did not co-operate with 
grain deliveries were immediately handed over to local security authorities for 
imprisonment. And any hidden grains, when caught, were confiscated without charge. 
In many cases the authorities set delivery targets so high that farm households could 
not keep the minimal grain they were allowed to do. 5° 
This coercive campaign might help the new socialist government overcome 
the country's food crisis in 1945-46. But it could not be a permanent institution for 
several reasons. First, it could damage the incentives of newly emerging owner farm 
households, possibly leading to another disastrous decline in grain production. 
Second, it could be also politically risky. Coercive grain collection could focus on the 
small number of landlords before the land reform. Under small-scale owner farming 
system, however, numerous poor farm households had to deliver their grain to state. 
Given that the new socialist government was still in its early stage to need the support 
of poor farm households, the ongoing compulsory collection might cause political 
problems. Third, the government frequently emphasised that the compulsory grain 
collection would be temporary until the new socialist state was firmly in place. This 
emphasis was made because farm households had already suffered immensely from 
4' PPC decree no. 2, Provisional People's Committee decision on food policy, 27 February 1946. 
50 Even the official DPRK history textbook wrote that the farm households who faced food shortages 
after fulfilling delivery quotas in North and South Hamgyung had to gather wild foods in mountains 
and fields, and that there were farm households complaining about the bureaucrats who did not pa} 
appropriate prices for grain delivery (Chosen Jonsa, Vol. 23, pp. 403-404). 
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the similar coercive collections by the Japanese government. 51 It was therefore 
difficult to launch another coercive campaign after PPC was formed in February 1946 
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was officially established in January 
1947. 
3.3.2. The formation of new agricultural marketing institutions 
Between April and October 1946 the authorities introduced a series of new 
agricultural marketing institutions to replace compulsory delivery quotas. The 
institutions consisted of three parts: agricultural tax-in-kind, the voluntary grain 
procurement of consumer association, and (farmers') markets. On the one hand, the 
institutions aimed to establish stable food supply channels for urban socialist sector. 
Both agricultural tax-in-kind and the voluntary procurement served this purpose. On 
the other hand, the institutions intended to leave a significant amount of agricultural 
surplus in the hands of farm households, promoting their production incentives. 
Farmers' markets served to circulate this surplus remaining in farm households. 
3.3.2.1. Agricultural Tax-in-kind 
A new grain-marketing institution first appeared on 27 June 1946, barely three 
months after the land reform, when PPC adopted the decree of agricultural tax-in- 
kind, stating: 
51 Since wartime grain collection system was established in 1930, the colonial government procured 
virtually the whole grain surplus in rural areas. In 1941-45, for instance, state collection amounted to 
62.4 percent of total grain production, demonstrating that compulsory state purchase was the main 
reason for the chronic food shortages in rural areas. In addition, because state purchase prices were 
extremely low, even lower than the official prices in Japan, state collection also exacerbated rural 
poverty (Kim Seung Jun: 1988, pp. 74-77). It is therefore hardly surprising that the DPRK farm 
households would severely oppose the continuation of compulsory grain collection after the country's 
independence. 
<State Grain Purchase Under the Japanese Rule> 
(thousand sok) 
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Average 
State Purchase 9,208 11.255 8.750 11.957 9,634 10.161 
% of Production 43.1 45.2 55.7 63.8 60.0 62.4 
Source: Kim Seung Jun (1988), p. 74 
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The North Korean Provisional People's Committee makes the following decisions to provide 
food to the North Korean labourers and office workers and secure food reserves. 
Article 1. Exempt all the taxes relating to land (land tax and income tax etc) for the North 
Korean peasants and instead collect 25 percent of harvest (rice, dry-field grains, beans, and 
potatoes) from farm households for agricultural tax-in-kind. Abolish all the grain procurements. 
Article 3. Peasants can freely sell their surplus grains after submitting the amounts indicated 
by tax invoice. 
Article 4. People's committees can not impose mandatory grain delivery quotas, apart from 25 
percent of the harvest for agricultural tax-in-kind. 52 
As stated by the decree, the primary purpose of agricultural tax-in-kind was to 
secure state food reserves for urban socialist sector. 53 In this respect it is noteworthy 
that the tax rate was set at 25 percent of harvest. As mentioned before, those who 
were entitled to state food rations comprised around 20 percent of total population in 
1946. It means that agricultural tax-in-kind could provide not only appropriate food 
supply for urban socialist sector but also significant food reserves for the government. 
With the introduction of agricultural tax-in-kind, therefore, the government had the 
first stable food supply channel, not depending on compulsory quotas, which was 
necessary for the proper operation of the economy. 
Beside this primary purpose, the tax had another important purpose: 
encouraging agricultural production under small-scale owner farming system. To do 
this the tax rate was set at 25 percent of harvest, far lower than 50-70 percent of farm 
rents, and all the existing land taxes were abolished. In addition, mandatory delivery 
quotas were abolished and private grain trade was re-allowed, giving farm households 
institutional opportunities to keep a significant portion of their production and realise 
it in market. 
Along with the introduction of agricultural tax-in-kind, Food Administration 
Bureau [Ministry of Food Administration (MFA) since 1947] and its subordinate 
departments were established in PPC and local people's committees up to county 
level in June 1946, organising tax collection procedures. In village the chairman of 
52 PPC decree no. 28, decision on agricultural tax-in-kind, 27 June 1946 
53 Agricultural tax-in-kind was also important for the government revenues. In 1946, for instance, it 
was the second largest revenue source for the government after drinking tax. Its revenue reached 232 
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village people's committee was responsible for the procedures. He reported sown 
areas and average yields by farm households and by lands to higher people's 
committees, delivered tax invoices, and checked out tax payment situation in village. 
In general, tax collection proceeded as follows. Before harvest started, 'harvest 
assessment committee' was formed with the chairman of village people's committee, 
harvest assessment personnel and farmers. The committee investigated the expected 
yields of sample lands and multiplied them by total sown areas to calculate official 
harvest figures by farm households. Using those figures, MFA issued tax invoices to 
farm households by the 20th of June for early harvested crops and by the 20"' of 
August for other crops. 54 Corresponding tax payments were made to county people's 
committees by the end of August and by the 15th of December respectively. And there 
were strict rules on tax payment: the payment could not be deferred more than 15 
days; unpaid tax was confiscated by the security authorities; and for those who 
reported false figures up to 50 percent of harvest was confiscated. 55 
There are no available data concerning national grain collection through 
agricultural tax-in-kind. Nonetheless it seems clear that the actual scale of tax 
collection might well exceed the extent the decrees of agricultural tax-in-kind 
proclaimed. 
Table 3-5. Collection of Agricultural Tax-in-kind 
(gan2ani) 
2,466 farm households Inje County Sonchon County in 1946 2) 
surveyed by Ministry of in 19462) 
Agriculture in 19491) Rice other grain total 
Production (A) 150,000 1,478 41,238 14,282 55,520 
Tax payment (B) 33,000 364 13,529 6,229 19,759 
B/A 22% 24.6% 32.8% 43.6% 35.6% 
Source) 1) Chosun Jonsa, Vol. 25, p. 265-266 
2) Kim Sung Bo (2000), pp. 247-250. 
million North Korean won, accounting for 25 percent of total government revenue[Research Institute 
for Asian Culture, Bukhan Gyungje Tongye Jaroyjip, 1994, p. 114) 
54 People's Committee decree no. 24, decision on the change of agricultural tax-in-kind, 12 May 1947. 
55 PPC decree no. 110, decision on the violation of agricultural tax-in-kind payment, 18 Nov. 1946 
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Table 3-6. Agricultural Tax-in-kind: 1946-1966 
27 June 1946 12 May 1947 20 Dec. 1955 9 March 1959 
(The law of 
agricultural (cabinet decree 
(PPC decree no. 28) (PC decree no. 24) tax-in-kind) no. 124) 
Tax A share of annual A share of annual A share of A share of planned 
harvest harvest average yields of harvest 
land 
tax-rate 25% for all crops rice: paddy-fields: . paddy-rice: 
25% 20-25% 11-14% 
fruits: dry-fields: 
. 
dry-field grains: 
25% 10-23% 3-9% 
other crops: orchards: .. potatoes: 
23% 23-25% 6-9% 
vegetables: 
6-9% 
fruits: 14%, etc 
Concession Reduction: Reduction: Exemption: 
and exemption Fire-field farm cooperative farm newly cultivated 
households: 10% . (5% of tax) 
land 
of harvest Exemption: fire-field crops 
. newly cultivated private plots of 
- land cooperative farms 
. private plots 
in 
. private plots of 
cooperative farms industrial workers, 
. poor 
farm etc 
household with 
little land 
Table 3-5 presents the actual scale of tax collection in various areas and 
different years. Consider the survey data of Ministry of Agriculture on 2,466 farm 
households in 42 rural areas. In 1949 the surveyed areas paid 22 percent of their 
production for agricultural tax-in-kind. Given 25 percent of tax rate for rice and 23 
percent for other crops in that year [see table 3-6], the actual tax rate was slightly 
lower than the proclaimed rates. Perhaps this was because the surveyed area included 
many fire-field farm households who paid only 10 percent of harvest for the tax. A 
similar story is reported by the 1946 tax data of Inje county in Kangwon province. 
The county had no rice production due to its mountainous geography. Of early 
harvested dry-field crops, the county paid 24.7 percent for agricultural tax-in-kind. It 
was also lower than 25 percent stated by the decree of 1946. But the situation was 
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quite different in Sonchon county, South Pyongan, one of the main rice production 
areas in the country. In 1946 this county paid 35.6 percent of its rice production for 
agricultural tax-in-kind. And the rate rose up to 43.6 percent for dry-field crops that 
farm households preferred to use for tax purpose due to their low market prices. An 
interesting point is that the authorities launched a tax over-fulfilment campaign in 
December 1946, which mainly targeted the country's main grain production areas 
such as South Pyongan. 56 
From those figures and information several conclusions could be drawn. First, 
the actual tax rates might be different from the officially proclaimed rates. Second, the 
mountainous areas with less productivity might pay the tax according to the officially 
proclaimed rates, but the main grain production areas with high productivity were 
more likely to suffer higher tax rates than the official ones. Third, therefore, in general 
the authorities might collect more grains than the decrees of agricultural tax-in-kind 
proclaimed, say, 25 percent of harvest. 
3.3.2.2. Grain procurement by Consumer Association 
Two months after agricultural tax-in-kind was introduced, the authorities established 
another food supply channel for urban socialist sector. The idea was that a centralised 
civil organisation purchased grains from farm households on behalf of the 
government, providing them to urban socialist sector and the government. 
Indeed, on 20 August 1946, PPC delegated the North Korean Consumer 
Association (NKCA), the national federation of consumer cooperatives, 57 to purchase 
56 Kim Sung Bo (2000), pp. 247-250 
57 NKCA was the first national organisation of spontaneous civil consumer co-operatives that had been 
already widely formed under the Japanese rule with the purpose to purchase basic necessities and daily 
commodities directly from the producers and provide them to the members at cheap prices. Since its 
establishment on 20 May 1946 the NKCA grew rapidly. The number of its members that started with 1 
million doubled up to 2.3 million by the end of 1946 and further increased to 4.9 million in 1947 (Cho 
Hong Hui: 1948, p. 1), comprising for about 30 percent of total population. 
In viewpoint of state grain collection NKCA was the most appropriate organisation to replace 
administrative organisations for two aspects. First, it was basically a peasant organisation. Of its total 
members in 1947, peasants accounted for 67.6 percent and, of its 1259 shops, 75 percent located in 
rural areas (Kang Jin Gun: 1948, p. 8). Second, because Nationalisation Act of Major Industries was 
announced in August 1946, NKCA was under the direct control of the government in the sense that 
state sector was the biggest supplier of industrial goods that were tradable in rural areas. This meant 
that the authorities could easily control the procedures and terms of trade that NKCA carried out in 
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150 thousand tons of grains from farm households, proclaiming that the whole 
administrative organisations would provide necessary resources for the NKCA grain 
procurement. 58 Each province people's committee was allocated its own procurement 
target that it had to help NKCA meet in its jurisdiction. Industry Bureau of PPC was 
given the responsibility to produce and supply industrial goods for NKCA to 
exchange grain with. Agriculture and Forest Bureau and Transportation Bureau were 
assigned to provide warehouses and transportation facilities for the custody and 
delivery of grain. 
Not surprisingly local administrators utilised coercive methods in order to 
accomplish its procurement targets. Like in the compulsory collection campaign in the 
winter of 1945-46, mandatory grain delivery quotas were imposed on farm 
households; and county bureaucrats were sent to rural NKCA shops to supervise grain 
delivery. Those who sold their grains to NKCA was forced to receive coupons, 
instead of industrial goods, when industrial goods were not supplied as planned. 
Unlike in the previous campaign, however, coercive methods did not work well in this 
campaign. Hoarding and speculation of grains were common in most rural areas, and 
even some farm households explicitly refused the compulsory sales. Indeed actual 
grain delivery remained at only 8 percent of the target even a month after the 
campaign commenced. 59 On 26 December, therefore, PPC officially admitted the 
failure of the campaign and announced that thereafter the NKCA grain procurement 
must be based on the voluntary grain sales of farm households. 
Provisional People's Committee decided to.... allocate the amounts of grain procurements to 
each provinces in Provisional People's Committee decree No. 673. But the allocations were 
comprehensive numbers and they did not mean to impose mandatory delivery quotas on farm 
households... In spite of that, the Consumer Association is executing the grain procurement project 
in wrongly commanding and bureaucratic ways to allocate the grain procurement quotas to every 
farm household. This is a big mistake......... To eliminate the command and bureaucracy in the 
grain procurement project and achieve the project in the planned period the following decisions are 
made. 
rural areas. It also meant that most grains that NKCA purchased from farm households were utilised for 
state purposes. 
58 PPC decree no. 63, decision on the grain procurement of the consumer association, 20 August 1946 
59 PPC decree no. 140, on grain procurement project, 26 December 1946 
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One. The chairman of each provincial people's committee should immediately cancel the assertive 
and bureaucratic method of procurement and any method that included compulsory factors, and carry out 
the project in the principle of absolute voluntarism. ....... 
6'0 
According to this decree the NKCA grain procurement was carried out without 
compulsory factors until it was replaced by state grain marketing system in 1955. The 
evidence is that the scale of the NKCA grain procurement remained minimal. In 1946, 
for instance, total grain collection by NKCA was around 25 thousand tons, 
comprising only 1.5 percent of total production. 61 
Despite its small scale the NKCA grain procurement was important for several 
reasons. First, it helped stabilise market grain prices. The NKCA grain prices were 
maintained at 30-35 percent of market prices and, when necessary, the government 
utilised NKCA shops to participate in market trade so as to stabilise market prices. 
Second, it enabled the authorities to adjust state food reserves more flexibly in 
response to the unexpected changes in food demand. Third, it provided urban socialist 
sector with additional grains at almost state rationing prices. 
3.3.2.3. Farmers' markets 
An important feature of the new agricultural marketing institutions was that they 
incorporated market as an essential part. Before the institutions were established, most 
farm households had had little surplus that could be sold in market. This is because 
state collection absorbed virtually the whole agricultural surplus from rural economy. 
During the Japanese rule in 1941-45, for instance, the colonial government collected 
62.4 percent of total grain production on annual average [see the table in footnote 51 ]. 
In 1945-46 the socialist government also collected the whole grain surplus from rural 
economy. But the situation changed completely as the new grain marketing 
institutions appeared. Agricultural tax-in-kind was set at 25 percent of harvest and the 
NKCA procurement was maintained at minimal level, say, mere 2 percent of 
production in 1946. It means that the share of state collection in total production 
dropped below half of the colonial period in 1941-45. Under the new institutions, 
60 Ibid 
61 Chosun Jonsa, Vol. 23, P. 413 
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therefore, there must remain a considerable amount of surplus in village even after 
completing state collection. In this sense the existence of market to realise the surplus 
was essential for rural economy. 62 
Between 1945 and 1953 state market policy was twofold. On the one hand the 
authorities imposed heavy regulations on trade items and prices. On the other hand 
however the authorities increased the number of markets and their trade volumes in 
order to boost the transfer of rural surpluses to urban industries. As a result, there 
appeared an interesting form of market called farmers' market that was organised and 
operated by administrative organisations. 
State market policy began with heavy regulations. On 4 October 1946, shortly 
after private grain trade was restored, PPC announced another decree to severely limit 
the extent of the trade: 63 
One. Allow free grain trade in principle. But prohibit the trade among grain merchants and the 
wholesale trade that intend to concentrate grains.... 
Two. Prohibit all grain exports and deliveries to outside North Korea in any cases. 
Three. Prohibit trading grains in advance before harvests. 
Four. The production, processing and sale of food, foodstuffs, alcohol made out of main grains 
(rice, dry-filed grains, potatoes) must win the approval of the chairman of province, city, county 
people's committee. 
Administrative price control was also put in place. In December 1946 `price control 
committee' was formed in PPC and local people's committees up to county level. The 
committee set the limits of market prices and cancelled the trade violating the limits. 64 
Both state retail shops and NKCA shops were mobilised to stabilise market prices. 
Due to those regulations market prices fell sharply. Between 1947 and 1948, for 
instance, retail prices in Pyongyang dropped by almost 40 percent on average. And 
grain price had the biggest fall. 
62 According to the survey data of Ministry of Agriculture, 2,466 farm households produced 150 
thousand gamani of grains and sold 22 thousand ganiani to market in 1949 (Chosun Jonsa, Vol. 23, 
p. 265-266). Of total production, roughly 15 percent was sold to market. (In 1944 they sold only 2 
percent of production to market). Given that the farm households paid 33 thousand garmmani for 
agricultural tax-in-kind in that year, the amount of grain sold to market surely was not so small. 
63 PPC decree no. 93, decision on free grain trade, 4 October 1946 
64 Chosen Jonsa, Vol. 23, p. 409 
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On the basis of this market stabilisation, the authorities launched a series of 
market reforms in 1948-50 in order to institutionalise and encourage market trade. 
The reforms brought about several important changes. First, all existing small-scale 
markets changed into either constant markets or regular markets with greater scales 
and more marketing days. 65 Secondly, the number of markets increased from 386 in 
1946 to 475 in 1948, including 382 constant markets and 93 regular markets. Thirdly, 
local people's committees were given formal responsibilities to provide all the 
necessary resources for market operations in their jurisdictions. Fourthly, the roles of 
administrative organisations in markets were specified. All local people's committees 
made 'regional market management rules' by 1950 and, according to those rules, 
established their branches in markets called 'market management station'. The station 
had two roles: 1) providing all the necessary resources and funds to open and operate 
market; 2) collecting market fees from merchants and farm households, monitoring 
trade items and prices, maintaining security and order, and supervising the operations 
of state retail shops and NKCA shops in market. 
Completing those reforms, the authorities finally created farmers' markets in 
1950. Farmers' markets had the same structure with existing markets. A difference is 
that in farmers markets farm households sell their surpluses to final consumers 
without the intervention of merchants. 66 It is these farmers' markets that have existed 
as the only agricultural markets until present time. 
Table 3-7. Retail Price Index, Pyongyang: Nov. 1947 - April 1948 
Nov. 1947 Dec. 1947 Jan. 1948 Feb. 1948 Mar. 1948 Apr. 1948 
Cereals 100 87 66 57 50 44 
Clothing 100 90 63 64 56 53 
Daily necessities 100 66 79 74 69 65 
Fuel 100 92 71 74 58 49 
Fish, meat 100 82 78 84 75 59 
Foodstuffs 100 105 84 90 78 68 
Lumber 100 80 97 106 82 82 
Other 100 53 63 66 71 73 
Average 100 82 76 77 61 62 
Source: Scalapino and Lee (1972), p. 1027 
6" Kim Won Sam (1958), p. 303. Constant markets had more than 150 marketing days per year while 
regular markets had less than 150 marketing days. 
66 Cabinet decree no. 9, decision on the establishment of farmers' markets, 11 October 1950 
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3.4. The establishment of State food rationing system 
Between 1945 and 1955 the authorities laid the foundation for state food rationing. 
The rationing was initially taken as a temporary measure to mitigate the food shortage 
of 1945-46, but soon transformed into a permanent institution as the new agricultural 
marketing institutions were created. In its structure and function the rationing system 
does not differ greatly from the present PDS. 
3.4.1. The formation of state Food Rationing 
State food rationing system was established through three steps: 1) provincial 
rationing: 2) temporary national rationing: 3) national rationing as a permanent 
institution. 
Food rationing was first introduced in October 1945 when province people's 
committees banned the operation of grain merchants and prohibited grain trade in 
order to resolve the urban food shortage. All grain possessed by the Japanese 
government, people, organisations and Korean grain merchants were confiscated and 
rationed for urban dwellers. To collect grain and organise rationing procedures 'food 
supply committee' was formed in province and city people's committees. In labour 
district 'food management station' was in charge of food distribution. At this time the 
rationing proceeded within the territory of province with locally available food 
according to the norms made by province people's committees. 
Provincial rationing was transformed into national one in February 1946 when 
PPC declared that food must be temporarily rationed across the country according to a 
nationally unified norm in order to "overcome the food crisis caused by extreme food 
shortages in North and South Hamgyung and South Pyongan". 67 The national 
rationing norm classified urban dwellers into 4 categories according to their ages and 
works, setting different rations by categories from 600 grams per person per day to 
300 grams. 
67 PPC decree no. 2, Provisional People's Committee decision on food policy, 27 February 1946. 
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In labour district food management station was still in charge of food 
distribution. In city and province however food supply committee was renamed as 
emergency food committee, being subordinate to the same committee in PPC. 
Emergency food committee in PPC had two roles: 1) setting a national rationing 
norm; 2) organising inter-provincial grain trade to ensure that national standard 
rations were supplied evenly across the country. It was however still each province 
people's committee that had practical responsibility to provide state food rations to 
the population. 
Table 3-8. State Food Rationing: 1946-1954 
Recipient Daily Ration 
27 Feb 1946 Labourer, office worker, and their band 1: heavy labourer; 600gr 
dependants band 2: labourer; 500gr 
band 3: office worker; 400gr 
band 4: dependants; 300gr 
19 Oct. 1946 Labourer, office worker, and their 
dependants 
special band: 900gr 
band 1: heavy labourer; 750gr 
band 2: labourer; 600gr 
band 3: office worker and student; 525-r 
band 4: dependants; 450gr 
26 Dec. 1946 Those who work in state organisations, band 1: heavy labourer; 700gr 
state enterprises, and private firms that band 2: labourer; 600gr 
the state regards as important, and their band 3: office worker; 500gr 
dependants band 4: dependants; 300gr 
12 July 1947 Private firms are entitle to rations only 
for the period that they are directly 
involved in state economic planning. 
27 March 1952 Those who work in state sector, band 1: heavy labourer; 900gr 
industrial collectives, private firms that band 2: heavy labourer: 800gr 
the cabinet approves; and their band 3: labourer; 700gr 
dependants, band 4: office worker, 600gr, 
band 5: student in senior high 
school etc; 500gr 
band 6: student in primary or 
junior high school; 400gr 
band 7: infants in nursery; 300gr 
Source: 
1) PPC decree no. 2, People's Provisional Committee decision on food policy, 27 Feb 1946 
2) Food Administration Bureau decree no. 2, On the coupon system according to the ratings, 
food rationing system, 19 Oct. 1946 
3) PPC decree no. 141, On food rationing, 26 Dec. 1946 
4)People's Committee decree no. 55, decision on the grain rationing prices for labourers and office 
workers in private firms, 12 July 1947 
5) Cabinet decree no. 56, Rules on state food rationing, 27 March 1952 
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Food rationing was finally transformed into a permanent institution as the decree of 
agricultural tax-in-kind was announced in June 1946. The decree stated that the 
purpose of agricultural tax-in-kind was to provide state food supply to urban industrial 
sector. More importantly, it proclaimed that Food Administration Bureau in PPC and 
its subordinate departments in local people's committees, the new ministerial 
hierarchy in charge of agricultural tax-in-kind, was also responsible for the allocation 
of food that was collected from the tax. This meant that state food rationing, though 
introduced as a temporary measure to mitigate the food shortage of 1945-46, would 
not disappear in so far as agricultural tax-in-kind was maintained. Since then, state 
food rationing has been one of the most important economic institutions in the DPRK 
until present time. 
3.4.2. Rationing Norms 
Initially food rations were supplied to all urban dwellers, including those who worked 
in private firms and organisations. In December 1946 however limitations were 
imposed on the qualifications of the recipients; and the limitations subsequently 
intensified. During this period, though some changes found in details, the main 
recipients of state rations were labourer and office workers in state sector and the 
members of industrial collectives. Those who worked in non-socialist sector were 
entitled to state rations only when they were directly engaged in the economic 
activities assigned by state economic plans. In this respect state food rationing mainly 
covered urban socialist sector that employed around 25 percent of total population. 
Food rations were determined by a fairly egalitarian rule. Only two factors 
were considered: recipient's age and the degree of physical demanding of his work. 
The authorities determined first a basic ration for adult with least physically 
demanding work, say, office worker. On the basis of this ration, fewer rations were 
given to children and more to those with more physically demanding work. Not 
surprisingly food rations gradually increased over this period, and rationing bands got 
more specified until the 1952 rationing norm had 7 rationing bands and 600 grams of 
basic adult ration. This rationing norm has in principle remained unchanged until 
present time. 
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In general, food rationing proceeded as follows. 68 By the 5 `" of every month 
the managers of firms that were entitle to state food rations reported their monthly 
ration requirements to city food administration department. Reviewing the 
requirements with rationing registration books containing the names of recipients, the 
department reported the city's aggregate ration requirements to the chairman of 
province people's committee by the 12th of that month. The report must include the 
information about the food reserves of the city. Then the chairman ordered province 
food administration department to make provincial food allocation plan, having its 
approval from Ministry of Food Administration by the 18th of the month. The 
approved plan was sent to city food administration department by the 25`h of the 
month. According to this plan, the department adjusted food reserves among food 
management stations in labour districts and ordered the managers of firms to issue 
ration-coupons to their employees by the end of the month. With those coupons 
individual workers purchased their rations biweekly - on the 15t" and the 30`" of every 
month- at food management stations they were registered to. 
Table 3-9. The Composition of Population by Social group: 1946-53 
(%) 
1946 1949 1953 Average 
Labourer 12.5 19 21.2 17.6 
Office worker 6.1 7 8.5 7.2 
Member of collectives - 0.3 0.5 0.4 
Merchants 3.3 1.7 1.2 2.1 
Entrepreneurs and self-employs 1.7 0.9 0.7 1.1 
Peasants 74.1 69.3 66.4 69.9 
Others 2.2 1.8 1.5 1.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Chosun Joongang Nyungam [DPRK Central Yearbook], various years 
3.4.3. The Roles of Food Rationing 
State food rationing had several important roles particularly for the socialist 
government in its early stage. First, it helped the authorities maintain the country's 
food balance. By the early 1950s the DPRK had faced on-going food pressures. 
68 Ministry of Food Administration decree no. 5, rules on food rationing, 6 Jan 1947 
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Although grain production began to increase from 1946, it was still below the 1994 
level under the Japanese rule [see table 3-11]. State food rationing controlled urban 
food demand and thus helped avoid another possible food crisis. 
Second, the rationing stabilised grain market. In its early stage the socialist 
government faced extremely volatile grain market. At the end of 1946, for instance, 
market rice price rose up to 1000 yen per small mal (7.5 kg) while an average urban 
worker earned only 400-550 yen per month. 69 Food rationing fulfilled basic food 
requirements in urban areas and thus, together with administrative price guidance, 
dramatically reduced market food prices as shown by table 3-7. 
Third, the rationing was important for labour controls in state enterprises. The 
authorities set standard food rations for state employees and provided them with more 
or less rations than the standards according to their working days and performance. 70 
Given no firmly established incentive systems in state enterprises yet, food rations 
must be of great importance in motivating state employees. 
Fourth, the authorities utilised food rations to control the remaining urban 
private sector. For instance, the authorities provided state food rations to private firms 
when they operated according to state economic plans. To encourage collectivisation 
movement in urban private sector, industrial collectives were also included in state 
food rationing in March 1952. 
3.5. Agricultural Resource Shortage and Administrative Production 
Guidance 
Between 1945 and 1953 the DPRK government planned agriculture. The authorities 
imposed production targets on farm households and allocated state agricultural 
resources accordingly. Compared with its current form, however, the planning had 
two basic differences: 1) state targets were not compulsory; 2) the authorities did not 
69 Scalapino and Lee (1972), p. 1032 
70 For instance, those who belonged to rationing band 1 (750 gram per day) in December 1946 received 
the ration of special band (900 gram) when they fulfilled their production targets by 1 10 percent. 
Similarly they received the ration of band 2 (600 gram) when they failed to meet the targets by 100 
percent (Food Administration Bureau decree no. 2, On the coupon system according to the ratings, food 
rationing system, 19 Oct. 1946) 
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involve the operations of farm households. In this section we study how this planning 
pattern appeared. 
3.5.1 Agricultural Resource/Input Shortage 
During the Japanese rule the DPRK had suffered an ongoing shortage of agricultural 
inputs such as drought animals, farm equipment, fertiliser and water supply. In 1943, 
for instance, the northern part of Korea had only 676,618 drought animals, roughly 
one animal per two households. Moreover, due to the ongoing compulsory animal 
collections by the colonial government the figure dropped to 449,657 by 34 percent in 
1945.71 In consequence, around 54 percent of total farm households had no drought 
animals when they started the 1946 spring planting. The supply of farm equipment 
and fertiliser was also extremely low. In 1945 an average farm household had only 
0.29 ploughshares, 1.81 weeding-hoes, 1.48 sickles and no farm machinery. 72 In 1937 
chemical fertiliser consumption per chungbo was mere 20 kg, which did not change 
significantly until 1945.73 The shortage of irrigation facilities was another problem: 
due to the absence of stable water supply so-called `dry planting [gunjikpa]' was 
common even for rice production in many rural areas. 
This input shortage much worsened after the country's independence. As land 
reform was publicly acknowledged, many landlords slaughtered their animals and 
destroyed their seed grains. Hence there were unprecedented seed and animal 
shortages in the 1946 spring planting. 74 And the shortages were not resolved fully 
until the 1948 spring planting. 
The difficulty was that newly emerged owner farmers were mostly too poor to 
afford new seeds, drought animals, fertilisers, and farm equipment. To resolve the 
ongoing input shortages, therefore, state intervention was necessary. Indeed the 
government took three important measures concerning state resource supply to 
agriculture between March and September 1947. First, it monopolised all agricultural 
input supplies. Due to the 1946 land reform that nationalised 1,165 irrigation 
facilities, 2,692 chungbo of orchards and 3,432,986 chungbo of forests, the 
71 Lee Sun Keun, some issues on North Korea's agricultural development, Inmin [people] I-1,1946 
7' Chosun Jonsa Vol. 24 p. 130 
73 Ibid, p. 130 
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government already appeared as the biggest owner of agricultural resources. In 
addition, it monopolised the supply of industrial goods to agriculture on 24 August 
1946 by announcing the Nationalisation Act of Major Industries. On 26 September 
1946 fertiliser trade was brought under state control, 75 and on 9 September 1946 all 
76 the irrigation facilities across the country were effectively nationalised. 
Second, the government improved its resource supply capabilities in 
agriculture. On 1 April 1946 the North Korean Peasant Bank was established, starting 
to provide financial supports for farm households to purchase drought animals, seeds 
and farm equipment. Several farm equipment manufactories were established in 
Pyongyang and a series of national irrigation projects were launched throughout the 
77 
year. 
Third, the government established administrative channels to allocate state 
agricultural resources/inputs among farm households. At this time province and 
county people's committees owned most state agricultural resources, allocating them 
according to private contracts with farm households. From the 1946 spring planting 
however all the contracts with farm households were exclusively carried out by the 
MOA hierarchy, being strictly subject to state agricultural plans. 
Owing to the above policies all agricultural input supplies went under state 
control by September 1946. It was this state control of inputs that enforce newly 
established small-scale owner farming system to operate according to state 
agricultural plans in 1946-53. 
3.5.2. Early Quantitative Planning 
Between 1945 and 1953 the DPRK had a ministerial system in agriculture. At the top 
of the hierarchy, Agriculture and Forest Bureau in PPC [Ministry of Agriculture 
(MOA) since 1947] was in charge of economic planning and resource allocation in 
agriculture. In province and county people's committees MOA's branches (agriculture 
departments) specified and distributed national plans/targets among farm households. 
74 Ibid, p. 356-357; PPC decree no. 7, the decree on the preparation for spring planting, 15 March 1946 
75 PPC decree no. 86, the provisional law of fertiliser trade, 26 September 1946 
76 PPC decree no. 75, the decree on state management of irrigation facilities, 9 September 1946 
77 Chosun Jonsa Vol. 24 p. 357-59 
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In village the chairman of village people's committee was responsible for supervising 
the operations of farm households. 
Using this ministerial hierarchy the authorities initially attempted a centralised 
quantitative planning. The primary purpose of the planning was to increase 
agricultural production, and the imposition of quantitative production quotas and 
corresponding (state) resource allocations were the main policies to enforce state 
plans to producers. 
The planning started on 15 March 1946 when PPC announced the decree of 
the 1946 spring planting, specifying both provincial targets for sown areas by crops 
and corresponding resource allocation plans. 78 And it ordered provincial 
administrators to make more detailed figures at county level until 30 March 1946. 
According to this decree, in the early April the provincial authorities ordered the 
county authorities to prepare for the spring planting. An order made by South 
Hamgyung province party committee to county party committees stated: 
Making production plans 
a. organising village conferences by villages 
b. correctly surveying this year's sown areas 
c. making plans to plant appropriate crops to appropriate lands 
d. making production plans and, on the basis of the plans, informing farm households of 
their responsible production quotas (establishing production responsibility system) 
2. The issue of organising production brigade 
a. organising it by villages, with smart members of youngsters, adults and women in 
Peasant Committee, making it the model of peasants in front of production so as to 
mobilise all peasants ........ 
79 
On the basis of this order, county administrators specified sown areas and crop 
compositions by villages. Furthermore, they made concrete production quotas by 
villages and ordered village people's committees to distribute the quotas among farm 
households. To do this each village people's committee carried out three tasks. First, 
it organised `production teams [sangsanban]' and imposed state production quotas on 
79 PPC decree no. 7, the decree on the preparation for spring planting, 15 March 1946 
67 
them. Each production team consisted of 5-6 farm households, pooling seasonally 
labour, animals and other agricultural assets to conduct joint farming. After the land 
reform the basic production unit in agriculture was owner farm households who 
owned their land and carried out independent farming. It was therefore difficult for 
village people's committee to control individual farm households directly. Hence the 
committee forced farm households to join production teams, controlling their 
operations collectively rather than individually. Second, the committee organised 
`production increase brigades [sangsan jungsan dolg_yukdae]' with young farmers in 
village. Its purpose was to provide good-quality labour support to production teams 
and thus encourage farm households to join them. Finally, the committee made 
concrete production and resource allocation plans for production teams. 
As the result, the 1946 spring planting was carried out in highly centralised 
and administrative manners: MOA -> MOA branches in province and county 
people's committee --> village people's committee -ý production teams -> farm 
households. 
Table 3-10. Production Teams and Production Increase Brigades: 30 May 1946 
Production Teams 
number member 
Production Increase Brigades 
Number member 
South Pyongan 13258 261315 2498 115591 
North Pyongan 17865 303695 2938 153795 
South Hamgyung 20965 213815 2272 30319 
North Hamgyung 7248 25185 2235 30900 
Hwanghae 9518 262314 4686 126348 
Kangwon 10635 207219 2135 29365 
Total 79489 1274243 16764 486318 
Source) Chosen Jonsa, Vol. 24. P. 360 
In viewpoi nt of individual farm households state plans were not compulsory. 
They had no legal obligation to fulfil the production quotas of production teams. They 
could even refuse to join production teams. In this sense the 1946 agricultural 
planning was fundamentally different from the present planning in which producers 
have legal obligations to meet state targets. 
79 South Hamgyung Province Party Committee, the order on spring planting preparation, 18 April 
1946, quoted in Kim Sung Bo (2000: p. 235) 
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Nonetheless it seems obvious that farm households' decisions were strictly 
binding to state agricultural plans because all state resource supplies, including farm 
equipment, fertiliser, drought animal and water supply, were based on them. In 
particular, the authorities began to organise `production guidance teams [sangsanr 
jidodae]', which temporarily mobilised urban and industrial labourers to support 
agricultural production, from the 1946 spring planting. 80 On 28 May 1946, for 
instance, Wonsan city people's committee formed `city planting guidance team' 
consisting of 30 city officials, sending around 40,000 urban labourers to neighbouring 
rural areas to help the spring planting until 15 June. Because these labour supports 
were provided only to production teams, it was common for farm households to join 
the teams particularly during farming season. 
3.5.3. The Establishment of Administrative Production Guidance 
The centralised quantitative planning continued until 1948. But they caused several 
problems. 8' First, the joint farming by production teams undermined labour morals 
particularly among middle and rich farm households who had higher productivity. 
Second, the production plans made by the authorities frequently ignored concrete 
agricultural conditions. Third, as the authorities focused on organising production 
teams and brigades, little attention was given to technical problems farm households 
faced. As the result, agricultural production did not increase fast. For instance, grain 
production reached 1.9 million MT in 1946 and 2.1 million MT in 1947. But both 
figures were still much lower than 2.4 million MT in 1944 under the Japanese rule, 
indicating that the country was still under food pressure. 
In this circumstance the authorities made important changes in agricultural 
planning between 1948-53. Above all, the purpose of the planning was changed into 
simply motivating farm households to increase their production . 
82 In 1946-47 
agricultural plans consisted of real production targets that farm households were 
supposed to fulfil, even though they were not compulsory. To meet the targets the 
authorities focused on organising and controlling the operations of farm households. 
'0 Chosun Jonsa Vol. 24 p. 362-65 
81 Cabinet decree no. 10, the decree on the 1949 agricultural planting works, 9 February 1949 
82 Oh Dae Ho (1985) p. 4-11 
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By contrast, agricultural plans after 1948 aimed to provide farm households with the 
broad prospects of agricultural development. And the production targets in the plans 
were merely to motivate farm households to increase their production according to the 
country's needs. To realise the targets the authorities promoted competitions among 
farm households rather than controlled their operations. 
As the planning purpose was changed, the authorities stopped imposing 
concrete production plans and instead encouraged individual farm households to make 
their own plans. 83 In consequence, there were great changes in planning procedures. 
Up to county level the planning proceeded in the same manner as before: the MOA 
plans were specified and distributed among villages through administrative hierarchy. 
In village, however, the village people's committee did not impose production quotas 
on production teams. Instead, it informed individual farm households of village 
production quotas and encourage them to make and report concrete production plans 
to increase their production and so meet the village quotas. And one of the important 
roles of the committee was to monitor whether individual farm households carried out 
production according to their own plans. In consequence production teams did not 
function as the basic production units any more and so, together with production 
increase brigades, were gradually dismantled and replaced by voluntary joint 
production teams such as traditional `cow sharing teams [sogyuri]' and `labour 
sharing teams [pumasi]'. 
The role of the government was also changed into providing technical 
supports to farm households, including the development of new technologies, new 
seeds, farm machinery and irrigation facilities etc. In 1949, for instance, the 
authorities held 15,416 agricultural technology conferences in which 986 thousand 
farmers participated. 
In short, the DPRK agricultural planning after 1948-53 proceeded in the way 
that the government gave a broad prospect of agriculture and, in order to realise the 
prospect, provided state resources and technologies to farm households who made and 
executed their own production plans. In this respect we call this planning 
`administrative production guidance'. 
83 Chosun Jonsa Vol. 25 p. 75 
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Table 3-11. Grain Production in 1946-53 
(1000 MT) 
1944 1946 1947 1948 1949 1951 1952 1953 
Grain Production 2417 1898 2069 2668 2654 2260 2450 2327 
Source) Chosen Joongang Nyungam., various years 
3.6. Conclusion 
The discussion of this chapter could be summarised as follows. 
1. Between 1945 and 1953 the DPRK had small scale owner farming system in which 
a vast number of owner farm households carried out independent farming activities. 
The system was quite similar to private farming system in market economy but at the 
same time had two basic differences: 1) farm households could not invest in land and 
so their farming scale could not exceed the boundary of their family labour force; 2) 
farm households were under some degree of administrative control in both production 
and marketing. 
2. The 1945-46 food crisis made state grain collection the most urgent and important 
task for the new socialist government to tackle. However, as small scale-owner 
farming system was established, it was difficult for the government to impose 
compulsory grain delivery quotas on farm households. To resolve this difficult the 
government introduced three agricultural marketing institutions: 1) agricultural tax-in- 
kind; 2) the voluntary procurement of the consumer association; 3) farmers' markets. 
3. To overcome the food crisis the government initially introduced a temporary food 
rationing. But the rationing was soon transformed into a permanent economic 
institution as the government established secure food collection channels such as 
agricultural tax-in-kind. In 1946-53 the DPRK food rationing covered mainly socialist 
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sector that comprised roughly 25 percent of total population and 84 percent of urban 
population. 
4. The DPRK suffered the ongoing agricultural input shortage in 1946-53. To mitigate 
this shortage the government monopolised the input supply to agriculture, on the one 
hand, and improved state input supply capabilities on the other hand. This state 
monopoly of agricultural input supply made it possible for the government to plan the 
agriculture under small-scale owner farming system. In compared with the current 
form, however, the role of agricultural planning in this period was confined to 
providing the producers with production guidelines such as the broad pictures of 
future agricultural development and various technical assistance. 
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IV. Cooperativisation, the 1954 Food Crisis and 
New Agricultural Management System: 1953-73 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we study the institutional changes in the DPRK agriculture from the 
beginning of agricultural cooperativisation in 1953 to the establishment of so-called 
the new agricultural management system in 1961. The agricultural institutions 
established in 1963-61 had not changed until Juche Nongbub was introduced in 1973. 
Hence the discussion of this chapter effectively covers the DPRK institutions between 
1953 and 1973. 
The years of 1953-61 saw that the basic structure of the present DPRK 
agriculture was formed. In 1953-58 agricultural cooperativisation was completed, 
making cooperative farms the basic production units in agriculture. 84 State grain 
marketing commenced in 1957-59 and state food rationing expanded to the whole 
population, including farm households, in 1954-58. State agricultural plans that 
impose mandatory production and delivery targets on cooperative farms began in 
1956, and the planning institutions consisting of Agricultural Commission, PREC and 
CCMC appeared in 1961. 
Newly established institutions in this period were fundamentally different 
from those in 1945-53. As private farming was replaced by cooperative farming, all 
the farm operations from production to marketing went under direct state control. 
Grain trade was monopolised by state procurement agencies and thus the roles of 
agricultural markets reduced to circulating minimal amounts of non-grain foodstuffs 
coming from the small private plots of farm households. Because state rationing 
expanded to the whole population, the authorities had not only the power to control 
Ra The DPRK authorities called their farms collectively owned by farm households `cooperative farms 
[hyupdong nongjang]' rather than `collective farms [jipdan nongjang]', and the historical process of 
establishing the farms `cooperativisation [hypdongwha]' rather than `collectivisation [jipjdwi't'lýa]'. 
There are of course no meaningful differences between those words. In this thesis we follow the 
official DPRK terminology, using `cooperative farms (or simply cooperatives)' and `cooperativisation'. 
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the food consumption of each household but also the responsibility to feed the whole 
country. 
But the underlying rationale for the institutional changes remained unchanged. 
As in 1945-53, all the agricultural institutions in 1953-61 were formed to resolve the 
country's ongoing food pressures and agricultural resource shortages. Indeed, the 
country faced another food crisis in the winter of 1954-55, which triggered the 
appearance of state grain marketing and the expansion of state food rationing to farm 
households. And the agricultural resource shortages after the Korean War made the 
1953-58 agricultural cooperativisation inevitable, eventually leading to the 
establishment of the new planning institutions in 1961. 
The purpose of this chapter is to show this underlying rationale for the 
institutional changes in this period. To do this it is organised as follows. Section 4.2 
discusses the relation between the post-war resource shortages and cooperativisation 
movement in agriculture. Section 4.3 examines the state grain collection problem in 
the early 1950s, which was dramatically expressed by the 1954-55 food crisis, and 
examines how the problem changed the previous agricultural marketing and food 
rationing institutions. In section 4.4 we study so-called the new agricultural 
management system that created the localised agricultural planning institutions in 
which province administrators controlled agriculture independently. Finally section 
4.5 summarises this chapter. 
4.2. Agricultural Resource Shortage and Cooperativisation Drive 
Small-scale owner farming that was created by the 1946 land reform declined rapidly 
after the Korean War. In 1953, the year of armistice, it was still predominant, 
contributing 92 percent of total agricultural output. 85 However, as agricultural 
cooperativisation was launched in August 1953, farm households were rapidly 
absorbed by newly established cooperatives and small-scale owner farming had 
completely disappeared by August 1958. Since then cooperative farming has 
constituted the basis for all the DPRK agricultural institutions. 
85 Chung (1974), p. 11 
74 
4.2.1. Agricultural Resource Shortages and Early Cooperativisation Drive 
The Korean War that lasted for over three years between 1950 and 1953 saw a drastic 
decline in agricultural production and fundamental changes in its structure. 
During the war agricultural production declined rapidly. Between 1949 and 
1953 grain production fell by 15 percent, and it did not recover the pre-war (1948-49) 
level until 1956. The number of cattle fell by 36 percent and the number of pig by 18 
percent. Sericulture production also declined by 38 percent. 
Table 4-1. Agricultural Production During and After the Korean War: 1949-1960 
1949 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1960 
Sown Area 
(1000 Chungbo) 2836 2101 2253 2295 2337 2325 2413 2555 2744 2765 
Grain 
Production 
(1000 MT) 2654 2260 2450 2327 2230 2340 2873 3201 3700 3803 
Number of 
animals (1000) 
(cattle) 788 546 504 484 569 667 672 
(pig) 660 309 542 710 1339 1441 1123 
Sericulture 
production 
(1949=100) 100 60 102 185 
Source) Chosun Joongang Nyungain, various years 
Due to this decline in production most farm households were impoverished. 
Before the war a vast majority, 72-3 percent, of farm households were classified as 
middle farm households that could manage their livings without state supports. Of 
them, the half was defined as `upper middle' that produced considerable agricultural 
surpluses while another half was `lower middle' that had little surpluses. Although 
rich farm households that sold most their products to markets accounted for the 
relatively low portion, 2-3 percent, of total farm households, poor farm households 
that could not manage their livings without state supports were also below 25 percent 
of total farm households. During the war however the share of middle and rich farm 
households declined to 59.4 percent and 0.6 percent respectively, while that of poor 
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farm households increased up to 40 percent. 86 Furthermore, of middle farm 
households, most `upper middle' households turned down to `lower middle'. It means 
that a majority of farm households faced difficulties to maintain their livings even at 
bare subsistence levels. 
The important consequence of this impoverishment was that small-scale 
owner farming had begun to be dissolved during the war. Many poor farm households 
that had their family resources depleted formed various cooperatives, pooling 
resources, conducting joint production and sharing products. 87 Those who did not 
participate in cooperatives tended to transform their family members into seasonal or 
permanent farm labourers. Poor farm households were also driven out of independent 
production and marketing due to increasing debts. 88 They had to submit large shares 
of products to rich farm households under long-term debt contracts that were quite 
similar to tenancy contracts before the land reform. 
By contrast, though their numbers decline, rich farm households turned into 
capitalistic commercial farmers as well as professional merchants. They employed 
growing number of farm labourers to expand their own production, primarily rice and 
86 Chosun Jonsa Vol. 28 p. 184. 
97 During the war there were three types of work teams that were agricultural cooperatives in a 
germinal form. First, farm households facing animal and labour shortages voluntarily formed "ox- 
sharing teams" and "labour-exchange teams". Compared to those before the war, they had fixed 
members and operated throughout the year. And the charges for labour and animal were paid by labour, 
not money or products. These teams were the most common form of pooling rural resources during the 
war. In South Pyongan, for instance, there were 33,523 labour-exchange teams and 6,15 1 ox-sharing 
teams in 1952, incorporating 357,715 members (Chosun Jonsa Vol. 27 p. 207). Second, local 
authorities organised "good harvesting groups" with those farm households who sent their family 
members to the front and thus suffered from labour shortages. They conducted joint farming under the 
guidance of local authorities. Third, in the North-South Korean border provinces such as Kangwon and 
South Hwanghae where the battle was fierce, farm households formed wartime mutual work brigades 
that were agricultural cooperatives in traditional sense. They unified land into communal property, 
pooled animals and agricultural implements and carried out joint production under the guidance of 
representative committee consisting of 9 elected members. And the output distribution was made solely 
according to labour, regardless of previous land-holdings, animals and other possessions. 
88 The authorities were particularly concerned about the following adverse impacts of rural debts on 
small-scale owner farming. First, rich farm households loaned money to poor farm households and in 
return collected their products in harvest season. Second, they forced the indebted farm households to 
produce what they needed. Third, they let the indebted farm households pay the debts by animals or 
rear animals on their behalf. Fourth, they demanded seasonal or permanent farm labourers from the 
indebted farm households. In consequence, many poor farm households could not carry on independent 
farming during the war. Hence the authorities cancelled in October 1952 all debt contracts that 
influenced agricultural marketing in harvest season and provided in February 1953 additional land, 
animals and seeds to poor farm households in serious debts (cabinet decree no. 188, on preventing 
high-interest loans to poor farm households in rural areas, 30 August 1952; cabinet decree no. 26, on 
the policies to improve economic situations of poor farm households and petty fishery households, 18 
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vegetables for urban markets, entrusted their production to poor and middle farm 
households, and controlled agricultural markets where the government regulations 
were considerably weakened during the war. 
Not surprisingly the destabilisation of small-scale owner farming caused great 
concerns about whether it should and could be sustained after the war, which 
eventually led to a dispute in the communist party over the post-war agricultural 
structure, particularly the timing and speed of agricultural cooperativisation. 
During the war a majority of the communist party was in favour of early 
cooperativisation. But there was an opposition, too. According to the opposition view 
early cooperativisation was unrealistic in the sense that agricultural mechanisation, 
which was essential to large-scale cooperatives, was limited. Proceeding 
cooperativisation confined in the northern part of Korea could undermine the 
possibility of Korean reunification and thus be politically risky. To rehabilitate the 
post-war economy therefore this view emphasised the early revival of small-scale 
owner farming. 
Free merchandising would give a huge boost to small-scale farming that had no incentives to 
increase production. When free merchandising revives agriculture, which in turn influences 
manufacture and transportation, the whole economy will revive and improve. 89 
Despite this opposition, however, the party decided to launch a pilot 
cooperativisation program in August 1953, barely a month after the armistice treaty 
was concluded. And it was soon followed by a full-scale cooperativisation drive in 
November 1954. By August 1958 all farm households had been absorbed by new 
cooperatives, and it was officially announced in January 1959 that agricultural 
cooperativisation was completed in the DPRK. 
Why did the authorities rush into agricultural cooperativisation right after the 
war? Many factors could be attributed to it. For instance, the years of 1953-54 saw the 
best political chances for agricultural cooperativisation. Increasing poverty in rural 
economy made a majority of poor farm households favourable to cooperativisation 
February 1953). Nonetheless, the rural debt problems did not disappear until the end of war, which was 
one of the reasons for the early promotion of agricultural cooperativisation. 
89 Kim Kwang Soon, the theory of Lenin's New Economic Policies and its implication in world 
history" [in Korean], Gyungje Gunsol [economic building], June 1956, p. 120-121. 
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while the number of rich and upper middle farm households who were against 
cooperativisation was on decrease. The ongoing trend of voluntary cooperativisation 
movement from below might also boost the confidence of the authorities about the 
cooperativisation led by administrative organisations. In particular, most opposition 
leaders in the party began to be purged or demoted from key positions concerning the 
responsibilities of the war defeat: hence there could be no significant political voices 
against the government's decision. 90 
Of various possible reasons, however, the most fundamental was the post-war 
agricultural resource shortages. The Korean War devastated agricultural resources. 
Apart from 442,000 metric tons of grain losses, 905 reservoirs and irrigation facilities 
were destroyed, 370,000 chungbo of paddy fields were damaged and 90,000 chungbo 
of arable lands were demolished. ' As 250,000 cows and 380,000 pigs were 
destroyed, animal powers and organic fertilisers were in great shortages. And the loss 
of 90,000 fruit trees reduced lucrative sericulture production by more than 30 percent. 
To rehabilitate agriculture therefore a large scale of investment was necessary; and the 
investment had to be financed within agriculture because industry had suffered much 
more severe damages during the war. Indeed, due to the heavy wartime industrial 
losses, the share of industry and agriculture in gross social product changed from 47 
vs. 53 in 1949 up to 38 vs. 62 in 1953.92 The problem was that small-scale owner 
farming scattered rural resources among farm households and thus could not afford 
such a large investment. In this sense agricultural cooperativisation was the only 
alternative to mobilise rural resources for the post-war agricultural rehabilitation. 
The resource shortages also made small-scale owner farming unsustainable 
after the war. It was primarily because of the increasing severity of labour shortages 
in agriculture. During the war the DPRK population fell from 9.6 million in 1949 to 
8.5 million in 1953 by 11.6 percent, and this decline was predominantly made in 
90 Right after the war the mainstream party leaders made a series of political attacks against the 
opposition party leaders, which eventually led to so-called "August fraction incidents" in 1956 in 
which most pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese communist leaders were purged (Lee Jong Suk, Kim Il Sung's 
anti-fraction struggle and the formation of North Korean political structure [in Korean], Yeoksa 
BVp)'eofg [History Critique], 1995, p. 187-251). Concerning agricultural cooperativisation, the party 
mainstream began to directly control agricultural policies as early as March 1954 when Park Mun Kyu, 
the minister of agriculture, was demoted to the vice minister and instead Kim Il, the close colleague of 
Kim Il Sung, was appointed as the new minister. 
91 Korean Central News Agency, Chosen Joongang Nyungani 1954-55,1955, p. 51 
92 Kim 11 Sung University Press (1965), p. 192-193 
78 
agriculture. Peasant population declined from 6.6 million in 1949 to 5.6 million in 
1953 by 1 million, which amounted to 92 percent of total wartime population decline. 
Not surprisingly agriculture suffered serious labour shortages during the war. And the 
shortages much worsened after the war: between 1953 and 1960 peasant population 
further declined to 4.8 million by more than 14 percent, owing to both devastated 
rural conditions and the post-war industrialisation derive. 93 
Table 4-2. Peasant and Non-Peasant Population During and After the Korean War 
A: Composition (%) 
1949 1953 1954 1956 1957 1958 1960 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Peasant 69.3 66.4 61.3 56.6 53.1 49.8 44.4 
Non-peasant 30.7 33.6 38.7 43.4 46.9 50.2 55.6 
B: Number (thousand) 
1949 1953 1954 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
Total 9622 8491 n. a 9359 n. a n. a 10392 10789 
Peasant 6668 5638 n. a 5297 n. a n. a n. a 4790 
Non-peasant 2954 2853 n. a 4062 n. a n. a n. a 5999 
* Peasant includes cooperative farmers, state farmers and private farmers 
* The numbers of peasant and non-peasant population in [B] are calculated using their shares 
of total population in [A] 
Source) Chosuin Joongang Nyungain, various years 
The problem was that small-scale owner farming could not be sustained under 
such a large extent of labour shortages. As discussed in chapter 3, the 1946 land 
reform permitted the peasant land ownership only to the extent that the owner could 
cultivate the land with his own family labours. The land must be returned to state 
when the owner's family became incapable of cultivating it. And the transfer of land 
93 Chosun Jonsa Vol. 28 p. 24-27 
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ownership among farm households was strictly controlled by the authorities. It means 
that under severe labour shortages the land would be either idled or returned to state, 
making small-scale owner farming system collapse. Indeed, a basic reason for many 
poor farm households to form cooperatives during the war was that the cooperatives 
provided them with the only legal chance to preserve their private land ownership. In 
this respect small-scale owner farming was not unsustainable after the war: hence 
agricultural collectivisation was inevitable. 
4.2.2. Agricultural Cooperativisation 
Agricultural cooperativisation was carried out via three stages: experiment stage 
(August 1953-November 1954); mass movement stage (November 1954-December 
1956); and completion stage (January 1957-January 1959). " 
Experiment stage 
The cooperativisation was launched on 9 August 1953 when the Sixth Party Central 
Committee Meeting ordered the government to "widely organise `cooperative 
agricultural production joint firms' on the basis of preserving private land and private 
production means, and experimentally operate them from 1954". 95 
According to this order the cooperativisation proceeded on the voluntary basis. 
The purpose of the cooperativisation was to boost the post-war agricultural production 
by encouraging poor farm households who had difficulties in carrying on independent 
farming to form cooperatives, rather than to replace private farming with cooperative 
farming. Not only the authorities refrained coercive methods from the 
cooperativisation process but also allowed farm households to freely choose various 
organisational types of cooperatives: type I (mutual aid team), type II (semi-socialist 
cooperative) and type III (socialist cooperative). It was also up to farm households' 
decisions how to operate their cooperatives. 
9' For the detailed discussion of the process, see Suk Lee, Agricultural Collectivisation and its 
implications in the DPRK, unpublished working paper-October 2002, University of Warwick 
95 The Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, on the Party's struggles and tasks for the post- 
war rehabilitation of people's economy concerning the conclusion of armistice treaty, 9 August 1953, 
in Gyuljonjjip [Decisions], p. 17. 
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Table 4-3. Three Organisational Forms of Cooperatives 
Type I Type II Type III 
Ownership 
Farming pattern 
Output distribution 
mutual aid) 
private ownership 
private + collective 
farming 
1) the land owner 
decides what and how 
to produce in his land, 
2) on the basis of the 
land owners' decision, 
farm households carries 
out production 
collectively 
Products belong to land Products belong to 
owners 
*the owners pay for the 
use of labour, draft 
animals and farm 
implements of other 
members in the form of 
products and or labour. 
(semi-socialist) 
private ownership: 
land and private plots 
private or communal 
ownership: draft 
animals and farm 
implements 
collective farming 
cooperatives decide 
what and how to 
produce in each land 
cooperatives 
1) cooperative 
distributes up to 20 
percent of the crop to 
land owners, and the 
remaining 80 percent to 
the members according 
to their labour 
contribution 
. cooperatives 
decide 
what and how to 
produce in each land 
The products belong to 
cooperative 
(socialist) 
Private ownership: 
private plots 
communal ownership: 
all other assets 
including land 
Collective farming 
Cooperative distributes 
all the crop to the 
members solely 
according to their 
labour contribution 
2) cooperative pays for 
the use of draft animals 
and farm implements 
under private 
ownership according to 
previously contracted 
charges 
In this stage state economic supports were the main policy to induce farm 
households to from cooperatives. In 1954, for example, the government supplied to 
newly registered cooperatives more than 7000 chungbo of land at free of charge, 80 
million won of financial loans, and tens of thousand urban labour supporters. 
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Due to the voluntary principle however the cooperativisation ratio remained 
low. By October 1954 cooperative farms had incorporated only 10.9 percent of total 
farm households and 10.7 percent of total arable land. The size of cooperatives was 
also small, 10-15 farm households per cooperative on average. 
Table 4-4. Cooperativisation Ratio: 1953-1958 
Cooperativisat Cooperativisat 
No. of farm Arable land of ion ratio in ion ratio in 
No. of households in cooperatives total farm total arable 
cooperatives cooperatives (1000 chungbo) households land 
1953 806 11897 11 1.2 0.6 
1954 10098 332662 576 31.8 30.9 
1955 12132 511523 885 49.0 48.6 
1956 15825 864837 1397 80.9 77.9 
1957 16032 1025606 1684 95.6 93.8 
1958 13309 1055015 1791 100.0 100.0 
Source) Chosen Joongang Nyungam, 1959, p. 193 & 330 
Mass movement stage 
Agricultural cooperativisation entered a new stage in November 1954 when the Party 
Central Committee announced the decision of "on the policies of our Party for future 
development in agriculture", ordering: 1) to form `agricultural cooperativisation 
guidance committee' in Ministry of Agriculture and local governments so that 
administrative organisations directly organised and controlled cooperativisation 
process; 2) to increase the size of cooperatives up to 70 farm households per 
cooperative; 3) to train and dispatch administrative staff and agricultural specialists to 
operate cooperatives; 4) to make state agricultural plans for cooperatives from 1956. 
The decision caused the immediate changes in the purpose, method and 
pattern of cooperativisation. Unlike in experiment stage the purpose of 
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cooperativisation in this stage was to replace small-scale owner farming with 
cooperative farming: hence it directly aimed at middle and rich farm households as 
well as poor farm households. Although joining cooperatives still remained non- 
compulsory, the voluntary principle in early stage was de facto abolished. Those who 
refused to join cooperatives faced the immediate cessation of state economic supports, 
including financial and grain loans, draught animals, chemical fertilisers, farm 
implements and other agricultural requisites. In many cases they could not access to 
communal production facilities such as reservoirs, milling stations and farm 
implements repair stations etc. Those who remained outside cooperatives even after 
these measures were taken had to face fierce class struggles initiated by local party 
organisations. 
There were also two basic changes in the pattern of cooperativisation. First, 
the establishment of new type I and II cooperatives was discouraged and existing type 
I, II and III cooperatives were encouraged to merge into new type III cooperative with 
greater scales. As a result, the share of type III had increased to 97.5 percent of total 
cooperatives by December 1995, while that of type II had fallen to 2.5 percent and 
type I cooperatives had completely disappeared. 96 Second, the authorities took over 
the cooperatives from the hands of farm households. According to the November 
1954 party order compulsory production and delivery quotas began to be imposed on 
cooperatives from 1956. And all the key positions of cooperatives began to be directly 
appointed by the authorities from April 1957. 97 
Due to the intensified state initiative the speed of cooperativisation accelerated 
rapidly. Only for a month after the mass movement stage started the number of 
cooperatives increased almost three times, and the cooperativisation ratio rose up to 
31.8 percent in total farm households and 30.9 percent in total arable land. This fast 
speed continued until the end of 1956 when cooperatives absorbed 81 percent of total 
farm households, effectively ending the cooperativisation. 
96 Kim Sung Bo (2001), p. 311 
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Completion stage 
This stage concerned two tasks. First, all the remaining rich farm households were 
forcefully cooperativised between January 1957 and August 1958. Second, all 
existing cooperatives merged into a giant socialist cooperative established in every 
village between October and December 1958. The new giant cooperatives were 
announced not only to consolidate the work of such hitherto independent 
organisations as rural stores operated by consumer association and agricultural credit 
association under the control of village people's committee, but also to absorb all 
other social organisations, including health facilities and schools, in village. In 
particular, as the chairman of cooperative held the chairman of village people's 
committee, both politics and economy were consolidated in village. Due to the 
amalgamation the number of cooperatives declined from 13,309 in 1958 to 3,843 in 
1959. But their average size increased from 80 to 300 farm households; and from 130 
to 500 chungbo of arable land. 
Finishing all the procedures, the authorities held the First National Conference of 
Agricultural Cooperatives on 5 January 1959 and formally announced that agricultural 
cooperativisation was completed in the DPRK. 
4.2.3. Basic Features of the DPRK Cooperativisation 
It is well known that many socialist countries experienced severe agricultural 
stagnation and corresponding social calamities during their collectivisation periods. 
The 1929-31 Soviet famine and the 1959-61 Chinese famine were two typical cases. 
In this respect, however, the DPRK cooperativisation was quite successful. There was 
no significant decline in agricultural production during its cooperativisation period. 
On the contrary, as presented by table 4-5, grain production grew fast particularly 
after 1955 when cooperative farming incorporated a half of total farm households. 
There were other agricultural developments, too. Between 1953 and 1958 sown areas 
increased by more than 30 percent and, of them, irrigated areas almost doubled up. 
97 Chosun Jonsa Vol. 29 p. 62-63 
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The number of tractors increased four times and chemical fertiliser two times. 
Although the number of animals had declined in the early stages of cooperativisation, 
the trend was turned upward since 1956. On top of them, no bloodshed or major 
famines were reported. Although the year of 1954 saw a serious food crisis, as 
discussed in next section, the overall food situation was steadily improving, as 
evidenced by the gradual increase in per capita food availability. 
Why did then the DPRK not face such agricultural disturbances as other 
socialist countries did? It is difficult and perhaps unwise to give conclusive answers to 
this question, given little available data in this period. Nonetheless, some basic 
characteristics of the DPRK cooperativisation are still worth of noting. 
First, the cooperativisation started from the agriculture ruined by the Korean 
War. Because production had already fallen drastically and the country's 
rehabilitation efforts continued throughout the cooperativisation, production was more 
likely to increase rather than fall. 
Table 4-5. Agricultural Development During Cooperativisation 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
Grain Production 
(1000 MT) 2327 2230 2340 2873 3201 3700 3803 
Per capita food 
availability (kg)* 274 307 352 
No. of tractor 
(15 hp) 764 800 2561 2554 2671 12500 
Irrigated area 
(1949=100) 145 230 510 
Use of chemical 
fertiliser per 
chungbo(kg) 131** 113 160 
* per capita food availability = grain production/total population ** 1949 figure 
Source) Chosun Joongang Nyungam 
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Second, the authorities took gradual and careful steps toward the completion 
of cooperativisation. Unlike the land reform that ended in a month, agricultural 
cooperativisation took almost six years to complete. It was also not the case that the 
cooperativisation involved all farm households from the beginning. The authorities 
first focused on poor farm households that had most positive attitudes to cooperative 
farming, and then gradually expanded the targets to middle and rich farm households. 
Third, during the cooperativisation farm households were allowed to exit 
cooperatives at their free will. It is true that, as the cooperativisation drive intensified, 
more coercive methods were applied to force farm households into cooperatives. 
Nonetheless, the exit right was well respected and actually exercised until the very 
end of cooperativisation. 98 
Fourth, private land ownership was respected during the cooperativisation. 
There were two principles concerning the cooperativisation of farm households' 
private assets. In case of farm implements, animal and other assets except land, 
cooperatives paid the market prices. In case of land, however, they did not pay the 
price. Instead, the owners preserved their private land ownership even while the land 
98 In August 1954, a year after the pilot cooperativisation program was launched, Ministry of 
Agriculture announced standard charter of agricultural cooperative. Apart from clarifying the 
organisational structures of cooperatives, the charter proclaimed two important rights of the 
cooperative members: 1) the members could join and leave cooperatives at their free will; 2) the 
members could preserve their private land ownership even after joining cooperatives (Sunjin Nongup, 
the Explanation of the Standard Charter of Agricultural Cooperatives (3) [in Korean], June 1955, p. 
115). 
Of course, both rights were effectively abolished when the authorities made new standard 
charter in November 1958, announcing: 
Article 5. Cooperative collectively owns all lands and crops subject to it..... 
Article 10-4. The members could exit cooperative. But those existing cooperative can not be 
allocated collectively owned production means and communal properties..... (Standard Charter 
of Agricultural Cooperative, 24 November 1958) 
Since the new charter abolished the private land ownership in cooperatives, it also effectively 
prevented the members from exiting the cooperatives. 
Until the new charter was announced, however, both the exit rights and private ownership of 
the cooperative members were well respected. For instance, There was so-called "Baechun Baram 
[wind]" between the autumn 1956 and the spring 1957. In Baechun county, South Hwanghae, most 
farm households left cooperatives as soon as the 1956 output distribution was completed. For this 
incident Ko Bong Gi, the chairman of South Hwanghae province party committee, was purged and the 
central Party launched a massive scale of investigation, which revealed that those who initiated the 
exiting from cooperatives were rich and upper middle farm households, and that they had just 
temporarily joined the cooperatives to avoid both high taxes on private farming and the pressure of 
local authorities. Although there are no records available to show how the authorities treated those farm 
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was collectively cultivated in cooperatives. And the land was returned to the owners 
when they left cooperatives. This private land ownership was well maintained until 
the November 1958 Standard Charter of Agricultural Cooperative announced that all 
the land in cooperatives must be collectively owned. [see footnote 98] 
Fifth, farm households had a large extent of independence in forming and 
operating cooperatives. They freely chose the organisational forms of their 
cooperatives, elected the chairman and other staff, and selected other members among 
applicants and carried out production and marketing with little state control. The 
authorities of course eventually took over cooperatives. But they did it gradually 
through number of steps, which finally finished in April 1957. Thus cooperatives 
operated independently for somewhat long periods after the cooperativisation drive 
was first launched in August 1953. 
4.2.4. The Structure of Cooperative Farm 
The basic structure of cooperative has had little changes since the cooperativisation 
was completed in 1959. In the late 1980s, for instance, an average cooperative had 
around 300 farm households, 500 chungbo of land and 6-7 tractors per 100 chungbo, 
predominantly engaging in grain production. 99 It was almost same to the late 1950s. 
Organisational Structure 
Agricultural cooperative has two official purposes: executing state agricultural plans 
and improving their members' living conditions. 
Article 3. Cooperative focuses on agricultural production according to state people's economic plan, 
rationally organises side-works, correctly manages commodity circulation, credits, education, culture and 
health programs, and improves members' living conditions by continuously developing its economy1°° 
households, this incident suggests at least that the exit right in cooperatives was actually exercised until 
the very end of cooperativisation. (Suh Dong Man, 1995, p. 417-420) 
99 Oh Dae Ho (1989), p. 41-43 
100 Standard Charter of Agricultural Cooperative, 24 November 1958 
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To realise the purposes the cooperative is organised as follows. The highest 
decision-making organ is General Assembly, a meeting of all members, or 
Representative Convention called into regular session at least once a quarter either on 
the initiative of Management Committee or on the request of more than one third of 
total members. 101 General Assembly notifies the orders of the country's leader, Kim 
Jong Il, to the members, enacts and amends all decrees and regulations governing the 
cooperative, ratifies annual production plan submitted by Management Committee, 
approves output distribution and so forth. Of the various functions of General 
Assembly, the most important is to select Management and Inspection Committees, 
the two key administrative bodies of the cooperative. 
Management Committee, consisting of 9-25 members serving for a term of 
one year, is in charge of the daily operations of the cooperative and so responsible for 
its performance. In principle, the chairman of Management Committee who 
automatically holds the chairman of village people's committee is elected by the free 
vote of the members. In practice, however, he/she has been appointed by the 
communist party since the Party Central Committee ordered in April 1957 that the 
chairman must be from so-called core classes such as the families of the dead in the 
Korean War or of the party members, and that county and province people's 
committees must review the backgrounds of those elected by the cooperative 
members before they gave approval. 102 The chairman has one chief technician and 
two vice-chairmen. It was the responsibility of chief technician to make production 
plan, allocate works among work teams and sub-work teams, monitor their 
performance and provide technical supports. In contrast, the vice-chairmen are in 
charge of handling all the properties of cooperative, including social properties such 
as nurseries and clinics, and providing adequate funds and materials for production. 
The chief technician supervises various work-teams [jakupban). Usually a 
work team is formed in a natural hamlet, comprising 7-80 farm households. 
According to geographical conditions, however, 2-3 work-teams could be established 
in a hamlet in flat areas while 2-3 hamlets could form only one work-team in 
mountainous areas. There are many different work-teams by functions: grain 
(agricultural) production, vegetable production, sericulture, animal rearing, fishery, 
101 Oh Dae Ho (1989) p. 29-40 
88 
machinery, housing work-teams etc. Of them, grain production work teams have the 
greatest importance and the largest scale, comprising from 100-120 chungbo of land 
in flat areas to 40-60 chungbo in mountainous areas. 
Actual production is carried out by sub-teams [bunjo]. A sub-team consists of 
15-20 farm households in flat areas, 12-18 in intermediate areas and 8-12 in 
mountainous areas. Every sub-team is allocated its own land as well as farm 
implements and animals, being solely responsible for the production of its land. In 
this reason each sub-team constitutes the basic unit for output distribution. 
Production, Marketing and Side-works 
The most important task of the cooperative is to increase grain production. 
Indeed the authorities give all the cooperatives different ranks according to their grain 
production, differentiating the number of staff of Management Committees and the 
amounts of state resource supplies. And it is prohibited for farm households to grow 
grain privately in their private plots. Of its grain production, as discussed in the next 
section, the cooperative is responsible for selling all the remaining grains to state after 
deducting its assigned grain requirements that are determined by the authorities. 
The cooperative should meet other agricultural production and procurement 
targets as well. Of its products, industrial crops are procured in their whole amounts 
by state procurement agencies. By contrast, other products such as vegetables and 
fruits could be freely sold to state enterprises and consumers after fulfilling state 
delivery quotas. 
In case of vegetables, farm households could produce them privately in their 
private plots. 
Article 6. In principle cooperative produces vegetables jointly in communal land, but for some occasions 
cooperative could give each farm household private plot with the maximum of 30-50 pyung from its 
collectively owned land. 
Article 7..... Member farm households could own small amounts of farm implements and facilities in 
order to handle their private plots..... 103 
102 Chosun Jonsa Vol. 29 p. 62-63 
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Although the production from private plots is in principle for farm households' own 
consumption, it is allowed to sell them freely in farmers' markets. 
Income Distribution 
Income distribution is made by a somewhat complicate work-point system. 
The net income of the cooperative is derived by subtracting various deductions 
from total outputs, including: 1) the fees for using state resources such as farm 
machinery, tractors and irrigation; 2) production fund for seed, fodder and fertiliser 
etc; 3) communal accumulation fund for machinery purchase and social and cultural 
facility constructions etc; 4) social and cultural fund for the maintenance of nurseries, 
libraries, and other facilities; 5) assistance fund for needy families., 04 It is the 
remaining income, reportedly 30-50 percent of total outputs, after deducting all the 
above payments that is available for the distribution among the member households. 
To distribute the income the cooperative assesses each member's performance 
in the following ways. Above all, all farm works are grouped into six types according 
to their physical difficulties and demanding skills. Each type has a different work 
point. And the members earn their working days [nodong il] on the basis of their 
performance in production: 1 os 
W= wt(F/S)9 
where W =working days, wt = work point by type, F= work fulfilment, S= work 
standard, q= work quality. For instance, the weeding for maize production is a type V 
work that assigns 1.4 working points for the worker who weeds 100 pyung 
completely. Suppose however that a member weeds only 90 pyung of which 10 
percent, that is, 9 pyung have still some remained weeds. Then this member's working 
days for his weeding is: 
1.134 = 1.4 x (901100)x (0.9) 
103 Standard Charter of Agricultural Cooperatives, 24 November 1958 
104 Yoon Iii Joong (1977), p. 66 
105 Oh Dae Ho (1989), p. 104 
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The final income share of a member at the end of the year is in principle determined 
by the share of his cumulative working days earned relative to the grand total working 
days of all members of the cooperative for the year. But two problems would appear if 
this principle were directly applied to income distribution. First, the members would 
attempt to earn more working days rather than improve their productivity for the 
increase of final products. Second, some members having more favourable conditions 
such as more fertile land would earn working days more easily. To resolve the 
problems the cooperative imposes all work-teams and sub-teams concrete production 
quotas according to working conditions, exercising two bonus systems: work-team 
bonus system [jakupban udaeje] and sub-team group contract system [bunjo 
dogupje]. 106 
Under the work-team bonus system the actual output in excess of 90 percent 
of production quota is directly awarded to the work-team. At the same time, if a work 
team falls short of 90 percent of production quota, it must contribute 5 to 15 percent 
of the deficiency to the cooperative. Using this system income distribution is first 
made among work-teams. That is, around 10 percent of income is distributed 
according to each work team's performance in compared with its production quota. 
And the remaining 90 percent is distributed according to the share of the cumulative 
working days earned by each work-team to the grand working days earned by all 
work-teams. 
In work team the income is redistributed among individual members using the 
sub-team group contract system. Under this system the working days earned by each 
sub-team are corrected upward or downward, depending on whether it over- or under- 
fulfilled its production quota. On the basis of those adjusted working days the income 
is distributed among sub-teams. And then finally each sub-team divides its income 
among individual members according to the share of their working days. 
106 For the explanation of work-team bonus system and sub-team group contract system in English, see 
Chung (1974), p. 26-29 
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4.3. The 1954-55 Food Crisis, State Grain Marketing, Food Rationing 
and Supplement Food Supply Channels 
In 1957-59 the DPRK authorities reformed agricultural marketing and food rationing 
institutions. The purpose of the reform was to solve state grain collection problem 
permanently. To do this state grain marketing institutions were established to collect 
all rural grain surpluses. In return, food rationing expanded farm households and 
various supplement food supply channels were institutionalised. These three 
institutions have been still put in place, featuring the DPRK food distribution and 
consumption. 
4.3.1. The 1954-55 Food Crisis and State Grain Collection Problem 
In 1954 the DPRK authorities faced a similar grain collection problem to that in 1945- 
46. Until this time state grain collection was predominantly dependent on agricultural 
tax-in-kind that claimed 25 percent of harvest. During the Korean War however the 
authorities had to make several tax concessions and exemptions in order to help poor 
and lower middle farm households that suffered serious production losses. 107 After the 
war another concessions and exemptions were necessary to encourage farm 
households to join newly formed cooperatives. In consequence, the tax rate declined 
to 20.1 percent of harvest at the end of 1953. In contrast, urban food demand 
increased rapidly after the war. Due to the post-war population movement into cities 
the population of Pyongyang increased by 60 percent for less than a year between 
January and December 1953.108 And the ongoing industrialisation drive pushed up the 
share of industrial labourers from 19 percent of total population in 1949 to 21.2 
percent in 1953 [see table 3-9 in chapter 31. 
To make the matter worse, the autumn harvest of 1954 was extremely poor. 
Grain production fell below the wartime (1950-53) level, recording the lowest since 
107 Cabinet decree no. 40, on providing peasants in calamities with food to secure their farming 
activities, 13 March 1952; cabinet decree no. 114, on a partial exemption in agricultural tax-in-kind for 
the 1952 early crops, 20 June 1952; cabinet decree no. 161, on exemptions in the 1952 agricultural tax- 
in-kind and state grain loans for poor peasants in food shortages, 30 September 1952. 
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1948 [see table 4-1 ]. It was therefore increasingly difficult for the government to meet 
urban food demand only by agricultural tax-in-kind. 
In this circumstance the authorities launched a compulsory grain collection 
campaign between November 1954 and February 1955 that was quite similar to the 
1945-46 campaign. On 15 October 1954 the operation of grain merchants was 
prohibited and individual grain trade was effectively banned. 109 And on 3rd November 
1954 the Party Central Committee criticised the poor performance of the 1954 NKCA 
grain procurement, ordering the government to make new grain procurement plans 
and find all possible procurement sources. ' 10 
According to this order, compulsory grain delivery quotas were imposed on 
farm households until the end of November; and harsh grain collection procedures 
followed. Local cadres searched all villages to find unreported grain and, if caught, 
confiscated it without compensation. Those who did not co-operate with grain 
deliveries were threatened and beaten. 
The government agents, according to Chang, operated from a temporary headquarters with three 
rooms. In the first room, the initial negotiations took place. Armed with production reports, agents 
opened discussions on how much grains the farmer held, and how much he should sell to the 
government, urging that the farmer sell a maximum amount..... If the farmer resisted the demands 
of agent, he was taken to the second room. Here, more pressure was applied, with tougher 
language being used. If he remained adamant, he was moved to a third room where naked force 
was used. "Are you or are you not going to sell the government this amount of grain? " was the 
sole question asked, and if the answer remained negative the farmer had cold water poured on 
him, was beaten, and was subjected to other mistreatment. 111 
Not surprisingly this campaign caused severe rural food shortages in the 
winter of 1954-55. Indeed, many defectors stated that there occurred a small-scale 
famine. A defector recalled: 
108 Chosun Jonsa, Vo1.28, p. 50 
109 Cabinet decree no. 130, on prohibiting individual grain merchants, 15 October 1954 
110 "On the prospect struggle measures of the Workers' Party for the rapid rehabilitation and 
development in agricultural economy", 3 November 1954, in the Korean Workers' Party Central 
Committee, Gyuljongjip-1954 [decrees-1954], p. 5-39 
11 Scalapino & Lee (1972), p. 1060 
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I saw many farmers who had been mobilised for construction work at the Hwangju Airfield 
collapse from hunger. The bark was peeled off from the pine trees for food as in the old days. The 
crisis was nation wide. 
112 
There are no available official figures or literature either to confirm or to deny the 
existence of the famine. Nevertheless the defectors' statements seem quite real for 
two reasons. First, it was officially reported in 1954 that 40 percent of total farm 
households had great difficulties to feed themselves, 50 percent managed their livings 
with some difficulties and only 10 percent enjoyed some amounts of surpluses, 113 
Given that 90 percent of farm households could not feed themselves properly, it 
would be odd that such a hash grain collection like in 1954-55 did not cause a food 
crisis in rural areas. Second, the authorities admitted increasing unrest among farm 
households. On 2 February 1955 the Party Central committee warned that the 1954-55 
grain collection campaign was destabilising rural society too much even while state 
grain purchase remained moderate. ' 14 It blamed that local cadres ignored the supply 
of industrial goods for grain purchase, ordering the government to end the campaign 
by 10 February 1955. If there was no rural food crisis, this order should not be made. 
According to the above party order, the compulsory grain collection was 
replaced with a voluntary procurement by NKCA in February 1955, which eventually 
ended on 24 June 1955 when the authorities re-allowed individual grain trade and 
lifted all the remaining grain delivery quotas from farm households. ' 15 
It is not clear how severe the 1954-55 food crisis was and how long it lasted. 
Nevertheless the existence of the crisis was enough to demonstrate a dilemma the 
DPRK authorities faced concerning state grain collection in the early 1950s. During 
this period, as the rate of agricultural tax-in kind continued to fall and the NKCA 
procurement remained minimal, ' 16 state grain purchase was increasingly necessary to 
meet growing urban food demand. Unlike the NKCA procurement, however, state 
collection was likely to cause much rural unrest because it imposed compulsory 
112 Chong Sik Lee's interview with Kim Nam Sik, Yusong, August 28-29,1969, in Scalapino & Lee 
(1972), p. 1059 
1'3 Kim II Sung Jojakjip Vol. 5, p. 113 
114 The Party Central Committee decision , on the assessment of grain procurement project and the 
measure to strengthen rural policies, 2 February 1955. 
115 Kim Sung Bo (2000) p. 354 
116 For the changes of the tax rate in this period, see table 3-6 in chapter 3 
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delivery quotas that did not take rural food consumption into consideration. The 
dilemma was that it was difficult to incorporate rural food consumption into state 
grain collection, even if the authorities intended to do, when agriculture consisted of a 
vast number of farm households carrying out consumption and production 
independently. It means that a similar food crisis could always happen whenever the 
authorities needed to impose compulsory delivery quotas on farm households. 
4.3.2. The Institutional Solutions to State Grain Collection Problem 
Between November 1957 and January 1959 the authorities found the institutional 
solutions to the above dilemma. Three solutions came out under the assumption that 
cooperative farms constituted the only grain producers in agriculture. First, state 
agencies purchased all surplus grains from cooperative farms. Second, food rationing 
expanded to cooperative farms in order to ensure a certain level of food consumption 
for farm households. Third, apart from state food rations, both urban and rural 
population were given additional opportunities to increase their food consumption. 
4.3.2.1. State Grain Marketing 
Institutional changes began by establishing new state grain marketing institutions. In 
contrast to the previous agricultural marketing institutions such as agricultural tax-in- 
kind, the NKCA procurement and markets, the new institutions had three distinctive 
features. First, they aimed to collect all surplus grains from producers while the 
previous institutions left considerable amounts of surpluses to producers. Second, 
private grain trade was strictly prohibited. Third, the powers and responsibilities of 
grain purchase were transferred from NKCA to professional state procurement 
agencies under the directives of local people's committees. 
State grain marketing started on 3 November 1957 when the authorities announced a 
cabinet decree of food trade: 
The DPRK cabinet makes the following decisions about carrying out food sales under a 
unified state system. 
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1) Grain procurement from peasants and food sales to residents are carried out only by a 
unified state system 
2) Agricultural cooperatives and peasants sell surplus grain only to state; and prohibit all 
individual merchant activities on grain from 1 December 1957.......... 7 11 
The decree laid the foundation for the government to control all grain circulation in 
the economy. Indeed, private grain trade was prohibited and thus the government 
appeared as the only grain trader. It was however still difficult for two reasons for the 
government to collect all rural surplus grains. First, there were no administrative 
organisations dealing with state grain purchase. Second, although grain producers 
should sell their surpluses only to state, it was still their rights to decide how much to 
sell and even whether or not to sell. 
To resolve the difficulties the authorities first launched a local administrative 
reform on 18 October 1958, establishing professional state procurement agencies in 
agriculture. 
1) The procurement tasks that were carried out by rural consumption cooperative networks 
and Consumer Association in villages and labour districts are transferred to each province 
people's committee from 30 November this year. "8 
According to the reform, Procurement Division (and Section) was newly formed in 
province (and county) people's committee, being in charge of planning, supervising 
and monitoring grain purchases. 119 And Province (and County) Procurement Station 
was established as professional state procurement agency under the directives of 
province (and county) people's committee. It was responsible for collecting grains 
from cooperative farms, according to provincial plan, and delivering them to local 
food administration stations that rationed food among urban residents. 
Because the reform assigned each province people's committee for the final 
. responsibility of state grain purchase, grain collection was planned and organised at 
provincial level. Nevertheless it was necessary to co-ordinate provincial food balances 
at central level. For this purpose Ministry of Food Administration was expanded into 
1 17 Cabinet decree no. 102, on carrying out food sales under a unified state system, 3 November 1957 
118 Cabinet decree no. 128, on partially reorganising guidance, commodity supply and procurement 
system in rural commerce, 18 October 1958 
119 Kim Chun Sung (1989), p. 98-114 
96 
Ministry of Procurement and Food Administration (MPFA) that controlled and co- 
ordinated both provincial grain collections and inter-provincial food trade. And 
Central Procurement Station was established under the directive of MPFA, carrying 
out grain deliveries among provinces. 
Then the authorities announced `the sale of all surplus grain to state' as a legal 
obligation of cooperative farms, finally completing state grain marketing institutions. 
The November 1958 Standard Charter of Agricultural Cooperative read: 
article 25. Cooperative should obligatorily carry out state procurement tasks by selling to 
state all surplus grain, including `communal fond (fund)' that is financed in kind........... 120 
The charter empowered the government to define the amount of surplus grain in 
cooperative farm by announcing that it should operate according to state economic 
plan (article 3), and that its chairman who was under control of county people's 
committee was solely responsible for the sales of agricultural products (article 20). On 
this basis, state procurement agencies began to collect all rural grain surpluses from 
the 1958 autumn harvest. 
Specifically, state collection absorbed the surpluses by two channels: 
obligatory procurement [euimu sumae] and free procurement [jayu sumae]. 1' 1 
Obligatory procurement referred to the legally imposed delivery quotas. The quotas 
were imposed on both cooperative farms and local procurement agencies. They were 
usually set as a certain percentage of production quotas; and cooperative farms should 
meet them, regardless of their actual grain production. By contrast, free procurement 
was employed to adjust the difference between the grain allocation and standard food 
ration of each farm household in cooperative farms. Unlike obligatory procurement 
the procurement targets were imposed only on local procurement agencies, not on 
cooperative farms. Hence, both cooperative farms and farm households had no legal 
obligation to fulfil them. Nonetheless, cooperative farms forced farm households to 
sell state agencies the differences between their grain allocations and standard food 
rations. It was therefore practically impossible for farm households to keep more 
grains than their food rations officially determined by the authorities. 
120 Standard Charter of Agricultural Cooperative, 24 November 1958 
121 Yoon Ki Joong (1977), p. 70-72; Shin Dong Sik (1993) p. 36-37 
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As state grain marketing institutions were settled down, the previous 
marketing institutions were gradually dismantled. Of total 3700 cooperative farms, 
1331 had been exempted from agricultural tax-in-kind by 1963 and another 1,772 
farms by 1965. And the tax was finally abolished in April 1966.122 Before that, the 
NKCA procurement had already ended in 1958. Due to the prohibition of private 
grain trade existing agricultural markets were either closed or merged into the only 
remaining farmers' markets. Even the operations of farmers' markets were 
increasingly limited to circulating minimal amounts of non-grain foodstuffs corning 
from small private plots of farm households. 
4.3.2.2. State Food Rationing for the Whole Population 
In parallel with the introduction of state grain marketing, there were two important 
changes in state food rationing. First, state food rations were supplied to all urban 
population. Second, a similar rationing mechanism was established for farm 
households. As the result, state food rationing began to cover the whole population 
from November 1958. 
In the 1940s, as discussed in chapter 3, state food rationing was applied only 
to urban socialist sector. In 1952, however, urban industrial cooperatives and private 
23 firms licensed by the government were officially included in state food rationing., 
And urban industrial collectivisation was completed in August 1958, making all urban 
population entitled to state food rations. 124 In consequence, the number of official 
rationing population increased rapidly. It amounted to 29.7 percent of total population 
in 1953, in compared with 18.6 percent in 1946; and the figure rose up to 38 percent 
in 1959. 
However what differentiated the state food rationing of the 1950s most was 
not the increase in official rationing population, but the fact that rural population was 
in effect included in the rationing. In 1954 the authorities allowed some cooperative 
farms to provide food rations to their members in order to promote agricultural 
cooperativisation. And this practice had been applied to all cooperative farms by 
122 Supreme People's Assembly, On abolishing agricultural tax-in-kind completely, 29 April 1966 123 For details, see section 3.3, chapter 3 
98 
November 1958 when state grain marketing commenced. The purpose of this policy 
was to protect minimal rural food consumption and so prevent the occurrence of 
another food crisis even while the government procured all rural grain surpluses. 
It did not mean that farm households were entitled to state food rations as 
urban population. On the contrary, the authorities have emphasised until present time 
that every cooperative farm should be self-sufficient on food. Nonetheless, it seems 
fair to say for three reasons that farm households were effectively incorporated into 
state food rationing in the late 1950s. 
First, standard grain allocation was defined for every farm household in 
cooperative farm. And the allocation was based on state food rationing norms. For 
instance, Kim 11 Sung wrote: 
Some says that leaving a peasant with 400 kg of algok [grain] for food is too much. This is a 
false view. Converting 400 kg of algok into rice gives around 320kg and dividing it by 365 days yields 
800 grams per day. How could peasants do physically demanding farming works without eating 800 
grams of rice per day. '25 
When the above remark was made in the mid 1960s, state food ration for (heavy) 
industrial worker was 800 grams per day. It means that the authorities allowed farm 
households to keep the same amounts of foodgrains as their counterparts in industry 
received from state rationing institutions. 126 A number of defectors who had been 
engaged in farming activities in the DIRK also stated that they received roughly the 
same amounts of grains as industrial workers. ' 27 
Second, farm households were entitled to their standard grain allocations. 
Income distribution in cooperative farms, as described in section 4.2.4, was 
determined according to each member's contribution to production. Hence some 
households might receive less grains than their standard allocations. However, even 
when it was the case, they could secure their standard grain allocations by two 
channels. Those who received less grains for temporal reasons such as illness were 
entitled to grain loans from their farms, the maximum of which was 30 percent of 
124 For the cooperativisation in private manufacture and merchant sector, see The Korean Workers' 
Party Publisher (1960) 
125 Kim II Suing Jojakjip Vol. 20, p. 14 
126 See table 3-8 in Chapter 3. The 1952 food rationing norm had not changed until 1973. 
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actual allocations. ' 28 And those who suffered low income due to permanent reasons, 
including the losses of family members during the Korean War, were provided food 
aid by their farms. ' 29 
Third, the authorities allowed cooperative farms to keep necessary grains to 
provide standard grain allocations to their member households. Indeed, available 
DPRK literature suggests that state grain collections were carried out in a way to 
ensure that cooperative farms had the assigned amounts of grains to feed their 
members. For instance, a cabinet decree dated 20 July 1961 read: 
article 1. This rule honours cities, counties and agricultural cooperatives that left enough grain for- 
members, seeds, fodder and then sold to state more grain, meat, vegetables, and other agricultural 
130 products.... [italics added] 
A DPRK source made a similar report: 
The primary task of taking care of farm members' livings was to make them free of worries in 
eating, wearing and consuming problems. To do this the farms made the farm members keep 
enough rice from algok [grain] they produced and then sell the remains to state. And for other 
secondary foodstuffs farm members were in principle encouraged to use private plots 
effectively... 131 [italics added] 
And the cooperative farms in Najin-Sunbong special economic zone distributed their 
grain production in the 1990s in the following orders: 
1) payments and communal fund 
2) distribution among farm members according to their works 
3) state procurement of production in excess of the target 
4) state procurement of farm members' allocations in excess of standard rations 
127 Scalapino & Lee (1972), p. 1056-1058 
128 Article 48 of Standard Charter of Agricultural Cooperatives, 24 November 1958 
129 Article 47 of Standard Charter of Agricultural Cooperatives, 24 November 1958 
130 Cabinet decree no 116, Rules on giving honours to cities, counties and agricultural cooperatives that 
sold more agricultural products to state, 20 July 1961 
M Oh Dae Ho (1989), p. 109-110 
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5) patriot rice (10 percent of final allocations to farm members), pigs supporting people's army 
(70 kg of grains per households)'32 
In this reason the DPRK leaders frequently complained that, even if it was necessary 
to increase urban food supply, farm households were not interested in increasing food 
production more than what they needed for their own consumption. For instance, Kim 
IL Sung wrote: 
But now some peasants did not work hard, having egoistic thought that it is enough to produce 
what they eat. If peasants produce only rice that they eat, what should labour eat and how could 
he make cloths, machinery and fertiliser?..... 
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The above three facts suggest that farm households were effectively included 
in state food rationing. But they also show that the rationing mechanism for farm 
households was different from that for urban population. 
Until that time (and even until present time) urban population was biweekly 
provided state food rations by administrative organisations. '34 The rationing 
proceeded by provinces, with locally available food sources, under the responsibility 
of the chairman of province people's committee. But the central government set up a 
nationally unified rationing norm, planning and co-ordinating inter-provincial food 
trade to equalise state food rations among provinces. 
To compare, farm households received food rations from their cooperative 
farms, not from administrative organisations. The government was not responsible for 
providing food rations to farm households, but instead it allowed cooperative farms to 
keep necessary grains to provide the rations. Food rations for farm households were 
basically equivalent to those for their counterparts in industry. Unlike urban 
population however farm households received their annual rations at once shortly 
after harvest was completed. 
2 Ryu Tae Young (1998), p. 83 
X 33 Kinn II Sung Jojakjip Vol. 28, p. 189 
134 For details, see section 4.2 of Chapter 3 
101 
4.3.2.3. Institutions for Supplementing Food Rations 
Owing to the introduction of state grain marketing and the expansion of state food 
rationing, the government could control the distribution and consumption of foodgrain 
up to household level. Yet it caused a burden that the government should provide 
appropriate food rations to the whole population even while the country's grain 
production was small and volatile. 
To reduce the burden the government took three measures between the early 
1950s and the early 1960s. First, it institutionalised the practice that both farm and 
non-farm households privately grew other food items than grain, including vegetables, 
fruits and meats etc, either for their own consumption or for markets. Second, 
cooperative farms were allowed to freely sell their food products except grain to final 
consumers after meeting state delivery targets. Third, state enterprises shared the 
responsibility to provide their employees with all necessary foodstuffs except grain. 
Initially the above measures appeared during the Korean War when urban 
food rations were severely deteriorated. On 21 February 1952, for example, the 
government announced a cabinet decree to allocate agricultural land to state 
institutions under interior ministry and education ministry, allowing them to conduct 
farming activities to compensate insufficient food rations. '35 And five days later 
another similar decree was announced for universities and colleges across the 
country. 136 Although the decrees were temporal until the end of the war, the practice 
for non-farm households to involve farming activities did not stop since. On the 
contrary, the practice was institutionalised for all state enterprises in December 1961 
when the new industrial management system called Daean Work System was 
established. 137 
Daean Work System referred to the collective management principle of the 
DPRK state enterprises in which the factory party committee exercises the traditional 
roles of manager. An interesting point was that it imposed on state enterprises the 
responsibility to supply all necessary foodstuffs to their employees, creating the 
position of second vice-chairman who was solely responsible for this task. It caused 
15 Cabinet decree no. 24, on the resolutions for land required to farms of subordinate organisations 
under interior ministry and education ministry, 21 February 1952 
136 Cabinet decree no. 52, on running farms by universities and colleges, 26 February 1952 
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two important changes in the pattern of urban food supply. First, almost all state 
enterprises had their own food production facilities. Daean Electric Factory where the 
System was born, for example, was reported to have 70 chungbo of land for vegetable 
production, another 80 chungbo for fruit production, a chicken factory that produced 
45,000 eggs per day, and a similar scale of pig factory in order to feed 5,000 
employees. Second, state enterprises independently purchased agricultural products 
from cooperative farms unless the products were grains. Because the second chairman 
of state enterprise held the chairman of labour district management committee where 
the enterprise located, Daean Work System meant that the responsibility of urban 
food supply should be shared between the government and state enterprises. 
Similar practices were institutionalised in cooperative farms as well. Above 
all, the marketing of other food items was carried out differently from that of grain. 
For these items there were three different purchasers: state procurement agencies, 
state enterprises and individual consumers. After fulfilling compulsory delivery 
quotas to state agencies, cooperative farms were allowed to sell their products to state 
enterprises under long-term supply contracts or to individual consumers in markets. ' 38 
And farm households were allowed to produce other foodstuffs privately, 
though private grain production was strictly prohibited. As pointed out already, they 
had private plots, a small number of animals, farm implements and additional grains 
for animal fodder under their private ownership. And the products from these assets 
were freely sold in farmers' markets. 
In consequence, if excluding grain, there had emerged an agricultural system 
by the early 1960s in which virtually all the economic agents were engaged in food 
production and circulation. 
4.4. New Agricultural Management System and Local Planning 
Between 1959 and 1961 the DPRK authorities laid the foundations for the current 
planning institutions in agriculture. The institutions aimed to give local administrators 
real powers and responsibilities to control agriculture independently. Although their 
137 Brun & Hersch (1977), p. 357 
US Kim Chun Sung (1989), p. 98-114 
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actual workings have changed since the early 1970s, their basic structures have 
remained unchanged to the present time. 
4.4.1. Early Ministerial Planning in 1955-60 
As already mentioned, agricultural planning that incorporated cooperative farms 
started in August 1955 according to the Party Central Committee decision of 
November 1954. The authorities imposed both production targets and delivery quotas 
on cooperative farms, and it was officially announced by the November 1958 
Standard Charter of Agricultural Cooperative that cooperative farms should operate 
according to state economic plan. 
By 1960 agricultural plans had been made, executed, and monitored by the 
existing ministerial hierarchy: Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) --> Agricultural 
Division in province people's committee -4 Agricultural Section in county people's 
committee -4 cooperative farm in village. 
It was MOA that had the final responsibility for agricultural planning. MOA 
involved the planning in three ways. First, it made draft plan for both current (annual) 
plan and prospective (3-7 year) plan, submitting it to SPC for transformation into 
control figures. Second, once draft plan was transformed into control figures, MOA 
made ministerial plan (resource allocation plan) that the local authorities and 
cooperative farms should follow in their actual operations. Third, MOA organised 
technical and administrative supports for the local authorities and cooperative farms, 
including: 1) agricultural research about new seed varieties, advanced technologies 
and new machinery etc; 2) the education and dispatch of agronomists and technicians 
to rural areas; 3) the making of standard forms and procedures in assessing, 
monitoring, and reporting agricultural performance through the administrative 
hierarchy. 
The local authorities focused on delivering state plans to cooperative farms. 
The main responsibility of Agricultural Division in province people's committee was 
to divide state production targets by counties, allocate state resources owned by the 
province, and monitor the performance of counties. Agricultural Section in county 
people's committee had similar functions. It distributed the targets and resources 
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among villages (cooperatives), according to the size of land, labour force and 
productivity etc, and monitored their performance. 
The local authorities were also responsible for supervising the operations of 
cooperative farms. For instance, Agricultural Section in county people's committees 
was responsible for guiding cooperative farms to make monthly or weekly working 
plans, supervising their labour and resource allocation plans, solving technical 
problems, introducing new seeds and technologies and organising the delivery 
processes of agricultural products to state. In practice, however, the local authorities 
were hardly engaged in the actual operations of cooperative farms due to the lack of 
experienced cadres. By 1960 a county people's committee had had only 2 personnel 
who dealt with agricultural planning, while there were around 15 villages in a 
county. 139 And most county people's committee did not have even a single 
agronomist/agricultural specialist. 140 It was therefore practically impossible for county 
people's committee to control the daily operations of cooperative farms. 
In this reason agricultural production still proceeded without much 
intervention of administrative organisations. One might assume that village people's 
committee would control the daily operation of cooperative farm because its chairman 
was also the chairman of cooperative farm. But the farm operation were more 
influenced by elder members in village than by the chairman of village people's 
committee. The elder members had great knowledge about the traditional Korean 
farming methods that dominated agriculture at this time. Moreover, they were the 
heads of kinship families that divided village by hamlets. Given that collective 
farming was still in its early stage and the intervention of county administrators was 
limited, those elder members should effectively determine all farm operations. 
But this ministerial planning had some basic problems. First, as the local authorities 
simply imposed production targets and made little efforts to control farm operations, 
it was common for both cooperative farms (villages) and work teams (hamlets) to try 
to reduce their targets rather than meet them. 
139 Yoon Ki Joong (1977), p. 24-25 
140 Kim 11 Sung, For correct management of socialist agriculture, quoted in Chosun Jonsa Vol. 29, P. 
194-5. 
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Secondly, the administrative structure of the local government acted as a 
bottleneck. 141 In county people's committee, for instance, Agricultural Section was in 
charge of agricultural planning while Labour Section controlled labour mobilisation 
from cooperative farms. Cultivating new land was the responsibility of Land Section; 
and resource supply to cooperative farms was under control of Social Section that 
managed county shops. Given these dispersed functions and responsibilities, it was 
difficult to execute agricultural plan efficiently. 
Thirdly, there were confusions in the ownership and allocations of state 
agricultural resources. 142 By 1960 chemical fertilisers and agricultural chemicals were 
distributed by state procurement agencies that were under the directives of MOA. In 
contrast, machine tractor stations, reservoirs and waterways were owned by province 
people's committees. County people's committees also owned local farm implement 
factories and repair stations. 
That state agricultural resources were owned by different administrative levels 
had not caused much trouble in small-scale owner farming where individual farm 
households made separate supply contracts with each resource owner. But the 
situation was different for cooperative farms that depended their input supplies solely 
on the owners' plans. Because most state assets were owned by MOA and provinces 
that did not know the situation in village, their resource allocations were less likely to 
meet the timings and amounts of needs in production. This scattered ownership also 
made it difficult for a single local authority, say, county people's committees to 
control cooperative farms in a unified way. 
The above problems of the ministerial planning drew a particular attention from the 
DPRK as agricultural cooperativisation was completed in 1959. In his famous 
Chongsanri on-the-spot-guidance of January 1960, Kim Il Sung publicly criticised 
that, even though the central government was planning agriculture, cooperative farms 
operated without any concrete plans, ignored the plans and targets imposed upon 
them, wasted labour force and rural resources, and violated socialist distribution 
principles. ' 43 It was, he blamed, the consequence of bureaucratic and administrative 
141 Yoon Iii Joong (1977), p. 25 
14' Yu Gwan Chil (1974), p. 22-25 
143 Kinn 11 Sung Jojakjip Vol. 14, p. 98 
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ways of guidance in which the local authorities simply passed central orders to 
cooperative farms, not bothering to be involved in actual production. 
According to his critique, the government launched an administrative reform 
in agriculture in March 1960.144 All the cooperative-related-functions/sections in local 
people's committees were handed over/merged to Agricultural Division (and Section), 
which in turn went under the direct control of MOA. And many agronomists, 
agricultural technicians and staff who worked in MOA, together with the graduates 
from agricultural colleges, were dispatched to local people's committees and 
cooperative farms to improve their planning capabilities. Undoubtedly the reform 
intended to strengthen the existing MOA hierarchy. But it did not last long: the 
government soon changed its direction, launching another major administrative 
reform that dissolved the MOA hierarchy from the bottom. 
4.4.2. The New Agricultural Management System and Local Planning 
Between September 1959 and December 1961 the DPRK authorities conducted an 
important institutional experiment: to dissolve the ministerial system both in industry 
and agriculture and decentralise authority for controlling economy from the central 
bureaucracies in Pyongyang to local administrators. The main purpose of the 
experiment was to build up self-sufficient regional economies. The experiment proved 
a failure in industry when central ministries were revived in 1983.145 In agriculture, 
however, the local planning institutions established in this time have still dominated 
the DPRK administrative structure. 
4.4.2.1. Industrial Decentralisation Drive in 1958-60 
After the Korean War the DPRK authorities faced two delicate issues concerning 
post-war economic rehabilitation. One concerned the priority of state investment: the 
war damaged all economic sectors while state resources for rehabilitation were 
limited. Another was that economic rehabilitation should be carried out in a way to 
prepare for the possible reoccurrence of war. During the war the DPRK industries, 
144 Chosen Jonsa Vol. 29, P. 204 
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which had geographically concentrated on some industrial cities near natural 
resources, and its transportation facilities were easily exposed to the heavy US 
bombardment. To avoid the similar situation in the possible future war the relocation 
of industries had to be taken into consideration and ultimately regional economic self- 
sufficiency had to be pursued. 
Both issues were eventually resolved as generating the following directions of 
post-war economic rehabilitation: 1) state investment focused on heavy industry, but 
the priority within heavy industry was given to those that had close links with light 
industry and agriculture, for instance, agricultural machinery production; 2) light 
industry developed exclusively on the basis of regional reserves and needs; 3) 
agriculture provided necessary resources and demands for the development of 
regional light industry, ultimately creating regionally self-sufficient economy. 
According to these directions heavy industry developed first between 1953 
and 1958. And it was soon followed by a massive-scale local light industry building 
campaign' between 1958 and 1960.146 On 10 July 1958 the government issued a 
cabinet decree to establish within months more than a thousand local factories 
producing foodstuffs, daily necessities and farming implements. '47 Indeed, the 
number of local factories had soared up to around two thousands by the end of 1960, 
comprising 39 percent of total industrial production and 59 percent of consumer 
goods production. 
It was these local factories that triggered the institutional reform in industry 
and agriculture between 1959 and 1961. In contrast to state enterprises in heavy 
industry, however, local factories in light industry had two distinctive features: 1) they 
were legally owned by the local governments, not by the central government; 2) as 
their operations were entirely dependent on local resources and demands, regional ties 
were more important than technical and functional ties. It was therefore unrealistic for 
central ministries to control their operations according to functional lines. But the 
problem was that existing local administrative organisations had neither experiences 
nor specified institutions to run those local factories. 
145 Ko Seung Hyo (1993), p. 232, footnote 15. 
146 Chosun Jonsa vol. 29. p. 126 
147 Cabinet decree no. 81, on improving and strengthening the production of daily goods and food stuffs, 
10 July 1958 
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To resolve the problem the government launched an institutional reform in 
industry in August 1959.148 The primary purpose of the reform was to establish 
professional state agencies in provinces and counties that could run local factories. 
But its consequences far exceeded establishing new agencies: it dissolved the existing 
ministerial hierarchies in industry and decentralised the powers and responsibilities to 
run the economy. 
At central level, all industrial ministries merged into either Heavy Industry 
Commission or Light Industry Commission. Unlike the previous ministries both 
commissions did not involve the management of state enterprises, except those with 
national importance such as in defence industries. Their roles were confined to 
providing technical and administrative supports for provinces and co-ordinating 
provincial industrial plans. At province level, Province Economy Commission (PEC) 
was created, operating separately from province people's committee. It was formally 
the regional branch of Light Industry Commission but effectively functioned like a 
central ministry under the directives of the cabinet. It owned state enterprises in its 
jurisdiction, planning, managing, monitoring their operations and thus being 
responsible for their performance. At city and county level, City/County Economy 
Commission was established as a subordinate body of PEC. It delivered provincial 
plans to state enterprises, provided them with technical and administrative support and 
reported their performance to PEC. 
4.4.2.2. The Establishment of the New Agricultural Management System 
The institutional reform that started in industry soon spilled over to agriculture. On 15 
December 1961 the Party Central Committee announced a decision of on 
establishing new economic management system", ordering the government to dissolve 
the ministerial hierarchy in agriculture and establish new professional agricultural 
agencies in provinces and counties. '49 Like in industry new state agricultural agencies 
aimed to run cooperative farms. Unlike in industry, however, cooperative farms were 
legally owned by farm households, not by the government. Considering this 
148 Chosun Jonsa vol. 29. p. 136-138 
149 Chosun Jonsa, vol. 30. p. 47-61 
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difference the authorities proclaimed three principles for state agricultural agencies to 
involve the operations of cooperative farms. 
Combination of state ownership and cooperative ownership: Although cooperative 
farms were owned by farm households, the state should participate in their operation 
because it was the only supplier of agricultural inputs such as machinery, farming 
implements, water, fertiliser, agricultural chemicals, seeds, and animals etc. In 
particular, as agricultural production became more dependent on such inputs, it was 
necessary for the state to be the production partner of cooperative farms in order to 
improve their performance. 
Enterprise methods of guidance: When the state was the production partner of 
cooperative farms, administrative guidance that the authorities simply imposed targets 
and assessed their performance was no longer effective. The purpose of state 
intervention was to improve productivity. To realise it, the state should be the 
organiser of farm operation. It should design production process, provide technical 
solutions to the problems in production, supervise the mobilisation of labour and other 
resources and organise output distribution and other farm activities. 
Decentralisation of state guidance: To improve agricultural performance more power 
should be given to lower agricultural agencies that had closer relationship with actual 
production. It should be allowed for local agencies to make their own plans, reflecting 
their own conditions. It was also necessary for local agencies to directly control all 
state assets utilised for agricultural production. 
On the basis of these principles, the government announced on 22 December 1961 a 
cabinet decree concerning so-called new agricultural management system in which 
local agencies planned and organised agriculture independently. 150 
At central level MOA was transformed into Agricultural Commission. In 
contrast to MOA, Agricultural Commission did not have any powers and functions 
relating to agricultural planning. Its main role was to organise agricultural research 
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and provide the cabinet with professional advice about the long-term perspectives of 
agriculture, as summarised in what follows. 151 
Conducting and organising national research to develop agricultural technology 
Educating professional staff and organising scientific research for the long-term 
development of rural economy. 
Organising and guiding nationwide nature reconstruction projects 
Providing the cabinet with professional advice concerning the direction of long-term 
agricultural development 
In consequence, Agricultural Commission was effectively excluded from agricultural 
planning and resource allocation. 
Instead, all the planning-related-powers and functions that MOA had exercised 
were transferred to Province Rural Economy Commission (PREC), new state 
agricultural agency in province. PREC absorbed all agriculture-related-divisions, staff 
and functions of province people's committee, but operated separately from the latter. 
It directly belonged to the cabinet, acting like a central ministry. Of course PREC had 
to report to Agricultural Commission. However, as Agricultural Commission was not 
engaged in agricultural planning and resource allocation, there was no institutional 
channel for it to control PREC. In this respect PREC was a practical central planner in 
each province, as evidenced by its following roles. ' 52 
. Making agricultural plans and monitoring their executions 
Establishing the scientific and technological standards concerning agricultural 
production; 
a) selecting standard seed varieties by crops; b) making rules for crop 
arrangements by land types; c) making rules for labour arrangements by land 
types and by crops; d) establishing the timing of all agricultural activities such as 
sowing, planting, and harvesting etc; e) choosing standard types of fertilisers by 
150 Cabinet decree no. 157, On establishing agricultural cooperatives management commission, 22 
December 1961 
151 The Korean Workers' Party Publisher (1963), p. 94 
152 Park Young Keun 1992: 163-164); Chosun Jonsa vol. 30,66-69; Kim It Sun Jojakjip Vol. 5 ( p. P" Sling 1?. 
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land types and by crops; f) establishing the timing and methods of fertilising; g) 
making other provincial standards necessary for production. 
. 
Establishing and running 'provincial resource supply company' that exclusively 
supplied agricultural inputs to counties and cooperatives 
The most important organisation in the new agricultural management system 
was County Cooperative Management Commission (CCMC). Although it was 
established as a subordinate body of PREC, its roles far exceeded simply 
disaggregating provincial targets among cooperative farms. Rather, its basic 
responsibility was "to directly control and supervise all farm activities from making 
plans to organising production procedures, technological developments, input 
supplies, labour mobilisations and arrangements, financial activities and so forth 1 53 
Indeed, the functions of CCMC included: 154 
. Making county agricultural plans and transforming them 
into concrete production 
orders 
Providing cooperative farms with technical supports and all necessary state resources 
Supervising the labour mobilisations and arrangements of cooperative farms 
Supervising all other farm activities such as financial transactions, output 
distribution, bookkeeping and so forth. 
In short, CCMC aimed to plan, organise and monitor all the operations of cooperative 
farms. To achieve this goal CCMC took over not only the cooperative farm-related 
functions from county people's committee, but also the ownership of all state 
enterprises and organisations providing goods and services to the farms, which had 
been previously controlled by province (and county) people's committee and MOA, 
including machine tractor stations, irrigation administration offices, farm implement 
shops etc. 155 
153 The Korean Workers' Party Publisher (1963), p. 39-40 
b4 Park Young Keun etc (1992: p. 163-164); The Korean Workers' Party Publisher (1963), p. 95-109 ASS Cabinet decree no. 157, On establishing agricultural cooperatives management commission, 22 
December 1961 
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Actual functions of CCMC were carried out by three personnel. First, the chief 
technician under the chairman of CCMC was in charge of agricultural planning. He 
supervised all the production-related activities of cooperative farms, provided 
technical supports and introduced new technologies. Second, the first vice-chairman 
who controlled state enterprises and organisations in county was responsible for 
supplying state inputs to cooperative farms. Third, the second vice-chairman carried 
out labour administration in and among cooperative farms, supervised the 
consumption, marketing and financial activities of cooperative farms. 
As CCMC directly organised their operation, cooperative farms lost their 
independence, being reduced to an agent of state agricultural plans. And there 
appeared the vertical relationships among the key personnel between CCMC and 
cooperative farms. For instance, the chief technician of cooperative farm should 
directly report to the chief technician of CCMC. And the primary responsibility of the 
former was to make and execute biweekly, weekly, daily operational plans according 
to the monthly production orders imposed by the latter. Similarly the two vice- 
chairmen of cooperative farm had to receive and handle the directives from their 
counterparts in CCMC. 
An interesting point was that, since the chairman of cooperative farm was also 
the chairman of village people's committee, he should be subordinated to both CCMC 
and county people's committee. To prevent the confusions of these double directives 
the above cabinet decree of 22 December 1961 proclaimed that the chairman of 
cooperative farm should receive only the commands of CCMC and instead the 
chairman of village party committee should handle the directives of county people's 
committee. 
4.4.2.3. Basic features of the new agricultural management system 
The new agricultural management system brought immediate and profound 
changes to the levels, goals and methods of the authorities to control agriculture. 
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4.4.2.3.1. Local Agricultural Planning 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the new system was that local 
(provincial) administrators planned and organised agriculture independently. Before 
the new system, state intervention in agriculture had been designed and exercised by 
MOA. And the role of local administrators was mainly to distribute central commands 
among producers. By contrast, the new system did not provide any institutional 
channel for Agricultural Commission to control local agricultural agencies. Each 
PREC made its own agricultural plan and functioned like a central ministry. The 
central co-ordination of provincial plans was also carried out by the cabinet, not by 
Agricultural Commission. It means that agricultural planning was now effectively 
localised. 
It should be however noted that this localised planning did not necessarily 
weaken state intervention. Perhaps the opposite was true for two reasons. First, the 
localised planning enabled the authorities to directly control daily farm operations, 
which they had previously failed to. Second, it executed central commands more 
swiftly and efficiently in the sense that PREC was under the direct control of the 
cabinet, and that CCMC was effectively running cooperative farms. A DPRK source 
put these points as follows: '56 
The natural and geographical conditions in our country...... make great differences within 
provinces, counties, cooperative farms and even lands in a farm. Thus there appear different 
regional characteristics in agricultural specialisation, production items, methods of cultivation and 
livestock rearing. Given these conditions it was impossible for MOA to provide technologies and 
production guidance appropriate to regions... Therefore it was the most rational and realistic policy 
to transfer production guidance functions of MOA to provinces.... Making guidance approach to 
production fields strengthens the unified central guidance rather than weakens it. Because PREC 
directly belongs to the cabinet, the party lines and policies spread into lower units more swiftly and 
correctly, and their execution is guaranteed with more responsibilities. Because the problems in 
production reach the centre more rapidly through the channels that provinces directly report to the 
cabinet, they are also resolved correctly. 
1 sý' The Korean Workers' Party Publisher (1963), p. 91-95 
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4.4.2.3.2. Regional food self-sufficiency 
The primary goal of the local planning was to achieve regional food self-sufficiency. 
As discussed in chapter 2 and 3, a basic reason for state intervention in agriculture in 
the DPRK was to resolve chronic food shortages and accomplish the country's food 
self-sufficiency. But, when agriculture was organised separately by provinces, it was 
difficult for the central government to pursue the goal in a unified way. The simplest 
and easiest solution to this problem was to impose food self-sufficiency on every 
region. Indeed the DPRK leaders believed that regional food self-sufficiency was the 
most powerful tool to resolve its chronic food shortages. 
Above all, our party has introduced an important principle of achieving food-self sufficiency in 
every region in the country in order to increase rice production and resolve grain problem. That 
every region in the country is self-sufficient on food means that we fully mobilise and utilise all the 
country's reserves for grain production. When every region is self-sufficient on food, the country's 
grain problem could be more easily resolved. It means that we provide people with abundant food, 
supply enough fodder to animals, resolve the shortages of raw materials in food industry and secure 
enough food reserves.... Therefore our party has made not only flat areas and intermediate areas but 
also even mountain areas, particularly the highland areas such as Ryanggang province, self- 
sufficient on food by growing potatoes and Bora beans fitting to their geographical conditions. ' 57 
On 7 August 1962, shortly after the establishment of the new agricultural 
management system, Kim Il Sung announced in Changsung Conference of Local 
Parties and Economy Workers that every county should pursue its own self-sufficient 
economy in order to boost the country's economy and develop rural and urban areas 
evenly. 158 The establishment of regionally self-sufficient rural economy was 
confirmed as a basic agricultural policy in February 1964 when Kim Il Sung declared 
so-called Rural Thesis' that clarified the purposes, prospects, structures and policies 
of the DPRK agriculture. 159 On 18 March 1964 Kim Jong Il, the present DPRK 
leader, also announced the establishment of regionally self-sufficient rural economies 
as one of the most important task in agriculture. 160 
157 Park Young Ho (1994), p. 224-225 
158 Kim Il Sung Jojakjip Vol. 16 p. 241-284 159 Kim 1/ Sung Jojakjip Vol. 18 p. 195-245 160 Kim Jong 11, (1985), p. 3-27 
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Although the DPRK leaders stressed that regional self-sufficiency should be 
achieved at county level, it was in practice pursued only at provincial level. Even at 
provincial level it was still a complicated matter. At this time agricultural production 
was heavily affected by geographical conditions; flat areas such as South Pyongan, 
North and South Hwanghae provinces, produced mainly the country's main food 
grains such as rice, while mountainous areas, including Ryanggang, Jagang and North 
Harngyung provinces, were largely engaged in the production of other minor 
foodgrains and industrial crops. Hence there were huge differences in provincial food 
balances, making most provinces in mountainous areas dependent on food imports 
from other provinces in flat areas. 
To resolve this problem the authorities employed two important policies 
between the late 1950s and the early 1960s, which subsequently intensified in the 
1970-80s. 
The first and most important policy was that all provinces, including those in 
mountainous areas, should reorganise their agriculture in order to primarily produce 
two high-yield grain items: rice and maize. In flat areas it was greatly encouraged to 
expand paddy fields to grow rice. In intermediate areas maize began to replace 
existing crop items such as tubers, millets and potatoes, which had traditionally 
dominated the North Korean food diet. In mountainous areas existing crop 
composition was respected; but even in these areas maize was increasingly important 
in the 1970s when Juche Nongbub introduced new maize cultivation techniques. In 
the new agricultural management system PREC had the final responsibility to 
determine crop composition. Hence, although the increase of rice and maize 
production was a national policy, its implementation was solely imposed on local 
agricultural agencies. 
Another important policy was to modernise agriculture. The DPRK authorities 
believed that in order to overcome natural and geographical handicaps agriculture 
should and could be transformed into an industry in which the productivity was 
determined by the levels of inputs and technologies, not by natural conditions. 
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The industrialisation, modernisation. . . of agriculture means that, although agricultural 
production is biological process, its whole process is transformed into modern technological production 
process like industry that is realised by the powers of machines, electricity and chemicals. 
"' 
With this purpose the Party Central Committee adopted the first 7-year 
economic plan on 17 September 1961, announcing that the country should start its 
technical revolution in agriculture. 16' And four agricultural modernisation programs, 
including mechanisation, electrification, irrigation, and chemicalisation, were 
officially launched. A series of nationwide agricultural research projects and land 
reconstruction programs were also organised. 163 Although those agricultural 
modernisation programs were initiated by the central government, it was the task of 
local agricultural agencies to change actual agricultural production. PREC was 
responsible for developing and importing new technologies and transforming them 
into standardised agricultural production processes. And it was CCMC that organised 
actual farm operations according to provincial standards. 
4.4.2.3.3. Production process planning (operational plan) 
The new agricultural management system changed the basic character of agricultural 
planning. In ministerial system agricultural plans were basically target plans in which 
the authorities imposed production quotas but did not organise actual production 
procedures. These plans assumed that cooperative farms could operate with a large 
degree of independence. By contrast, the new system completely deprived cooperative 
farms of their independence from the selection of crops to the marketing of surplus 
products. Hence, unless the authorities made operational plans for cooperative farms, 
they could not operate properly any more. 
Compared with target plans, operational plans had several distinctive features. 
First, they required far more detailed figures. In the ministerial system, for instance, it 
was enough to define production targets by crops and by cooperative farms. In the 
new system, however, the authorities should specify the targets not only by crops and 
by cooperative farms but also by seed varieties and by lands in order to make 
i61 Kim Seung Jun (1988), p. 295 162 Control figures of 7-year (1961-1967) people's economic development plan, 17 September 1961 
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agricultural plans to work properly. Second, operational plans should incorporate 
production process plans. They should divide agricultural production by numerous 
different tasks and provide detailed figures by works, including the targets, timings, 
periods, input requirements, labour arrangements, applied technologies and the 
assessment criteria of performance etc. Thirdly, operational plans should include other 
activities of cooperative farms than production, including consumption, income 
distribution and financial activities etc. 
4.5. Conclusion 
In the DPRK agricultural history the years of 1953-61 (or 1953-73) constituted the 
most important period during which most current agricultural institutions were 
established, including: regional planning institutions, state grain marketing, state food 
rationing and supplement food supply channels. Concerning the establishment of 
these institutions this chapter has made the following points. 
1. In the early 1950s the DPRK suffered the serious agricultural resource shortages 
caused by the Korean War. The shortages triggered early agricultural 
cooperativisation and made it successfully completed without production failures and 
any bloodshed. As cooperative farming appeared as the dominant farming style, the 
existing agricultural institutions based on small-scale owner farming became 
unsustainable. It was the basic reason why there were fundamental changes in 
agricultural institutions during this period. 
2. Together with agricultural resource shortages, the DPRK faced a state grain 
collection problem in the early 1950s that caused the outbreak of unconfirmed small- 
scale famine in 1954-55. To resolve the problem the authorities addressed three 
institutional solutions: 1) the government collected all grain surpluses from 
cooperative farms in order to meet growing urban food demand; 2) instead, state food 
rationing expanded to cooperative farms and protected the minimal food consumption 
of farm households; 3) both farm and non-farm households were given additional 
163 Chosun Jonsa Vol. 30, p. 140-152 
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opportunities to increase their food consumption. The first solution was materialised 
as state grain marketing institutions in 1958-59. The second solution made state food 
rationing cover the whole population in 1954-58. And the third solution led to the 
post-war institutionalisation of the practices that all economic agents were engaged in 
farming activities during the Korean War. 
3. Agricultural plans that incorporated cooperative farms were initially made by the 
centralised ministerial hierarchy. But they soon proved failed because local 
administrators could not control and organise daily farm operations. Moreover, the 
authorities attempted to reorganise the economy on the basis of regional self- 
sufficiency. In both reasons there appeared the new agricultural management system 
in 1961, decentralising agriculture. In terms of institutions the system meant the 
establishment of localised planning institutions in which province and county 
administrators controlled agriculture independently. The DPRK agricultural planning 
institutions consisting of Agricultural Commission, PREC and CCMC represented 
such localised planning institutions. 
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IV. The 1970-73 Food Shortage, Juche Nongbub 
And Central Planning: 1973-87 
5.1. Introduction 
The years of 1973-87 saw that the DPRK agriculture was highly centralised. Local 
administrators lost their independence in agricultural planning and resource 
allocation, being directly subordinate to the centre. Farm households also lost their 
influences in agricultural production as the central government established and forced 
mechanical farming procedures called Juche Nongbub. As the result, there appeared 
agricultural system in which the central government directly control even daily 
operations of cooperative farms using centralised administrative command 
hierarchies. 
Of course, it does not necessarily mean that the new agricultural management 
system in the 1960s collapsed completely. In many important aspects the new 
agricultural management system was still well preserved. For instance, there was no 
change in existing administrative structure consisting of Agricultural Commission, 
PREC and CCMC. In particular, PREC and CCMC continued to have various 
nominal powers concerning agricultural planning and resource allocation. 
Nonetheless, the most fundamental feature of the new agricultural management 
system disappeared. That is, PREC and CCMC did not organise agricultural 
production independently any more, being strictly controlled by Agricultural 
Commission. 
As those in 1940s and 1950s, the institutional changes in the 1970s were 
triggered and motivated by food shortage. Indeed the country faced another 
agricultural stagnation and corresponding food shortage in 1970 and 1973, which 
inspired the DPRK leadership to centralise agricultural institution. The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine how the 1970-73 food shortage eventually led to the 
establishment of centralised agriculture in the mid/late 1970s. For this, the remaining 
chapters are organised as follows. 
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In section 5.2 we identify the 1970-73 food shortage using a variety of anecdote 
evidence and discussed its institutional implications. Section 5.3 considers how this 
food shortage led to the introduction of Juche Nongbub in 1973. In this section we 
study in detail what Juche Nongbub is, how it was implemented, and how and why it 
resulted in agricultural centralisation in the 1970s. Section 5.4 studies the unified and 
detailed agricultural planning as the final stage of agricultural centralisation. Finally 
section 5.5 provides a brief summary of this chapter. 
5.2. The 1970-73 Food Shortage and its Institutional Implication 
5.2.1. The 1970-73 Food Shortage 
It is not so easy to study the DPRK's food situation in the 1970s. During this period 
the DPRK government did not release any official agricultural statistics. No 
government decrees reflecting the country's food situation were published and, to our 
knowledge, no DPRK literature has studied the food situation in detail. Despite this 
lack of data, however, it is not so difficult to show at least that the country faced 
another food shortage from 1970 to 1973. There is a variety of anecdote evidence. 
First of all, the DPRK leadership officially admitted that the country's grain 
production failed to catch up population growth in 1969-72. In his speech at South 
Hwanghae, Pyongyang, South Pyongan, and North Pyongan Agriculture Workers' 
Conference on 17 January 1973, " To make a great turning point in agricultural 
production", Kim 11 Sung said: 
It was in 1968 that our country had the best harvest.. . 
But grain production did not increase fast 
from 1969. 
That grain production did not increase fast must be a serious problem. In our country, 
population has been recently growing by many hundreds of thousands every year. It is because 
due to our republic government's population policies birth rate is rising while death rate keeps 
on declining. When population grows, agricultural production must increase accordingly. But in 
our country the increase of agricultural production does not catch up the population growth. 
Because agricultural production did not grow fast for some recent years, the party central 
committee discussed a lot about agricultural problems and criticised much about rural economic 
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workers. But the problems of agriculture sector have not been resolved and agricultural 
production has not had any progress. 164 
It is true that Kim Tl Sung expressed his personal disappointment about the country's 
grain production for several times in the 1960s. But it was the first time that he 
publicly announced that the failure of grain production posed a serious problem to the 
country. 
Second, consistent with this admittance, the authorities changed population 
policy and reduced state food rations between 1970 and 1973. By the 1960s the 
authorities had tended to encourage people to have as many children as possible so as 
to narrow the population gap between North and South Korea. 165 For instance, 
honours and economic merits had been given to the mothers who had more than 3 
children. In the early 1970s, however, birth control policy such as state propaganda 
for the appropriate number of children and the provision of birth pills through state 
health organisations was first introduced. And this policy subsequently intensified, 
including: 1) increasing actual female marriage age to 22 (in law 19); 2) giving 
disadvantages in food rations to those who had more than 4 children; 3) intensifying 
state campaign for having only 3 children. In addition, the authorities reduced the 
food rations by 13 percent in 1973: every recipient was deducted four-days-rations 
from his/her monthly rations in order to accumulate so-called `wartime grain reserve 
[jonsi bichukmi]' for the possible reoccurrence of the Korean War. ' 66 It was the first 
official reduction since 1952, and the reduced rations have not recovered until this 
time. 
Third, the country's grain import drastically increased between 1970 and 
1974. According to FAO statistics, the country's net grain import was 180 thousand 
MT on annual average in 1960-69. But the figure increased up to 421 thousand in 
1972, and particularly it soared up to 1.1 million in 1973 and 772 thousand in 1974. 
Those figures suggest that the country's food situation in the early 1970s worsened 
enough for the authorities being responsible for providing state food rations to 
urgently increase grain import. 
164 Kim /l Sting Jojakjip Vol. 28, p. 10-11 
165 For the changes in the DPRK population policy by periods, see Jeong, Ki Won., Gang, Hyegyu and 
Lee, Sang Eun (1995) 
166 Naewae News Agency (1995), p. 241 and Oh, Gyung Chan (1997), p. 145 
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Table 5-1. The DPRK Grain Trade: 1969-75 
(1000 MT) 
Avg. 60-69 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 
Total 236 226 338 300 531 1265 1108 621 
Import Maize 53 192 147 
Wheat 180 226 315 300 320 480 520 300 
Other 91 23 211 593 441 321 
Total 56 114 99 113 110 152 336 528 
Export Maize 14 17 10 10 10 50 50 200 
Rice 70 96 89 103 100 102 286 328 
Balance -180 -112 -239 -187 -421 -1113 -772 -93 
Source) FAO Statistical Database 
Of course, the above evidence does not tell much about the precise timing and 
magnitude of the food shortage. Nonetheless, they seem enough to demonstrate at 
least that the country suffered poor harvests in 1969-72 and thus it faced another food 
shortages in 1970-73. 
5.2.2. The Causation of the Shortage and Its Institutional Implications 
As the timing and magnitude of the food shortage can not be ascertained, its causation 
is also not clear. Simply there are no enough data available for this issue. Nonetheless, 
it is still possible to point out some factors that might be attributed to the food 
shortage. For instance, the country's industrial development considerably decelerated 
in the late 1960s. According to official announcements, the DPRK industrial output 
grew by 35 percent on annual average in 1956- 60. But the growth rate fell to 15 
percent in 1961-65 and further dropped to 12 percent in 1966-70. It suggests a 
possibility that due to industrial slow down the government did not increase state 
resource supply to agriculture or even transferred agricultural resources to industry. 
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Table 5-2. Some Factors for the 1970-73 Food Shortage 
A. Industrial Production Growth Rate (°Io) 
1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 
Annual average 34.96 15.02 11.86 20.00 
Source) The ROK Ministry of Unification, Bukhan Gyungje Tongyejip [Collected North 
Korean Economic Statistics]. 1996 
B. Temperature during Farming Season (Centigrade) 
60-68 69 70 71 72 73 
Avg. (Mar. - Sep) 14.51 14.03 14.16 13.93 14.26 14.89 
Source) Chosen Joongang Nytingam, Various years 
C. Population Growth Rate (%) 
1953-56 1956-60 1960-65 1965-70 
Annual average 3.29 3.61 2.83 3.33 
Source) see Table 6-5 in chapter 6 
Indeed a DPRK source pointed out that it was from 1973 that the government 
accelerated state investment in agriculture to increase the country's grain production, 
confirming this possibility. 
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And there was an increasing military tension between the DPRK and the US. 
In January 1968 the US Navy ship Pueblo was attacked and captured by the DPRK 
forces, which triggered a severe military confrontation in Korean peninsular. Due to 
this confrontation many rural labourers were dispatched to the army, which might 
aggravate rural labour shortages. 168 
The weather was also bad. Between 1969 and 1972 the country frequently 
suffered abnormal cold weather during farming season, which might cause damages 
in grain production particularly in the northern parts of the country. 
Finally, population growth considerably accelerated in the late 1960s: the 
annual population growth rate that had declined to 2.8 percent in 1960-65 rose up 
again to 3.3 percent in 1965-70. It means that the adverse impacts on grain production 
might be more easily turned into a real food shortage in the early 1970s. 
An interesting point is that, whatever the real causation of the food shortage 
was, the DPRK leadership had a clear perception about it. Of the adverse factors 
mentioned above, the leadership admitted that the shortage of state agricultural 
167 Park, Young Ho (1994), p. 186 
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resource supply was important. '69 Indeed state policy to overcome the shortage 
mainly focused on increasing state investment in agriculture. From the mid 1970s, for 
instance, the government began to build small and medium size electricity station in 
every possible rural area, expand irrigation facilities to the dry-fields for maize 
production, mechanise all farming processes and establish land construction station in 
every county, launching a series of land expansion programs. 170 But the most 
important factor the DPRK leadership saw as causing the 1970-73 food shortage was 
not such socio-economic factors as above, but the institutional factors: the 
inefficiency and incapability of agricultural administrators and the deteriorating 
morale among farm households in cooperative farms. 
What was then the fundamental reason for failing agriculture for the last several years'? Above 
all, it was because the party organisations failed ideological education for rural economic staff 
and agricultural workers..... The most important thing in the ideological education for rural 
economic staff and farmers is to sweep the remaining of capitalist ideology such as individual 
egoism, arm them with communist ideology, and particularly educate them to have the spirit to 
love labour.... Not only rural economic staff but also ordinary farm members appeared to dislike 
labour. Now some farm members do not participate in farm operations as owners, avoiding hard 
works and seeing only easy works. 171 
The next reason for failing agriculture for the last several years was the bureaucratism, 
subjectivism and formalism of rural staff in guiding rural economic sector. -The main reason for 
North Pyongan to fail to increase grain production fast was to force rice variety that requires 
much fertiliser but ripens lately. . . 
Last year, because rural economic staff ignored the party policy 
and forced crops unfitted to natural and geographical conditions, some regions had even typhoon 
damages. 
. . 
In South Hwanghae the bureaucratism and subjectivism of rural staff led to caused 
unbearable incident that many thousand Chungbo of paddy fields were flooded. They stored too 
much unnecessary water in the bore and discharged it in monsoon season, making near paddy 
fields flooded.... 172 
It is of course controversial whether the inefficiency of agricultural administrators and 
the low moral of farm households, both of which are seemingly the structural 
168 Kim 11 Sung Jojakjip Vol. 28, p. 11-12 
169 Kim Il Sung Jojcikjip Vol. 28, p. 18-22 
170 Park, Young Ho (1994), p. 167-171 
171 Kim 11 Sung Jojakjip Vol. 28, p. 13-17 
172 Kim 11 Sung Jojakjip Vol. 28, p. 23-26 
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problems of socialist collective farming, were the real causation of the 1970-73 food 
shortage. But the point is that, on the basis of this assessment, the DPRK leadership 
made a series of institutional reforms in agriculture. Indeed, as we shall see below, all 
the important agricultural reforms in the 1970s had a common purpose to improve the 
actual workings of the existing agricultural institutions and so increase the country's 
grain production. 
Then, what were the real contents of the reforms? Did they establish new 
incentive systems to make agricultural administrators and farm households operate 
more efficiently? Interestingly all the reforms in the 1970s had nothing to do with 
such incentive systems. On the contrary, the underlying idea of the reform was to 
minimise the independence of (local) agricultural administrators and farm households 
in resource allocation and production in order to prevent their errors and adverse 
influences on agricultural performance. Due to this idea the reforms proceeded in the 
way that the central government designed both detailed administrative decision 
making procedures and concrete farming practices, forcing them on local 
administrators and farm households. 
Note that this idea was quite contradictory to the basic features of the existing 
agricultural institutions. Under the new agricultural management system established 
in the early 1960s, as discussed in chapter 4, province administrators (PRECs) 
independently conducted agricultural planning and resource allocation; and in order to 
implement provincial agricultural plans, county administrators (CCMCs) organised all 
the operations of cooperative farms. By contrast, central administrators (Agricultural 
Commission) had no institutional channels to influence agricultural planning and 
resource allocation. 
An interesting point is that these decentralised agricultural administrative 
organisations did not change at all in the 1970s. Then, how did the central government 
dismantle the independence of local administrators? To answer the questions we have 
to look at two important institutions that appeared in the 1970s: Juche Nongbub and 
the unified and detailed agricultural planning. 
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5.3. Juche Nongbub and Central Control over Agriculture 
5.3.1. The Content of Juche Nongbub 
According to official view, Juche Nongbub is a set of new farming techniques that 
Kim 11 Sung invented and spread to the whole nation throughout his on-the-spot- 
guidance in 1973-79. '73 And the DPRK government has propagandised that `Jucke 
Nongbub is not only the scientific farming methods to conduct farming scientifically 
according to our country's climates and geography and crops' biological 
characteristics as well as intensive farming methods to enable highly intensive 
agriculture according to modern science technology". 174 As implied by this official 
view and propaganda, Juche Nongbub primarily concerns farming techniques. Indeed 
its development was motivated by two technical needs: 1) upgrading traditional 
Korean farming skills and importing advanced foreign technologies in order to 
prevent the adverse impacts of abnormally cold weather' 75 that hit the country in the 
early 1970s; 2) establishing new farming practices for maize production that was 
increasingly important for the country's food balance but still unfamiliar with many 
farm households. 176 Nevertheless, the actual contents of Juche Nongbub did not 
confine to farming techniques, and particularly its implications were much more 
institutional than technical. 
In general, Juche Nongbub consists of three parts: youngnong wonchik 
[farming principles], youngnong bangbub [farming methods] and sebu gongjeong 
[detailed production processes]. '77 In the first place, its farming principles provide 
four basic rules for agricultural administrators and producers to follow in order to 
increase agricultural production under such unfavourable natural conditions as small 
land and cold weather. One rule is jokji jokjak [appropriate crops for appropriate 
land]: the selection of crops and their varieties should be strictly binding to regional 
geographical conditions. Another rule is jokki jokjak [appropriate farming for 
173 Lim, Ki Bum (1992), p. 211-213 
174 Kim, 11 Nam., Kim, Se Kuk and Kim, Young Un, Chosun Nongupsa [The Agricultural History of 
Korea: henceforth Chosun Nongupsa] Vol. 4,1991, p. 116 
175 Chosen Nongupsa Vol. 4, p. 113-115 
176 For the importance of maize production in the period, see table 6-6 and 6-7 in chapter 6 
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appropriate timing]: all farming activities should be carried out in the most effective 
timings and periods given variable seasonal weather conditions. The third rule is pogi 
nongsa [dense planting/cultivating]: in order to maximise agricultural production 
under limited land, it is necessary to increase the number of planted seeds per land. 
Indeed, as we shall see in chapter 6, the country began to increase the number of 
planted seeds per land from the mid 1970s at least by 30 percent more than before. 
And the final rule is jiryuk hyansang [improving land fertility]: when the repeated 
mono-culture of food grains is inevitable due to small land, systematic farming 
practices to prevent soil exhaustion must be put in place to improve agricultural 
productivity. 
The farming methods of Juche Nongbub refer to techniques or farming 
practices to realise the above principles. With respect to jokji jokjak, for instance, 
Juche Nongbub specifies crop compositions and seed varieties by provinces, counties 
and even cooperative farms. In case of South Hwanghae province, a typical flat area 
in the country, rice and maize are the standard crops; and Pyongyang 15 is the 
standard variety of rice. In contrast, the standard crops of mountainous North 
Hamgyung include minor foodgrains such as beans and millets as well as industrial 
products. Its standard rice variety also is not Pyongyang 15 but Yeornju 1. Concerning 
jokki 
, 
jokjak, Juche Nongbub provides standard flow charts of all farming activities 
from before-planting ploughing to harvesting. In typical rice production areas, for 
instance, ploughing should be completed by mid March, transplanting by late May, 
harvesting by early September and so forth. To carry out pogi nongsa efficiently, 
Juche Nongbub develops six farming techniques/practices: 1) new seedling 
techniques such as rice cold seedlings and humus-cake nurseries for maize seedlings; 
2) the application of rice transplanting methods to maize production; 3) optimal 
arrangements of planted seeds in order to maximise sunshine penetration to plants; 4) 
new fertilising practices to fertilise differently roots, stems, and leaves by seasons; 5) 
new irrigation practices to keep the temperature of water supply constantly; 6) 
standard methods of usage of pesticides. Juche Nongbub also specifies the methods to 
prevent soil exhaustion, including the usage of organic fertiliser along with chemical 
fertiliser, regular soil changes and obligatory winter ploughing. 
177 For official explanation about the contents of Juche Nongbub, see Chosun Nongupsa Vol. 4 , p. 1 17- 
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If Jtrche Nongbub refers simply to techniques, the above farming principles 
and methods would feature it best. However, Juche Nongbub is not only a set of 
techniques but also a set of real production procedures. In fact, it designs all detailed 
agricultural production processes, forcing them on farm households in the fields. A 
DPRK source put this as follows. 
An agricultural production process is divided into several detailed processes. Detailed processes 
consist of means of labour for works, working times and working places. Suppose that in order to 
produce fertilising-soil (fertilising-soil production process) a machine loads materials to tractors, 
tractors deliver them, decomposers decompose them and then tractors deliver them again and pile 
them at a place. In this case the work of the machine to load materials constitutes loading detailed 
process, that of decomposer decomposing detailed process, that of tractors delivery detailed 
process and piling detailed process..... 
Great Juche Nongbub not only specifies the kinds, flowcharts and conducting methods of 
production processes by agricultural items, but also concretely reveals the kinds, flowcharts and 
conducting methods of the detailed processes of each production process. Juche 
Nongbub... establishes new scientific systems of detailed processes. The detailed processes 
revealed by Juche Nongbub are all scientifically constructed ones to maximise the productivity 
in agricultural products and animals. 178 
Specifically, Juche Nongbub designs detailed production processes as follows. First, it 
specifies the concrete target of each detailed process. In case of ploughing, for 
instance, it defines how widely, deeply and evenly a labourer should plough in order 
to earn one labour-day. Second, it defines the concrete input requirements of each 
detailed process with possible substitution ratios among input factors. For instance, it 
specifies how many tractors and labourers should be mobilised to plough one hectare 
of dry-field as well as how many labourers can substitute one tractor for the work. 
Third, it specifies both the duration of each detailed process and the flowcharts of 
several detailed processes by production processes and agricultural items. 
5.3.2. The Establishment of Central Control 
120 178 Lee, Jin Cyu (1986) p. 82 
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At first glance, Juche Nongbub seems nothing special, arguably except its principle of 
pogi nongsa [dense planting]. All countries must have their own farming techniques 
fitted to their natural conditions. In particular, many important aspects of Juche 
Nongbub such as the farming principles of jokji jokjak [appropriate crops for 
appropriate land] and jokki jokjak [appropriate farming for appropriate timing] are too 
natural to be possibly disputable by anyone. In this reason many outside researchers 
have regarded it as irrelevant. 179 When we focus on the technical aspects of Juche 
Nongbub, this criticism might be plausible. However, when we look at its institutional 
implications, the situation is quite different. 
The most important feature of Juche Nongbub is that it standardised all the 
agriculture-related-decisions and practices from crop selections by agricultural 
administrators to fertilising activities by farm households. It had two important 
institutional implications in the 1970s. First, because it was the central government 
that made, changed and interpreted Juche Nongbub, local administrators were 
effectively deprived of their existing powers to conduct agricultural planning and 
resource allocation independently. In other words, using Juche Nongbub the central 
government directly controlled local decision making processes without formally 
centralising the existing decentralised agricultural administrative organisations. 
Second, because all detailed production processes in agriculture were standardised 
and forced by the government, farm households also completely lost their 
autonomy/influences in production. There was now no difference between simple 
industrial labourers and farm households in production. 
Consider the first implication in detail. Until the early 1970s the rights of crop 
selections had been exercised by province administrators, and Agricultural 
Commission had no power to influence provincial decisions. But this situation 
dramatically changed as Juche Nongbub was introduced. It started with Kim Il Sung's 
order in 1970-72 that Agricultural Commission should develop new rice and maize 
varieties fitted to cold weather. ' 80 To carry out his command Agricultural 
Commission had centralised all agriculture research institutes by 1973, on top of 
which was Maize Research Institute in Pyongyang. And there appeared new national 
standard seed varieties in 1974-75. To spread the new varieties Agricultural 
179 For instance, see Sakurai, Hiroshi (1998) 
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Commission organised various province/county agriculture conferences, and 
particularly Kim 11 Sung himself forced them on local authorities and farm households 
under the name Juche Nongbub during his on-the-spot-guidance. Not surprisingly 
there was resistance by province administrators. But it was immediately criticised for 
not abiding jokji jokjak [appropriate crops for appropriate land], the main principle of 
Joche Nongbub. And this criticism was initiated by Kim Il Sung himself. For instance, 
he attacked the regionalism of local agricultural administrators in his speech at the 
Korean Workers' Party South Hwanghae Conference on 12 September 1979 as 
follows: 
South Hwanghae also lost lots of grains due to the failure of rice variety selection. -When 
I 
guided a conference in South Hwanghae last year, an official told me to plant "Baecheon 68" 
and "Yeonan 12" in the southern areas below Suyang Mountain. So I told him not to do that but 
to plant "Pyongyang 8". "Baecheon 68" and "Yeonan 12" are not good varieties. Because I 
experimented "Pyongyang 8" for a long time, I know it well. 
But some counties in South Hwanghae are still not willing to plant "Pyongyang 8". 
Bacheon county failed this year's production because of planting "Baecheon 68"... Yeonan 
county also planted "Yeonan 12" this year, failing to have bumper harvest. 
South Hwanghae sees regionalism in the selection of varieties. That Baecheon county 
planted "Baecheon 68" and Yeonan county "Yeonan 12" is the reflection of regionalism as well 
as the incident expressing that they do not have the sprit of accepting the party commands 
absolutely and unquestionably. When the party orders to plant "Pyongyang 8" and "Pyongyang 
15", it must be done without any question.... South Hwanghae Province Party Committee and 
Province Rural Economy Committee should be responsible for the fact that Baecheon county 
and Yeonan county planted "Baecheon 68" and Yeonan county, damaging grain production. " 
Together with this personal interference of Kim Il Sung, the central government made 
a series of official decisions to effectively transfer the rights of crop selection from the 
hands of local administrators to the centre. On 7 January 1976, for instance, the 
government issued the cabinet decree no. 70 to announce that the regional and 
provincial crop compositions of rice, maize and beans should be determined 
according to Juche Nongbub, which was followed by the similar Agricultural 
180 Chosun. Nongupsa Vol. 4, p. 120-121 
181 Kim Il Sittig Jojakjip Vol. 34, p. 369-370 
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Commission order no. 15 on 20 March 1978.182 Since then the central government has 
directly controlled province, county and even village crop selections and their 
selections of seed varieties although province administrators are still nominally 
entitled to doing the job. 
Judie Nongbub deprived province administrators of their powers to establish 
technical standards in farming activities, too. It was mainly due to the principle of 
pogi nongsa [dense planting]. In his speech at National Agriculture Conference on 15 
January 1975, "All strengths to take over the height of 8 million MT of grain 
production", Kim Il Sung ordered to drastically increase the number of planted maize 
seeds up to 40 billion. '83 By that time however no provinces had had any experiences 
of this dense planting of maize. To carry out his order, therefore, all provinces had to 
accept new dense planting techniques, including standard seed arrangements, humus- 
cake nursery techniques and new methods of fertilising and irrigation, which were 
developed by Agricultural Commission through already centralised agriculture 
research institutes. Since then all technical standards in agriculture were made and 
forced by Agricultural Commission; and the roles of local administrators were 
reduced to simply passing the standards to producers. 
Local administrators also faced the weakening of their powers in agricultural 
resource allocation. Juche Nongbub stated that the standard ratio between fertiliser 
consumption and agricultural output should be 1: 10. It also specified the ratios 
between other inputs such as tractors and agricultural outputs, mechanically 
regulating local administrators' decisions on resource allocation. Furthermore, the 
central government centralised the resource allocation procedures in many cases. In 
the mid 1970s, for instance, the government established new centralised irrigation 
institutions in which the central irrigation manager in Agricultural Commission 
directly controlled province irrigation managers and their subordinates: regional, 
country and village irrigation managers. 184 
Through the above procedures local administrators had effectively lost their 
powers in agricultural planning and resource allocation by the 1979 when Juche 
Nongbub was finally announced as the only farming method in the DPRK. 
182 Chosen Nongupsa Vol. 4, p. 123 
183 Kin, Il Sung Jojakjip Vol. 30, p. 30-31 
194 Chosun Nongupsa Vol. 4, p. 133-134 
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What about the impacts of Juche Nongbub on farm households? As pointed 
out in chapter 4, farm households had already lost their autonomy in production as the 
new agricultural management system let local administrators effectively run 
cooperative farms in 1961. Until the early 1970s however farming practices had 
largely relied on traditional farming techniques that were not standardised and so 
varied greatly by regions. In this reason the morale of farm households, particularly 
that of elders who had good knowledge on traditional farming techniques, was still an 
important factor in agricultural production. But Juche Nongbub decisively weakened 
this importance. 
In February 1973, a month after Kim 11 Sung began his on-the-spot-guidance 
concerning Juche Nongbub, the DPRK government launched the three revolution 
team campaign in rural areas in which young communists were dispatched to 
cooperative farms to initiate the ideological, cultural and technological education of 
farm households. '85 It was this campaign, which continued throughout the 1970s, that 
made Juche Nongbub take root in actual production. The campaign began by 
establishing agriculture colleges educating Juche Nongbub in every province and 
opening the night curriculum of Juche Nongbub in all rural high schools and party 
institutions. Graduates from agriculture colleges were prohibited from moving to 
cities, being obligatory dispatched to cooperative farms; and all important staff of 
cooperative farms, including chairmen, team and sub-team leaders, should enrol the 
Juche Nongbub curriculum. In consequence, there was a shift in core generation in 
cooperative farms, playing down the influences of elders with the knowledge of 
traditional farming techniques. The next step of the campaign was to standardise all 
farming procedures according to Juche Nongbub. In 1977, for instance, each 
cooperative farm in South Hwanghae convened more than 100 Juche Nongbub 
conferences, reorganising its farming practices. '86 Because Juche Nongbub consists of 
standardised mechanical detailed production processes like those in industry, it means 
that the influences of individuals in agricultural production were minimised. Finally 
the campaign formalised the daily lives of farm households: so-called the life of 8 
hours' learning and training, 8 hours' labour and 8 hours' rest appeared as the normal 
185 For the three revolution team campaign, particularly its economic aspects, see chapter 8 of Park, 
Young Ho (1994) 
186 Chosun Nongupsa Vol. 4, p. 164 
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life of an ordinary farm household. In consequence, the central government controlled 
every aspect of rural life, easily making Juche Nongbub as the only farming method 
in agriculture. 
In sum, Juche Nongbub provided the channel through which the central 
government directly controlled both local administrators and farm households even 
while maintaining the existing decentralised agricultural administrative organisations. 
The below quotation from Kim Il Sung's speech on 15 January 1975, "all strengths to 
take over the height of 8 million MT of grain production", seems to show, though 
metaphorically, what changes Juche Nongbub brought about in agriculture. 
We firmly established political and ideological bases to increase agricultural production 
fast.... Among our workers stands the revolutionary spirit to accept the part policies 
unconditionally and implement them unconditionally. In the past, when the party made new 
policies, the spirit to accept and carry out them was lacking. But recently we launched strong 
ideological struggles against the wrong tendency among workers to neglect or negotiate the 
party policies so that it has disappeared. Now the thoughts of the party centre immediately go 
down to the below and the thoughts of the below immediately reach the party centre... Today 
all our staff and party members know only the party lines and policies, do only as the party says 
to do, breathe only with the party ideology.. .. 
Today our party and society are filled with Juche 
Idea. This is the decisive base on which we can take over the height of 8 million MT or even 10 
million MT of grain production. '87 
5.4. The Unified and Detailed Planning and Its Implications 
From the viewpoint of economic planning Juche Nongbub meant a huge input-output 
table in agriculture. Because it defines both standardised output targets and input 
factors for detailed production processes, economic planners had mechanical input- 
output relations in all agricultural production processes as in industrial production 
processes. On this basis, the DPRK government announced the unified and detailed 
planning in agriculture in 1979. To simply put, the unified and detailed planning 
187 Kim Il Sung Jojakjip Vol. 30, p. 26-28 
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refers to the principle that the central planners should plan and control all concrete 
production processes through centralised planning organisations. 
'88 
Although the DPRK agricultural planning started in 1957, it had not planned 
concrete production processes until the 1970s. In his speech at Joint Conference of the 
Party Central Committee, Central People's Committee and the Cabinet on 10 January 
1979, "On conducting detailed agricultural planning", Kim 11 Sung pointed out: 
Listening to the chairman of Agricultural Commission concerning the 1979 agricultural plan, I 
can not say that detailed agricultural planning is successful. The manuscript of this year's 
agricultural plan include only big indicators such as sown areas by crops, the amount of 
fertiliser and the number of planted seeds per pyung, not revealing concrete technical indicators 
for labour plans and agricultural production processes. ... 
I think that the manuscript of this 
year's agricultural plan is only around 15% successful in terms of detailed planning.... Now we 
do not have enough time for this year's agricultural plan, so provinces and counties should help 
find and add missing detailed factors by agricultural production processes to the manuscript. 189 
The unified and detailed planning intended to upgrade this low level of agricultural 
planning. What should be noted however is that this new planning principle brought 
about two immediate institutional changes. 
First, the government established a formal organisation through which 
Agricultural Commission directly controlled their subordinates in provinces (PRECs), 
counties (CCMCs) and villages (cooperative farms) concerning agricultural planning 
and resource allocation. 
The state adopted the cabinet decree no. 10 (26 February 1979), establishing Staff Department 
the head of which was the vice chairman of Agricultural Commission. Staff Department grasped 
and guided agriculture in a nationally unified way, ensuring appropriate input supply for 
production. Hence, all the production activities carried out by cooperative farms in the country 
proceeded thoroughly according to the commands from Staff Department in Agricultural 
Commission; and all the small and big problems in the production processes were immediately 
reported and informed. In consequence, it was possible to guide cooperative farms to conduct 
188 For official explanation of the unified and detailed planning, see Park, Young Keun et al (1992), p. 
204-221 
189 Kini I! Sung Jojakjipp Vol. 34, p. 45 
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farming according to their geographical conditions under the principles of jokji jokjak and jokki 
jükjak. 190 
Second, agricultural planning and resource allocation went under the control of 
State Planning Commission (SPC), state planning agency in Pyongyang, too. 
In the unified planning system the planning departments in production units that had 
been previously subordinated only to their higher organisations were also defined as 
the planning cells that were subordinated to state planning agency. Hence they played 
the roles of State Planning Commission's arms and legs. 19' 
It was 1965 when SPC first established its own branches up to county level, providing 
technical supports for PRECs, CCMCs and cooperative farms. But local agricultural 
organisations had not received orders from SPC, and so its influences had been 
limited. However, as the unified and detailed agricultural planning started, local 
agricultural organisations formally received the planning orders from SPC; and SPC 
branches monitored and reported local agricultural planning. 
Undoubtedly both changes completed the centralisation procedures in 
agriculture that stated with the introduction of Juche Nongbub. An interesting 
question is: how did the DPRK economic planners manage the unified and detailed 
planning in agriculture? In the early 1970 the planners reportedly struggled to deal 
with only 4,000 control figures. However, there were more than 3,000 cooperative 
farms in the country; and agricultural productions processes consists of numerous 
different production processes by seasons, crops, lands and so forth. Was it then really 
possible for the planners to conduct the unified and detailed planning? 
It is not clear how detailed agricultural plans the DPRK planners have made. 
Nonetheless, a possible answer to the question might be found in two DPRK planning 
methods: the division of planning indicators and the pursuit of low equilibrium. 192 In 
the DPRK economic planning, there are various planning indicators. In agricultural 
plan, for instance, if one goods is produced and consumed exclusively within a 
cooperative farm, it constitutes the cooperative farm planning indicator. And if 
190 Chosu. uit Nongupsa Vol. 4, p. 165 
191 Park, Young Keun et al (1992), p. 209 
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another goods is produced and consumed exclusively within a county, it is the county 
planning indicator. Similarly there exist the province planning indicators and the SPC 
planning indicators as well. The division of planning indicators means that each 
planning organisation is exclusively responsible for planning its own planning 
indicators. In each county, for instance, farm implements are produced by the 
factories owned by CCMC and consumed by cooperative farms within the territory of 
the county. Hence, each CCMC is solely responsible for planning the production, 
distribution and consumption of farm implements. In this respect each planning 
organisation has to deal with two different planning indicators: the one it can plan 
independently and the other higher planning organisations must plan and pass. The 
pursuit of low equilibrium refers to the principle that each planning organisation 
maximises the share of its own planning indicators in total planning indicators it has 
to deal with. In other words, it should be as self-sufficient in its operation as possible. 
In this framework, as each planning organisation is more self-sufficient, the 
planning works of its higher organisations are simpler in the sense that the number of 
their planning indicators decline. In chapter 4 we have seen that the DPRK has 
pursued to establish self-sufficient rural economies up to county level since the early 
1960s. It means that, although the country introduced the unified and detailed 
agricultural planning in the late 1970s, its planning burden to the planners might not 
be so huge as it looked. 
Of course, as each planning organisation is more self-sufficient, the central 
control over agricultural planning might weaken. However, insofar as the central 
government provides standard agricultural production processes, say, Juche Nonghub 
on the base of which all planning organisations make their plans, this weakening of 
the central control might not be so great. 
5.5. Conclusion 
The findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows. 
192 ibid., p. 254-262 
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1. Between 1970 and 1972 the DPRK faced another food crisis. The food shortage 
seems to be caused by several factors, including decelerated industrial development, 
increasing military tension with the US and bad weather. But the DPRK leadership 
saw that the main causation of the shortage was the inefficiency of agricultural 
administrators and the low morale of farm households. It was why the leadership 
pursued the institutional changes in agriculture. 
2. The underlying idea of the institutional changes was to minimise the independence 
of (local) agricultural administrators and farm households in resource allocation and 
agricultural production, preventing their errors and adverse influences on agricultural 
performance. Due to this idea the institutional changes in the 1970s largely meant the 
increasing central control on agriculture. 
3. The changes began by the introduction of Juche Nongbub. It standardised all the 
agriculture-related-decisions and practices from crop selections by local agricultural 
administrators to fertilising activities by farm households. Using Juche Nongbub, on 
the one hand, the central government deprived local administrators of their powers to 
conduct agricultural planning and resource allocation independently. It also blocked 
any influences of individual farm households on agricultural production. In 
consequence, the DPRK agriculture was highly centralised in the 1970s although the 
existing decentralised administrative organisations did not change. 
4. On the basis of Juche Nongbub the central government also announced the unified 
and detailed agricultural planning in 1979. To conduct the planning it established a 
formal institutional channel in which Agricultural Commission directly controlled 
local planning and resource allocation procedures. It finally completed the 
centralisation procedures in agriculture that stated with Juche Nongbub in 1973. It is 
this centralised agriculture that has played until present time. 
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VI. The 1987-99 Food Crisis and the Collapse of 
Agricultural Development Strategy 
6.1. Introduction 
So far we have seen that the DPRK agricultural institutions have evolved to resolve 
repeated food shortages and the final outcome of this evolution is the current 
institutions in which the central government plans and controls all economic activities 
concerning food production, distribution, consumption and trade. Ironically, however, 
the current institutions have seen the worst food crisis in the DPRK history. Indeed 
the country fell into another food shortages in 1987-93, reportedly faced famine 
situation in 1994-99 and has not overcome the food shortages yet. The remaining 
chapters of the thesis examine this recent food crisis and its implications for the future 
of the DPRK agriculture. 
In the previous three chapters, we have identified three historical food 
shortages in the DPRK but have not discussed their patterns and features in detail. 
Rather, we have focused on how they triggered and influenced corresponding 
institutional changes. It is mainly due to the lack of available data. Fortunately, 
however, the data are not so rare, though not abundant either, concerning the recent 
food crisis. It is therefore feasible to study why and how the crisis happened, how it 
was unfolded, what features it had and how the agricultural institutions influenced the 
features. In this sense the 1987-99 food crisis gives a good, and the only so far, 
chance to understand the real contents of the DPRK food shortages. 
Of more than ten years of the food crisis, we focus on the years of 1994-99 for 
several reasons. First, this period saw the most severe food shortages in the DPRK 
history in which the country reportedly faced a national famine. Second, all the 
debates over the food crisis have concentrated on this period. Third, the institutional 
changes caused by the food crisis were most dramatic during this period: hence it is of 
great importance concerning the future changes of the DPRK agriculture. 
139 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide some preliminary discussions in 
order to proceed into the 1994-99 DPRK food situation. 
To do this we first review the food crisis from in its whole period from 1987 to 
1999 in chronological order, showing that the country's food situation was most 
critical between 1994 and 1999. This chronology is presented in section 6.2. Then we 
study the reasons why the DPRK fell into another food shortages in the late 1980s and 
eventually faced famine situation in the mid/late 1990s. Section 6.3 concerns this 
issue. In this section we argue that the DPRK agricultural strategy for grain 
production has totally collapsed since 1987, which has caused a drastic decline in the 
production and food availability between 1987 and 1997. In section 6.4 we outline 
various controversial issues surrounding the food crisis with three simple questions: 
1) did the food crisis escalate to famine; 2) was the famine different from those in 
other countries; 3) has and will the famine change the DPRK agriculture? And finally 
section 6.5 briefly summarises this chapter and presents some introductory remarks 
for next chapters. 
6.2. The Chronicle of the Food Crisis 
The recent food crisis in the DPRK was first widely known in the autumn of 1995 
when the government appealed for international aid organisations to provide 
emergency food aid. A variety of evidence however suggests that the country was 
facing a precarious food situation for more than a decade. In this section we briefly 
describe the country's food situation from the official reduction of state food rations 
in 1987 to international disputes over the DPRK food refugees in 1999. 
The years of 1987-93 
The first sign of the crisis emerged in the late 1980s when PDS (public distribution 
system), the DPRK food rationing system, went under stress. 
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In 1987 the government reduced PDS rations, which had been maintained 
stable since 1973, by 10 percent. 193 The reduction was made shortly after the DPRK 
leadership expressed increasing difficulties to feed the population; and massive food 
imports immediately followed. According to FAO statistics, the DPRK (net) grain 
import almost tripled to 438 thousand MT in 1987 from 153 thousand MT in 1986 
and since then the country has turned into a net grain importer. 194 
Table 6-1. The Changes of Food Rations 
Norm * ration for official 
worker 
1955-72 Basic Formula: from 900 grams of daily rations for heavy 
industrial workers to 300 grams for children 
1973 Deduction of four days rations from monthly rations for so- 
called "war-time grain reserves" (average 13% deduction) 
1987 10% deduction for so-called "patriotic grain" 
1992 10% deduction from adult rations 
700 grans per day 
256 kg per year 
608 grams per day 
222 kg per year 
547 grams per day 
200 kg per year 
492 grams per day 
179 kg per year 
1994- Great difference between norm and actual ration supply - 
Source) Naewae News Agency (1995), p. 241 and Oh Gyung Chan (1997), p. 145 
Economic reforms were also launched to compensate for the reduction of food 
rations. In 1987 the government allowed industrial workers, who had been entirely 
dependent on PDS rations, to privately cultivate small lands near their work places 
and encouraged state firms to allocate official farming hours for their workers. '95 
Farmers were permitted to expand their private plots collectively and personally. In 
193 
Oh Gyung Chan (1997), p 145 
194 see section 8.5.2 and table 8-18 in chapter 8 
195 Naewae News Agency (1995), p. 230 
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addition, though still illegal, it was actually tolerated for farmers to grow grains in 
their private plots and trade them in farmers' markets. 
Food shortages were unmistakable in the early 1990s. The government 
launched a "let's eat only two meals a day" campaign in 1991; and it subsequently 
intensified. 196 In 1992 PDS rations were further reduced by 10 percent except for 
army and heavy industrial workers. '97 In 1993 the government started diplomatic 
negotiations with South Asian countries, including Thailand and Vietnam, to obtain 
emergency food shipments although its grain imports already exceeded I million 
MT. '98 And it was persistently reported that PDS rations were delayed or temporarily 
stopped in northern parts of the country and there emerged, though unconfirmed, food 
riots. 199 In December 1993 the government officially admitted the failure of the 3"d 7- 
year plan and announced that it would adopt new economic policies to resolve the 
shortages of food and consumer goods under the slogan of "agriculture first, light 
industry first, foreign trade first". 
The year of 1994 
Food situation was reportedly critical in 1994. A Chinese source warned in 1994 that 
the DPRK was facing the worst food shortage in its history. 20° Indeed the government 
shut down PDS in four northern provinces -North and South Hamgyung, Ryanggang, 
Kangwon- and prohibited all internal food shipments to these provinces. 201 And an 
official grain re-collection campaign was launched to coercively collect 5 kg of grains 
per farmer who had already received his/her annual rations. 202 It was in this year that 
the DPRK food refugees began to flee to neighbouring countries, particularly 
China. 203 Until then, however, the government denied the existence of hunger in the 
country. In January 1994, for instance, the spokesman of the DPRK Agricultural 
Commission condemned the hunger reports of western media as "wicked deception to 
196 Noland, Robinson and Wang (2001), p. 743 
197 Oh Gyung Chan (1997), p 145 
198 Radio Press, (Monthly) North Korean Policy Trend [in Japanese], No. 12,1993, p. 36 [henceforth 
North Korean Policy Trend] 
199 Kim Yeon Chul (1997) and The Economist, 18. Dec. 1993 
20° Eberstadt (1997), p. 233 
2°1 Natsios (1999) 
202 Ahn Jong Chul (1998), p. 251 
203 KBSM(1998) 
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degrade the socialist image of the DPRK", arguing that it has filed a large amount of 
grain stocks as an important strategic resource". 204 
The year of 1995 
This attitude however changed suddenly in early 1995. In February the government 
announced that it received 300,000 MT of food aid from an international NGO. 205 In 
May it officially admitted that the country was facing food shortage, asking its two 
old enemies, the ROK and Japan, for food assistance. 206 In June the country agreed 
with the ROK and Japan to procure emergency food aid -150,000 MT of gratis from 
the ROK, and 150,000 MT of gratis and another 150,000 MT on concessional terms 
from Japan. The aid was publicly announced to the DPRK people in July. And a 
similar appeal was also made to the USA in that month. 
Together with its admittance of food shortages, the government implemented a 
wide range of pragmatic policies in early 1995.207 At central level, all the construction 
projects under way were suspended and the resources mobilised for the projects were 
transferred to agriculture and light industry. At provincial level, local governments 
and state firms were empowered to import and trade food independently. At county 
level, all the regulations on farm households' private plots were effectively lifted. 
Profit-pursuing activities such as personal restaurants and foodstuff sales in farmers' 
markets were also tolerated. And Kim Jong Il declared in May that boosting grain 
production is "the most important task in the current socialist phase of the DPRK", 
ordering the government to mobilise all the possible resources to accomplish the 
task. 208 
To make the situation worse, however, the country faced a catastrophic flood 
between July and August that was officially the worst for the last hundred years. 
According to official estimates, flood damage reached 15 billion US dollars, including 
1.2 million MT of grain losses that comprised roughly 17 percent of the 1994 
production announce by Pyongyang Media. In August, immediately after the flood, 
204 North Korean Policy Trend (1994, No. 27), p. 47 
205 North Korean Policy Trend (1995, No. 4), p. 52 
206 Noland, Robinson and Wang (1999) 
207 Joongang Daily News, 28 May 1995 
208 Yonhap News Agency, 23 June 1995 
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the government launched an official appeal for international food aid for its flood 
victims, which was soon followed by FAO and WFP's field-visits to the country. And 
both organisations announced a joint statement in December 1995 that 2.1 million 
DPRK children and 500,000 pregnant women were on the verge of starvation. '`"' 
Following this announcement, the first international food aid, 140 tons of rice from 
WFP, was delivered to the DPRK in November 1995; and the aid rose up sharply 
since. It supplied around 2.2 million MT of food grains to the DPRK between 1995 to 
1998, which accounted roughly for 14 percent of total food consumption of the 
country during that period. 210 
The year of 1996 
The year of 1996 began with an official announcement that PDS would stop providing 
food rations until May and those who steal food and animals would be immediately 
executed . 
211 The announcement was made shortly after the government reported the 
depletion of food stocks to WFP and FAO. 212 As food situation got worse, however, 
the government introduced in January a new incentive system for cooperative farms 
called `new sub-team contract system'. 213 The new system allowed farmers to keep 
their surplus grains after fulfilling fixed state delivery quotas while the old system 
collected all their production except their food rations. 
Despite the new incentive system, however, the 1996 autumn harvest was 
extremely poor. According to Pyongyang media announcement, grain production 
dropped to mere 2.5 million MT in 1996, the lowest level since 1948. 
This poor harvest made two changes. First, the government began to admit 
that it should change its basic economic structure in order to survive. In December 
Kim Young Nam, the head of the DPRK Cabinet, said in an interview with a German 
TV that the country was facing the risk of economic collapse and the government 
would take all possible actions to avoid it. 214 Kim Jong Woo, the vice-chairman of the 
DPRK Foreign Economy Commission, made a similar statement that the country 
209 FAO/WFP(22 Dec 1995) 
210 The ROK Ministry of Unification (17 Sep 1999) 
21' Yonhap News Agency, 3 Jan 1996 
z'' FAOJWFP (22 Dec 1995) 
213 Joongang Daily News, 16 June 1996 
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failed to establish a self-sufficient economy, its utmost economic goal, and the 
government would change its economic policies to participate in international markets 
and revive its economy . `15 
Second, a growing number of food refugees travelled 
domestically without official permission and even fled into China, raising great 
security concerns from the government. In December, for instance, Kim Jong Il 
warned that such a population movement was causing chaos and disorder in the 
country, ordering the government to take immediately all necessary actions to prevent 
it. 216 
Due to the refugees, however, international attention for the DPRK food 
situation was growing fast. They commonly stated that a large number of population 
was starving to death in the DPRK and even cannibalism took place in some areas. 217 
Quoting their statements, international media began to report from mid 1996 that a 
famine hit the country in full scale. 
The year of 1997 
This famine claim became more widely spread in 1997 when the country's food 
situation was reportedly worst. In late 1997 some NGOs operating for the DPRK food 
refugees in China shocked the world by revealing their survey results that around 20 
percent of the refugee family members died of starvation in 1995-1997.218 On the 
basis of these survey results, they argued that the DPRK was experiencing one of the 
worst famines in human history that could destroy all the younger generations of the 
country without appropriate international intervention. Since then such high mortality 
figures have been frequently quoted by international media to characterise the DPRK 
food crisis. 
But this famine claim was immediately denied by the DPRK government. Lee 
Jong Wha, the Chairman of the DPRK Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee, 
criticised the claim as "pure fiction", saying that it would not accept any food aid with 
such political purposes as degrading the country's pride and demanding its economic 
214 North Korean Policy Trend (1997: No. 1), p. 1 
2 15 North Korean Policy Trend (1996: No. 6), p. 56-7 
21 Natsios (1997) 
217 North Korean Policy Trend (1996, No. 10), p. 31; Kyodo News Agency, 24 Oct. 1996; Yonhap News 
Agency, 4 July 1996 
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and political changes. 219 UN aid organisations and even some donor countries, 
including the ROK, were also sceptical about such high mortality figures. 220 In 
addition, some Russian sources said that, although the DPRK was suffering food 
shortages, the situation was far from being famine. 221 
In this circumstance WFP offered its first eyewitness account concerning the 
mal-nourishment of the DPRK children in April 1997, describing the country as being 
"on the knife edge of a major famine". 222 This eyewitness account was revised and 
confirmed by FAO/WFP/EU's research on the DPRK children's nutritional state in 
May 1998 (FAO/WFPIEU, May 1998). The research provided a surprising result that 
60 percent of the DPRK children were stunted and 50 percent were malnourished. 
Facing widespread hunger, the DPRK government took a wide range of 
agricultural reforms in 1997-99. The reforms started with purging Seo Gwan Whi, the 
party agricultural secretary, and the chairmen of PRECs in 6 provinces in January 
1997,223 which led to Kim Jong I1's direct control on agriculture and his new 
interpretation of Juche Nongbub. First, the government began to change the country's 
outdated crop husbandry. It encouraged potato production instead of maize which had 
dominated agriculture for the last four decades, imported double cropping system and 
new grain hybrids from abroad, rented lands to foreign farms, received UN 
Agricultural Developments and Recovery Funds and so forth. Second, (cooperative) 
farm management began to be deregulated. Farm households were allowed to keep a 
portion of their surpluses and given back their rights to elect the chairman of co- 
operative farms. 224 In some cases, they were given complete autonomy in farm 
management from choosing crop items to marketing the surpluses. Third, the 
government repeatedly announced its willingness to introduce market mechanism in 
agriculture. In May 1998, for instance, the vice-minister of the DPRK Agricultural 
218 KBSM (1998); Reuters, 16 Sep. 1997 
219 Gustavson and Lee Rudolf (1997), p. 142 
220 Interacting DPRK Working Group (1999) 
221 A number of Russian delegates who visited the DPRK in late 1997 said that their impression was 
that, at least cities and towns, there was no famine. The food supply was very limited, there were cases 
of malnutrition; however most people had the minimum sufficient for survival. From these sources 
North Koreans got used to Spartan conditions that might seem intolerable, for example, Western 
observers. That is, the food situation could be described as very grave and the ruling regime was 
backed into a corner: for the DPRK, this was nothing new (The Centre for Contemporary International 
Problems, The DPRK Report No. 9: September-October 1997, Nautilus Institute) 
222 WFP (18 April 1997) 
223 North Korean Policy Trend (1997, No. 2), p. 32 
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Commission stated that the country considered to introduce so-called Chinese style 
`contract production system with farmers', plant export-oriented-crops, liberalise 
grain prices and gradually replace state food-rationing with market mechanism. '`' 
The years of * 1998-99 
Reported food situation improved slightly in 1998 and 1999. In January 1999 the 
government announced that the 1998 grain production significantly increased from 
the lowest level in 1995-97 and the economy began to revive. 226 Both UN aid 
organisations and the ROK government also observed that PDS recovered its 
functioning in many areas and PDS rations were on increasing. 227 In particular, farm 
households now had reportedly far better food situation than before. 
Nevertheless, the food crisis was far from being over. WFP was still appealing 
for emergency food aid of 1.2 million MT in 1998 and 1.1 million MT in 1999 to ease 
the country's dire food situation. 
In 1998-99 another concerns were raised with respect to the DPRK food crisis. 
First, the DPRK food refugees in China provoked international disputes. While NGOs 
and the ROK government demanded China to accept their refugee status and provide 
appropriate supports, the Chinese government forcefully returned them to the DPRK 
when caught. Second, it became apparent that emergency food aid could not be the 
solution of the ongoing food shortages in this country: hence international concerns 
gradually shifted to its long-term agricultural recovery. Third, the DPRK became 
more open to outside world politically and economically. It has made new diplomatic 
relations with many European and Asian countries, trained its government officials to 
have more knowledge about international economy and encouraged foreign 
investments more than any time. And the government has revealed its willingness to 
negotiate any political and military issues with any countries if they could provide 
food and hard currencies. In this respect international concerns have been growing 
over how the food crisis will change this only remained isolated and aggressive 
communist country in Far East. 
224 FAQ/WFP (8 Nov. 1999) 
225 Hwang Dong Un (1998) 
22' The ROK Ministry of Unification (8 Oct. 1999) 
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6.3. The Collapse of Agricultural Development Strategy in 1987-1997 
Fig. 6-1 indicates what is the main factor leading to the recent food crisis in the 
DPRK. According to official announcements, grain production in the DPRK increased 
more than five times from 1.9 million MT in 1946 to 10 million MT in 1987.228 But it 
stagnated visibly in 1988-93 and completely collapsed in the mid/late 1990s. In 1997, 
for instance, grain production declined to 2.5 million MT that was only one fourth of 
the 1987 level. FAO statistics provide a similar picture. They suggest that grain 
production had persistently increased from 3.6 million MT in 1961 to 9.1 million MT 
in 1993, but collapsed to 2.6 million MT in 1996. Given this drastic decline in grain 
production, it would be quite odd if the country did not face any food crisis in the 
1990s. 
Table 6-2 shows this point more clearly. During the private farming era in 
1946-53 grain production increased on the annual rate of 2.95 percent while 
population declined on the rate of 1.23 percent due to the Korean War. Needless to 
say, grain production exceeded population growth. During the regional planning era 
in 1953-73 population grew rapidly on the annual rate of 3.03 percent. However, grain 
production also accelerated to the annual rate of 4.24 percent, still exceeding 
population growth. And this gap between grain production and population growth 
much widened during the central planning era under Juche Nongbub in 1973-87. But 
the situation was completely reversed in 1987-97. During this period grain production 
drastically fell on the annual rate of 12.32 percent while population still grew annually 
by 1 percent. It seems therefore hardly surprising to find that the country suffered 
significant food shortages in the 1990s (and the 1980s). 
The question is: why the DPRK grain production steadily increased until the 
1980s but suddenly collapsed since? Due to the lack of data it might be risky to give 
227 Yonhap News Agency, 19 Jan. 1998 
228 Some might argue that official DPRK announcements and FAO statistics are exaggerated and thus 
unreliable. We agree with this argument to some degree. At the same time, however, we believe that 
both statistics are the only chance to study the DPRK agriculture in reasonable manners and there are 
rational ways to utilise them. See Appendix II of this thesis for the manners and rationale for using both 
statistics. 
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robust answers to this question. Nevertheless, in what follows we find a possible 
answer by examining the agricultural development strategy that the country has 
exercised to increase its grain production for the last five decades. 
Fig. 6-1. The DPRK Grain Production 
1000 MT 
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Source) table 6-3 and 6-4 
Table 6-2. Grain Production and Population Growth: Annual Growth Rates (%) 
Private Regional Central The Era of 
Farming Era Planning Era Planning Era Confusion 
(1946-53) (1953-73) (1973-87) (1987-97) 
I. Production 
official claim (A) 2.95 4.24 4.62 -12.32 
FAO estimates (B) --3.27 -9.24 
II. Population 
Official claim (C) -1.23 3.03 1.63 1.00* 
III. Difference 
(A) - (C) 4.18 1.21 2.99 -13.32 
(B) - (C) --1.64 -10.24 
*annual average between 1985and 1999 
Source) 1. For production, table 6-3 and 6-4 
2. For population, table 6-5 
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6.3.1. Agricultural Strategy for Grain Production: 1946-73 
As shown by table 6-2, the DPRK agricultural performance differed greatly between 
the private farming era in 1946-53 and the regional planning era before Juche 
Nongbub in 1953-73. In terms of agricultural strategy for grain production, however, 
both periods had little differences. In this section therefore we do not distinguish 
them. 
According to official announcements, the DPRK grain production increased 
around three times between 1946 and 1973 [table 6-3]. The production increased 3.8 
percent on annual average, well exceeding the population growth rate of 3.2 percent 
during this period. FAO statistics do not provide the figures in 1946-60. Instead, they 
suggest that grain production increased 2.8 percent annually in 1961-73, exceeding 
the annual population growth rate of 2.6 percent [table 6-4]. 
This progress is impressive given unfavourable agricultural conditions in this 
period. The DPRK inherited an underdeveloped agriculture from the Japanese rule, 
which generated a food crisis in 1945-46, and then experienced serious agricultural 
setbacks during the Korean War that led to another food crisis in 1955-56. There were 
also successive institutional changes, including land reform, agricultural 
cooperativisation and increasing market controls, which in many other socialist 
countries caused serious agricultural stagnation. Moreover, agriculture faced 
permanent labour shortages. As shown by table 6-5, the share of rural population 
declined to 43 percent of total population in 1975 from 82 percent in 1953; and this 
trend has not been reversed until present. 
From these unfavourable conditions some might argue that official 
announcements and FAO statistics exaggerate the production. We agree with this 
argument. But we should point out that the (increasing) trend of grain production 
during this period was real, although the absolute levels of the production might be 
inflated. It is because a systematic strategy to increase total quantitative volume of 
grain production was established in this period. 
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Table 6-3. The DPRK Grain Production (Official Announcements): 1946-1997 
(1000 MT) 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Total 1898 2069 2668 2654 2260 2450 2327 2230 2340 2873 3201 3700 
Rice 1052 1158 1229 1392 
Maize 156 375 224 760 
Other 690 1121 874 721 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Total 3803 4830 5000 5000 5000 4405 5110 5672 5343 
Rice 1535 1796 
Maize 950 1549 
Other 1318 1485 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Total 7000 7700 8000 8500 7870 9000 10000 
Rice 
Maize 
Other 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Total 10059* 9490* 9000 8900 8800 9000 7100 3500 2500 2700 
Rice 4320 4480 4090 4450 4750 3110 2000 1410 1570 
Maize 4340 3900 4200 3720 3940 3550 1370 830 1010 
Other 
* converted into physical outputs from growth rate figures 
Source) 1. For all figures between 1946 and 1961, Chosun Joongang Nyungain 
2. For total grain production [algok] between 1962 and 1989, ROK Ministry of 
Unification Bukhan Gyungje Tongyejip [Collected North Korean Economic 
Statistics], 1996 
3. For total grain production [algok] between 1990 and 1997, Hirata (1998) 
4. For rice and maize between 1989 and 1997, UNDP/DPRK (1998a) 
Table 6-4. The DPRK Grain Production (FAO Statistics): 1961-1997 
(1000 MT) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Total 3583 3725 4054 4212 3707 4073 3788 3662 4378 4365 4499 4310 4817 5068 
Rice 1809 1897 2073 2176 1905 2128 1977 1913 2343 2328 2407 2312 2599 2710 
Maize 1245 1305 1430 1505 1315 1465 1365 1320 1620 1610 1670 1595 1790 1915 
Other 529 523 551 531 487 480 446 429 415 427 422 403 428 443 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Total 5247 5491 5799 5798 6006 5752 6255 6523 6707 7128 7097 7650 7559 7517 
Rice 2814 2854 3061 2957 3060 2646 3045 3204 3290 3496 3369 3805 3538 3394 
Maize 2000 2200 2300 2400 2500 2700 2800 2900 3000 3200 3300 3400 3500 3600 
Other 433 437 438 441 446 406 410 419 417 432 428 445 521 523 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Total 7824 8071 8836 8681 9137 7215 3787 2596 2866 
Rice 3500 3570 4120 4500 4787 3177 2016 1426 1527 
Maize 3800 4000 4200 3718 3937 3547 1366 825 1014 
Other 524 501 516 463 413 491 405 345 325 
Source) FAO Statistical Database 
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Table 6-5. The DPRK Population: 1946-99 
(thousand, %) 
1946 1949 1953 1956 1959 1960 1963 1965 1970 1975 1980 
Total 9257 9622 8491 9359 10392 10789 11568 12408 14619 15986 17298 
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
Rural -- 6988 6645 6443 6409 6420 6514 6695 6922 7455 
(-) (-) (82) (71) (62) (59) (56) (52) (46) (43) (43) 
Urban -- 1503 2714 3949 4380 5148 5894 7924 9064 9843 
(-) (-) (18) (29) (38) (41) (45) (48) (54) (57) (57) 
1982 1985 1986 1987 1993 1999 
Total 17774 18792 19060 19346 20522 21797 
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
Rural 7412 7705 7795 7816 8021 - 
(42) (41) (41) (40) (39) (-) 
Urban 10362 11087 11265 11530 12501 - 
(58) (59) (59) (60) (61) (-) 
* It is unknown whether the figures in 1946-1963 include military population. 
* The figures in 1965-99 exclude military population. 
Source) 1. For 1946-63, Chosun Joongang Nyungam 
2. For 1965-87, the DPRK's submission to UNDP available from Eberstadt and Banister 
(1992: p. 20) 
3. For 1993, the DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics (1995) 
4. For 1999, the DPRK's submission to FAO/WFP (8 Nov. 1999) 
The strategy entailed three agricultural policies: 1) the persistent increase in 
grain sown area; 2) the radical shift of crop composition from low-yield grain items to 
high-yield items; 3) the maximisation of agricultural inputs for grain production or 
four agricultural modernisation programs: irrigation, chemicalisation, mechanisation 
and electrification. 
Above all, the government made continuous efforts to increase grain-sown 
area. A massive-scale of New West Coastline Land Expansion Project was launched 
right after the liberation from the Japanese rule; and successive mountain cultivation 
programs followed. A series of land rehabilitation programs for destroyed and 
neglected land during the colonial era and the Korean War were carried out, and 
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traditional land borders by individual owners were abolished to increase actual sown 
areas. State economic plans included clear quantitative targets for land expansion, 
which were in turn imposed on both local governments and cooperative farms in the 
form of annual and quarterly targets. Due to these efforts grain-sown area increased 
remarkably between 1946 and 1975. According to official announcements, it 
increased up to 2.3 million Chungbo in 1960 from 1.7 million in 1946 by more than 
30 percent [table 6-6]. And FAO statistics suggest that this increase continued 
between 1961 and 1973 [table 6-7]. 
In addition to the expansion of grain-sown area, the government attempted to 
increase grain yields as well. The most important policy taken for this purpose was to 
transform the country's crop composition in favour of two high yield grain items: rice 
and maize. Table 6-6 and 6-7 show that there was a dramatic change in the 
composition of grain cultivation between 1946 and 1973. According to official 
announcements, the share of rice and maize in total grain-sown area was 23 percent 
and 10 percent in 1946, respectively. Hence, though important, they were far from 
being dominant grain items. Rather, other grains such as starchy, pulse and beans 
were more important for both agricultural production and people's food diet, 
comprising 66 percent of total grain-sown area. In 1960, however, the share of maize 
rocketed up to 34 percent, while that of other grains declined to 44 percent. And FAO 
statistics suggest that this trend continued until 1973 when the share of rice and maize 
rose up to 37 percent and 40 percent respectively, showing that they were now the 
dominant grain items in the DPRK. 
Table 6-6. Sown Areas by Grain Items (Official Announcements): 1946-60 
(1000 Chungbo, %) 
1946 1947 1948 1949 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1960 
Total 1670 2013 2127 2112 1904 2062 2103 2111 2099 2165 2255 2264 2279 
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
Rice 388 420 444 382 380 406 432 452 455 493 500 504 500 
(23) (21) (21) (18) (20) (20) (21) (21) (22) (23) (22) (22) (22) 
Maize 174 239 275 282 249 247 241 236 335 608 759 826 784 
(10) (12) (13) (13) (13) (12) (11) (11) (16) (28) (34) (36) (34) 
Other 1108 1354 1408 1448 1275 1409 1430 1423 1309 1064 996 934 995 
(66) (67) (66) (69) (67) (68) (68) (67) (62) (49) (44) (41) (44) 
Source) Chosun Joongang Nyungain 
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Table 6-7. Sown Areas by Grain Items (FAO Statistics): 1961-97 
(1000 ha, %) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Total 1432 1436 1476 1479 1460 1484 1490 1483 1508 1510 1514 1523 1558 
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
Rice 420 440 450 480 480 500 500 500 530 530 530 530 570 
(29) (31) (30) (32) (33) (34) (34) (34) (35) (35) (35) (35) (37) 
Maize 525 530 530 535 535 540 540 550 560 570 590 610 630 
(37) (37) (36) (36) (37) (36) (36) (37) (37) (38) (39) (40) (40) 
Other 487 466 496 464 445 444 450 433 418 410 394 383 358 
(34) (32) (34) (31) (30) (30) (30) (29) (28) (27) (26) (25) (23) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Total 1592 1616 1618 1635 1638 1635 1611 1630 1618 1605 1635 1603 1628 
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
Rice 600 625 630 650 657 660 650 670 670 658 700 670 700 
(38) (39) (39) (40) (40) (40) (40) (41) (41) (41) (43) (42) (43) 
Maize 650 670 680 690 690 690 690 690 690 690 690 690 680 
(41) (41) (42) (42) (42) (42) (43) (42) (43) (43) (42) (43) (42) 
Other 342 321 308 295 291 285 271 270 258 257 245 243 248 
(21) (20) (19) (18) (18) (17) (17) (17) (16) (16) (15) (15) (15) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Total 1703 1690 1671 1655 1556 1546 1493 1527 1503 1390 1432 
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
Rice 700 700 650 650 588 592 589 583 582 580 611 
(41) (41) (39) (39) (38) (38) (39) (38) (39) (42) (43) 
Maize 680 660 700 680 643 644 628 638 670 589 602 
(40) (39) (42) (41) (41) (42) (42) (42) (45) (42) (42) 
Other 323 330 321 325 325 310 276 306 251 221 219 
(19) (20) (19) (20) (21) (20) (18) (20) (17) (16) (15) 
() Composition 
Source) FAO Statistical Database 
Table 6-8 explains the reason why this change was made. Between 1946 and 
1960 grain yield per Chungbo was 2.9 MT for rice and 1.12 MT for maize, but only 
0.8 MT for other grains. This means that there were great chances to increase total 
grain production by replacing other grain items with rice and maize. The difficulty 
was however that the country's mountainous geography did not allow the swift 
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expansion of paddy fields for rice production and existing farming style made 
producers reluctant to increase maize production. Traditionally North Korean farm 
households preferred other grains than maize for two reasons: 1) double/triple 
cropping of other grains was important to prevent soil exhaustion; 2) they were easy 
to cultivate in the sense that they required relatively little fertilisers. By contrast, 
maize was not suitable for double cropping and needed heavy fertilising. 
Table 6-8. Grain Yields (Official Announcements): 1946-60 
(MT per Chungbo) 
1946 1949 1953 1956 1960 Average 
Total 1.14 1.26 1.1 1 1.33 1.67 1.30 
Rice 2.71 3.03 2.84 2.82 3.07 2.90 
Maize 0.90 1.33 0.93 1.25 1.21 1.12 
Other 0.62 0.77 0.61 0.68 1.32 0.80 
Source) Chosun Joongang Nyungain 
To resolve this difficulty three measures were institutionalised. First, during 
the 1953-58 agricultural cooperativisation the authorities deprived farm households of 
the rights of crop selection. Second, as the new agricultural management system was 
introduced in 1961, regional food self-sufficiency was emphasised to encourage local 
agricultural agencies to change crop compositions in favour of high yield grain 
items. 229 Third, the authorities divided agricultural areas into flat, intermediate and 
mountainous areas, setting up `standard crop composition' for each area. By the early 
1970s rice had been a standard crop item for flat area, the combination of rice and 
maize for medium area and other grains for mountainous area. 
Another policy to increase grain yields was to maximise agricultural inputs. 
From the Japanese rule it was well known among policy makers that such agricultural 
inputs as water supply and (chemical) fertilisers had great effects on grain yields. 
Both factors became even more important as the new socialist government 
emphasised rice and maize production. The expansion of paddy fields for rice 
229 See section 4.4.2.2.2 in chapter 4 
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production depended on the level of water supply, and the success of maize 
production was largely affected by the supply of chemical fertilisers. In addition to 
water and fertiliser, agricultural machinery appeared as an important issue in the 
1950s when agriculture faced labour shortages after the Korean War and agricultural 
cooperativisation was completed. From its very beginning, therefore, the government 
identified agricultural modernisation as increasing the supplies of four major 
agricultural inputs: water, (chemical) fertiliser, machinery and electricity. 
To increase those inputs, on the one hand, the government emphasised so- 
called `the synchronised development of agriculture and industry. It referred to the 
principle that, when economic resources were transferred from agriculture to industry 
in the early stage of industrial development, the priority within industry should be 
given to the sectors producing goods for agricultural production and conversely, when 
industry developed rapidly, the resources should be transferred from industry to 
agriculture. On the other hand, the authorities imposed on state agricultural agencies, 
not on producers, the responsibilities to provide all necessary inputs for agricultural 
production. PREC had its own resource supply firm, being responsible for procuring 
industrial products and distributing them among CCMCs. And CCMC owned all local 
facilities and controlled local industrial factories producing agricultural inputs, being 
finally responsible for the input supply to producers. 
Table 6-9. Gross Industrial Production in the DPRK: 1946-73 
(1946 =100) 
1946 1950 1955 1960 1964 1970 1973 
Gross Industrial Production 100 295 485 2100 3700 7130 11410 
(means of production) 100 333 488 2300 3700 
(consumption goods) 100 254 497 2000 3700 
Source) Chosun Joongang Nyungam 
Due to both policies agricultural inputs increased drastically in accordance 
with industrial development. According to official announcements, the DPRK 
industrial outputs increased more than hundred times in 1946-73 [table 6-9]. In 
parallel, chemical fertiliser consumption in agriculture increased around eight times 
between 1946 and 1974 [table 6-10]. Irrigated land expanded more than five times 
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Table 6-10. Agricultural Inputs (Official Announcements): 1949-74 
A. Fertiliser (1000 MT) 
1949 1956 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1969 1973 1974 
Total 
Perchunngbo (k) 
260 
131 
215 
113 
307 501 
160 249 
566 599 640 
281 300 321 512 1000 1000 
B. Irrigated Land 
1949 1953 
(1949 
1956 
=100) 
1960 
Land 100 145 230 510 
C. Tractor in Use 
1953 1954 1956 1957 1958 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1974 
Number (15 hp) 764 800 2561 2554 2671 12500 13996 15692 18002 20000 72008 
Area (1000 Chun bo) 95 162 487 854 1202 5910 6227 
D. Rural Electricity 
1953 1958 1961 1963 1964 1966 1968 1974 
Total Consumption 
(1953 =100) 100 474 
738 1077 
Ri with electricity supply 
(% of total Ri) 47.2 67 92.1 93.3 95.5 
98.2 100 100 
Farm households with 
electricity supply 41 49 62 
71 81 86.1 91.2 100 
(% of total farm households) 
Source) Chosun Joongang Nyungain 
Table 6-11. Agricultural Inputs (FAO Statistics): 1961-97 
(1000 ha) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Fertiliser 
(I000MT) 112 139 158 164 173 186 208 250 251 309 338 361 371 
Tractor in use 
(1000) 9 10 12 13 13 14 16 17 18 20 21 22 23 
Irrigation 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 600 700 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Fertiliser 
(I000MT) 416 434 551 611 767 749 729 786 740 791 774 844 756 
Tractor in use 
(1000) 24 25 26 27 33 39 44 50 56 62 68 68 69 
Irrigation 800 900 1000 1030 1060 1090 1120 1150 1180 1210 1240 1270 1300 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Fertiliser 
(1000MT) 746 812 815 832 811 783 766 323 104 93 171 
Tractor in use 
(1000) 70 71 72 73 74 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Irrigation 1330 1360 1400 1420 1440 1460 1460 1460 1460 1460 1460 
Source) FAO Statistical Database 
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between 1949 and 1960. The number of tractors increased around hundred times 
between 1953 and 1974, and all farm households had been supplied with electricity by 
1974. Of course FAO statistics provide different numbers [table 6-11]. Nonetheless 
they also suggest that the level of agricultural inputs rose up drastically during this 
period. 
Given the above three agricultural policies, including the expansion of grain- 
sown area, the transformation of crop composition into high-yield grain items and the 
level-ups of agricultural inputs, it would not be surprising that grain production had an 
increasing trend between 1946 and 1973. 
6.3.2. The Strategy for Grain Production: 1973-87 
For the years of 1973-87 the DPRK grain production was most successful. 
According to official announcements, the production increased on the annual rate of 
4.62 percent, finally reaching 10 million MT in 1984 that had long been conceived as 
the level with which the government could provide enough `rice rations' to the whole 
population. FAO statistics assess the production slightly lower than official 
announcements. Nevertheless, they still suggest that this period saw the most rapid 
increase in grain production. 
Clearly this increase was the result of ongoing agricultural policies that had 
been previously established to increase grain production. Indeed the government 
intensified the efforts to expand grain-sown area. In 1974, for instance, the mass 
campaign of `finding 300 thousand chungbo of new land' was launched, which was 
soon followed by the well known `terraced field cultivating campaign' in 1985 that 
cut and transformed all the mountainous areas below the slope of 30 degree into 
terraced fields. As a result, grain-sown area increased up to 1.7 million hectares, the 
historically highest level, in 1984 [table 6-7]. 
The transformation of crop composition into high-yield grain items continued, 
too. During this period the policy was unfolded in the form of: 1) increasing the share 
of rice production in intermediate areas that had previously focused on maize 
production; 2) spreading maize production to mountainous areas that had produced 
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mostly other minor grains and thus had not been self-sufficient on food. As the result, 
the share of rice had risen up to 43 percent of total grain-sown area by 1986 and that 
of maize to 42 percent. 
Agricultural input supply also went on smoothly. Between 1973 and 1987 
fertiliser supply increased by 78 percent; irrigation areas by 65 percent; and the 
number of tractors tripled [table 6-11]. 
However, the most distinctive feature of this period was not the continuity of 
the existing agricultural policies, but the fact that the government introduced new 
agricultural technologies and practices in order to achieve the DPRK version of green 
revolution. Note that Juche Nongbub first appeared in 1973. It was during this period 
that Juche Nongbub, particularly its technical aspects, were fully developed, 
beginning to characterise all agricultural practices in the DPRK. 
New agricultural practices started with a simple idea entailed by Juche 
Nongbub: `dense planting' would be the most effective way to increase grain 
production in a country where arable land is limited. Due to the idea cooperative 
farms were forced to plant from 6-70,000 maize seeds per hectare to 100,000 seeds, in 
contrast to 50,000 seeds in most other countries. 230 At first sight, dense planting might 
look plausible. In reality, however, it is more likely to reduce grain yields for several 
reasons. Firstly, it prevents plants from absorbing enough sunshine, damaging their 
growths. Secondly, it accelerates soil exhaustion, leading to the long-term decline in 
grain yields. Thirdly, densely planted seeds need more intensive care that may not be 
available in large-scale collective farms where agricultural production is organised in 
highly administrative ways. Due to these adverse effects China abandoned dense 
planting shortly after the great production failures and corresponding famine in 1959- 
61.231 
Moreover, there was another problem in the DPRK. From the early 1970s, as 
mentioned above, the government forced maize production even to mountainous areas 
where weather is colder and so growing season is shorter. It was therefore doubtful 
whether dense planting could work properly in such unfavourable natural conditions. 
To resolve those problems of dense planting, the government organised 
numerous agricultural projects, the results of which were aggregated, standardised and 
230 Shin, Dong Wan et al (1998), p. 174-76 
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spread across the country under the name of Juche Nongbub in 1973-78. Perhaps the 
first and utmost project was to develop new seed varieties suitable for dense planting. 
To do this, on the one hand, state agricultural agencies imported wide ranges of seed 
varieties from the Soviet Union and China and mixed them with traditional North 
Korean seed varieties. On the other hand, a national scale of land research project was 
carried out, on the basis of which newly developed varieties were experimented in all 
different land and weather conditions. 232 Through these procedures, all existing rice 
and maize varieties were replaced with new ones in the mid/late 1970s [table 6-12]. 
Table 6-12. Major Seed Varieties in the DPRK 
Before 1970s 1970s and 80s Since 1980s 
Rice Ryongsung 25, Pyongyang 15, Pyongbok 3, Pyongyang 15, 
Ryongsung 26, Yeomju 14, Yeomju 1, Pyongyang 9, Pyongyang 4 
Hamnam 15 Seohaechal Yeomju 1, Seohaechal 
Maize Long Fellow, Soksung 1, Gangsang 4, Eunchon 5, Whasung 1, Whasung2, 
Mammoth White Pyongnam 6, Eunsan 3, Eunchon 5, Whangju 1, 
Shingye 15, Euiju 2 Haeju I 
Source) Shin Dong Wan et al (1998) p. 103 and 162-163 
Another project was to establish new agricultural standards of planting and 
fertilising. 233 The new planting standards were invented for maximising the osmosis 
of sunshine per plant and the new fertilising standards for increasing nutrient supplies 
to plants and preventing their diseases. The former was embedded in new planting 
machines in order to reduce human errors in actual practices, being introduced to 
cooperative farms in 1976. And the latter was reflected in the worksheets of 
cooperative farms in the mid/late 1970s. 
Agricultural project to prevent soil exhaustion was also carried out. It mainly 
involved three new responsibilities of cooperative farms: regular soil changes, after- 
harvest-ploughing and organic fertiliser production. 234 Now all cooperative farms 
should obligatory replace their soils with those of other fertile lands every four or five 
231 Chang, Hae Sung (1999), p. 22 
232 Lee, Chul Hee (1986), p. 31-32 and Park Young Ho (1994), p. 169 
233 Park, Young Ho (1994), p. 176-78 & p. 218-219 
234 Lee Chul Hee (1986), p. 90-91 and Shin Dong Wan et al (1998), p. 177-8 
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years. They should also carry out after-harvest-ploughing to expose exhausted soils 
two times every year - in winter and in spring before planting started. Moreover, they 
should meet the quantitative targets of traditional organic fertilisers called Toebi made 
out of leaves and human and animal manure. 
Protecting maize seeds from cold weather constituted another issue of 
agricultural projects. To do this new maize seedling practices were established. The 
practices demanded producers to plant and grow maize seeds first in hothouses and 
then transfer their baby plants into fields just like rice. If it was not possible, another 
method called `humus-cake nurseries for growing maize seedlings [kangnaengi 
youngyangdanzi]' was applied. 235 It demanded producers to make a round cake with 
the diameter of 3-5cm in which a maize seed was in the centre, fertilisers surrounded 
the seed and clay was in outer space, and to plant this cake after deeply digging the 
fields. The idea was that the heat from fertilisers in the cake could protect maize seeds 
from cold weather. 
The final project was about dissolving agricultural production processes into a 
series of simple labour processes and thus playing down the importance of human 
labour. In case of plating, for instance, labourers were grouped into three teams: 
tractor/planting machine teams, correction teams and watering teams. Tractor teams 
simply drove tractors that automatically carried out planting works. Correction teams 
followed tractor teams, raising up and refitting fallen plants. And watering teams 
followed correcting teams, watering the plants. 
It is difficult to assess how successful those new agricultural practices were. 
Nevertheless there are two good reasons to believe that at least they did not fail 
immediately. Let us first look at table 6-13. It shows that grain yield jumped up 
around the late 1970s/early 1980s. In case of maize, for instance, the yields steadily 
increased to 2.99 MT per hectare in 1975 from 2.37 MT in 1961, suddenly jumping 
up to 3.91 MT in 1980. These figures suggest that both dense planting and new 
agricultural practices to prevent the problems of dense planting might have positive 
effects on grain yields. Secondly, the country has still maintained dense planting 
although the situation has slowly changed as the recent food crisis has deepened. If 
235 Shin Dong Wan et al (1998), p. 167-176 
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this practice had huge negative effects on grain yields, it must have been abandoned 
long before as in China. 
Table 6-13. Trends of Grain Yields in the DPRK (FAO Statistics) 
(MT per ha) 
1961 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Grain - Total 2.50 2.54 2.89 3.25 3.57 4.43 4.88 2.52 
Rice 4.31 3.97 4.39 4.50 4.07 5.03 5.49 3.46 
Maize 2.37 2.46 2.82 2.99 3.91 4.78 5.88 2.04 
Other 1.09 1.09 1.04 1.35 1.50 1.76 1.54 1.61 
Source) FAO Statistical Database 
6.3.3. The Collapse of the Strategy: Since 1987 
The DPRK has suffered disastrous setbacks in its grain production since 1987. 
Between 1987 and 1996 the production declined to 2.5 million MT from 10 million 
MT according to official announcements, or to 2.6 million MT from 7.6 million MT 
according to FAO statistics. Although both statistics provide different numbers, they 
commonly suggest that the production dramatically collapsed in the 1990s. 
At a first glance, it might be odd that the country, which had seen a steady 
increase in grain production for around four decades, suddenly faced a production 
collapse. However, when we take into consideration the factors that had boosted the 
country's production until the 1980s, it might not be so surprising. Indeed all the 
existing agricultural policies and practices that had previously increased grain 
production have worked in quite reverse ways since 1987. 
Consider grain-sown area. As shown by table 6-6, the sown area reached the 
peak in 1986 and has persistently fallen since. And the decline was paramount in the 
1990s. For instance, the 1996 grain-sown area was mere 1.39 million hectares, even 
lower than the 1961 level. 
The fact that the government launched the `terraced field cultivating 
campaign' in 1985 paradoxically shows that the expansion of arable land already hit 
the limit in that time. Hence, it would be understandable even if the area did not 
increase further in the 1990s. But it actually fell. Why? A possible answer is the poor 
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management of terraced fields. In principle, terraced fields should have appropriate 
defence facilities against landslides as well as irrigation facilities to raise grain yields. 
In reality however such facilities did not exist or were poorly managed. Indeed it has 
been frequently reported since the early 1990s that due to terraced fields heavy rains 
have easily led to floods with severe landslides, destroying not only terraced fields but 
also near flat lands. 236 In addition, international aid agencies such as FAO and WFP 
have found in their regular visits to the country that the grain yields in terraced fields 
were extremely low, advising that the country should stop cultivating the fields given 
scarce other agricultural resources. 237 This advice has been accepted by the DPRK 
authorities since 1996, which is a reason why grain-sown area declined particularly 
rapidly in the mid/late 1990s. 
What about the transformation of crop composition into high-yield grain 
items? Similarly to grain-sown area, the share of rice and maize in total grain 
production reached the peak in 1985-86, which have not changed greatly since. This 
means that there has been no room to increase grain production by simply expanding 
the share of two high-yield grain items. Conversely, due to its high fertiliser 
consumption the government has increasingly discouraged maize production since 
1997.238 It suggests that the share of both rice and maize in total production is likely 
to decline in near future rather than rise. 
The situation was most dramatic in the supply of agricultural inputs. Let us 
look at fertiliser supply in table 6-9. Between 1987 and 1997 fertiliser supply declined 
on the annual average rate of 15.9 percent: consequently the 1996 fertiliser 
consumption collapsed to mere 93,000 MT, almost one ninth of the 1986 level. Of 
course, the figures for other inputs such as tractors and irrigated land did not change 
greatly. Note however that these figures are stock and there were great shortages of 
energy and agricultural machinery parts in the 1990s. Indeed, the country's energy 
consumption declined on the annual rate of 11 percent in 1992-96 mainly due to the 
cessation of oil import from the Soviet Union. 239 And international aid agencies have 
236 Lee Young Bum (1999) 
237 FAO/WFP(12 Nov. 1998) 
238 Kim and Jeon (1999a) 
239 Since the oil import from the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, the DPRK oil consumption 
reduced dramatically. Total oil consumption declined for seven consecutive years from 1990 to 1997 
on annual rate 12.3 percent. In consequence, the 1997 oil consumption was less than 40 percent of the 
1990 level. 
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observed that due to the shortages of spare parts a vast majority of machinery, 
including tractors and irrigation facilities, was useless or destroyed. 240 It suggests that 
the situation in the supply of those inputs was not different to that in fertiliser supply. 
The basic reason for this decline in agricultural inputs was the collapse of 
industrial production. Table 6-14 presents the composition of the DPRK national 
output in 1992-96. The data show that industrial output declined by more than 60 
percent only for four years. Actually the fall in industrial output was far more 
dramatic than in agricultural output. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to study the 
reasons why there was an industrial collapse in the 1990s. Perhaps the breakdown of 
the USSR and the increasing difficulties of domestic resource mobilisation played 
important roles. However what the data suggest is that this industrial collapse was the 
main immediate factor leading to the input collapse in agriculture. 
Table 6-14. The Composition of National Output: 1992-96 
(million US dollar) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Total 20875 20935 15421 12802 10588 
Agriculture 7807 8227 6431 5223 4775 
Industry 4551 4689 3223 2228 1556 
Construction 1315 1256 910 819 508 
Other 7160 6762 4858 4532 6748 
Source) DPRK's submission to IMF quoted by Noland, Robinson and Wang (1999) 
This decline in agricultural inputs had particularly adverse effects on grain 
production, because it led to the immediate collapse of existing agricultural practices. 
[The DPRK Oil Consumption] 
(thousand barrel per day) 
1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Total 67.7 72.1 62.1 53.5 43.9 38.3 33.5 29.4 28.6 
(Motor Gasoline) 23.8 24.0 20.3 17.4 14.6 12.4 10.5 8.9 8.6 
(Gas Diesel) 24.5 26.6 22.5 19.9 16.5 14.8 13.4 12.0 11.7 
(Heavy Fuel Oil) 11.3 12.8 11.1 9.0 6.6 5.5 4.4 3.6 3.5 
Source) International Energy Agency, Energy Statistics of Non-OECD Countries, various years 
240 Indeed, FAO/WFP mission teams observed: 
"The highly mechanised DPR Korea agriculture faces a serious constraint as about four-fifth of 
motorised farm machinery and equipment is out of use due to obsolescence and lack of spare parts and 
fuel During the field visits the Mission saw a large portion of tractors, transplanters, trucks and other 
farm machinery lying unused and unusable. In fact, because of non-availability of trucks, harvested 
paddy has been seen left on the fields in piles for long periods" (FAOPNFP: 12 Nov. 1998) 
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Present agricultural practices were established to resolve the problems of dense 
planting. For these practices to work properly a certain level of agricultural input 
supply was essential. Without appropriate fertiliser supply, for instance, it would be 
impossible to make humus-cake nurseries to protect maize seeds from coldness. It 
would be also difficult to provide enough nutrient supplies to plants and prevent their 
diseases under dense planting. What about the shortage of agricultural machinery'? 
Present practices consist of numerous simple labour processes in which agricultural 
machinery plays the central role. In case of planting, for instance, tractors or planting 
machines carry out actual planting and human labourers simply raise up fallen plants 
after the machines finish the works. It means that agricultural productivity is 
decisively dependent on the quantity and quality of the machinery. Of course it must 
be possible to replace the machinery with human labours. Nevertheless, given that all 
existing practices have been standardised along the machinery, its shortage should 
lead to the immediate decline in productivity. 
In short, the years of 1987-97 saw that all the existing agricultural policies 
collapsed, leading to grain production failures. Grain-sown area declined; the share of 
high-yield grain items did not rise or even declined; agricultural input supply 
collapsed and thus the present agricultural practices requiring a high level of input 
also supply collapsed. Because the practices prevented the problems of dense 
planting, their collapse meant that grain yields should be adversely affected by dense 
planting. Given these factors it would be odd if grain production has not fallen 
significantly since 1987. 
6.3.4. Food Shortages, Agricultural Strategy for Grain Production 
And the 1987-99 Food Crisis 
From the above discussion we can identify the DPRK agricultural strategy to increase 
grain production with the following five policies: 1) the expansion of grain-sown area; 
2) the transformation of crop composition in favour of high-yield grain items; 3) the 
maximisation of agricultural inputs on the basis of corresponding industrial 
development; 4) the introduction of dense planting; 5) the establishment of 
agricultural practices to prevent the problems of dense planting. Of them, the first 
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three policies characterised agriculture between 1946 and 1973. And the last two were 
dominant from the introduction of Juche Nongbub in 1973 to the eve of recent food 
crisis in 1987. 
Owing to this strategy the country had managed to increase its grain 
production five times between 1946 and 1987, modernise its agriculture and establish 
its own agricultural practices. An interesting point is that the strategy explains the 
DPRK food shortages well. That is, the DPRK food shortages have occurred when 
external shocks temporarily prevented the above strategy from working properly and 
thus grain production stagnated temporarily. 
For instance, the 1954-55 food crisis occurred with the 1954 grain production 
failure, which was in turn caused by the post-war resource shocks in agriculture. Due 
to the Korean War grain-sown area declined by 30 percent in 1951-53 and the number 
of animals fell by 20 percent. 241 Because industrial production dropped by 40 percent, 
agricultural input supply by industry also collapsed. Two of three agricultural policies 
that had been utilised to increase grain production before 1973 did not work properly 
due to the post-war resource shock. 
The 1970-73 food shortages provide a similar example. 242 In the late 1960s 
industrial development decelerated and military confrontation with the US intensified. 
In agriculture, labour shortages worsened due to increasing labour shifts to industry 
and military sector. Both factors destabilised agricultural input supplies, which in turn 
led to agricultural stagnation. 
The recent food crisis is similar to the previous ones in the sense that it 
happened because the strategy to increase grain production did not work properly due 
to external shocks such as domestic industrial collapse and the sudden drop in energy 
import from the Soviet Union. But there are two fundamental differences. In case of 
the recent food crisis, as seen already, the five policies to increase grain production 
collapsed totally while only some of them did not work properly in the previous 
shortages. In consequence, both the degree and period of production failures and the 
severity of food shortages were much greater in the recent crisis. Second, all the five 
policies eventually proved unsustainable and thus the recent food crisis must be much 
difficult to overcome. It is straightforward that both the expansion of grain-sown area 
241 See table 5-2 in chapter 5 
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and the transformation of crop composition into high-yield grain items can not go 
forever. Actually the recent food crisis proved it. In addition, the present agricultural 
practices presuppose a high level of agricultural input supply such as machinery, 
fertiliser and energy. Without this supply the practices would greatly reduce grain 
yields due to the problems of dense planting. Given the ongoing industrial stagnation 
as shown by table 6-11, however, it is doubtful whether the DPRK can secure the 
supply. This means that the existing DPRK strategy to increase grain production is not 
realistic until its industry recovers fully, and in order to overcome the recent crisis 
therefore new strategies, say, the massive import of foreign agricultural technologies 
and capital and corresponding institutional changes in domestic agriculture may be 
necessary. 
6.4. Three Controversial Issues Surrounding the Food Crisis 
So far we have seen that the DPRK has faced severe food shortages since 1987, and 
that the shortages were caused by the collapse of the country's strategy to increase 
grain production. Perhaps there could be no opposition to both facts. Apart from the 
facts, however, nothing has been agreed on the recent DPRK food crisis. In particular, 
the disputes are seemingly irresolvable over the country's food situation in the 
mid/late 1990s. In this section we summarise the disputes with three issues. 
6.4.1. Was there famine? If there was, when and how severe was it? 
In the past seven years the food crisis in the DPRK has provoked many debates 
among researchers, international NGOs, food donor countries and even UN aid 
organisations. In the centre of the debates lies the issue of whether the crisis 
developed into famine in the mid/late 1990s. 
242 See section 5.2 in chapter 5 
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6.4.1.1. Was there famine? 
Of course, most researchers and NGOs have believed that the existence of famine 
in the DPRK is undeniable. 
... the worst 
famine in human history is now transpiring in North Korea.... The current status of 
wholesale starvation in North Korea is much worse than similar disasters such as the famine in 
Ethiopia and Somalia. It is the worst human tragedy of the late 20`x' century . 
243 
As mentioned already, however, Pyongyang media has persistently denied this famine 
claim. Interestingly there are indeed some researchers supporting this official non- 
famine claim. 
It does not seem to be true that North Korea suffers from severe famine and civil riots for food, 
even though food supply is not enough. North Korea has tried to change its public food 
distribution system from central rationing system to regional one. Sometimes this change can 
cause severe food shortages in certain areas. However there is no evidence that North Korea 
suffers from overall famine and thus the situation is getting worse. 244 
More interesting is the attitude of UN aid agencies that have led international food aid 
to the DPRK and initiated aid activities in the country since 1995. On the one hand, 
they have announced that the DPRK has suffered an extreme scarcity of food since 
1995. On the other hand, however, they have been very careful in using the word of 
famine when they have described the country's food situation. When they need to 
emphasise the severity of the DPRK food situation, they have used such words as 
`grave food supply problems', `on the knife edge of famine' and even `famine in slow 
motion', but not the simple word of `famine'. Furthermore, in many cases they 
pointed out that the DPRK avoided `a wide scale famine' due to both the country's 
effective food distribution and international food aid, although there was a great 
possibility of the outbreak of famine. 
Is there famine in DPRK? 
243 KBSM (1998) 
244 Han Ho Suk (1997) 
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Outright famine has been avoided but its spectre still looms. Government estimates indicate the 
prevalence of malnutrition among children has now increased to 38 percent of the under-five- 
population. 245 
All these rather confusing arguments have made it difficult to judge whether 
the DPRK food crisis developed into famine. 
6.4.1.2. How severe was the famine? 
Needless to say, these confusions concerning the existence of famine have 
originated from the fact that there are no reliable statistics or estimates about so-called 
famine deaths in the DPRK. In other words, we do not know how severe the DPRK 
food crisis has been and how it has affected the country's demographic trends. 
Of course, those who have believed the existence of famine have made various 
attempts to estimate the demographic impacts of the crisis. However, the results are 
extremely different from `many millions of famine deaths' to `hundreds thousands'. 
Among 22 million people, the population after the deduction of the number of ruling class in 
North Korea (approx. 15%, 3million) and farmers (approx. 30%, 6 million) is 13 million. When 
we adapt 28.7% of average mortality rate of the interviewee's family, the mortality is more than 
3.5 million . 
`4' 2 
Famine deaths started to appear from 1995, and their number is estimated 7-80,000 on annual 
average until 1997. However, the number is estimated to decline to 40,000 in 1998 due to 
international aid. Total number of famine deaths between 1995 and 1998 is estimated around 
270,000, comprising 26 percent of 1.02 million deaths for that period. 247 
In this reason Noland, Robinson and Wang (2001) say that, although there was a 
famine, its scale is unknown. 
245 UNICEF, Update on UNICEF activities in DPR Korea, 1 Sep 1997 
246 KBSM (1998) 
247 ROK National Statistical Office (1999) 
169 
As well as can be ascertained, North Korea is now into its ninth year of economic decline. It has 
been facing food shortages at least since the early 1990s and is experiencing a famine of unknown 
severity. 
249 
In contrast, Pyongyang media has frequently claimed that there have been no 
famine deaths and the country's population has grown along the population trends 
revealed by its 1993 census. Meanwhile UN aid agencies have not made any concrete 
statistical announcements about the number of famine deaths in the DPRK. Instead, 
they focused on identifying the nutritional status of the population to have the 
implications of international food aid to the country. 
In this respect the severity of the food crisis is as controversial as whether it 
developed into famine. 
6.4.1.3. When was there famine? 
It is also not clear, if the food crisis escalated to famine, when it did. In section 6.2 we 
have seen that the origin of the crisis can be back up to the year of 1987. Yet, most 
debates concerning the crisis have focused on the years since 1995 when the DPRK 
government officially appealed for international food aid so that the crisis was widely 
known to outside world. 
In this circumstance some researchers addressed the issue of the timing of the 
food crisis (famine). 
A substantial body of new evidence indicates that the country has been experiencing a major 
famine with abnormally high mortality rates since 1994. The food crisis did not begin with the 
floods in August 1995, as has been commonly understood, but with the sharp reduction in heavily 
subsidised food, equipment, and crude oil from the Soviet Union and China in the early 1990s. 249 
Although it did not raise great concerns, the issue is important in two respects. First, 
the DPRK government has argued that the basic reason for the country's food crisis 
since 1995 was the great flood in July/August 1995. Hence, the timing of the food 
crisis (famine) is closely related to the causation of the crisis (famine). 
248 Noland, Robinson and Wang (2001), p. 741 
249 Natsios (1999) 
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In 1993, our government, under the guidance of the late General leader, President Kim Il Sung, 
had set out the framework for a new economic strategy which gave a new emphasis and 
precedence to agricultural development..... The repeated natural calamities of recent years-with 
their historically unprecedented floods and droughts-prevented the timely initiation of the plans 
and created the temporary production shortfalls and food shortages... The most immediate cause 
of current food shortages is the unprecedented series of natural disasters which have affected our 
country. It is important that these disasters were of such a magnitude that these shortages would 
have occurred even if other economic problems were not present. 25° 
Second, it is important to estimate the demographic impact of the famine, if it existed, 
because undoubtedly the estimation period would have great influences on the 
estimation results. 
6.4.2. Was the famine different from other famines? 
Another controversial issue is whether the crisis (famine) was different from those in 
other countries. This issue concerns the basic features of the crisis. 
6.4.2.1. Was it FAD famine or not? What was the causation of the famine? 
Most researchers, NGOs and food donor countries have believed that the crisis 
(famine) occurred basically due to the country's food shortages caused by its (grain) 
production failures. 
The DPRK faces a grave food supply problem, aggravated by large reductions in output over the 
past two years due to adverse weather.... Only urgent mobilisation of food assistance would 
advert further hardship and possible starvation . `51 
The DPRK is faced with a grave humanitarian crisis. At least five million people are currently 
affected by food shortages, and DPRK's Ministry of Public Health recently estimated that 38 
percent of the children under five years of age -a staggering 800,000- are malnourished. 
250 Choi Su Hon, Statement by Choi Su Hon, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, 
DPRK/UNDP (1998a) 
251 FAOIWFP (22 Dec. 1995) 
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UNICEF, along with a growing number of aid organisations, are warning that the crisis is 
threatening to escalate into a widespread and deadly famine. 252 
It is also the official view of the DPRK government. However, some researchers have 
made a quite different argument: the crisis did not entail significant food shortages 
and, on the contrary, it occurred mainly due to food distribution failures. 
The immediate causation of famine was not food shortages, but the collapse of Public Distribution 
System (PDS)...... In the DPRK famine, the question is why and how food was distributed 
asymmetrically, rather than how much food available declined. Even with stable food supply the 
amounts of food allocated for the population sharply declined, and inequality of the allocation 
253 more widened. 
A distinctive feature of modern economics of famine is that it has tended to 
distinguish FAD (food availability decline) famine and Non-FAD famine, showing 
that FAD is not the only causation of the famine. And it advises to look at how a 
person's ability to command food (entitlement) changes during the famine period 
rather than how total food availability changes. 
The above quotation argues that the DPRK food crisis (famine) was not a 
FAD famine in spite of the country's paramount (grain) production declines in the 
1990s as shown by the previous section. In this respect the causation of the DPRK 
food crisis (famine) is still controversial. 
6.4.2.2. Were there the government's policy failures? Was it a controlled famine? 
An important reason why some researchers argue that the DPRK food crisis is not a 
FAD famine is that they believe that the government effectively selected famine 
victims from certain social groups or at least made little efforts to save the victims of 
certain social groups. In this sense they regarded the DPRK famine as a `controlled 
famine' by the government. 
In fact, when food supply declined in the late 1990s, the authorities primarily supplied food to 
special classes such as army, high party and government officials and Pyongyang residents, who 
252 UNICEF, Update on UNICEF activities in DPR Korea, 1 Sep 1997 
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are absolutely necessary for the regime to survive, providing only small food to ordinary people 
irregularly.. 
-. And it seems that a vast amount of money were wasted for military build-ups and 
political propaganda.... In addition, the closeness of North Korean society blocked the 
opportunities to reduced the damage of the famine. The authorities hid the situation and blocked 
external access, hindering appropriate aid that could be massive otherwise. 254 
Unlike in Africa, the food crisis in the DPRK is the structural problem that was caused by the 
ineffectiveness of socialist economy and the authorities' ignorance of relief efforts. The 
authorities avoided self-relief efforts and wasted money for military build-ups and political 
propaganda. If the authorities reduced only some percent of distorted resources, the food crisis 
could be resolved [1.5 billion dollar (3% of military costs) could buy 1 million MT of maize ]. 255 
This argument is not unique in the DPRK famine. In case of the 1932-33 
Soviet famine, for instance, Stalin has been blamed to purposefully utilise the famine 
for the political purpose of the communists. Or at least the Soviet government failed 
to response the famine appropriately so that many victims who could have been saved 
lost their lives. Indeed the government still exported grains even while the famine hit 
the country, hid the real situation from both its people and outside world and did 
organise little relief programs. 
Similar blames have been repeated for the DPRK government during its food 
crisis. For instance, it was criticised to hide the country's real food situation, block 
international food aid, provide food rations unevenly among social groups and make 
little efforts to reduce its military expenses to save famine victims. 
Interestingly, however, there is other evidence suggesting that the DPRK 
government did not fail to response the food crisis appropriately. For instance, it 
increased its grain import from the early stage of the crisis, appealed for international 
food aid and opened the country to the aid agencies for the first time in its history. In 
particular, as far as food distribution is concerned, some argues that the government 
maintained a fairly egalitarian distribution rule during the food crisis. 
Previous FAOIWFP assessments have indicated that Korea DPR faced a large cereal deficit and 
severe food supply problems in 1996. Perhaps the most important reason that there was no wide 
''j Han Seung Hun (2000), P. ] 1-12 
255 Han Seung Hun (2000), p. 8-9 
2`5 ROK Ministry of Unification (Sep. 1998) 
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scale famine during the year, was an effective Public Distribution System, which ensured food, 
albeit at much reduced level, to the entire population. In Korea DPR the effects of food shortages 
have been uniformly spread over the population and the PDS has proven itself to be a highly 
eflective channel for food assistance..... in particular rations for children were not lowered 
throughout the period256 
In this respect it is controversial whether the food crisis was worsened or eased by the 
government responses. In other words, whether did the government do proper job to 
save the victims? 
6.4.2.3. Who were the victims? 
Perhaps the most interesting but controversial issue of the DPRK famine is who were 
the main victims. In most historical famines (food shortages) farm households usually 
appeared as the main victims. The famines also hit different regions unevenly. For 
instance, the victims of the 1932-33 Soviet famine came mostly from peasant class 
and Ukraine was the worst famine-stricken-area. And during the 1959-61 Chinese 
famine rural mortality rates were significantly higher than urban mortality rates. 
Similarly, many UN aid agencies, NGOs and researchers have believed that during 
the DPRK famine farm households, particularly in the southern part of the country, 
suffered relatively more. 
Emergency food assistance is especially needed for the farming community, who have no 
established access to the Public Distribution System, in addition to young children and pregnant 
and nursing mothers, 257 
Vulnerable group initially lost their entitlement to food due to political decisions regarding 
rationing through the government-run Public Distribution System (PDS) rather than through 
markets forces. -The main groups outside the 
PDS are the workers on state farms, who receive 
only 6 months' rations through the PDS, and workers on cooperative farms, who must depend on 
on-site production. This latter group has been borne the brunt of the losses that resulted from 
severe flooding and has been the main recipient of humanitarian assistance. 259 
256 FAO/WFP (6 Dec. 1996) 
25' FAOIWFP (22 Dec. 1995) 
258 Noland, Robinson and Wang (2001), p. 747 
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For example areas visited by the mission in the north appear to be slightly better off nutritionally, 
than those in the South. This may be partly attributed to the fact that the northern provinces have 
more resources, such as timber, and access to China to barter for food... As a result food 
availability in southern areas is considered to have fallen more appreciably. 259 
But the problem is that th e same or other UN aid agencies, NGOs and individual aid 
activists have reported that the famine was worst among urban population, 
particularly in the northern part of the country. 
David Morton [UN Humanitarian co-ordinator in the DPRK] said the WFP believed the largely 
mountainous northeast was hardest hit because its big industrial population had little or no work 
and little access to any other food. "They still have lot of people living in industrial cities and 
where industrial cities have been affected by fuel and energy shortages, the factory workers, 
peoples working in mines ... are particularly vulnerable". 
260 
The north eastern provinces of North Hamgyung and South Hamgyung are believed most affected 
by food shortages. Prior to 1995, they used to receive surpluses from North and South Hwanghae 
on the south west coast, but those surpluses have gone. The situation of these two provinces is 
exacerbated by the fact that they have large populations and contained the country's second and 
' third largest cities (Hamhung and Chongjin). ý'i 
If this observation is correct, the DPRK famine is quite unique in the sense that it hit 
mainly urban population whose entitlement has been protected by state food rations. 
However, it is still unknown and thus controversial who were the real victims 
of the famine. 
6.4.3. Did and will the famine change agriculture? 
The final but most important issue is whether and how the famine did and will change 
the DPRK agriculture. As discussed in previous chapters, the DPRK agricultural 
institutions have changed according to repeated food shortages. Hence it is natural to 
259 FAO/WFP (3 June 1997) 
260 Reuters, N. Korean Famine Victims turn to alternative food, 7 May 1999 
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assume that the recent food crisis will also change the institutions. But the problem 
does not seem so simple. 
During the food crisis, as briefly mentioned already, the DPRK government 
made various practical efforts to increase both grain production and people's food 
consumption. And the efforts were mostly to decentralise, liberalise and open 
agriculture. In this sense some argues that the crisis will eventually lead to market 
reform in agriculture. 
The crisis of food rationing and the shortages of consumer goods resulted in various social 
changes. Private food trading has increased, and due to the development of black market two-tier 
price system has been formed and social control has weakened. ... Although the 
DPRK 
authorities have denied market reforms and emphasised the maintenance of socialist system, the 
country has already gone under the market reform processes. The present situation that the 
authorities lost control over black market and so tolerated its natural growth is regarded as the 
first phase of market reform. Note that the economic reforms in China and Vietnam also started 
when the leadership admitted the pressures of changes from below... Compared with the pre- 
reform situation in China and Vietnam, the presently widespread market relations are more 
developed. 262 
At the same time, however, the government frequently announced that it 
would not tolerate any basic changes in its socialist agricultural structure, and did 
actually took actions when food situation improved temporarily. 263 In this sense some 
believes that the changes in the agriculture, which were made during the famine 
period, might not last longer and the authorities will adhere to existing socialist 
system. 
Nevertheless this changes in economic policies have been limited controlled by other factors .... The 
growth of farmers' markets and the widespread black markets also do not mean the complete 
deviation from socialist production relation in the sense that the administrative management system 
is still in place in farmers' markets and state control still influences unofficial economy.... In 
particular, the newly adopted `people's economic planning law' show that the DPRK still maintains 
the planned economy under state control.... In short, although the changes in the DPRK economic 
261OCHA, DPRK Humanitarian Situation Report: 15 Mar-15 April, 15 April 1999 
202 Kim Yeon Chul (1997) 
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policies in the 1990s had many differences from before, they should not be regarded as the 
fundamental changes in the basic economic lines. 2 
In this sense it is still not clear how the DPRK agricultural institutions have 
and will change during and after the food crisis. 
6.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have reviewed the recent food crisis in the DPRK and examined 
why the crisis has happened, particularly concerning the collapse of the country's 
agricultural strategy for grain production. We have also addressed three controversial 
issues surrounding the crisis. The discussion of this chapter can be summarised as 
follows. 
1. The DPRK has faced food shortages since 1987. The shortages were particularly 
worse between 1994 and 1997 when the famine claim surrounding the country was 
widespread in outside world. In 1998-99 the shortages were reportedly improved 
slightly. But there is no evidence the country has overcome the shortages yet. 
2. The drastic decline in grain production was the main immediate factor leading to 
the food shortages. Between 1987 and 1997 the DPRK grain production was almost 
quartered according to official announcements. Although outside estimates suggest 
that the actual degree of decline in the production during this period might be lower 
than the official announcements, it is undeniable that the production collapsed in the 
1990S. 
3. Between 1946 and 1987 the DPRK has employed an agricultural strategy to 
increase the quantitative volume of grain production. It entails five policies: 1) the 
expansion of sown area; 2) the transformation of crop composition into high-yield 
263 When grain production improved significantly in 1998, for example, Kim Jon Il immediately 
ordered in February 199 the government to tightly controlled farmers' markets and enforce people to 
get back to their workplaces (ROK Ministry of Unification: 8 Oct. 1999) 
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grain items; 3) the maximisation of agricultural inputs; 4) the introduction of dense 
planting; 5) the establishment of agricultural practices to prevent the problems of 
dense planting. Due to the strategy the DPRK agriculture had managed to increase its 
grain production more than five times during that period. 
4. However, the strategy has collapsed completed since 1987. Grain-sown area has 
fallen, the share of high-yield grain items has not increased (or even declined), and 
agricultural input supply has collapsed. Because the existing agricultural practices 
preventing the adverse effects of dense planting could not work properly due to the 
shortages of agricultural inputs, dense planting has also damaged grain yields. It was 
this collapse of the agricultural strategy that generated a drastic decline in grain 
production between 1987 and 1997. 
5. With respect to the food shortages, particularly those since 1994, three 
controversial issues have been and can be addressed. 1) Did the shortages lead to a 
famine? If so, when? And how severe was it? 2) Were (was) the shortages (famine) 
different from the food shortages (famines) in other countries? Who were the victims? 
What was the main factor determining the victims-FAD and food distribution? How 
did the government respond? 3) Have the food shortages changed agriculture? And 
will they? 
Each of the following three chapters will deal with one of the three issues addressed 
by this chapter separately. Chapter 7 considers the first issue, estimating the 
demographic impacts of the food shortages between 1994 and 1999. Chapter 8 
examines the basic features of the shortages in detail, comparing them with those of 
other food shortages. And chapter 9 studies the changes of the DPRK agricultural 
institutions since 1987 and discusses the possibility and directions of the future 
changes. 
2o4 Kim Keun Sik (1999) 
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VII. Estimation on the Demographic Impacts of 
the DPRK Food Crisis: 1994-99 
7.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we consider the first issue of the DPRK food crisis. Did it develop into 
famine? If it did, when? And how severe was the famine? 
Common usage allows two distinctive definitions of famine. 265 One is that 
famine entails an extreme and general scarcity of food while the other defines it as 
widespread, unusually life-threatening, hunger. The basic difference between both 
definitions is that the latter does not require a contraction in the aggregate availability 
of food for famine to occur. Modern economics of famine has tended to follow the 
latter definition. This definition has proved quite useful not only in studying 
historically reported famine phenomena without significant food availability decline 
(FAD), but also in developing a general theory of famine . 
266 In this chapter we follow 
this latter definition. This is however mainly for practical reasons. 
In the debates over the DPRK food crisis, no opposition has been made against 
the fact that the country experienced a general scarcity of food at least in the mid /late 
1990s. But there has been a great dispute over whether this scarcity of food resulted in 
significant demographic changes. In one extreme, official media in Pyongyang has 
claimed that despite the food crisis the country's demographic trend has not changed 
at all. `67 In other extreme, some NGOs have argued that more than three million 
people, which comprise around 15 percent of total population, died of hunger between 
1995 and 1997 when the country's food situation was reportedly worst. 268 To put this 
dispute into context we begin by defining famine as life-threatening hunger. 
20 Ravallion (1997), p. 1205. For the general discussion of famine definition, see the chapter 1 of 
Devereux (1993) 
266 For the general aspects of modern economics of famine, see Sen (1977: 1981: 1993), Dreze and Sen 
(1989: 1990: 1991) and Dreze (1999). 
267 Pyongyang TV News, 5 October 1997, quoted by North Korean Policy Trend (1997 no. 14 : p. 26). 
And Pyongyang TV News, 13 November 1998, quoted by North Korean Policy Trend (1998 no. 14: 
pp. 42-43). 
268 KBSM (1998) and KSM(1999). 
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Undoubtedly this definition requires detailed demographic research in order to 
judge whether the DPRK food crisis led to a famine. Indeed there have been many 
attempts to assess the country's demographic loss during the food crisis. However, the 
attempts have produced seemingly irreconcilable estimation results that put the 
number of total famine deaths during the food crisis from more than three million to 
less than 300 thousand. In consequence, they have intensified the famine dispute 
rather than resolved it. 
In this chapter we show that all the previous attempts have failed to produce 
reasonable estimates, because they stand on inappropriate data and unreasonable 
assumptions. We also point out that the only way to construct reasonable estimates is 
so far to use official DPRK population statistics. Using the official statistics we 
conduct our own estimation, suggesting that the food crisis claimed 688 thousand 
excess deaths from 1 January 1994 to 31 August 1999. This result will clarify that the 
crisis actually developed into famine. But it will also show that the famine was not 
such a great one as international media and some NGOs have reported. 
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 7.2 we examine previous 
estimates about the DPRK's demographic loss during the food crisis and show that 
they are all unfounded. For an alternative to previous estimates, section 7.3 studies the 
possibility of utilising the official population statistics. We discuss the availability and 
reliability of the statistics as well as the time period our estimation should cover. In 
this discussion we prove that the DPRK faced a famine in 1994-98(9). Using the 
official statistics, section 7.4 estimates the demographic impact of the famine in terms 
of total number of excess deaths. And section 7.5 considers the demographic impact 
in regional perspectives. In this section we develop the concept of the relative regional 
population index, finding that the famine was the most severe in the north-eastern part 
of the country. Finally section 7.6 summarises the findings of this paper. 
7.2. Previous Estimates 
It is interesting to begin with existing estimates. Clearly the number of famine deaths 
has been central to the debates over the DPRK food crisis, and until recently most 
attempts to estimate that number have concluded that the crisis was one of the most 
tragic famines in human history in which around 3 million people perished of 
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starvation. To understand these attempts it helps to divide them into three groups 
according to their methods and data used. First, Eberstadt (2000) studied the DPRK 
population size implied by the number of delegates at the 1998 Supreme People's 
Assembly (SPA), concluding that 3 million people are missing between 1990 and 
1998. Second, Natsios (1999) and Choi Euh Chu] (1999) etc examined various 
information provided by the DPRK defectors, particularly that by Hwang Jang Yop, a 
former party ideologue of the DPRK, arguing that 2-3 million people died from 
hunger between 1995 and 1997. Third, Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement (KBSM) 
(1998), Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) (1999) and Robinson, Lee, Hill and 
Burnham (1999) collected household demographic data from the DPRK food refugees 
in China, showing that during the food crisis their death rates increased by at least 8 
times more than normal . 
269 As summarised by table 7-1, they differ greatly by 
estimation periods, methods and data used. Nevertheless, they all argued that the 
DPRK food crisis caused at least many millions of famine deaths. 
Interestingly, however, the ROK government announced a quite different 
estimation result in 1999. The ROK National Statistical Office (1999) studied the 
information provided by the DPRK defectors, as many existing attempts did, but 
concluded that the number of famine deaths during the DPRK food crisis should be 
about 7-80,000 per year. 270 The figure is less than one tenth of what other estimates 
presented. 
In addition, Goodkind and West (2001) recently argued that the existing 
estimates of famine deaths are `best viewed as conjectures rather than reliable 
estimates', carrying out their estimation in a quite different way. They assumed that 
the DPRK experienced similar mortality increases during the food crisis to those of 
China during the Great Leap Forward, showing that famine deaths in the DPRK from 
1995 to 2000 most likely numbered between 600,000 and 1 million. 
269 Besides those mentioned in the text, many outside observers have made their own estimations. For 
instance, see Kirk (1998). However those estimations are either largely guesswork, depending on 
rumours and eyewitness, or quotations from other estimations, mainly those made from the DPRK food 
refugees' household data. Hence we do not consider those estimations that fail to clarify their 
estimation methods, 
270 In fact NSO (1999) is the result of co-works of many ROK government agencies, including National 
Security Planning Agency and Ministry of Unification. Its estimation results are known as largely 
dependent on two sources: the DPRK 1993 census data and the information provided by the DPRK 
defectors who had been previously engaged in public health sector. But it is not known how many 
defectors were engaged in the estimations and how their information was utilised. 
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Both the ROK National Statistical Office (1999) and Goodkind and West 
(2001) cast doubt on the reliability of the exiting estimates arguing many millions of 
famine deaths. But are the ROK National Statistical Office (1999) and Goodkind and 
West (2001) reliable? In what follows we show that all the existing estimates, 
including the ROK National Statistical Office (1999) and Goodkind and West (2001), 
are ill-founded and thus unreliable. 
Table 7-2. The DPRK Population Implied by Elections 
for Supreme People's Assembly (SPA): 1962-1998 
Election Delegates Implied Population Reported Population* 
Date Elected (million) (million) 
Oct. 1962 383 11.49 11.41 
Nov. 1967 457 13.71 13.25 
Dec. 1972 541 16.23 15.15 
Nov. 1977 579 17.37 16.45 
Feb. 1982 615 18.45 17.77 
Nov. 1986 655 19.65 19.06 
Apr. 1990 687 20.61 - 
Sep. 1998 687 20.61 - 
* interpolated between actually reported years 
Source) 1. For 1962-1990, Eberstadt and Banister (1992) p. 36 
2. For 1998, Eberstadt (2000) 
7.2.1. Estimates based on the number of delegates at SPA Election 
Consider the estimates using the 1998 SPA election as an indicator for the DPRK 
population. Eberstadt (2000) pointed out that according to the DPRK constitution a 
delegate should be elected for every 30,000 population at SPA election. On this basis, 
he argued that the DPRK population in 1998 was not significantly different from that 
in 1990 because the SPA elections in both years elected the same number of 
delegates. By contrast, the population projection using the 1987 household 
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registration data suggests that total population should increase by around 3 millions 
between 1990 and 1998. He interpreted that those missing 3 millions reflected the size 
of demographic loss claimed by the food crisis. 
Traditionally the number of delegates at SPA elections has been frequently 
used by many researchers to approximate the DPRK population size. 27' In particular, 
Eberstadt and Banister (1992) showed that the figures driven in this way had not made 
huge differences from actually reported population sizes until 1986. Hence one might 
assume that the 1998 population could be approximated in the same way. But the 
1998 SPA election was carried out under a new election law, which deletes the article 
defining a delegate for every 30,000 population. The law simply states that the 
number of delegates should be decided proportionately to the population size, not 
referring any concrete rules. 272 This means that the population estimates made out of 
the number of delegates at 1998 SPA election results are in principle groundless. It is 
therefore difficult to accept that Eberstadt (2000) provides a reasonable estimate. 
7.2.2. Estimates based on the DPRK defectors' statements 
What about the estimates based on the DPRK defectors' statements? It is well known 
that many defectors had suffered immense food shortages and witnessed lots of 
famine deaths in the DPRK. It is however unlikely that they know the overall 
situation of the DPRK where the government has completely withdrawn any statistics 
from public since 1962 and controlled all population movement. In this respect their 
statements should be regarded as reflecting their own personal experiences largely 
affected by their locations and social statuses. 
The problem is that the personal experiences of the defectors have proved too 
diverse to extract a general trend while their numbers are too little to control the 
diversity. Some say that they witnessed 2-3 neighbours dying from hunger every day 
while others report that there was no famine death where they lived. Due to this 
diversity the estimates based on their statements have produced seemingly 
271 For instance, Bukhan Yonguso [Research Institute for North Korea], a ROK research institute, had 
made its own estimates on the DPRK population sizes using this technique until 1987 when the DPRK 
household registration data was first submitted to UN (Bukhan Yonguso, Bukhan Chongram 
[Encyclopaedic Information about North Korea]. various years) 
272 For the development of the DPRK election law, see Jang Myung Bong (1999) 
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unreasonable differences. For instance, Choi Euh Chul (1999) put the number of 
famine deaths between 1995 and 1998 as high as 3 millions while the ROK 
government estimates the same number as low as 300 thousands. By all means, these 
differences do not seem plausible. 
An exception is the statement of Hwang Jang Yop. Unlike other defectors he 
had been entitled to accessing sensitive information in the DPRK as a party ideology 
secretary. Further he says that he heard about concrete death tolls during the food 
crisis from the persons who were dealing with official figures. He said: 
According to a person in organisation department in the party, 500,000 died of starvation in 1995, 
including 50,000 of party members, and in this year [1996] around 1 million people were dying 
from hunger.... The secretary who was in charge of defence industry told a similar story. Of 
500,000 workers in defence industry, even the death tolls of most skilled technicians who were 
regarded as the jewels of the country numbered 2,000. In addition, he said that more than half of 
2'3 workers could not go to their workplaces due to severe hunger, lying down at home. 
We would not challenge the truth of his statement. Nevertheless, we would argue for 
two reasons that it is unwise to use his statement. 
First, it is difficult to accept the demographic implications of his statement. 
Lee Sam Sik (2000) shows that Hwang's statement should lead us to the conclusion 
that the DPRK life expectancy in the mid 1990s dropped to mere 21. Given that the 
1993 DPRK life expectancy was 72, this figure means that the longevity of an average 
North Korean was cut by more than 70 percent for only two or three years. Further, if 
the figure is correct, the life expectancy in the DPRK should be far lower than even 
that in the poorest countries in the world such as Somalia (45.4), Sudan (55.0), Nepal 
(57.3) and Cambodia (53.4). 274 We do not believe that a country's living conditions 
could change so miserably in such a short space of time. 
Second, Hwang's statement suggests that the DPRK government has provided 
fictional statistics to outside world. Hwang specifies his sources as the persons who 
make economic policies with official population statistics, but his statement can not 
be compatible with any official population figures the government has released since 
273 Cho, Gap Je, "Figures tell: Statistical Analysis of 3 million famine deaths in North Korea" [in 
Korean], Wolgan Chosun [Monthly Chosun], September 1999 
274 Lee Sam Sik (2000), p. 68 
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1993. As we shall see later, the government has reported that its population increased 
from 21.2 million in 1993 to 22 million between October 1995 and February 1996, 
and to 22.5 million on 31 August 1999. Given 500 thousand deaths in 1995 and I 
million deaths in 1996 by Hwang's statement, those official figures could not be 
produced with any reasonable birth rates. In order for his statement to stand, therefore, 
the DPRK government should have `double bookkeeping system', providing outside 
world with fictional statistics that are totally different from what it has. 
It is true that statistical manipulation did occur in many socialist countries . 
275 
Nevertheless it was not a common way for socialist governments to hide their 
shortfalls from outside world. Rather, they tended to stop providing statistics, changed 
the ways of collecting and announcing statistics, including transformation of absolute 
numbers into indexes, and make statistical definitions and base years obscure. These 
methods have been frequently used by the DPRK government, too. 276 But until 
present time there has been no evidence that the government has manipulated 
statistics only for the purpose of submission to outside world. 277 In this sense, if we 
use Hwang's statement, we would face a rather difficult question: we should reassess 
all the available official DPRK statistics and, given the lack of information for that 
assessment, we should eventually give up using the statistics at all. We do not believe 
that it is wise to study the DPRK, the most isolated country in the world, without any 
help of official statistics. 
7.2.3. Estimates made from household data of the DPRK food refugees 
Next we consider the estimates made from household demographic data provided by 
the DPRK food refugees in China. KBSM (1998), KSM (1999) and Robinson, Lee, 
Hill, and Burnham (1999) separately surveyed the refugees with regard to the deaths 
and births of their family members but commonly found that the refugee households 
have experienced abnormally high mortality and low fertility since 1994. On this 
basis, they argued that the DPRK suffered millions of demographic loss during the 
275 Concerning the Soviet statistical manipulation, for instance, see Davis, Harrison, and Wheatcroft 
(! 994) pp. 24-37 
276 See Appendix II of this thesis 
277 For the general discussion of the DPRK statistics, see Chung (1974: p. 169-1770) and its critique by 
Eberstadt (1999) 
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food crisis. Because their studies are based on real household data collected from lots 
of the DPRK families, their findings have been regarded as the most convincing 
evidence to support the existence of great famine in the DPRK. Indeed all the DPRK 
famine reports and arguments by international media and researchers have ultimately 
depended on those household data. 278 
Given little official data available, one might think that surveying the food 
refugees is the best alternative way to construct reasonable estimates for the country's 
demographic loss during the food crisis. But we would argue that such estimates are 
not reliable, because the data collected from the refugees should be inevitably biased 
regionally and socially, leading to huge estimation errors. 
Table 7-3. Regional and Occupational Distribution of Food Refugees 
(%) 
KBSM KSM Robinson etc The DPRK 
1. Regional Distribution 
North Hamgyung 59.60 57.80 78.00 10.04 
South Hamgyung 20.00 22.90 12.00 13.31 
Others 20.40 19.30 10.00 76.65 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
2. Occupational Distribution 
Farmers 5.30 2.89 9.00 23.53* 
Non-Farmers 71.70 87.02 68.95 76.47* 
Others 23.00 10.09 22.05 - 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00* 
* Occupational distribution of North and South Hamgyung 
Source) 1. KBSM (1998), KSM (1999), Robinson, Lee, Hill and Burnham (1999) 
2. For the DPRK, DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics (1995) 
278 The report of great famine in the DPRK first appeared in September 1997 when World Vision, a 
Christian aid organisation announced its survey results on North Korean food refugees that one in 
seven North Koreans starved to death during the food crisis. (Reuters 16 Sep 1997). But its survey 
results relied on only 33 respondents; hence there were many doubt about their reliability. 
This situation took a new turn in December 1997 when KSBM (1998), a Buddhist aid organisation that 
operated with the largest scale for North Korean food refugees in China, began to conduct a similar 
surveys. KSBM (1998)'s survey results reinforced the argument that around 15-20 percent of total 
population in the DPRK perished from starvation between 1995and 1997. And such similar surveys as 
mentioned in the text followed to confirm KSBM (1998)'s survey results, which has dominated the 
DPRK famine reports by international media. 
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A common feature of the DPRK food refugees in China is that they have quite 
similar regional backgrounds: they came mostly from the north-eastern part of the 
country, North Hamgyung and South Hamgyung province. Hence, when we collect 
their household data, we must face a regionally biased sample. For instance, around 
80 percent of respondents in KSBM (1998) and KSM (1999) were from North 
Hamgyung and South Hamgyung, and this ratio rose up to 90 percent in Robinson, 
Lee, Hill, and Burnham (1999). Then, what implications does this regionally biased 
sample have? 
Table 7-4. Provincial Births and Deaths in the DPRK: 1993 
Births Deaths 
(per 1000) (DPRK=100) (per 1000) (DPRK =100) 
North Hamgyung 18.40 90 6.50 115 
South Hamgyung 19.10 93 6.40 114 
Chagang 21.00 102 5.80 103 
North Pyongan 20.40 100 5.90 105 
South Pyongan 20.50 100 5.40 96 
Ryanggang 21.50 105 6.20 110 
Nampo City 16.70 81 4.50 80 
Kangwon 22.70 111 6.10 108 
North Hwanghae 22.60 110 5.40 96 
South Hwanghae 22.80 111 5.40 96 
Kaesung City 21.00 102 5.70 101 
Pyongyang City 20.20 99 4.40 78 
The DPRK 20.49 100 5.63 100 
Source) DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics (1995) 
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Table 7-4 presents provincial birth and death rates found by the 1993 DPRK 
population census. The DPRK government has announced that the census results 
show normal demographic trends in the country. Hence, the presented birth and death 
rates should be regarded as reflecting normal mortality and fertility trends. They show 
that North Hamgyung and South Hamgyung had the highest mortality and the lowest 
fertility rates in the country. For instance, crude death rate in North Hamgyung is 
higher by more than 40 percent than in South Hwanghae. The implication is clear: the 
sample data from the DPRK food refugees would lead to the overestimation of the 
country's deaths and the underestimation of its births even in normal years. 
Table 7-5-A. Grain (Rice + Maize) Production in Hamgyung Provinces, 1993 -1997 
(million MT) 
89-92* 93 94 95 96 97 
North Hamgyung 0.44 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.14 0.11 
South Hamgyung 0.90 0.57 0.71 0.36 0.23 0.11 
Sub-total 1.34 0.79 0.96 0.58 0.37 0.22 
(89-92 = 100) (100) (59) (72) (43) (28) (16) 
DPRK total 8.38 8.69 6.66 3.37 2.24 2.58 
(89-92 = 100) (100) (104) (80) (40) (27) (31) 
'" average production between 1989 and 1992 
B. Per Capita Food Availability in Harngyung Provinces, 1994 -1998 
Grain (rice + maize) 
Population of 1993 Production on annual B/A 
(million) average in 93-97 (kg) 
(million MT) 
(A) (B) 
North Hamgyung 2.06 0.188 91 
South Hamgyung 2.73 0.396 145 
DPRK Total 21.21 4.708 222 
Source) 1. For all production figures, DPRK's submission to DPRKIUNDP (1998a) 
2. For the 1993 population, DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics (1995) 
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Furthermore, table 7-5-A and B show that North Hamgyung and South 
Hamgyung faced the worst food situation during the food crisis. In both provinces, 
grain production began to dramatically fall from 1993 a year before it did in other 
provinces. It was also both provinces that had the highest fall in grain production 
between 1993 and 1997. In consequence, they suffered the lowest food availability 
during the food crisis. Per capita grain production was mere 91 kg in North Hamgyung 
on annual average between 1993 to 1997 while the national average reached 222kg. 
The former was even lower than the half of the latter. It is therefore not surprising to 
find that most food refugees came from North Hamgyung and South Hamgyung. Its 
implication is also clear: the sample data from the refugees are more likely to 
exaggerate the country's demographic loss during the food crisis. 
It seems now apparent that the household data from the food refugees would 
not produce reasonable estimates for the country's demographic loss as a whole. 
Then, how about using them to estimate the loss of a certain region such as North 
Hamgyung or South Hamgyung? The answer seems also negative, because the 
refugees represent those who had the weakest entitlements even in their provinces. 
Lets return to table 7-3, comparing the occupational distribution of the 
refugees with the overall occupational distribution in North Hamgyung and South 
Hamgyung. The data show that the share of jobless and non-farmer is much higher in 
the food refugees. It means that the refugees had weaker entitlements than their 
counterparts remaining in the country. Because all populations in the DPRK are 
provided food rations through their workplaces, those without job have in principle 
their rations suspended. Further, as discussed in the next chapter, non-farmers in the 
DPRK has tended to face more unstable food supply than farmers, particularly for the 
period of food shortages. Therefore, as the share of jobless and non-farmers increases 
in a population group, its entitlement in the DPRK should get weaker. 
The fact that the refugees had relatively weaker entitlements is confirmed by 
table 7-6. The respondents of Robinson, Lee, Hill, and Burnham (1999) said that 
official food rations for their households averaged 30g per person per day by the end 
of 1997. According to official statistics, however, food supply for the residents in 
North Hamgyung and South Hamgyung, not including food aid, exceeded 440 grams 
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Table 7-6. Official Food Distribution in Harngyung Provinces at the end of 1997 
A. Farmer 
Annual Grain Daily Grain Population of Daily Grain 
Allocation in Allocation at the 31 Aug. 1999 Allocation per 
Nov. 97-Oct. 98 end of 1997 (thousand) farmer at the end 
(1000 MT) (MT) of 1997 
(gram) 
[l] [2] 1] / 365days [3] [4]= [2]/[3] 
N. Hamgyung 79.6 218.1 490 445 
S. Hamgyung 149.3 409.0 909 450 
*Annual grain allocation includes food ration for farmer, seed and fodder 
*Farm households receive their annual grain allocation at once shortly after harvest 
B. Non-Farmer (PDS Population) 
Monthly Food Daily Food Ration Population of Daily Food 
Ration at the end of 1997 31 Aug. 1999 Ration per Non- 
in Dec. 1997 (MT) (thousand) Farmer at the end 
(1000 MT) of 1997 
(gram) 
[5] [6] [5] / 31 days [7] [8]= [6]/[7] 
N. Hamgyung 13.1 422.6 1737 243 
S. Hamgyung 13.6 438.7 2023 217 
*Food ration includes only grain supply for human consumption 
*Non-farmers receive their food rations biweekly 
C. Defectors' Daily Rations 
Per Defector 30 grams at the end of 1997 
Source) 1. For defectors' daily rations, Robinson, Lee, Hill and Burnham (1999) 
2. For grain supply figures, the DPRK's submission to the DPRKIUNDP (1998a) 
3. For farm and non-farm population on 31 Aug 1999, the DPRK's submission to 
FAO/WFP (8 Nov. 1999) 
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per person per day for farmers and 210 grams for non-farmers at the end of 1997. The 
daily ration for an average refugee family was mere one seventh of the ration for an 
average non-farm household in South Hamgyung. This means that the refugee 
families are actually those who suffered most from food shortages even in North 
Hamgyung and South Hamgyung. 
In sum, North Korean food refugees represent a population group who had the 
weakest entitlements in the region where the food crisis was most severe. In this sense 
we do not believe that their household data could produce any reasonable estimates 
for the DPRK demographic trends during the food crisis. 
7.2.4. Estimates based on China's mortality experience in 1958-61 
Finally consider the estimates of Goodkind and West (2001). In order to estimate the 
number of famine (excess) deaths in the DPRK from 1995 to 2000, they assumed that 
peak increases in mortality during the DPRK food crisis matched those of China 
during the Great Leap Forward, that is, the 1958-61 Chinese famine. Based on this 
assumption, they grafted the absolute increase in Chinese death rates from 1958 to 
1961 onto the 1994 death rates in the DPRK, concluding that the number of famine 
deaths in the DPRK reached 1.04 million from 1995 to 2000. Then, they found that 
there is a linear relation between child malnutrition and infant mortality in most Asian 
countries. Hence they compared the 1998 DPRK children's nutritional data obtained 
by EU/FAO/WFP survey with those of other Asian countries and obtained another 
death rate figure of 8.7 per thousand during the DPRK food crisis. Because this figure 
was significantly lower than that driven by the peak death rate during the Chinese 
famine (13.6 per thousand), they scale-backed peak death rates directly calculated 
from China's experience and obtained another total famine death figure of 605,000 in 
the DPRK from 1995 to 2000. Using this figure they finally argued that the real 
number of famine deaths during the DPRK food crisis should number between 
605,000 and 1.04 million. 
As shall be discussed in section 7.4, these estimates are quite similar to our 
own estimates. Moreover, when there are no available official DPRK demographic 
data, such indirect information as other country's famine experience or other related 
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data like children's nutritional data might be the only alternatives to assess the 
demographic impact of the country's food crisis. Nonetheless, it is still questionable 
whether those estimates were reliable. 
The reliability of the above estimates entirely depends on the assumption that 
the DPRK saw similar increases in mortality during its food crisis to those of China in 
1958-61. To justify this assumption Goodkind and West (2001) emphasised the 
similarities between the DPRK food crisis (famine) and the Chinese famine. They 
wrote: 
Both famines resulted from a series of climatic calamities interacting with overzealous attempts to 
transform social institutions in line with Marxist ideals. Both famines persisted for several years 
because secretive governments were initially reluctant to admit the existence of adverse conditions 
and were opposed to relief efforts being undertaken earlier. 
However, this argument is misleading. Consider the causation, pre-famine conditions 
and government's responses concerning both famines. Prior to famine, China had 
bumper harvests for several years. Together with overzealous political ambitions, 
those bumper harvests led to the launching of the radical commune movement at the 
final stage of agricultural collectivisation in 1958. This sudden institutional change 
resulted in successive grain production failures in 1959-61, eventually leading to the 
famine. Because the Chinese government was over-confident from pre-famine 
bumper harvests, when there were famine reports from rural areas shortly after the 
1958 autumn harvest, it simply ignored them, still exporting grains to international 
market and making little efforts to alleviate the famine. By contrast, the DPRK had 
experienced on-going food shortages long before famine situation reportedly appeared 
in the mid 1990s. Hence, as shall be discussed in chapter 8, the government started to 
closely monitor the country's food situation and make various efforts to increase grain 
imports already from the late 1980s. In addition, there was no institutional change 
possibly leading to famine either. Note that agricultural cooperativisation in the 
DPRK was completed in the late 1950s. Moreover, when the food situation got worse 
in the mid 1990s, the government immediately appealed for international food aid and 
opened the country to westerners for the first time in its history in order to get the aid. 
Further, it implemented various reform policies to encourage private food production 
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and trade that had been prohibited for around four decades. In this sense we do not 
believe that the DPRK food crisis was similar to the 1958-61 Chinese famine. 
In addition to this difference, there are two good reasons to believe that the 
DPRK's mortality trends during the food crisis might be different from those of China 
in 1958-61. One reason is that the main victims of the DPRK food crisis were 
different from those of the Chinese famine. In China, the famine was more severe in 
rural areas because urban population was protected by state food rations while 
agricultural population was not. By contrast, as we shall see in chapter 8, the DPRK 
food crisis was far more severe in urban areas, even though urban population is 
protected by state food ration as in China. Another reason is that the duration of the 
DPRK food crisis is much longer than that of the Chinese famine. In China, the 
famine lasted for around three years. In the DPRK, however, famine conditions 
reportedly continued at least for six years from 1995-1999. Taking into consideration 
of pre-famine food shortages, the duration of the food crisis is more than twelve years. 
We do not believe that two different famines with different victims and duration 
might bring about the same changes in mortality. 
To sum, the DPRK food crisis was different from the Chinese famine in terms 
of: 1) causation; 2) pre-famine conditions; 3) government's response; 4) main victims 
and 5) duration. In this regard, it is difficult to accept that Goodkind and West (2001) 
directly applying China's experience to the DPRK provided reasonable estimates. 
7.3. Official DPRK Demographic Statistics and Their Implications: 
The Existence and Duration of famine 
So far we have seen that previous studies have failed to produce appropriate estimates 
for the number of famine deaths during the DPRK food crisis. A reason for this failure 
is that they have relied too much on non-official information. It is difficult and 
perhaps unwise to construct a country's demographic situation without official 
statistics, particularly when the country has been isolated from outside world for more 
than five decades. In this reason we utilise official DPRK population statistics to 
make our own estimation in the next section. 
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Before proceeding to the estimation, however, this section provides some 
preliminary discussions. We consider three questions. First, are the official statistics 
available? Second, are they reliable? Third, what should be the estimation period? 
Note that in order to specify the estimation period we should first answer the 
questions of whether and when famine occurred in the DPRK. Indeed, using the 
official statistics this section show that the DPRK food crisis that started in 1987 
developed into a famine in 1994, lasting at least until 1998. 
7.3.1. Availability 
Official DPRK population statistics are extremely hard to obtain. Since 1962 there 
have been only two cases that the government made its demographic data known to 
outside world. One case is that DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics (CSB) provided 
the 1987 household registration data to UNDP in November 1987.279 Another case is 
that the same body submitted to UN the 1993 yearend census results in 1994.280 Since 
then the government has made no detailed data available. Moreover, official media in 
Pyongyang has frequently claimed that despite the food crisis the country's 
population has grown at the official annual rate of 1.5 percent, the rate revealed by the 
1993 census. Together with the lack of available data, this government's attitude has 
generated a perception among many researchers that it is impossible to study the 
country's demographic situation since 1993 using official data. 
Interestingly however the government did provide outside world with some pieces of 
its population statistics between 1996 and 1999. And these statistics clearly show that 
the DPRK population was significantly influenced by the food crisis. In the first place 
the DPRK Ministry of Public Health made the country's updated child mortality 
figures known to US Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (USCDC) delegates 
in 1997.2$1 It said that due to the food crisis child mortality under 5 increased six 
times to 31 per thousand in 1994 from 5.3 in 1993, and that the rate further rose up to 
58 in 1996. Secondly, in September 1999 a high official in the DPRK Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs informed UN aid organisations in Pyongyang that crude death rate 
279 The submitted data are available from Eberstadt and Banister (1992). 
280 DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics (1995) 
281 USCDC (1997). 
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Table 7-7. Officially Claimed Mortality Rates, 1987-1998 
(per thousand) 
1987 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Crude Death Rate 5 5.5 6.8 n. a n. a n. a 9.3 
Under 5 infant Mortality Rate - 5.36* 31 n. a 58 n. a n. a 
under 5 deaths/under 5 yearend population 
Source) 1. For 1987, Eberstadt and Banister (1992) 
2. For 1993, DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics (1995) 
3. For crude death rates in 1994 and 1998, Watts (1999) 
4. For under 5 infant mortality rates in 1994 and 1996, USCDC (1997) 
increased from 5.5 per thousand in 1993 to 6.8 in 1994, and to 9.3 in 1998.282 Thirdly, 
in November 1999 the DPRK government provided FAO with its official population 
figures, which state that total population reached 22.5 million on 31 August 1999.283 
Given 21.2 million of total population at the end of 1993, the newly submitted figures 
suggest that the DPRK population grew by 1.09 percent on annual average between 
1994 and 1999. Undoubtedly the rate is significantly lower than the official growth 
rate of 1.5 percent. Fourthly, prior to the submission of the 1999 population figures, 
the DPRK People's Service Commission that is in charge of food rationing gave its 
population figures between October 1995 and February 1996 to an US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) delegate who visited the country in September 
1996.284 Because the figures are not dated, it is difficult to calculate population 
growth rates by comparing them with the 1993 census data. Nevertheless they are of 
great importance in the sense that they show significant changes in regional 
population shares, suggesting that the severity of the food crisis varied greatly 
according to regions. 
It is not clear why the DPRK government has maintained such mixed attitudes 
over the country's demographic situation since 1993: the denial of any demographic 
loss, on the one hand, but the submission of official statistics showing the loss, on the 
other hand. What is clear however is that it is not as difficult as generally conceived to 
examine the demographic impact of the DPRK food crisis using official statistics. 
28' Watts (1999), p. 1773 
283 FAO/WFP (8 November 1999) 
284 Lautze (1996) 
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Indeed we can estimate total demographic loss between 1994 and 1999 by comparing 
two reported population sizes dated of 31 December 1993 and of 31 August 1999. 
Combining the results of this estimation with official mortality rates available in some 
years, we can also examine the chronological development of the food crisis. It is 
equally possible to study the food crisis in regional perspectives using available 
regional population figures. 
Table 7-8. Reported DPRK Populations: 1987-1999 
(thousand) 
1987 * 1993 * 1995 ** 31 Au,.. 1999 
Special Cities 
Pyongyang 2,355 2,742 2,852 3,044 
Kaesung 331 335 347 386 
Nampo 715 731 760 814 
North West 
S. Pyongan 2,653 2,867 2,981 3,100 
N. Pyongan 2,408 2,437 2,501 2,625 
Chagang 1,156 1,152 1,199 1,232 
North East 
S. Hamgyung 2,547 2,732 2,842 2,932 
N. Hamgyung 2,003 2,061 2,143 2,227 
Ranggang 628 638 664 703 
South West 
S. Hwanghae 1,914 2,011 2,092 2,290 
N. Hwanghae 1,409 1,512 1,573 1,734 
South East 
Kangwon 1,227 1,305 1,357 1,467 
Military Population - 691 753 757 
Civilian Population 19,346 20,523 21317 21797 
Total Population - 21,214 22,070 22,554 
Note) * yearend population 
* population between August 1995 and March 1993, but not dated 
Source) 1. For 1987, Eberstadt and Banister (1992) 
2. For 1993, DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics (1995) 
3. For 1995, Lautze (1996) 
4. For 31 Aug 1999, DPRK's submission to WFP/FAO (8 Nov. 1999) 
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7.3.2. Reliability 
The above official statistics provide a chance, the only chance so far, to estimate the 
demographic loss during the food crisis. But there are already some critiques over the 
reliability of those statistics. It seems therefore necessary to discuss the features of the 
available official statistics further before proceeding to the estimation. We consider two 
questions. First, have the DPRK government deliberately manipulated the statistics? 
Second, are they accurate even when they are not manipulated? 
Consider the first question. Eberstadt (1999) found that there are 
inconsistencies among officially released mortality rates. As mentioned above, the 
DPRK Ministry of Public health reported that child mortality rate under 5 was 31 per 
thousand in 1994. Assuming that the mortality rates of other age groups did not 
change between 1993 and 1994, the change in child mortality should push up crude 
death rate to 8.5 per thousand in 1994. But the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
announced that the rate was 6.8 in that year. Needless to say, it is highly unlikely that 
the mortality rates of other age groups fell under the deteriorating food situation in 
1994. On this basis, Eberstadt (1999) argued that either officially released mortality 
figures were deliberately manipulated or they represented total failures of the DPRK 
statistical systems. 
In addition, one might think that the population figures dated of 31 August 
1999 were also manipulated. The figures were submitted in an effort to obtain food 
aid from UN. Apparently exaggerating population size would make the country's food 
situation more miserable and thus help get more aid from abroad. 
We believe that these critiques are quite plausible. At the same time however 
we should point out that the counter-arguments could be equally plausible. Above all, 
the inconsistencies among officially released mortality rates could happen from the 
very character of the DPRK statistical systems. The DPRK population data have been 
collected through household registration system, a main purpose of which is to 
maintain the country's food rationing system. In normal years, population figures are 
calculated by the differences between reported births and deaths. When there is a birth 
(or death), the head of household should obtain birth (death) certificate from hospital, 
198 
have it stamped by local police station, and finally submit it to local food rationing 
body (via his workplace) in order to list (withdraw) the name of birth (death) on 
(from) rationing books. 285 Therefore three different administrative hierarchies have 
been engaged in collecting population statistics: Ministry of Public Health, Ministry 
of Interior, and People's Service Commission. This means that officially released 
population statistics could differ by their collection bodies and released timings due to 
both time-lags and intentional omissions in reporting. During the food crisis, for 
instance, households would prefer to delay or avoid reporting the deaths of family 
members particularly to local rationing bodies. In this sense, say, if the DPRK 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs quoted mortality data originated from People's Service 
Commission, the data could be inconsistent to child mortality data provided by 
Ministry of Public Health even when the government did not have any intention of 
statistical manipulation. 
It is also possible to argue that the population figures dated of 31 August 1999 
can not be severely manipulated for the same reason to obtain food aid from abroad. 
For exaggerating population should mean that the country had effectively survived 
even very low food availability, hence hindering its efforts to get more aid from 
abroad. 
The problem is that there are no enough data/information to judge both 
competing arguments. Hence, though further studies needed on this issue, we simply 
assume that officially released population statistics since 1993 could be manipulated 
but the degree of manipulation might not be great. 
Now consider whether the data are accurate even when they are not manipulated. In 
contrast to the first question, the answer to this second question seems quite 
straightforward: they are not necessarily accurate. There are two reasons. First, most 
population figures available since 1993 seem from People's Service Commission that 
tends to have the most exaggerated figures among the DPRK statistical collection 
bodies for the reasons mentioned above. Of course, the figures dated of 31 August 
1999 are not labelled with any concrete source within the government. But they divide 
population into PDS population and non-PDS population by regions, showing that 
285 Seo (1995), p. 35-47 
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they are made for rationing purpose by People's Service Commission. Second, as 
discussed above, the figures about crude death rates since 1993 seem to underestimate 
actual mortality trends. 
This means that, when we use those available official statistics, we are likely 
to underestimate the demographic loss during the food crisis. In this sense we assume 
that our estimates, which will be presented in next section, provide the lower limit of 
possible reasonable estimates over the demographic loss. 
7.3.3. Implications: the existence and duration of the DPRK famine 
Finally consider some implications of the above statistics concerning the period for 
which we should estimate the demographic impacts of the DPRK food crisis. 
Undoubtedly establishing reasonable estimation period is important to have 
appropriate estimation results. In addition, it is of great importance in two other 
respects. First, it is related to the question of whether and when famine occurred in the 
DPRK. Second, it is also related to the main factor leading to the famine. 
Until present time the DPRK government has claimed that its food crisis was 
caused by the great flood in 1995. Indeed it appealed for international food aid right 
after the flood, and consequently many demographic studies have implicitly assumed 
that the country went under famine situation in 1995 [see the estimation periods of 
previous studies in table 7-11. But this implicit assumption of famine-starting year 
should be rejected from the official DPRK statistics. For they clearly suggest that the 
famine started in 1994. For the same reason the government's excuse for the food 
crisis, the 1995 flood, should be also rejected. 
Let us first look at mortality rates. As mentioned above, child mortality rate 
under 5 jumped by six times already in 1994 and crude death rate also significantly 
increased in that year. Of course the increase in mortality could occur from various 
factors other than food shortage. But official grain production statistics show that the 
increase was the direct result of deteriorating food situation. 
Now we return to table 5-A. The 1993 autumn harvest that determined the 
1994 food situation was reasonably good, compared with the 1989-92 level: it 
increased by 4 percent. But the provincial harvests in both North Hamgyung and 
South Hamgyung were extremely poor in that year: they fell by more than 40 percent 
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reportedly due to cold weather. What should be noted is that, as discussed in chapter 
4, the DPRK agriculture has been organised to achieve regional food self-sufficiency 
and thus its food rationing system has operated within each province since the early 
1960s. It means that the 1993 poor harvests put immense food pressures on North 
Hamgyung and South Hamgyung in 1994. 
Moreover, as mentioned in chapter 6, the government stopped all internal food 
deliveries to the northern part of the country in 1994 and shut down PDS in the 
region. As a result, many residents in North Hamgyung and South Hamgyung faced 
entitlement failures. According to the surveys of KBSM (1998), for instance, most 
food refugees from both provinces experienced temporal cessation of food rations and 
thus received only 60 percent of their rations in 1994. 
In the introduction of this chapter we have defined famine as life-threatening 
hunger. And we now know three facts concerning the 1994 DPRK food situation: the 
sharp increase in mortality, dramatic (grain) production failures in sonne provinces 
and entitlement failures among some households in the same provinces. Given these 
facts and definition, it would not be difficult to conclude that famine occurred in the 
DPRK in 1994. 
By the same analogy, we can see that the famine hit the whole nation at least 
until 1998. Both child mortality rate and crude death rate kept on rising until 1998, 
which was accompanied by grain production failures in national level and widespread 
entitlement failures among most households. 
Yet it is not clear whether the famine lasted in 1999 and whether it has ended 
yet. There are no enough official data available while information and related data 
made by outside world provide quite different pictures. Nevertheless, we assume that 
the famine lasted at least in 1999. Because the latest available official population 
figures are dated of 31 August 1999, this assumption would save us from making 
another unnecessary assumptions in order to estimate the demographic impact of the 
famine. 
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7.4. Estimation on the Demographic Impacts of the DPRK Famine 
In this section we estimated the number of total deaths in the DPRK for the period from I 
January 1994 to 31 August 1999 using official population statistics. We also estimate the 
hypothetical number of total deaths that would come out if there were no famine. The 
difference between those two numbers, that is, the number of excess deaths is presented 
as the genuine demographic impact of the DPRK famine. 
7.4.1. Account Framework 
Consider population changes between time 0 and t in a society where there is no 
immigration. Suppose that there is no change in death rate and birth rate over time. In 
this society, population changes must be determined solely by natural population 
increase rate, the difference between death rate and birth rate. Hence the population 
size at time t can be described as 
P` _ (1+r)`P°= (1+b-m)`P° 
[Pk: population at t, r: natural population increase rate, m: death rate, b: birth rate] 
If deaths are evenly distributed between time i and i+l, the number of total deaths 
during that period is: 
'= 1/2 [mP' + mP'+' ] 
= 'l2mP° [(I +b-m)' + (l+b-m)'+i] (2) 
where D' is the number of total deaths between time i and i+1. Hence, total deaths 
between 0 and t can be expressed: 
t- I 
D= 1 ý/z mP° [(1 +b-m)' + (1 +b-m)'+1 ] 
0 
(3) 
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Equation (l) shows that, when we know death rate, birth rate, and population size at 
time 0, we can project population until time t when death rate and birth rate are 
constant. We can also forecast total deaths for that period according to equation (3). 
Conversely, when we know population size both at time 0 and at t, we can find death 
rate for that period given birth rate using equation (1). In this case we can also 
estimate total deaths using equation (3). 
This result is quite useful to assess the size of demographic shock over time. 
Imagine that a demographic shock occurred in the society at time 0, affecting both 
death rate and birth rate until time t. Initial death rate and birth rate is given m° and b° 
respectively. In this case, if we know P° and P`, we can estimate total size of the 
demographic impacts caused by the shock, although we can not specify the impact on 
death rate and birth rate separately. 
First, using P°, m° and b° we can project population and then forecast total 
deaths until t under the assumption that there is no change in death rate and birth rate 
[equation (1) and (3)]. It gives a hypothetical total death figure that would come out, 
if there were no demographic shock. 
Second, using P° and P` we can estimate the death rate reflecting the 
demographic impacts of the shock [equation (1)]. Of course, we do not know the real 
birth rate that has changed from b° due to the shock: hence it is impossible to find the 
real death rate. However, we can simply assume that birth rate does not change from 
b° even after the shock. Under this assumption the whole demographic impacts of the 
shock, including those on birth rate, should reflect themselves in the change of death 
rate. Clearly the death rate driven in this way is not real death rate, but the rate 
reflecting total size of the demographic impacts caused by the shock 
Third, once the death rate is obtained, we can conduct another population 
projection and produce another death toll figures [equation (1) and (3)]. 
Finally, we can calculate the difference between two death figures generated 
above. It is the difference that should indicate the genuine size of total demographic 
impacts caused by the shock. 
Now look at the DPRK case. From the 1993 census data we have detailed 
information about the DPRK population size, death rate, birth rate at the end of 1993. 
The official population size of 31 August 1999 is also available. Moreover, we know 
that the DPRK famine started from 1994 and lasted until 1999. This means that we 
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can estimate total demographic impacts of the famine employing the same procedures 
as above. First, using the 1993 census population, birth rate and death rate we can 
project the DPRK population from 1 January 1994 to 31 August 1999 and forecast 
total deaths for that period. It will give a hypothetical death figure that would come 
out if there were no famine. Second, using the 1993 census population, the 31 August 
population and the 1993 census birth rate we can estimate the death rate reflecting the 
demographic impacts of the famine from 1 January 1994 to 31 August 1999. To do 
this, of course, we should assume that birth rate did not change during the famine 
period. Third, using the death rate driven in this way we can conduct another 
population projection and produce another total death figure. Finally, we can calculate 
the difference between two differently estimated total death figures and present it as 
the number of excess deaths (famine deaths), that is, the genuine size of the 
demographic impacts of the DPRK famine. 
4.2. Method 
The above framework is simple. But the estimation procedures it generates could be 
quite complicate, depending on the methods employed and the assumptions made. 
Here we employ the component method of population projection that is quite similar 
to that for UK national population projections. 286 The difference is that our method 
projects annual yearend populations while UK national population projections 
produce middle year populations every two years. 
The component method is utilised for a projection of population by sex and 
age. Total population size is the result of this sub-population projection. To apply this 
method, therefore, we should know age(sex)-specific death rates and age(sex)-specific 
birth rates as well as initial age(sex) structure of population. 
In general, under the assumption of no immigration, female population aged I 
or above at time t+ I can be described as 
F; r+' = (1-qf_l) F; 1 `, for i is 1 or above (4) 
[F; t: female population aged i at t, 
2& For the details of this method, see Hinde (1998: p. 205-217) 
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qfj: q-type mortality rate for female population aged i] 
Assuming that births are evenly distributed over time, the number of female births 
between t and t+1 is 
Bflflt = ilz [Eby-, F; '+EbrF; t+Ij 
[Bf,,, `: female births between t and t+l, 
bfi: fertility rate of female population aged i for female births] 
(5) 
Because the probability that a female born between t and t+l will die before t+l is qfOý, 
female population age 0 at time t+1 should be 
For+i = ý/z(1_gfo)[Ebf; F; r+EbF; F; '1 (6) 
Repeating the same procedures for male population we will have 
M; t+' = (1-q,,,; _, 
) M; 
_1 
`, for i is I or above (7) 
M0 t+i = '/2 (1 _qmo) [ %mi Fit +Ib iniFi 
c+11 (8) 
[M; ': male population aged i, MOB `: male population aged 0 
q,,,; : q-type mortality rate for male aged i 
b,,,; : fertility rate of female population aged i for male birth] 
Undoubtedly total population at time t+1 is 
Pc+l = F0 c+i + F1 t+' + M0 c+i + M1 c+' (9) 
The above equations provide the rationale for population projection using the 
component method. Given age-specific death rates, age-specific birth rates, and age 
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and sex structure of population at time t, the component method allows us to generate 
the population structure by sex and age at time t+l [equation (4)-(8)]. Once the 
population structure is generated at time t+], it is in turn used to generate the 
population structure at t+2; and this procedure could be repeated infinitely assuming 
that age-specific death rates and age-specific birth rates are constant over time. 
Because total population size is the simple sum of sub-population by age and sex, it is 
obtained as the natural result of the projection for population structure by age and sex 
[equation (9)]. 
Employing this component method we carry out our estimation as follows. In 
the first stage we project the DPRK yearend populations by sex and age from 1994 to 
1998 and the population of 31 August 1999 using the age-specific death rates, the 
age-specific fertility rates, and the age and sex structure of population revealed by the 
1993 census. From the projection we obtain annual and total death figures under 
normal trends. In the second stage we estimate the age-specific death rates reflecting 
the demographic impacts of the famine. To do this we set arbitrary age-specific death 
rates, replacing the 1993 age-specific death rates. Using the arbitrary rates we conduct 
the same population projection as in the first stage. If the projection produces the 
population figure of 31 August 1999 that is equal to the actually reported one, we 
recognise the arbitrary rates as the age-specific death rates correctly reflecting the 
demographic impacts of the famine. Otherwise we set another arbitrary rates, 
repeating the procedures. In the final stage we calculate the number of excess deaths 
using total death figures generated in the first and the second stage. 
7.4.3. Assumptions 
For actual estimation we make the following assumptions. They are necessary for the 
character of both our population projection and the data used. 
Assumption 1> During the famine period age-specific fertility rates did not change 
from those revealed by the 1993 census. 
As pointed out already, this assumption is necessary to calculate the average age-specific 
death rates reflecting the demographic impacts of the famine. Of course it is unrealistic. 
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Nonetheless, it could not make any difference as far as we are only concerned about the 
total size of the demographic impacts caused by the famine. Under this assumption any 
possible changes in fertility rates caused by the famine should express themselves in the 
form of changes in death rates. 
Assumption 2> During the famine period age-specific death rates increased by the 
same degree, regardless of age and sex groups. 
This means that there is no change in age and sex structures of mortality even while 
the mortality level goes up. In other words, the age-specific death rates during the 
famine period are expressed as 
gini(' = agmi c, gfid = agfi C where cc >I 
[gin; d: famine-period q-type mortality rate for male aged i, 
gr,, d : famine-period q-type mortality rate for female aged i, 
q,,,; ` : the 1993 census q-type mortality rate for male aged i, 
qfi` : the 1993 census q-type mortality rate for female aged i] 
This assumption seems also unrealistic because children, pregnant women and elderly 
are generally known more vulnerable to food shortages. Indeed there are many reports 
that the DPRK children and pregnant women faced greater health risks during the 
famine period than any other population groups. It has been however equally reported 
that they were the groups who were most protected both by international food aid and 
PDS. We do not have enough data to judge these competing reports. Hence, until 
further information is available, we assume that age and sex pattern of mortality did 
not change during the famine period. 
Assumption 3> The famine did not have any demographic impacts on military 
population 
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This assumption is necessary due to the character of the data used. In the 1993 census 
all demographic statistics such as deaths rates and birth rates are driven from civilian 
population, not from total population. The number of military population is presented, 
but no information about the mortality and fertility relating to this group is given. 
Therefore the population projection using the 1993 census data should be the 
projection of civilian population, excluding military one. In other words, we do not 
consider military population in our estimation. According to the 1993 census, military 
population comprised for only 3.2 percent of total population. And the 31 August 
1999 population statistics suggest that the share remained almost unchanged. In this 
respect we do not believe that the above assumption could bring huge differences to 
our estimation results. 
With these three assumptions we transform the demographic equations (4)-(8) into the 
following estimation equations: 
[Civilian Female population: Y] 
Y; '+' = (1-(xgr,, `) Y; _1 
c, for i is 1 or above 
. 10 T+I = 1/2 (l -(xgfoý`)[I bjc YE +E brc Y1 t+1 
[Civilian Male population: X] 
X; `+' = (1-(xq,,,; `) X; _I 
`, for i is I or above 
XO r+I = 1/z (1 _(xq, o`)[I b,,, "' Y; 
t+Vb,,. Cy t+1 
[Total Civilian Population: C] 
Ct+I = YO 
t+1 + ti 
t+! + X0 t+l +X1 
[Y; ': civilian female population aged i at t, YO': civilian female population aged 0 at t 
208 
X, `: civilian male population aged i at t, Xoý': civilian male population aged 0 at t 
br, `: the 1993 census fertility rate of female population aged i for female birth 
b,,,; `: the 1993 census fertility rate of female population aged i for male births 
C': total civilian population at t] 
In the first stage of the estimation, we set (x =1 in order to project population using the 
1993 census data. We call this projection Estimation I. In the second stage, we set 
initially an arbitrary number for a >1, and keep changing the number until we find oc 
that equalises the projected population of 31 August 1999 to the actually reported one. 
We call this projection Estimation II. The results of Estimation I and II are presented 
by Appendix I of this thesis. 
7.4.4. Results 
Table 9-A and 9-B summarise the estimation results. Estimation I suggests that, if 
there were no food crisis, the DPRK civilian population should have grown by 1.6 
percent on annual average between 1994 and 1999; hence it should have reached 22.5 
million on 31 August 1999. But estimation II shows that due to the famine population 
growth rate reduced to 1.06 percent for that period and consequently the civilian 
population of 31 August 1999 remained at 21.8 million. 
Table 7-9-A. The DPRK Population: 1994-1999 
(million) 
93 94 95 96 97 98 99.8.31 
Total 20.52 
Est. I male 9.68 
20.87 
9.85 
21.22 
10.03 
21.57 
10.21 
21.93 
10.39 
22.27 
10.56 
22.49 
10.67 
Female 10.84 1 1.02 11.19 11.37 11.54 11.71 11.82 
Total 20.52 20.73 20.96 21.19 21.42 21.64 21.79 
Est. 11 male 9.68 9.78 9.87 10.00 10.11 10.22 10.29 
female 10.84 10.95 11.07 11.19 11.31 11.42 11.49 
all yearend populations except for 99.8.31 
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Table 7-9-B. Demographic Impacts of the Food Crisis, 1994-1999 
94 95 96 97 98 99.8.31 
Death (thousand) 
Est. I(A) 117 123 129 136 142 97 
Est. II(B) 250 251 252 254 256 169 
Excess Death (B-A) 133 128 123 118 114 72 
Crude Death Rate (per 1000) 
Est. I (C) 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.5 
Est. II (D) 12.1 12.0 11,9 11.9 11.9 11.6 
D/C 2.16 2.07 1.98 1.92 1.86 1.78 
Birth (thousand) 
Est. I(E) 462 475 484 487 483 316 
Est. II (F) 462 474 483 486 481 315 
E-F 0 -1 -1 -1 -2 -I 
Life Expectancy 
Est. I (G) 72.58 
Est. II (H) 62.81 
Source) Appendix I 
This decline in population growth rate was caused by increasing mortality. 
Between 1994 and 1999 age-specific death rates rose by more than two times on 
average ((x = 2.15), in comparison with those in 1993. In consequence, crude death 
rate increased from 5.5 per thousand in 1993 to 11.9 between 1994 and 1999. This 
means that there were around 114 thousand of excess deaths on annual average and 
688 thousand in total during the famine period. Because we assume that there was no 
change in fertility, those death tolls should be regarded as total demographic loss 
caused by the famine. 
Due to the increase in mortality the DPRK life expectancy fell to 63.81 during 
the famine period from 72.58 in 1993. Considering most Far East Asian countries 
have enjoyed more than 70 year of life expectancy, this figure shows that the living 
conditions in the DPRK dropped to the lowest level in the region. Form the above 
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results we can draw several interesting conclusions about the DPRK famine. First, 
688 thousand excess deaths between 1994 and 1999 confirm that the DPRK food 
crisis that started in 1987 developed a famine in the mid/late 1990s. An interesting 
point is that this confirmation is driven from the official data provided by the DPRK 
government that has denied the existence of famine. It means that, whatever its stance 
at appearance has been, the government has actually known and effectively admitted 
the famine. 
Second, the DPRK famine was not a great famine as claimed by many 
previous studies in which around 15 percent of total population perished from 
starvation. 688 thousand excess deaths might look a huge number. But this number is 
the sum of excess deaths for more than five years. During the famine period crude 
death rate increased only around twofold, which was roughly one tenth of KBSM 
(1998)'s estimate and one fourth of Robinson, Lee, Hill, and Burnham (1999)'s. 
Considering that total civilian population was 21.3 million on average between 1994 
and 1999, annual excess deaths roughly comprised for 0.53 percent of total civilian 
population. 
Third, the DPRK famine seems to reach the peak between 1995 and 1997. As 
mentioned already, the DPRK government announced that crude death rate was 6.8 
per thousand in 1994 and 9.3 in 1998, both of which were significantly lower than 
11.9 per thousand, the estimated average rate between 1994 and 1999. This means 
that the annual death rates between 1995 and 1997 should be much greater than the 
estimated average: hence the famine should be more severe for that period. Indeed 
many outside observers such as UN aid organisations and the delegates of NGOs in 
Pyongyang have reported that the DPRK food situation was particularly bad between 
1995 and 1997 when successive natural disasters damaged domestic food production. 
Fourth, the DPRK famine seems to last longer than any other famines reported 
in human history. In general, famine is distinguished from chronic food shortage for 
two aspects: 1) it is accompanied by a drastic increase in mortality; 2) its period is 
relatively short - months, a year, or some years. But the DPRK famine does not seem 
to fit both facts. The famine pushed up crude death rate only by around two times. 
Further, the period in which mortality increased lasted for more than five years; and 
we do not know whether it has ended yet. We believe that these two factors - 
relatively little increase in mortality and longer famine period- fundamentally 
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distinguish the DPRK famine from other famines. We will return to this point in the 
next chapter. 
7.5. Assessment of the Demographic loss in regional Perspectives 
In this section we consider the demographic impacts of the DPRK famine in regional 
perspectives. There are of course no regional death figures available since 1993. But 
the official population statistics of 31 August 1999 provide regional population 
figures: hence it is possible to follow up regional population changes during the 
famine period. On this basis, we discuss how severe the famine was by regions. 
7.5.1. Idea 
Table 10 reports provincial population shares in the DPRK between 1987 and 1999. 
An interesting point is that there were significant changes in the trends of regional 
population shares before and after 1993. For instance, the share of North East in total 
population rose from 26.77 percent in 1987 to 28.07 percent in 1993. But this trend 
was reversed between 1994 and 1999: the share fell up to 25.99 percent on 31 August 
1999. By contrast, the share of South West that has slightly fallen between 1987 and 
1993 significantly increased in 1999. This means that there were significant changes 
in the trends of regional population growth rates before and after 1993. Some might 
argue that these changes are not genuine because the population figures of 31 August 
1999 include military population while other figures do not. However, when we use 
the population figures between August 1995 and February 1996, we can find similar 
changes after 1993. It seems therefore fair to say that the changes are genuine. 
An interesting point is that those changes could be used as indicators for regional 
demographic losses caused by the famine. In general, the population size of a region can 
be expressed: 
Pkt+l _ (1 + i}; + jk + Ok) Pkt = (1 + kk)Pkt (10) 
[PkL: population of region k at time t, rk: natural population increase rate of region k 
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jk: inward migration rate of region k, Ok: inward migration rate of region k 
kk: population growth rate of region k] 
It seems apparent that, when a severe food shortage hits a region, its population 
growth rate should fall because the shortage reduces both natural population increase 
and inward migration while accelerating outward migration. Of course, as shown by 
table 6, natural population increase rates differ greatly according to regions in the 
DPRK even in normal years. And there is no available information about regional 
migration rates. Hence it is difficult to use the absolute levels of regional population 
growth rates in order to study regional demographic losses during the famine period. 
But this difficulty could be eased by normalising regional population growth 
rates with national (average) population growth rate. Consider the relative population 
growth index, ß, which is defined as follows: 
(3k = (1+ kk)/(l +r) 
[r: national population growth rate, Pak: relative population index of region k] 
If 13k is greater than 1, the region k sees more rapid population growth than the 
national average and vice versa. The interesting aspect of (3 however is not its level 
but its changing direction over time. Imagine that food shortage hit the region k 
harder than any other regions. Then, ßk is likely to fall because the natural population 
growth rate of the region would decline more rapidly than national population growth 
rate, and because its outward/inward migration would also accelerate/decelerate. By 
the same token, if the region proves relatively safer from the shortage, Pak is more 
likely to increase. During the famine period therefore the change of ßk could be used 
as an indicator to reflect the relative severity of the famine in the region k, compared 
with other regions. 
It is quite simple to calculate P. In national level population growth is defined: 
P`} _ (l + r)Pt (12) 
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Table 7-10. Provincial Population Share 
(%) 
1987 1993 1995 31 Aug. 1999 
Special Cities 17.58 18.55 18.58 18.82 
Pyongyang 12.17 13.36 13.38 13.50 
Kaesung 1.71 1.63 1.63 1.71 
Nampo 3.70 3.56 3.57 3.61 
North West 32.14 31.45 31.35 30.85 
S. Pyongan 13.71 13.95 13.99 13.74 
N. Pyongan 12.45 11.88 11.74 11.64 
Chagang 5.98 5.62 5.63 5.46 
North East 26.77 28.07 26.51 25.99 
S. Hamgyung 13.17 14.12 13.33 13.00 
N. Hamgyung 10.35 10.04 10.06 9.87 
Ranggang 3.25 3.11 3.12 3.12 
South West 17.18 17.17 17.19 17.84 
S. Hwanghae 9.89 9.80 9.81 10.15 
N. Hwanghae 7.28 7.37 7.38 7.69 
South East 6,34 6.36 6.37 6.50 
Kangwon 6.34 6.36 6.37 6.50 
DPRK Total 100 100 100 100 
* DPRK total populations from 1987 to 1995 do not include military population and so 
represent total civilian populations while that of 31 Aug. 1999 include military population. 
Source) Table 8 
Dividing (10) with (12) gives 
Pk`+h/Pt+i (1+ kk)Pkt /(l + r)Pt 
. ßk _ (Pkt+l/Pt+l)/(Pkt/P r) (l3) 
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Hence we can calculate 13 only by the regional population shares between two 
different time points without any additional information. 
7.5.2. Assessment 
Table 11 presents 1i at each DPRK region for three different time periods: 1987-93, 
1994-99, and 1994-95. Of them, the period of 1994-95 is taken into consideration 
only for the purpose to check the trends that the period of 1994-99 reveals. This is 
necessary because, as mentioned already, the provincial population statistics of 31 
August 1999 include military population. 
Table 7-11. Relative Population Growth Index (0), 1987-1999 
1987-93 1993-99 B/A 1993-95 C/A 
(A) (B) (A=100) (C) (A=100) 
Special Cities 1.055 1.014 96 1.001 95 
Pyongyang 1.098 1.010 92 1.001 91 
Kaesung 0.952 1.051 110 1.002 105 
Nampo 0.964 1.013 105 1.002 104 
North West 0.979 0.981 100 0.997 102 
S. Pyongan 1.017 0.985 97 1.003 99 
N. Pyongan 0.955 0.980 103 0.988 103 
Chagang 0.940 0.973 103 1.002 107 
North East 1.049 0.926 88 0.944 90 
S. Hamgyung 1.073 0.921 86 0.944 88 
N. Hamgyung 0.970 0.983 101 1.001 103 
Ranggang 0.958 1.002 105 1.002 105 
South West 1.000 1.039 104 1.001 100 
S. Hwanghae 0.990 1.036 105 1.002 101 
N. Hwanghae 1.012 1.043 103 1.001 99 
South East 1.002 1.023 102 1.001 100 
Kangwon 1.002 1.023 102 1.001 100 
DPRK Total 11 100 1 100 
*ß population share at time t/population share at time t+l. 
Source) Table 7-9 
215 
Between 1987 and 1993 (3 is greater than I in Special Cities and North East, 
nearly I in South West and South East, and less than I in North West. It means that 
population grew faster in Special Cities and North East than national average. In 
contrast, the population growth of North West or other regions was similar to or 
greater than national average. The trends appeared similar between 1994 and 1999, 
except in North East where regional population growth rate turned out to be 
significantly lower than national average. 
Now look at the changes of ß before and after 1993. It is North East where ß 
fell most after 1993. At provincial level South Hamgyung experienced the greatest 
decline in I. This means that North East, particularly South Hamgyung, suffered 
relatively negative population shocks since 1993. Special Cities also saw the fall in P. 
Except in Pyongyang, however, ß increased significantly in all other Special Cities. 
Hence negative population shocks which hit Special Cities since 1993 mainly 
happened in Pyongyang. In contrast to North East and Pyongyang, other regions did 
not experience negative population shocks. They enjoyed either positive (in South 
East and in South West) or neutral (in North West) population shocks. 287 
From these results we can make the following conclusions. First, North East 
was the worst-famine-stricken area. Between 1987 and 1993 this region saw a rapid 
population growth with the rate far above than the national average. However, as the 
famine started in 1994, its population growth rate declined below the national 
average. This could happen only when its natural population increase rate fell more 
rapidly than the national average rate did during the famine period or outward/inward 
migration accelerated/decelerated. Whatever the cases were, they should be the results 
of the deteriorating food situation of the region in the sense that the region suffered 
the most dramatic food availability decline during the famine. 
Second, Special Cities were relatively safe from the famine. At a first sight, 
this conclusion looks quite odd because ß fell sharply in Special Cities since 1993. 
But such a fall mainly appeared in Pyongyang, the capital city, while other cities saw 
a significant increase in P. Moreover it is difficult to imagine that Pyongyang where 
287 Note that population shocks here are defined in relative terms among regions. When a region has a 
positive shock, it should be interpreted as positive in comparison with other regions. Hence a country 
suffers an overall decline in its population growth rate, the decline could be still observed even in the 
regions with positive population shock in terms of f3. 
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the DPRK elite classes reside was one of the worst-famine-stricken areas. The fall of 
P in Pyongyang therefore seems largely caused by the government's migration 
policies that encouraged Pyongyang residents to move outside the city. Indeed it has 
been frequently reported that the government has relocated mainly lower class 
Pyongyang residents to other cities and provinces since the early 1990s. 288 This 
suggests that despite the fall in (3 Pyongyang remained relatively safe from the 
famine. Combining this fact with the increasing 1 in other Special Cities, we conclude 
that Special Cities suffered the famine less than other regions did. 
Third, the famine was more severe in the northern part of the country than in 
the southern part, in the eastern part than in the western part. Between 1994 and 1999 
South West and South East commonly enjoyed positive population shocks (the 
increase in ß) while their northern counter parts faced negative or neutral shocks. In 
addition, the positive shocks were greater in the western part than in the eastern part. 
At provincial level, South Hamgyung in North East and South Pyongan in North West 
faced relatively the most negative population shocks. 
7.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have discussed whether the DPRK food crisis developed into a 
famine and, if it did, when it happened and how severe the famine was. Concerning 
these issues we have made the following points clear. 
1. To estimate the demographic impacts of the DPRK food crisis, previous studies 
have relied on non-official data and information such as the number of delegates at 
the 1998 SPA elections, defectors' statements and food refugees' household data. But 
these data and information are either inappropriate or unwise for being utilised for the 
estimation, and consequently previous studies have failed to reasonable estimates. 
2. Previous studies about the DPRK food crisis have tended to support the view that 
the crisis was one of the most tragic famines in human history in which around 15 
288 The ROK National Security Planning Agency, Pyongyang relocates poor, disabled, disloyal 
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percent of total population starved to deaths. Given that previous studies have proved 
unfounded, such an argument of great famine has also proved groundless. 
3. It is a possible, and the only reasonable, way so far to utilise the official DPRK 
population statistics for estimating the demographic impacts of the food crisis. The 
official statistics suggest that the DPRK food crisis developed into a famine between 
1994 and 1998. But there are no data and information enough to judge whether the 
famine lasted in 1999 and whether it has ended yet. In this chapter we have assumed 
that the famine lasted at least until 1999. 
4. It is estimated that the famine claimed 688 thousand excess deaths from 1 January 
1994 to 31 August 1999. On annual basis the number of excess deaths comprised 0.53 
percent of total population. Undoubtedly the famine did not bring about huge 
population loss as many other historical famines did. But its period lasted longer than 
any other historical famines. Both the relatively small population loss and the 
prolonged famine period constituted two basic features of the DPRK famine. 
5. In regional perspectives, the famine was more severe in the northern part of the 
country than in the southern part, in the eastern part than in the western part. This means 
that North East, including North Hamgyung and South Hamgyung, was the worst famine 
stricken area. By contrast, South West appeared as the relatively safest region from the 
famine. 
residents out of the city, 16 May 1997 
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VIII. FAD, Entitlement and the DPRK Famine 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the main features of the DPRK famine. In chapter 6 we have 
seen that there are three fundamental disputes over this issue. First, whether was it a 
FAD famine or not? In other words, what was the causation of the famine - FAD or 
distribution failure? Second, who were the main victims- farm households or urban 
industrial population? Third, were there policy failures? Did the government properly 
respond to the famine? Was it so-called `controlled famine' in which the government 
politically chose the victims? 
This chapter attempts to provide these disputes with the answers that available 
data allow us to give. To do this, however, we do not discuss the disputes directly. 
Instead, we study the causation, development process and basic features of the famine 
within the framework of modern economics of famine. Our answers to the existing 
disputes are given indirectly in the form of by-products of this study. 
In this chapter we will show that the DPRK famine was a typical FAD famine 
but, apart from that, it was unique in all other aspects. It happened with the absolute 
shortage of food: hence there were no feasible policies to prevent it. It hit mainly 
urban population whose entitlement is protected by state food ration. Thus, the 
government was far more sensitive to the famine than any other socialist governments 
were to their historical famines. This sensitivity led to national coping strategies 
initiated by the government, eventually making the social impacts of the famine 
unique. That is, despite the unprecedented degree of FAD the famine did not cause a 
massive population loss. Instead, it imposed serious long-term health risks on the 
whole population. The most distinctive feature of the DPRK famine was that the 
victims got gradually but persistently weaker for a long space of time rather than 
perished away for a relatively short period of shocks, due to the mixed results of great 
food shortage and national coping strategies. In this respect `famine-in-slow motion', 
the terminology used by UN, is the most appropriate to describe the famine. 
The remaining parts of this chapter are organised as follows. In section 8.2 we 
show that FAD was the causation of the DPRK famine, examining how it influenced 
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the development of the famine and the selection of the victims. Section 8.3 identifies 
two basic features of the famine that can not be explained by FAD: urban famine and 
`famine-in-slow motion'. To understand both features section 8.4 studies the DPRK 
entitlement system, finding the reasons why urban population was more vulnerable to 
the famine. Section 8.5 applies the DPRK entitlement system to the issue of policy 
mistakes during the famine period. In this section we show that not only did the 
DPRK government make few policy mistakes but also develop systematic national 
coping strategies to alleviate the famine. And these strategies are presented as the 
main immediate factor resulting in `famine-in slow motion' in the DPRK. Finally 
section 8.6 summarises the findings of this paper. 
8.2. FAD and the Causation of the DPRK Famine 
We begin with the causation of the famine. Was it caused by FAD or distribution 
failure? Our answer is simple and clear: the famine was a FAD famine in all respects. 
It was pre-dated and triggered by FAD. Its geographical movement was determined 
by ups and downs of regional food production. The regional distribution of famine 
victims corresponded to the differences in regional food availability. And there were 
no feasible policies to prevent the famine given the level of FAD in the mid/late 
1990S. 
In this section we do not discuss the possibility of food distribution failure. 
But the section 8.5 will show that such a failure is unlikely to have happened during 
the famine period. 
8.2.1. Constructing a DPRK Food Supply Table 
It is not as difficult as generally assumed to construct reasonable estimates, though not 
entirely precise ones, for total food supply in the DPRK as far as its famine period is 
concerned. Food supply consists of production, import and any withdrawal from 
accumulated stocks. 
Consider production. There are three sources for official grain statistics. First, 
Pyongyang media has regularly announced the country's grain production since 
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1990.2 9 Second, in 1998 the DPRK Agricultural Commission submitted to UNDP its 
official figures for annual rice and maize production from 1989 to 1997.290 Third, 
FAO has effectively published official DPRK statistics since 1991. The DPRK has 
been a member country of FAO since 1977. But FAO statistics for the DPRK grain 
production differed greatly from official announcements until 1990. In addition, FAO 
made it clear by the footnotes of FAO Production Yearbook that its statistics were not 
official figures but its own estimates. As shown by table 8-1, however, FAO has 
published the same figures as the official DPRK statistics submitted to UNDP since 
1991. The difference in rice in terms of milled equivalent is simply because FAO has 
been applying different milling rates to convert paddy rice into milled equivalent. 
Furthermore, the footnotes of FAO Production Yearbook saying that FAO statistics 
were its own estimates have disappeared since 1991. It implies that FAO statistics 
have effectively provided official DPRK statistics at least since 1991. 
Of these statistics, Pyongyang media figures may not be appropriate to 
identify the levels of grain production. The figures have been presented in the name of 
algok [grain] the definition of which was formerly vague, has changed several tunes 
and is not currently known. 291 More importantly, since annually released algok figures 
have been frequently subject to revisions, there is an inconsistency problem in the 
data. 
But there are no such problems in the statistics submitted to UNDP and those 
published by FA©. In particular, the statistics transmitted to UNDP are quite 
distinctive in several respects. Firstly, they are time series data with the longest time 
period ever released in one occasion. Secondly, they are presented with clear 
definitions fitted to international standards. Thirdly, they provide provincial 
production figures that had been hardly released since the early 1950s. 
289 Pyongyang media figures are compiled by a Japanese researcher (Hirata: 1998) who also obtained 
the confirmation of the figures from a high ranked DPRK official. 
290 These figures were presented at "Thematic Round Table Meeting on Agricultural Recovery and 
Environmental Protection For the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)" that was held in 
Geneva on 28-29 May 1998 with the co-hosts of the DPRK and UNDP (DPRKIUNDP: 1998a) 
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Table 8-1. Official DPRK Grain Production Statistics by Sources 
(million MT) 
Pyongyang The DPRK Agricultural Official DPRK statistics 
Media Commission published by FAO 
Announcement: 
brain total Rice 
(paddy) (milled) 
maize Rice 
(paddy) (milled) 
maize grain 
total 
1989 N. A 4.32 (3.24) 4.34 N. A N. A N. A N. A 
1990 9 4.48 (3.36) 3.9 N. A N. A N. A N. A 
1991 8.9 4.09 (3.07) 4.2 4.12 2.75 4.20 7.46 
1992 8.8 4.45 (3.34) 3.72 4.50 3.00 3.72 7.18 
1993 9 4.75 (3.56) 3.94 4.79 3.19 3.94 7.54 
1994 7.1 3.11 (2.18) 3.55 3.18 2.12 3.55 6.16 
1995 3.5 2 (1.40) 1.37 2.02 1.34 1.37 3.12 
1996 2.5 1.41 (0.99) 0.83 1.43 0.95 0.83 2.12 
1997 2.7 1.57 (1.10) 1.01 1.53 1.02 1.01 2.36 
Source: I. For Pyongyang media announcement, Hirata(1998) 
2. For the DPRK Agricultural Commission, DPRK/UNDP(I 998a) 
3. For the statistics published by FAO, FAO statistical Database 
The statistics submitted to UNDP do not provide total grain production 
figures. But this difficulty can be avoided by aggregating the statistics published by 
FAO. In sum, we have relatively detailed and clearly defined official grain statistics 
for 1991-97. 
How about the reliability of the statistics? Some might think that the statistics 
are deliberately manipulated and so unreliable. Indeed there are many reasons to 
believe that the 1989-94 statistics exaggerate real outputs. 292 Nevertheless, the 
statistics since 1995 can be regarded as relatively reliable for two reasons. First, the 
motives for statistical exaggeration have vanished since the country began to receive 
international food aid in 1995. Surely such exaggeration would undermine the 
country's efforts to have more international food aid. Second, it is unlikely that the 
"" For details, see Appendix II of this thesis 
292 see Appendix 11 
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government could deliberately underestimate its grain production given that FAO and 
WFP mission teams have regularly 
Table 8-2. DPRK Grain Trade Statistics by Sources 
(1000 MT) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Import 1571 1154 1585 573 1010 1107 1451 1501 
FAO Export 11 5 42 19 1110 
Net Import 1560 1 149 1544 555 1009 1 106 1451 1501 
USDA Total import 1260 924 1350 401 894 969 n. a n. a 
Source: 1. For FAO figures, FAO Statistical Database 
2. For USDA figures, Kim Lee and Sumner (1999), p. 531 
visited the country, estimated the production and monitored official statistics since 
1995. 
In addition, though the 1989-94 statistics may be inflated, their trends, not 
levels, should be regarded as genuine. For both the DPRK agricultural structure and 
its statistical institutions had not changed until the mid 1990s so that the factors that 
might lead to statistical exaggeration would similarly affect statistics of different 
years. Indeed, as far as production trends are concerned, most outside estimates have 
great similarities with the official statistics. '`93 
To conclude, the official statistics seem reliable since 1995 in terms of their 
absolute levels. In terms of their trends, the statistics seem reliable not only since 
1995 but also before 1994. In this respect it would not be so dangerous, if necessary 
precautions are taken, to estimate the country's food production using the official 
statistics in 1991-97. 
Now let us turn to (net) food import. Unlike in production there are no 
available official statistics. But international trade is one of few economic areas where 
outside researchers could have relatively accurate knowledge about the DPRK's real 
performance without official statistics. It is because there are so-called mirror 
223 
statistics, the statistics of trading partners. In case of the DPRK food trade, mirror- 
statistics are available in three different forms. First, IMF Direction of Trade and its 
magnetic data have reported the DPRK transactions by partner countries and by items, 
including food items. Second, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) has 
estimated the DPRK grain trade reportedly by aggregating its main trading partners' 
statistics. Third, FAO has provided its own statistics by aggregating the submitted 
trade statistics by its member countries. 294 
Of those statistics, FAO estimates seem to serve best for the study of the 
DPRK famine. IMF trade statistics have not included non-commercial trade such as 
food aid: hence they are of no great use for the DPRK food trade since 1995 when 
food aid accounted for up to 58 percent of its grain import [see table 8-19]. Both FAO 
and USDA estimates do include food aid. As shown by table 8-2, however, FAO 
estimates are greater than USDA estimates for all relevant years. Because the 
estimates using the statistics of trading partners are more likely to underestimate real 
trade volumes, it would be safer to use the estimates with greater values. 
What about food stock? No official statistics are available again. Nonetheless, 
a variety of evidence suggests that the country's food stock was extremely small at 
least in the mid and late 1990s: hence the food supply from the stock was negligible. 
First of all, the DPRK government reported to FAO/WFP mission team that the 
country had faced the depletion of food stocks by 1995.295 Secondly, consistent with 
this reporting, it has been observed that even military population and special security 
forces had their rations dramatically reduced from 1996, being encouraged to cultivate 
land for their own consumption. 296 Thirdly, it was frequently reported that a part of 
293 Appendix II presents and discusses six outside estimates that provide alternative (estimated) 
statistics about the DPRK grain production from the 1980s to the 1990s. Noland, Robinson and Wang 
(1999: 2001) also provide some outside estimates on the DPRK grain production in the 1990s. 
294 As Noland, Robinson and Wang (1999) pointed out, mirror statistics entail a certain degree of 
uncertainty. Some countries may not produce reliable official statistics; and some transactions such as 
border trade at personal level may not be even reported to the authorities. Hence it would be unwise to 
assume that mirror statistics produce precise estimates about the DPRK trade. Interestingly, however, 
Eberstadt (1998) showed that the estimates using IMF trade statistics produce the similar figures about 
the DPRK food trade in 1985-95 to those generated by FAO and USDA statistics. Muruoka (1995) who 
estimated the DPRK food trade in 1983-87 by aggregating its main trading partners' statistics also 
reached the similar figures to FAO statistics. It means that, although mirror statistics have a certain 
degree of uncertainty, they can still be a good indicator of the DPRK trade. 
295 FAO/WFP (22 Dec. 1995) 
296 In February 1995 the DPRK government allowed military personnel and their families to have and 
cultivate private plots with the maximum of 40 m2 for soldier and 100 m2 for his family. In return, the 
government reduced daily ration for military personnel to 650 gram from 800 in May 1996. For 
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international food aid was diverted for military purposes. For instance, the canned 
meats that an American church donated were found in a DPRK military submarine 
197 
that sank in the ROK territory of East Sea. - And Kim Dong Su, a former DPRK 
diplomat in FAO, stated that the government was diverting a part of international food 
aid for military stockpiling. 298 Though paradoxical, these reports suggest that the 
country faced food shortages even for military purposes during the famine period. 
Table 8-3. Total Food Supply in the DPRK: 1992-1998 
(million MT) 
Production Net Import Total food Supply 
(FAO figures) 
total (1993=100) 
1992 7.46 1.15 8.61 99 
1993 7.18 1.54 8.73 100 
1994 7.54 0.56 8,10 93 
1995 6.16 1.01 7.17 82 
1996 3.12 1.11 4.22 48 
1997 2.12 1.45 3.57 41 
1998 2.36 1.50 3.86 44 
* production figures are previous year's ones. 
** total food supply = production + net Import, not including grain reserves. 
Source: Table 8-1 and 8-2 
Of course, we would not argue that the DPRK had depleted its food stock 
completely. It would be unwise to assume that the country that has militarily 
confronted with the ROIL and the US for more than five decades had no military food 
reserves. Nevertheless, what the above evidence suggests is that during the famine 
instance, a North Korean soldier who was sent to South Korean area for a secret military campaign but 
caught by South Korean army stated that "in case of navy daily, ration reduced from 800 to 650 gram 
by 150 gram from May 1996, and they eat grain-soup in the evening with less physical activities" (Oh 
Gyung Chan 1997: p. 142). 297 Chosun Daily News, 17 October 1997 
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period the country's food stock might hit such a level that the government regarded as 
minimal for the survival of the country politically and militarily. Hence the existing 
stock might not be available for economic planners to use for current economic and 
social purposes. '" 
Given such limited stock, food supply should be determined by the size of 
production and import about which there are relatively reliable statistics. In this 
regard it is not impossible to follow up the DPRK food supply, at least during the 
famine period, in reasonable manners. 
8.2.2. FAD during the DPRK Famine 
Table 8-3 presents total food availability in the DPRK before and during the famine 
period. As we would expect, total food supply began to fall sharply when the famine 
started in 1994. In particular, it almost collapsed in 1997 and 1998. In 1997, for 
instance, total food supply dropped to mere 3.6 million MT, less than half of 8.7 
million MT in 1993. 
Ongoing production failures are the main factor that led to a drastic decline in 
total food supply. Grain production declined for three consecutive years from 1994 to 
1996 by more than 30 percent on annual average, reaching 2.1 million MT in 1996, 
one of the worst annual harvests in the DPRK history. It was less than one third of the 
"'K North Korean Policy Trend (1998, No. 4), p. 49 
"'`' The ROK and US intelligence agencies estimated that in the mid 1990s the DPRK had the food 
reserves ranging from 1 million to 1.5 million MT, which allowed the DPRK's offensive military 
operations against ROK for three or four months (Niksh, 1997). And the ROK government frequently 
criticised that the DPRK government did not use these reserves to save famine victims and instead tried 
to have more international food aid (Yonhap News Agency, 6 Jan 1996: Nihon Keizai, 9 Jan. 1996), 
although some other sources report that the DPRK did use military food reserves to provide food 
rations for some northern provinces (Joongang Daily News, 30 May 1996). It is of course unknown 
how much (military) food reserve the DPRK had during the famine period and how much food was 
withdrawn from the reserve to save famine victims. What is at least clear however is that the outside 
estimates of' 1-1.5 million MT in the mid 1990s is much less than the reported food stock of 4 million 
MT in 1990 (FAO/WFP: 22 Dec 1995). This suggests that the country's (military) food stock declined 
rapidly during the famine period and this decline might be due to the withdrawn of food for the supply 
of civilian rations, as claimed by the DPRK government. It also suggests that 1-1.5 million MT of' 
(military) food stock was nearly or below minimal (military) stock requirement that the DPRK 
government considered as `minimal'. For, if not, the government would not take risks to divert 
international food aid for military purposes and so face the cessation of the aid from many donor 
countries. Indeed the ROK president Kim Yong Sam openly criticised in June 1996 that most of the 
150,000 MT of rice ROK donated had been delivered to military, announcing the cessation of any 
subsequent food donation. And similar warnings have been repeated until this time. For instance, see 
the US General Accounting Office (1999). 
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1993 production, being quite similar to the production of the mid 1940s when the 
DPRK was first officially established. NO 
In contrast, grain import remained stable at high level through the 1990s. The 
country imported 1.1 million MT of grain on annual average in 1992-97, which was 
roughly five times the average in the mid 1980s. The only exception was 1994 when 
the import suddenly fell by more than 60 percent. But it soon recovered to I million 
MT in 1995 and subsequently increased as international food aid poured into the 
country. It shows that the import did not adversely affect total food supply during the 
famine period although the collapse of the country's import capabilities has been 
widely blamed for exacerbating the famine. 
The fact that food supply fell by more than half in the mid/late 1990s suggests 
that the DPRK famine was a typical FAD famine. Undoubtedly such a massive FAD 
would generate famine conditions in any other country. It would be particularly the 
case in the DPRK where the population had been already suffering serious food 
shortages long before the dramatic FAD was realised. 
Some might argue that the data presented here exaggerate the degree of FAD 
during the famine period because the 1991-94 production figures are inflated. Perhaps 
it is true. But the severity of FAD during the famine period is still paramount. 
Table 8-4 compares total food supply in the DPRK with those in other 
socialist countries during their famine periods. Although some disputes remain 
unresolved, the 1959-61 Chinese famine and the 1932-33 Soviet famine are generally 
accepted as two of the worst famines in human history in which many millions died of 
hunger. In addition, both famines have a common feature that they occurred with 
significant FAD. 301 
30° As discussed in Chapter 3, the DPRK appeared in history with a great food shortage in 1945-46. 
And its grain production significantly stagnated to 1.9 million MT in 1946 and 2.1 million in 1947 
1, rom 2.4 million in 1944. Except these two years, the 1997 production is the worst annual harvest in the 
entire DPRK history. 
301 For FAD in the 1959-61 Chinese famine, see Nolan (1993). For FAD in the 1932-33 Soviet famine, 
see Wheatcroft and Davies (1999) and Wheatcroft, Tauger and Davies (1995) 
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Suppose that the 1992-95 DPRK figures are inflated and therefore it is 
impossible to identify the precise degree of FAD during its famine period. Even so, 
the figures are striking. They suggest that the DPRK population suffered far more 
severe food shortages than their counterparts in China and the Soviet Union during 
their famine periods. In the DPRK, per capita food supply dropped to 168 kg in 1997. 
By contrast, when the famine reached the peak in China in 1960, per capita food 
supply was 213 kg. And the figure was 318 kg in the Soviet Union in 1932. It means 
that the DPRK faced far lower food availability than China and the Soviet Union 
during their famine periods. Moreover, this extremely low food availability lasted for 
a long period in the DPRK. Per capita food supply in the DPRK went down below 
200kg for three years between 1996 and 1998. For this period the DPRK population 
faced far lower food availability than their counterparts in China and the Soviet Union 
did in the peaks of their famines. It seems therefore clear that the stress caused by 
food shortages was much greater in the DPRK than in China and the Soviet Union. 
We have pointed out that, even if the official DPRK grain statistics are inflated 
for the early 1990s, their trends should be regarded as genuine. It means that the low 
food availability in 1996-98 was the result of ongoing FAD since the early 1990s. 
Combining this fact with the severity of the stress caused by food shortages in 1996- 
98, we can conclude that the degree of FAD during the DPRK famine period was 
unprecedented in human famine history. 
8.2.3. FAD, the Origin and Geographical Movement of the Famine 
A distinctive feature of the DPRK famine is that there are clear links between FAD 
and the origin of famine. One might assume that, when a famine takes place with 
FAD, the latter should be the causation of the former. But the history shows that the 
story is not always so simple. 
In the case of the 1959-61 Chinese famine, for instance, famine victims began 
to appear in late 1958 when the country had bumper harvest. 302 Of course, grain 
production drastically fell between 1959 and 1961 when the famine developed in full 
scale. Nonetheless, this beginning of famine has provoked disputes over whether it 
302 Chang and Wen (1997), p. 2 
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was a FAD famine. Similarly there was a significant increase in the share of 
government procurement in total grain consumption during the 1932-33 Soviet 
famine, which, together with FAD, triggered the famine mostly in rural areas. 303 Due 
to this fact it is still controversial which factor -FAD or compulsory procurement- 
played more decisive roles in the occurrence of the famine. 304 
In the DPRK famine, however, it seems beyond doubt that FAD was the 
causation of the famine. There are four reasons. First, FAD pre-dated and triggered 
the famine in its every stage. Second, the fluctuations of regional food supplies 
created the geographical movements of the famine. Third, the regional distribution of 
famine victims corresponded to the differences in regional food supplies. Fourth, 
there were no feasible policy options to avoid the famine given the degree of FAD. 
Consider the first two reasons. To understand both reasons it helps to divide 
the DPRK famine into three different stages. 
8.2.3.1. Famine Stage I: North East in late 1994-June 1995 
It was in 1994 that the DPRK food refugees from North East, North and South 
Hamgyung, began to flee to China, reporting the country's dire food situation. From 
the sharp increase in official mortality rates in that year we know that their reports 
actually described the occurrence of famine. The question is: why did the famine start 
in North East in 1994? 
The year of 1994 saw several important changes in food supply. Perhaps the 
most important one is that China ceased concessional grain export to the DPRK 
[Annex-table 8-1]. In 1989-94 China was the sole supplier of foreign maize, one of 
two staple grains rationed in the DPRK. In 1994 however the northern Chinese 
provinces such as Zillin, which had provided most grain shipments to the DPRK, 
suffered poor harvests due to cold weather. 305 Together with some political reasons, 
including the DPRK's growing trade with Taiwan, these poor harvests led to the 
sudden collapse of Chinese maize export to the DPRK. 306 As a result, the DPRK grain 
30; Lewin (1985), p. 142-77 304 Davies and Wheatcroft (1999) 
°' Lee Hy Sang (1999), p. 80-8 1. For the impacts of cold weather on the DPRK production in that 
year, see Appendix II of this thesis 306 Noland (1997), p. 53 
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import declined to 0.55 million MT in 1994 from 1.54 million MT in 1993 by around 
65 percent. Although the domestic harvest of 1993 was reasonably good, it did not 
reverse the negative effect of shrinking import: total food supply declined by 7 
percent in 1994 [table 8-3]. This shows that FAD pre-dated the famine in 1994. But 
was this degree of FAD enough to generate the famine? 
Table 8-5. Rice and Maize Production by Province: 1989-97 
(million MT) 
Ave. 89-92 93 94 95 96 97 
Special Cities 
Pyongyang ; 0.46 0.55 0.32 0.21 0.16 0.16 
Kaesung 0.15 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 
Nampo 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.09 
Sub-total 0.81 0.94 0.56 0.39 0.29 0.3 
(89-92=100) (100) (116) (69) (48) (36) (37) 
North West 
S. Pyongan 1.41 1.59 1.34 0.54 0.34 0.42 
N. Pyongan 1.35 1.56 1.13 0.36 0.3 0.35 
Chagang 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.08 0.08 0.09 
Sub-total 2.96 3.34 2.69 0.98 0.72 0.86 
(89-92=100) (100) (113) (91) (33) (24) (29) 
North East 
S. Hamgyung 0.90 0.57 0.71 0.36 0.23 0.11 
N. Hamgyung 0.44 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.14 0.11 
Rangbang 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Sub-total 1.37 0.83 1 0.6 0.38 0.24 
(89-92=100) (100) (61) (73) (44) (28) (18) 
South west 
S. Hwanghae 1.86 2.1 1 1,39 0.84 0.49 0.78 
N. Hwanghae 0.83 0.87 0.49 0.29 0.19 0.24 
Sub-total 2.69 2.98 1.88 1.13 0.68 1.02 
(89-92=100) (100) (111) (70) (42) (25) (38) 
South East 
Kangwon 0.36 0.31 0.32 0.18 0.08 0.07 
Sub-total 0.36 0.31 0.32 0.18 0.08 0.07 
(89-92= 100) (100) (86) (89) (50) (22) (19) 
DPRK Total 8.38 8.69 6.66 3.37 2.24 2.58 
(89-92=100) (100) (104) (80) (40) (27) (31) 
Source) DPRK/UNDP (1998a) 
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This question is answered by table 8-5. An important feature of the 1993 grain 
(rice + maize) production was that there were great variations in regional harvests. In 
particular, though most other regions enjoyed bumper harvests, North East faced an 
extremely poor harvest, which fell by nearly 40 percent compared with the 1989-92 
average. 
Traditionally North East has been one of the main food deficit areas due to its 
mountainous geography. Hence the sharp decline in grain production was a great 
food pressure not only on the local authorities but also on the central government. 
Indeed per capita production in this region dropped to 153 kg in 1993[Annex table 8- 
2], making it impossible for local PDS to provide even the reduced ration at that time, 
179 kg per person per year or 492 grams per day. 307 
It was therefore necessary for the central government to transfer more grain to 
North East in 1994 than before, from other local PDSs or abroad, in order to provide 
the assigned food rations in that region. The difficulty was however that the overall 
food availability in 1994 declined significantly due to import collapse. The initial 
response of the government was to re-collect a part of grains that had been already 
distributed among farm households for their annual consumption, 5 kg per head . 
3()8 As 
food situation got worse, however, this policy was replaced in late 1994 by the party 
order to cease all domestic grain shipments to North East. 309 
The result was devastating. According to the DPRK food refugees, PDS 
rations in North East dropped to 150 grams per person per day in 1994, below even 
one third of the reduced norm, 492 grams. 310 It is therefore not surprising to find that 
the famine hit North East first in late 1994. 
The above discussion makes two points: 1) FAD at both local and national 
level pre-dated and triggered the famine in 1994; 2) it also generated the geographical 
concentration of the famine to North East. 
8.2.3.2. Famine Stage II: North West in July 1995-August 1996 
307 For the rationing norm in 1993, see table 6-1 in chapter 6 308 Ahn Jong Chul (1996), p, 251 
09 Ahn Jong Chul (1996), p. 251 and Natsios (1999) 
3 1o KBSM (1998) 
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The famine entered a new stage with the great flood in July/August 1995. It is at this 
stage that international aid organisations, including FAO, WFP, UNICEP, 
International Red Cross and some NGOs, began to visit the country and report its dire 
food situation to outside world. Interestingly they found that the situation was critical 
in North West. By December 1995 UN aid agencies reported that they observed 
famine situations in North Pyongan and Chagang (North West) as well as a part of 
North Hwanghae (South West). 3 1 Until August 1996 all the famine symptoms 
reported by outside observers came out mainly from North West, particularly North 
Pyongan province. This suggests two possibilities: 1) the famine shifted from North 
East to North West; or 2) North West fell into a new famine-stricken area, in addition 
to North East. Then, why? 
The year of 1995 was a turning point in the DPRK famine in the sense that 
total food supply began to dramatically collapse. A new crisis started when national 
grain production fell by 20 percent in 1994. Facing a potential collapse of national 
food balance, as discussed in chapter 6, the government made diplomatic efforts to 
have emergency food shipments from neighbouring countries, including the ROK, 
Japan and Thailand. Due to the food aid from these countries grain import recovered 
to I million MT in 1995. But it did not compensate for the production decline, and 
thus food supply in 1995 was down by 1l percent [table 8-3]. 
The crisis reached a climax when the July/August 1995 flood hit the country. 
According to official estimates, the flood affected 5.2 million people, including 
481,740 homeless, and caused 626,200 MT of grain stock losses. 312 Taking into 
account these stock losses, actual food supply in 1995 dropped by almost 20 percent. 
Given that the famine already started in North East in late 1994, it is not surprising 
that the famine spread over to other regions with such a huge FAD in 1995. 
Note that the July/August flood was a geographically confined one. Of total 
crop damages caused by the flood, 61 percent was in North West and 67 percent of 
homeless also came from this region. 313 In consequence, the production of North 
West, traditionally one of rice baskets in the country, completely collapsed in 1995: it 
dropped to 0.98 million, roughly one third of the 1989-92 average [table 8-5]. It is 
311 For instance, see OCHA, DPRK-Flood Situation Report, 18 Dec 1995; FAO/WFP (22 Dec 1995) 312 UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, assessment of damage and immediate relief requirements 
following preliminary findings of United Nations Assessment Mission, 12 Sep 1995 
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true that other regions also suffered crop failures in 1995. But the failures were not as 
great as in North West. 
Now we have the two same conclusions in the second stage of famine as in the 
first stage: 1) FAD pre-dated and triggered the famine; 2) it generated the 
geographical movement of the famine to North West. 
8.2.3.3. Famine Stage III: National Famine since October 1996 
From late 1996/early 1997 outside observers began to witness two important changes 
in the country's food situation. First, there were now no safe regions from food 
shortages. Second, North East emerged as the worst food deficit area again. 
Between 1997 and 1999 FAO and WFP reported that all country went under 
immense food stress and particularly the population in highly mountainous North East 
suffered most from the shortages. 
There are however stark variations in vulnerability based on regional and localised dif'f-erences in 1 od 
supply, The provinces on the east coast (North and South Hamgyung and Kangwon), and particularly 
those in the northeast (North and South Hamgyung) appear to be the most vulnerable. Factors 
accentuating food supply problems include: dense population concentration; scarcity of good 
agricultural land; colder climate and short growing season ..... 
314 
Consistent with this report, UN aid agencies asked the DPRK government to open 
North East to international aid workers, which was finally accepted in May 1997. 
In this stage grain import increased significantly from 1.1 million MT in 1996 
to 1.5 million MT in 1998 mainly due to increasing food aid from abroad. However, 
as mentioned earlier, domestic production completely collapsed and so total food 
supply dropped to below one half of the 1993 level. 
Production collapse was particularly dramatic in the country's traditional rice 
baskets such as North West and South West. In 1993 per capita production reached 
517 kg in North West and 846 kg in South West [Annex-table 8-2]. The figures far 
exceeded the national average of 410 kg, suggesting that both regions supplied most 
grain surpluses in the country. In 1996, however, per capita production dropped to 
313 ibid. 
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1 12 kg in North West and 193 kg in South West. Given that the reduced norms of 
PDS rations were 179 kg per person for official worker, the figures mean that even the 
country's rice baskets failed to produce minimal ration requirements. It would be 
quite odd in this situation if any region was free from the famine. 
The data also show that North East again suffered the highest production fall 
in this stage [table 8-5]. Grain production in this region fell below one fifth of the 
1989-92 average. It explains why this region appeared as the worst famine stricken 
area once more. 
Now we can repeat the same conclusions as above but for all the stages of the 
famine this time. First, every stage of the famine was accompanied and pre-dated by 
FAD. Second, the geographical movements of the famine were determined by the 
differences in the severity of FAD by regions. 
8.2.4. FAD and the Distribution of Victims 
Next we consider the relation between FAD and the distribution of famine victims. 
Table 8-6 compares variations in ßs with regional output changes during the 
famine period. 315 The data show that the famine was most severe in North East in 
terms of relative population growth. That is, North East saw the most negative 
population shock during the famine period. Interestingly North East was also the 
region where food supply declined most dramatically. In comparison with the 1989- 
92 level, grain production in this region fell by 54 percent, the highest rate in the 
country, in 1993-97. And the population faced the lowest food availability, 112 kg per 
head, for that period [Annex table 8-2]. 
By contrast, South West in which FAD was not relatively severe appeared to 
enjoy the most positive population shock. In comparison with the 1989-92 level, grain 
production in this region declined by 43 percent, slightly lower than the national 
average of 44 percent, in 1993-97. Above all, the region had the highest food 
availability in 1993-97,437 kg per head, which was more than three times North East. 
314 FAOWFP (29 June 1999) 
315 For the definition of (3 and its application to measuring the regional differences in the severity of 
famine, see section 7.5 in chapter 7 
235 
Accordingly relative population growth in that region was higher during the famine 
period. 
This relation between food availability and relative population growth does 
not necessarily mean that FAD was the main factor determining the regional 
distribution of famine victims. For, as mentioned in chapter 7, relative population 
growth is affected not only by the severity of food shortage but also by the 
government's migration policy. Nonetheless, it suggests that FAD might be an 
important factor influencing the severity of the famine by regions. 
Table 8-6. Relative Population Growth Index (ß) and Urban Population Shares 
During the DPRK famine: 1 January 1994 -31 August 1999 
Change of Relative Change of Grain Share of Urban 
Population Growth Production on Average Population: 31 Aug. 1999 
Index ((3): 1994-99 in 1993-97 (°Io) 
(13 of 1987-93 =100) (avg. of 1989-92 =100) 
Special Cities 
Pyongyang 
Kaesung 
Nampo 
North West 
S. Pyongan 
N. Pyongan 
Chagang 
North East 
S. Harngyung 
N. Hamgyung 
Ranggang 
South West 
S. Hwanghae 
N. Hwanghae 
South East 
96 61 88 
92 61 92 
110 51 65 
105 70 82 
100 58 68 
97 60 73 
103 55 60 
103 66 72 
88 45 74 
86 43 69 
101 44 78 
105 87 79 
104 57 55 
105 60 51 
103 50 60 
102 53 69 
Kangwon 102 53 69 
TheDPRK 100 56 71 
Source) I. For the relative population growth index, table 7-10 in Chapter 7 
2. For production change, table 8-5. 
3. For urban population shares, the DPRK's submission to FAO/WFP (8 Nov. 1999) 
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8.2.5. The Absolute Shortage of Food 
Lastly, consider a hypothetical question: was it feasible to prevent the famine in the 
DPRK? According to Eilmann (1999), FAD famines could be divided into two 
categories: FAD I and FAD2 famines. FAD I famines are those in which there is no 
feasible division of the available food which can prevent famine. In contrast, FAD2 
famines are those in which, although food availability has declined, there are feasible 
policies that could have prevented the famine (or at any rate substantially reduced the 
number of victims). 
Table 8-7. Food Requirement and Availability for 
Human Consumption in the DPRK 
Food Supply State Food Grain Equivalent 
Total Per head 
(mil. MT) (kg) 
Ration: 
Reduced Norm for 
official worker 
for Minimum Calorie 
Requirement by FAO 
1992 8.61 406 
1993 8.73 412 
1994 8.10 382 492 grams per day 457 grams per day 
1995 7.17 338 or or 
1996 4.22 199 179 kg per year 167 kg per year 
1997 3.57 168 
1998 3.86 182 
Source) 1. For total and per capita food supply, table 8-3 and 8-4 
2. For official ration, table 6-1 in chapter 6 
3. For minimum calorie requirement, FAO/WFP (22 Dec. 1995) 
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Some might think that this categorisation is not practical. For instance, it may 
not be feasible in many cases to determine the absolute level of food availability 
below which famine should necessarily happen. Grains are used for various purposes, 
including human consumption, animal fodder, agricultural and industrial purposes and 
reserves for future consumption. It is difficult to estimate minimal food requirement 
for each purpose in a way that everyone would agree on. More difficult is to set up the 
reasonable distribution priorities among different purposes particularly when food 
availability declines. 
Nevertheless, Ellmann (1999)'s categorisation seems quite useful to 
understand the DPRK famine, because the available data suggest that the famine was 
a rare example of national FAD I 316 
In contrast to market economies and many other socialist economies, as far as 
human consumption is concerned, it is not so difficult to assess minimal food 
requirement in the DPRK where food has been rationed for more than five decades. In 
this country, state food rations have effectively covered the whole population. Of 
course the norms have changed several times since 1972, and recently actual rations 
were usually far lower than the norms. Note however that the rationing norms have 
not been further reduced since daily ration for official worker finally went down to 
492 grams per person in 1992.317 Since then the government has either temporarily 
stopped providing rations or supplied less food than the norms, instead of reducing 
them. This suggests that the daily adult ration of 492 grams reflects the minimal level 
of human food consumption in the DPRK that the government has considered as 
`minimal'. Interestingly this ration is similar to the minimum calorie intake for adult, 
457 grams of grain per person per day, which is defined by UN. In this respect it 
seems fair to say that the minimal food requirement for human survival in the DPRK 
should be around 457-492 grams per person per day. 
Table 8-7 compares per capita food supply during the famine period with this 
minimal food requirement for human survival in the DPRK. Strikingly per capita food 
supply was below 492 grams per day in 1997. It was of course slightly greater than 
"Ellmann (1999) provides an example of FADI famine in human history: the Leningrad famine of 
1942. But the famine was surely not a national one and happened under a special circumstance of war 
that German army blocked the city from outside food supply. In this respect the DPRK famine would 
provide a rather unique example of peacetime national FADI famine in human history. 317 Oh Gyung Chan (1997), p. 148 
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457 grams, the minimal food requirement defined by UN. 318 Taking into account 
other basic grain requirements for the reproduction of economy such as seeds and 
animal fodder, however, the figure seems effectively below the minimal food 
requirement for human consumption in the DPRK. 
It is important to keep in mind that this absolute shortage of food appeared 
after the population had already been under severe food stress for a long time. Note 
that the famine started in 1994 and food shortages had begun long before that. This 
means that there was practically no feasible division of food to prevent the famine at 
least in 1997. On this basis, we argue that the DPRK famine was an example of rare 
FAD 1 famine. 
8.2.6. FAD and the DPRK Famine 
So far we have shown five facts about the DPRK famine. First, there was FAD before 
and during the famine. Second, FAD pre-dated and triggered every stage of the 
famine. Third, FAD generated the geographical movement of the famine. Fourth, 
there was a clear relation between FAD and the distribution of victims. Fifth, food 
availability was so low in the last stage of the famine that there was no feasible 
division of available food to prevent the famine. It seems therefore obvious that FAD 
was the causation of the DPRK famine. 
8.3. Two Unique Features of the DPRK famine 
In contrast to many other socialist famines, the DPRK famine had two unique 
features. One is that it was primarily an urban famine. Another is that it did not cause 
a large degree of population loss but, instead, raised a serious long-term health crisis 
of the whole population. Interestingly, although FAD was the causation of the famine, 
it does not seem to explain both features very well. 
318 FA©/WFP (22 Dec 1995) 
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8.3.1 Urban famine 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the DPRK famine is that it mainly hit urban 
population. 
It is well known that most socialist famines in human history took place in 
rural areas. Compared with urban population, rural population were in many cases 
poorer, had fewer opportunities to increase income and were regarded as less 
important socially and politically. In the 1932-33 Soviet famine and the 1959-61 
Chinese famine, for instance, the government protected urban population with state 
food rations while agricultural population was forced to be self-reliant on food. This 
made a large difference between urban and rural mortality during the famine 
periods. 319 
Surprisingly however the DPRK famine hit mainly urban industrial 
population. An international aid worker who witnessed the famine put this as follows: 
.. the striking thing about this 
famine is that it's not occurring in the way that African famines 
unfold. People tend to be ashamed of being hungry, they tend to stay at home. You don't have large scale 
population. movements between different parts of the country..... They try to get food and it' they don't 
succeed they simply silently starve at home. 
Another striking thing is the fact that it affects the cities more than the countryside 
especially the industrial cities in the north. We visited one, Wee Chong, which is in the northern 
part of'the country or towards the north, and there you have people silently on the seventh floor o1' 
apartment buildings. And they're starving because no food is coming to the city320 
There are no available mortality data with the breakdown of urban and rural 
population during the DPRK famine period. Nevertheless, it is not so difficult to show 
that the famine was an urban famine. 
Let us first look again at table 8-6, comparing the changes of (3s with the 
shares of urban population by provinces. The data suggest that the regions with higher 
319 See Chang and Wen (1997) for the 1959-61 Chinese famine and Wheatcroft (1990) for the 1932-33 
Soviet famine. During the 1959-61 Chinese famine, for instance, urban death rate increased slightly 
From 10.92 per thousand in 1959 to 13.77 in 1960 by around 3 percent point. In contrast, rural death 
rate soared from 14.61 per thousand in 1959 to 28.58 in 1960 by almost 14 percent point (Chang and 
Wen, 1997: p. 1 1) 320 Valfells (1999) 
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shares of urban population suffered more negative population shocks. For instance, 
North East that experienced the most negative population shock has the highest urban 
population share in the country, except Special Cities, while South West with the 
most positive shock had the lowest urban population share. This means that the 
famine was relatively more severe where the share of urban population was higher. 
Now consider the statements of the DPRK food refugees. As discussed in 
chapter 7, the refugees mainly came from North East that has the highest urban 
population share in the country and suffered the most from the famine. According to 
KBSM (1998), an absolute majority of the refugees said that food situation was more 
difficult in urban areas than in rural areas. This suggests that urban population was the 
main famine victims in the worst famine stricken area in the country. 
Table 8-8. North Korean Food Refugees' Responses: 
More Difficult Area in Food Situation - Urban or Rural 
Urban Rural Similar Unknown Total 
Interviewees 1280 
Composition (%) 75.6 
26 
1.5 
137 
8.1 
251 
14.8 
1694 
100 
Source) KSBM (1998) 
Finally let us confirm this finding by reviewing the field reports by outside 
observers. For instance, FAO/WFP mission teams have reported: 
The combination of all these factors have led to polarity in food consumption in various respects, 
ie people with assets and remittances fare better than those without, the fanning community is 
better placed to meet shortages than the urban population..... Overall, therefore, food shortages are 
most entrenched in urban areas and, of this, in parts of the population which so far have relied 
entirely on the PDS for food supply. 32' 
Similar observations can be found in many field reports by other international aid 
agencies, NGOs and individual observers, one of which has been quoted above. 
32 FAO/WFP (25 Nov. 1997) 
241 
Note however that, although the famine was generally an urban famine, there 
was an exception. We have pointed out that the famine mainly hit North West in its 
second stage, largely due to the July/August 1995 flood. Interestingly there is a 
variety of evidence that most victims in this stage came from rural areas. First of all, 
UN aid agencies who began to work in the country from November 1995 found that 
farming households, who were outside from PDS, bore most burdens of the 
July/August 1995 flood and thus needed international food aid most urgently. 3" 
NGOs and individual observers made similar eyewitnesses. The DPRK government 
also admitted that food situation was particularly bad among farm households, who 
had faced the depletion of food stock by April 1996 long before the autumn harvest of 
that year was made, and thus had to be dependent on PDS rations to which they are 
not entitled. 3 23 
To conclude, the DPRK famine primarily hit urban population particularly in 
North East. Despite this general fact however the victims who came from North West 
due to the 1995 flood were mostly farm households. 
8.3.2. Famine in Slow Motion 
Another distinctive feature of the DPRK famine is that it did not cause some social 
groups eruptive demographic losses in a relatively short space of time. Rather, it 
resulted in a long-term health crisis of the whole population. Due to this feature UN 
aid agencies have described the famine as `famine in slow motion'. 
Table 8-9 presents birth, death and population growth rates for three socialist 
famines. In the DPRK famine, total population loss, which was assessed by the 
difference in population growth rate between normal period and famine period, was 
less than 0.5 percent. By contrast, the figure rose up to around 3 percent in the Soviet 
famine as well as in the Chinese famine. This means that the DPRK famine claimed 
the least population loss among three socialist famines. 324 
322 See FAO/WFP (22 Dec. 1995: 13 May 1996: 16 December 1996) and OCHA (18 Dec 1995) 
323 FAO/WFP (6 Sep. 1996) 
324 Although the difference in death rate between normal and famine period was the greatest in the 
DPRK, it is simply because of the assumption that there was no change in birth rate during the DPRK 
famine period. Unlike those of China and the Soviet Union, therefore, the famine death rate of the 
DPRK should he regarded as reflecting total size of demographic loss claimed by the famine, including 
the loss of births, rather than only the number of deaths (see the discussion of section 7.4 in chapter 7) 
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However, this low level of demographic loss makes the DPRK famine look puzzled. 
Of those three socialist famines, as discussed already, the DPRK famine saw the most 
serious FAD. But it caused the least demographic loss. Why? 
To make the issue more complicated, despite this low level of demographic 
loss the DPRK famine does not seem mild at all, in terms of the health risks it posed 
to the population. Table 8-10 illustrates the severity of mal-nourishment of the DPRK 
children during the famine period. According to EU/UNICEF/WFP nutritional survey 
that was carried out on randomly selected samples across the DPRK, around 16 
percent of the DPRK children under 6 were wasted, 62 percent stunted and 61 percent 
underweight. 325 
Table 8-10. Nutritional Status of the DPRK Children 
(%) 
Wasted Stunted Under Weight 
(acute Malnutrition) (Chronic Malnutrition) 
DPRK 15.6 62.3 60.6 
Niger 15 40 43 
Sierra Leone 9 35 29 
Angola 6 53 42 
Source) 1. For the DPRK, WFP (1998) 
2. For other countries, UNICEF (1999) 
These figures are striking in several respects. First, children's nutritional status 
in the DPRK was effectively the worst in the world in the sense that even the 
countries with the highest mortality rates under 5 in the world such as Niger and 
Sierra Leone managed to feed their children better. Second, given that the DPRK 
famine started in 1994, this miserable nutritional status lasted for a long period, at 
least for 4-5 years, as evidenced by the fact that 62 percent of children suffered from 
chronic malnutrition (stunted). Third, the EU/UNICEFIWFP survey was carried out 
after children's nutritional status was known to improve considerably due to several 
years of international food aid. It means that the children's nutritional status was 
actually far worse during the famine than what the survey shows. Fourth, of various 
325 This survey result was publicised by WFP (1998) 
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DPRK age groups, children under 5 have been best protected by both international 
food aid and the country's rationing system. Indeed international food aid has mainly 
targeted children and pregnant women in the country. And the DPRK government has 
also been reported to allocate children's food rations directly to nurseries and schools, 
the social institutions under state control, in order to ensure that the rations have 
directly reached the children with the first priority. 326 This means that during the 
famine period not only the children but also virtually the whole population were 
exposed to severe malnutrition and corresponding health risks. 
In many historical famines FAD expressed itself as eruptive population losses 
for a relatively short space of time. In addition, the high famine mortality hit in many 
cases only some social, regional and age groups, not all the groups. By contrast, in the 
DPRK famine even a huge degree of FAD seemingly failed to cause such eruptive 
population losses. Instead, it manifested itself as ongoing severe malnutrition of the 
whole population for a relatively long period. In this respect what characterises the 
DPRK famine most is not the size of short-term demographic losses it caused, but the 
implications of long-term health risks it imposed on the country. An international aid 
worker puts this as follows. 
Until this time famine happened mostly in unorganised countries. When famine occurs in these 
countries, some regions eat well and some regions die. However, since the DPRK is well 
organised, all manage to eat and survive under the control of the government. In this case people 
may die less, but in the long run there appear such problems that (children's) heights do not 
grow.... And their brains do not develop. In laboratories we have many experiments on mice. The 
DPRK could be a laboratory. There are reports that children under 5 suffering hunger have their 
327 brains underdeveloped. If not recovered, they have also other body problems.... 
Due to the lack of available information it is difficult to assess the implications 
of this so-called `famine in slow motion'. Nevertheless it seems clear that the DPRK 
famine provided a new type of famine the real impacts of which may be unknown yet. 
326 FAO/WFP (6 Dec. 1996) and Park Gyung Suh (1997) 
327 Linton (1997) 
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8.4. Food Rationing, Entitlement and Urban Famine 
In chapter 1 of this thesis we have argued that the DPRK agricultural institutions have 
characterised the basic patterns of the country's food shortages. In this and next 
section we indeed study how the institutions has generated two unique features of the 
1994-99 DPRK famine. To do this we take the basic concept of modern economics of 
famine: entitlement. 328 In this section we begin by examining how a person's 
entitlement is determined under the DPRK agricultural institutions. Then we study 
how the DPRK entitlement system affected the food distribution during the famine 
period, explaining the reasons why the DPRK famine was an urban famine. 
8.4.1. Food Rationing and Entitlement in the DPRK 
In the DPRK all grains are rationed. 329 And both private grain production and trade 
are strictly prohibited. Other food items such as vegetables are also predominantly 
rationed. But the regulations on their private production and trade are not as strict as 
in grains. Both farm households and urban workers are given small sizes of private 
plots, being allowed to produce other food items for their own consumption or for 
farmers' markets where the prices depend solely on supply and demand. From the 
viewpoints of consumers, grains are available only from state rationing agencies. For 
other food items, however, consumers could purchase them not only from state retail 
networks but also from farmers' markets as well as from their workplaces that may 
have independent supply contracts with cooperative farms. A person's entitlement in 
the DPRK is therefore affected by various factors, including state rations, rationing 
prices, income and market conditions. As far as food grains are concerned, however, 
his/her entitlement is extremely simple: it should be equal to his/her rations. 
328 Entitlement refers to the set of the alternative bundles of commodities that a person can acquire in 
exchange for what he owns. Therefore a person starves when his/her entitlement does not include 
enough food for survival (entitlement failure). Modern economic of famine tends to study why, how 
and whose entitlement fails during the famine period in order to explain the causation, patterns 
(categories) and victims of famine. See the concept of entitlement, see the chapter 1 of Sen (198 1) 329 For the development of the DPRK rationing system, see the related sections of chapter 3-5 
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There are of course many reports that it has been effectively liberalised to 
cultivate grains, mainly maize, in private plots and trade them in farmers' markets 
since the early 1990s. 330 Despite this fact, however, it does not seem wise to assume 
that there was a fundamental change in a person's entitlement during the famine 
period. 
Table 8-11 shows that market grain prices were too high for normal 
households to afford even in 1992 two years before the famine started. In the DPRK 
the salaries of workers in state sector that absorbs all non-farming population are 
basically determined at the level of so-called living costs [Saengwhalbi] that are based 
on state rationing prices for goods. In 1992, however, market rice price was roughly 
three hundred times the rationing price, so that an average official worker could buy 
only 2.7 kg of rice in market with his/her entire monthly income of 70 North Korean 
won. This amount was around one tenth of his or her monthly standard ration and one 
seventh of reduced ration. Moreover, table 8-12 shows that market prices rocketed up 
by more than ten times during the famine period. This indicates that a vast majority of 
households could not buy even an extremely small amount of grains in market so that, 
when state rationing system failed to provide adequate food supply, they should 
eventually starve. 
In this respect we assume that a person's entitlement in the DPRK during the 
famine period was basically his/her food ration, even though there were limited 
opportunities to obtain additional food. 
8.4.1.1. The DPRK Food Rationing System 
The DPRK food rationing system covers effectively the whole population, including 
farm households. Table 8-13 presents four social groups with different entitlements in 
that system. 
All farm households in cooperative farms should be in principle self-sufficient 
on food. They should not expect any food supply from the government, thus being 
excluded from PDS rations, food import and even international food aid channelled 
by the government. Nevertheless, their food consumption is protected and controlled 
330 Kim Yeon Chul (1997) and Chun Hong Taek (1997b) 
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by state rationing system. On the one hand, they are entitled to keeping aside their 
annual rations, the amounts of which are determined by the government, from their 
production before they sell the production to state. On the other hand, they should sell 
all remaining grains to state procurement agencies. 
For farm households in state farms that specialise in non-grain production 
such as animal rearing, seed production and fruits cultivation, 6 month rations are 
allocated in one occasion shortly after harvest and another 6 month rations are 
provided biweekly by PDS. 
Together with imported grains, the procured grains from farm households 
constitute state grain reserves, being eventually rationed among non-farm households 
by PDS. All non-farm households are entitled to PDS rations, but they are divided 
into two separate groups with different entitlements. A group is so-called `centrally 
supplied population' that includes high government officials, important military 
personnel and high profiles in every sector of society. Their rations are provided 
either daily, weekly or biweekly by the party or by some special suppliers in the 
government. All other non-farm households called `generally supplied population' 
purchase their rations biweekly at food warehouses in labour districts under the 
control of People's Service Commission. 
8.4.1.2. The DPRK Entitlement System 
A distinctive feature of the DPRK food rationing system is that it includes farm 
households as the first claimants of farm production for their annual food rations. 33 1 In 
this respect the DPRK differs from many other socialist countries where the 
government was the first claimant that deducted compulsory procurement quotas from 
the production before it was distributed among farm households. Due to this feature 
the rationing system tends to operate more favourably to farm households than to their 
counterparts in urban industry, particularly for the period of food shortage. 
; j' Note that the production here means `net production' that remains after deducting necessary costs 
from total production, that is, the costs for seeds, waters, fertilisers, electricity, agricultural machinery 
and so on. Because state owns and provides all such necessary agricultural inputs, cooperative farms 
should pay for the inputs before the production is distributed among members. Hence, when the 
production fell so as not to pay such costs, farm households could starve even while the government 
still collects grains from cooperative farms. For details, see section 3.2.4. in chapter 3. 
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It is of course `centrally supplied population' that is best protected by the 
DPRK rationing system. It is hard to imagine that this group experienced any decline 
in its food consumption even during the famine period. Apart from this group, 
however, farm households have a relatively stronger position in the DPRK rationing 
system, in compared with other ordinary PDS population. Indeed, as we shall see 
below, farm households proved to receive considerably higher rations than PDS 
population during the famine period. 
The strong position of farm households entails two basic features of their 
entitlement. First, in compared with the entitlement of PDS population, the 
entitlement of farm households is relatively safer from the adverse influences of 
production failures. Second, it is also free from the risk that the supply of rations 
suddenly stops or declines due to adverse seasonal factors. 
Consider the first feature. In the DPRK it is not easy for the government to 
unevenly pass over the burden of production failures to farm households. When farm 
households deduct their rations from production ahead of state procurement, any 
change in the production would firstly express itself as the change in the procurement 
unless the production goes down below their annual ration requirements. It provides a 
basic reason why farm households can have relatively safer rations from production 
failures. 
Of course, when the decline in state procurement cause a significant reduction 
in PDS rations, the government will reduce farm household rations accordingly. Even 
in this case, however, there are several factors that prevent the government from 
reducing farm household rations more sharply than PDS rations. 
Firstly, the DPRK is an over-industrialised country where (urban) industrial 
population comprised 60 percent of total population in 1993. Therefore, when there 
are food shortages, it is far more difficult to sustain the given level of PDS rations by 
reducing farm household rations than to do the opposite. Secondly, the DPRK 
authorities have connected farm household rations to the PDS rations for heavy 
manual workers (PDS group 5) since farm households were absorbed into state 
rationing system in the early 1950s. 332 Because this routine has been maintained for 
around five decades, it should be difficult to make a sudden gap between farm 
332 See section 4.3.2.2 in chapter 4 
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household rations and the corresponding PDS rations. Thirdly, the rapid reduction in 
food rations would drive farm households out of cooperative farming into private 
grain production and trade, although the latter is still illegal. Given that the DPRK 
agriculture has suffered from permanent labour shortages, it would lead to the further 
decline in official production and thus state food reserves. 
What about the second feature? In the DPRK, farm households are entitled to 
receiving their annual rations at once shortly after harvest. Hence, their daily rations 
are effectively fixed over the year at the beginning of new agricultural year. By 
contrast, PDS rations are supplied normally biweekly. It has two implications. First, 
the intended level of PDS rations may fluctuate over the year, depending on seasonal 
food situation. In particular, when there are ongoing food shortages, the level is more 
likely to fall because food situation generally gets worse as time passes by after 
harvest. Second, when there are unexpected shocks adversely affecting state food 
reserves, including the cessation of concessional food shipments from other socialist 
countries and the decline in international food aid, the government could fail to supply 
the intended level. The central government might order the local authorities to stop 
providing rations temporarily; and the local authorities might supply less rations than 
the amounts ordered by the central government. 
To conclude, when there are food shortages, the DPRK rationing system 
intrinsically provides relatively more stable and adequate food supply to farm 
households than to PDS population. It would be therefore not surprising to find that 
PDS population suffered more dire food situation than farm households during the 
famine period. 
8.4.2. Entitlement, Farm household Ration and PDS Ration 
Table 8-14 presents the real amounts of food rations provided for farm households 
and PDS population in the agricultural years of 1996-99. Annual average rations are 
constructed from the reported DPRK figures to FAOIWFP mission teams that have 
visited the country every year since 1995 [see Annex table 8-3]. In the agricultural 
year of 1996, for instance, the government informed that it provided PDS population 
with 452 grams of daily ration per person between November 1995 and March 1996, 
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250-300 grams between April and June 1996, and 200 grams between July and 
October 1996. We average these monthly figures, obtaining the average daily ration 
of 324 grams in that year. The government also reported that farm households in 
cooperative farms received around 100 kg of grain per person for their annual food 
consumption in November 1995. Dividing this annual figure by 365 days we have the 
average daily ration of 274 grams for the agricultural year of 1996.333 
Table 8-14. Reported Food Rations to Farmers and Non-farmers: Nov. 1995 - Sept. 1999 
(annual average: gram per person per day) 
Nov. 95-Oct. 96 Nov. 96-Oct. 97 Nov. 97-Oct. 98 Nov. 98-Sept. 99 
Nora-farmers 324 154 133 268 
Farmers 274 219 370 400* 
* average for 12 months from November 1998 to October 1999. 
Source) Annex table 8-3 
As expected, farm households had generally far more favourable food supply 
during the famine period. Their rations were much greater than PDS rations for three 
years from November 1996 to September 1999. Further, farm household rations 
gradually increased for that period, which was not the case for PDS rations. The only 
exception was the 1996 agricultural year when PDS population received around 20 
percent more than farm households did. 
An interesting observation is that these differences between farm household 
rations and PDS rations are quite consistent with the selection of victims by famine 
stages. As pointed out already, the famine mainly hit urban dwellers particularly in 
North East. In terms of famine stages urban dwellers (North East) appeared as the 
main victims in the first stage in 1994-June 1995 and the third stage in October 1996- 
1999. The exception was the second stage between July 1995 and August 1996 in 
which the victims came mainly from farm households in North West. 
333 
Because the reported figures are rather over simplified, it would be inappropriate to argue that the 
figures presented by table 8-14 are absolutely precise. Nevertheless they would not cause severe 
difficulties in understanding the general levels of rations during the DPRK famine. 
253 
Combing this fact with the above rationing figures, we can make the following 
conclusions. First, it was the distribution of food rations among social groups that 
determined the selection of victims in each stage of the famine. Second, generally 
farm households had more favourable rations than PDS population. In consequence, 
the victims mainly came from urban areas. Third, however, in the agricultural year of 
1996 PDS rations were considerably greater than farm household rations, driving 
mainly farm households into the victims. 
Of these conclusions, the first two are rather straightforward given the 
difference between the entitlement of farm households and that of PDS population. 
But the third conclusion seems to require some additional comments. 
There is no hard evidence concerning the reasons why farm households 
received less rations than PDS population in the agricultural year of 1996. 
Nevertheless, it seems rather obvious that the main reason was the 1995 July/August 
flood. As mentioned already, the flood caused 626,200 MT of grain stock losses, most 
of which came from rural areas. Given that the flood occurred at the nearly end of the 
1995 agricultural year, this massive scale of losses should destroy all the remaining 
grain reserves owned by both many farm households and cooperative farms. To avoid 
starvation, therefore, farm households should in principle receive grain loans from 
cooperative farms, which would be the case in normal years. 334 It is however doubtful 
how many cooperative farms could afford the loans given the severity of their own 
stock losses. In this respect the additional food supply to farm households between 
July and October 1995 must be made in a different way: distributing unripe grains 
from fields before normal harvest commenced. 135 This before-harvest-grain 
distribution should be deducted from annual farm household rations after harvest, 
which seems to be the main reason why the latter was smaller than PDS rations in 
1996. 
334 See section 4.3.2.2 in chapter 4 
335 Indeed this before-harvest-grain distribution emerged as an important national coping strategy 
during the famine period. For instance, FAO/WFP mission teams began to witness similar before- 
harvest-grain distributions from the 1996 agricultural year (FAO/WFP: 6 Dec. 1996). The DPRK 
government officially admitted in 1998 that it allowed both cooperative farms and regional PDS to 
distributed a part of production before harvest (DPRKIUNDP: 1998a). 
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8.4.3. Entitlement and Food Supply Pattern 
Table 8-15 presents provincial food allocations between farm households and PDS 
population in the agricultural year of 1998. Note that farm household allocations 
include not only food rations but also other grain requirements for agricultural 
production such as seeds and fodder, whereas PDS rations were pure food rations for 
urban population. Unlike in table 8-14, therefore, it would be inappropriate to directly 
compare two figures. Nevertheless, the data reveal several interesting features of the 
DPRK food supply pattern. 
Let us first look at regional variations in food supply. On the one hand, farm 
household allocations were relatively evenly distributed across the country. Except 
Ryanggang province that has the smallest size of (farming) population in the country, 
per capita grain allocation ranged from 144 kg in North Pyongan to 175 kg in 
Pyongyang. Given that grain production per farmer varied immensely from 103 kg in 
Kangwon to 442 kg in South Hwanghae [see Annex table 8-4], there were relatively 
little differences in farm household allocations by provinces. This indicates that there 
was a nationally unified norm for farm household allocations; and this norm was 
relatively well applied across the country. 
On the other hand, PDS rations had great provincial differences. For instance, 
per capita annual PDS ration was mere 21 kg in Kangwon, being almost half of 41 kg 
in Pyongyang. The figure was also very low in South Hamgyung and North Pyongan, 
two provinces where the food situation was reportedly the worst in North East and 
North West respectively. This suggests that unlike farm household allocations PDS 
rations were not provided precisely according to the nationally unified norm; and 
consequently some provinces suffered far lower rations than others. 
Now look at seasonal variations in food supply. By definition there must be no 
seasonal variation in farm household allocations. By contrast, PDS rations varied 
immensely by seasons. In all provinces PDS rations reached the peak in November 
and December 1997 when new grains were collected and transferred to state food 
reserves, but fell considerably until March 1998. And there was no supply of PDS 
rations for five months from April to August in 1998. The supply was finally resumed 
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in September and October 1998 when new-planted grains grow enough to be 
consumed before harvest. 
Table 8-16. Provincial and Seasonal Variations of Food Supply: Nov. 97-Oct. 98 
Provincial Variation Monthly Variation 
Average Max. Min. Std. Dev. Average Max. Min. Std. Dev. 
PDS ration 100 132 69 20.42 100 306 0 120.45 
Farm allocation 100 145 86 14.99 100 100 100 0 
Source) Table 8-15. 
Table 8-16 reports the above findings in a more formal way. The provincial 
variation measured by standard deviation is considerably greater in PDS rations than 
in farm household allocations. The monthly variation of PDS rations also fluctuates 
greatly while that of farm household allocations should be essentially zero. 
From table 8-15 and 16 the following conclusions can be drawn. First, during 
the famine period the DPRK rationing system provided relatively stable food supply 
to farm households both regionally and seasonally. This suggests that, insofar as farm 
households were concerned, the severity of the famine was distributed relatively 
evenly among regions and seasons. 
Second, PDS rations varied greatly by regions: hence PDS population in some 
provinces suffered more from the famine than those in other provinces. Now let us 
recall that the overall level of PDS rations was lower than that of farm household 
rations during the famine period, and that there were no such great regional variations 
in farm household rations as in PDS rations. It means that PDS population in those 
provinces with relatively lower PDS rations were those who suffered the lowest food 
supply during the famine period. Needless to say, they were also the main victims of 
the famine. 
Third, PDS population suffered a great instability in seasonal food supply. As 
discussed later, there was so-called `lean season' during the famine period when PDS 
rations ceased completely or fell dramatically. Of course, because international food 
aid could be still channelled by the government, PDS population did not necessarily 
starve completely even in this season. Nonetheless, it seems straightforward that this 
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season imposed great health risks on PDS population. Perhaps many farm households 
also faced similar lean season as their annual rations were depleted. But there is an 
important difference: farm households could prepare for lean season by planning and 
controlling their seasonal food consumption using their annual rations in their hands, 
which was reportedly the most important coping strategy in household level. Clearly 
this strategy was not available for PDS population who have to buy their rations 
biweekly. This means that, even when there was no difference between the level of 
farm household rations and of PDS rations, PDS population faced greater health risks 
during the famine period. 
8.4.4. The DPRK Food Distribution in Comparative View 
Table 8-17 presents rural and urban food supply during the 1994-99 DPRK famine 
and the 1959-61 Chinese famine. Note that food supply differs from food ration by 
definition. For instance, urban food supply should include not only human food 
consumption but also intermediate usage of industry as well as the increase in state 
food reserves. Similarly rural food supply should entail the food consumption of farm 
households, seeds and animal fodder etc. In table 8-17 we identify urban food supply 
with government procurement, because the latter was the only source to provide food 
to urban areas, including industry, for the concerning years. Accordingly rural food 
supply is defined by grains left in village after government procurement. In the 
DPRK, rural food supply should be also equal to farm household allocations. 
In the DPRK, per capita food supply was much greater in rural area than in 
urban area during the famine period. By contrast, the opposite was the case in China. 
An interesting point is that the gap between rural and urban food supply is much 
greater in the DPRK. Rural food supply was more than four times urban food supply 
in the DPRK while urban food supply was slightly greater or similar to rural food 
supply in China. What should be note here is that due to this gap the 1959-61 Chinese 
famine saw higher excess death rates in rural areas than in urban areas. 336 This 
suggests that in the DPRK the famine mortality was more likely higher in urban areas, 
not only because the food supply was lower in urban areas than in rural areas, but also 
336 See footnote 319 
258 
G Aý 
coo 
Öp 
pý'ý 
CD 
N 
ý CD 
00 
Oö 
v 00 
ti 
O 
v 
00 
ti 
ýC ct 
-, < 
-- 
aä CD 
( - '. 
o 
0 
oa 
r 
H 
C 
-0 
CG 
O 
Z 
O ýlo 
ti 
N 
w 
ON 
bbb ýO ýO ýO 
Oý Oý Oý L vt vi 
ti Z ý, O 00 ý1 
wp "o -1 
=s 
n 
är ý 
J) tv ti tv L/I Oý ý1 - Z' A N N Oo `-' " - Zs N A N r SID 00 
O tn ý 
-11 
c. n 
--j c. A D I Ö= 
N N 4ý, W tý ý-3 cs 
00 00 --A 00 O \C N rl 
v, Qln cln ý4- c-A (-A 
Q. -I (41 
ON ý" ý" Oo NJp, 
OC 
ýNWNOý 
NNNNNN 
AN ti N 00 ýO + 
N ýO Nw ýl C- 20 p? 
NNNww WO? 
NOw 0o ýO cr 
N ý. a Oo ýl ONö 
Ö 
A; 
'- O 
IV 
ý cv 
C7 
Z ýý 
110 
x 
I1 
p 
c 
H 
CD 
h-+ 
(D 
Qn 
CD 
1J 
p 
CD 
H 
CD 
00 
T1 
O 
O 
CD 
N 
CD 
T1 
p 
CD 
CD 
CU 
because the gap between rural and urban food supply was so great enough to produce 
significant differences between urban and rural mortality rates. 
8.4.5. The DPRK Entitlement System and Urban Famine 
Now it does not seem surprising at all that the 1994-99 DPRK famine was an urban 
famine. In this section we have established four facts concerning rural and urban food 
supply during the famine period. First, in the DPRK rationing system farm households 
tend to have stronger entitlements than urban population, particularly for the period of 
food shortage. Second, farm household rations were actually significantly higher than 
PDS rations during the famine period. Third, the supply of farm household rations 
was more stable both regionally and seasonally than that of PDS rations. Fourth, the 
gap between rural and urban food supply was greater in the DPRK famine than in 
other socialist famines that saw significant differences between rural and urban 
famine mortality. 
To conclude, farm households had stronger entitlements during the famine 
period, which made the famine an urban famine. 
8.5. Entitlement, National Coping Strategies and Famine In Slow 
Motion 
Another important consequence of the DPRK entitlement system is that it led to the 
appearance of national coping strategies, a main purpose of which was to minimise 
the demographic loss of urban population. The basic reason why the DPRK avoided 
massive increases in mortality rates during the famine period was the existence of 
these strategies. In this section we study what the strategies were, why they appeared 
and how they influenced the famine. The primary purpose of this study was to 
understand so-called `famine-in-slow motion'. In the process of the study, however, 
we also answer two basic disputes over the famine: 1) Were there any policy failures 
concerning the famine; 2) particularly were there food distribution failures and, if so, 
did they cause or exacerbate the famine? 
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8.5.1. Entitlement and the Government's Response to Famine 
A common feature of many socialist famines is that they were largely affected by the 
government's policy failures. In the case of the 1932-33 Soviet famine, for instance, 
the government has been blamed to pay little attention to rural food situation, collect 
too much grain from farm households who eventually fell into the famine victims, 
block international aid efforts and even export grain during the famine period. Similar 
blames have also been made to the Chinese government with respect to its 1959-61 
337 famine. Of these policy failures, the followings should be particularly noted. 
1) Information failure: The government failed to comprehend real food situation in the early 
stage of famine. Either the central government was misinformed by local cadres who 
reported highly exaggerated output figures, or it did not believe the reported figures from 
below when they showed sudden and considerable declines in outputs. 33' This hampered 
the government's understanding of famine. 
2) Relief failure: The government did not pay enough attention to organise famine-relief 
programs. On the contrary, it denied international food aid and even exported grain 
during famine period. 139 It exacerbated famine that would remain a much smaller one 
otherwise. 
337 As Eberstadt (1997) pointed out, most socialist famines happened with sudden institutional changes 
mainly accompanying or following agricultural collectivisation. The 1932-33 Soviet famine was 
directly influenced by sharp increase in stipulated procurement quotas after the forceful agricultural 
collectivisation (Conquest, 1986: Lewin, 1985). And the 1959-61 Chinese famine followed the radical 
communisation of farms and the introduction of communal dining system (Lin, 1990; Chang and Wen, 
1997: Yang, 1996). Some other socialist famines such as the Cambodian famine in the early 1970s 
were also similar (Eberstadt: 1997). But there exist socialist famines that occurred without such 
institutional changes. For instance, there were three or four different famines under the communist 
regime in the USSR, but it was only the 1932-33 famine that occurred with significant institutional 
changes (Ellmann, 1999). And clearly the 1994-99 DPRK famine was not caused by such institutional 
changes. Indeed, as discussed in chapter 3-5, all the DPRK agricultural institutions were primarily 
established between the late 1950s and the early 1960s, and had remained remarkably stable until the 
recent food crisis occurred. In this respect we do not discuss institutional changes concerning policy 
failures during the DPRK famine period. 
338 See Chang and Wen (1997: p. 3) for so-called `exaggeration wind' of grain outputs concerning the 
1959-61 Chinese famine. And see Davies, Harrison and Wheatcroft (1994: p. 115-116) and Davis and 
Wheatcroft (1999) for the statistical confusions of grain outputs during the 1932-3 1 Soviet famine. 
39 For instance, see the famous Sen vs. Nolan controversy over the relation between democracy and 
famine prevention particularly in the case of the 1959-61 Chinese famine (Nolan, 1993: Sen 1993). 
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3) Distribution failure: The government procured too much grain from farm households. 
Even when there was a significant decline in production, state procurement quota did not 
fall accordingly, partly because urban food demand was on increase due to rapid 
industrialisation derive, and partly because the government ignored the rural food 
situation. 34" As a result, farm households fell into famine victims. 
Considering the entitlement systems in many socialist economies, these policy 
failures are not surprising. Because the government was the first claimant to deduct 
state procurement quotas from farm production, it might not be greatly interested in 
actual output variations at least in short term unless the variations caused difficulties 
in enforcing the quotas. Hence the government might fail to grasp real food situation 
in rural areas. Further, even when the government was aware of the situation, it could 
not reduce state procurement quotas appropriately because it had an obligation to 
supply food rations to urban population while farm households were excluded from 
the rations. In particular, if the government regarded farm households as being 
unimportant politically and economically, it might be reluctant to organising famine 
relief programs. Rather it could be more inclined to blocking the embarrassing 
information of the famine from spilling over to outside world. 
As discussed in chapter 6, there are many arguments that the DPRK 
government made similar mistakes. The government has been blamed for being 
accustomed to highly exaggerated output figures, blocking international aid agencies 
from working freely in the country and diverting food aid for military purposes. Some 
argues that the government deliberately excludes certain social groups from state food 
supply, forcing them to starve. 
Are these allegations well founded? It is difficult to give a definite answer 
because many necessary data are missing. Nevertheless, the DPRK entitlement system 
casts doubts on these allegations. 
In the DPRK, farm households are the first claimants of production for their 
annual food rations: hence the decline in production is more likely to cause 
contraction in state procurement. This means that the government should be well 
340 See Conquest (1986) and Lewin (1985) for the 1932-31 Soviet famine, and Bramall (1993) for the 
1959-61 Chinese famine. 
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aware of real food situation, whether or not announced official output figures are 
exaggerated. For the same reason the government has relatively little chances to make 
distribution failures such as too much grain collection from rural areas or deliberate 
exclusions of farm households from state food supply. Moreover, as discussed 
already, the burden of food shortage is more likely to fall on urban population. 
Therefore, assuming that urban population is the backbone of the country's socialist 
regime, the existence of famine may be critical to the government politically and 
economically. Within this framework the government should be keen on alleviating 
the famine, say, increasing food import and receiving international aid, rather than on 
hiding it from outside world. 
8.5.2. Information Failures (? ) 
Consider whether the DPRK government had proper knowledge about the country's 
food situation from the early stage of famine. 
It seems clear that the government has been well aware of the food situation 
since the famine started in 1994. As presented by table 8-1, official statistics show 
that the country's grain production has drastically declined since that year. It would be 
quite strange if the government with such official statistics did not know the country's 
deteriorating food situation. 
What about the years before 1994? Surely official statistics do not show any 
significant decline in grain production. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the 
government was well aware of deteriorating food situation long before 1994. As 
discussed in chapter 6, for instance, PDS rations were officially reduced by 10 percent 
in 1987, which was soon followed by a series of economic reforms to encourage 
private food production and trade. 341 In the early 1990s the government openly 
admitted agricultural policy failures. Kim Il Sung personally oversaw in agricultural 
policies again and ordered economic planners to provide all necessary agricultural 
inputs, including fertiliser, electricity and machinery, with any costs. The slogan of 
"rice is communism" re-appeared, and so-called "agriculture first, light industry first, 
341 Kim Yeon Chul (1997) and Chun Hong Taek (1997b). 
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trade first" policies dominated the DPRK economic agenda. 342 These policy changes 
would not be made if the government considered the country's food situation as 
normal. 
That the government was well aware of the country's food situation before and 
during the famine period can be shown in a slightly different way. 
Table 8-18 shows that the DPRK grain import jumped in the mid 1980s and 
has gradually increased since. By contrast, grain export has almost disappeared since 
1986. As a result, the country has turned into a net grain importer since. Of course, it 
had not been a grain exporter even before the mid 1980s. But it had not been a net 
grain importer either. In 1975-85, for instance, the DPRK grain trade recorded 
surpluses for two years, deficits for eight years and kept a balance for one year in 
physical terms. On annual average the country saw 124 thousand MT of deficits: 
hence it was a net grain importer in physical terms. Surprisingly, however, it was a net 
grain exporter in dollar terms. During that period its grain trade recorded surpluses for 
seven years and deficits in four years in dollar terms. Hence, on annual average the 
country made 7.5 million dollar of grain trade surplus. It means that the DPRK was 
basically a food self-sufficient country that was capable of importing enough foreign 
food items simply by exporting its other domestic food items. But this capability has 
collapsed since the country transformed itself into a net grain importer both in 
physical and dollar terms in 1986. Then, why? 
The reason is found in the change of main import items. By 1985 the DPRK 
had imported almost a single item, wheat. But maize appeared as an import item in 
1986 and has dominated the country's import in the 1990s. Rice has been also 
imported in large amounts particularly since 1995 as many donor countries have 
provided rice aid. The difference between wheat and maize (and rice) is that the 
former is not the main rationing item in the DPRK while the latter is. It means that the 
purpose of grain import fundamentally changed before and after 1986: it was to 
diversify the country's food diets before 1986 while it has been to secure state food 
reserves for PDS rations since 1986. It would be quite strange if a government did not 
comprehend worsening food situation when it faced the difficulty in providing state 
food rations to the population. 
342 Im Eul Chul (1999) and the ROK Ministry of Unification (1994) 
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Table 8-18. DPRK Grain Trade: 1975-2000 
A. Quantity (1000 MT) 
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 
Import 621 530 500 350 510 510 720 585 350 200 200 353 698 
(maize) 55 90 
(rice) 40 28 78 
(wheat) 300 430 450 350 470 510 720 585 350 200 200 270 530 
(other) 321 100 50 
Export 528 393 570 612 434 227 264 210 120 150 200 200 260 
(maize) 200 300 300 200 200 
(rice) 328 93 270 412 234 227 264 210 120 150 200 200 260 
(other) 
Balance -93 -137 70 262 -76 -283 -456 -375 -230 -50 0 -153 -438 
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 
Total 1081 466 596 1571 1154 1585 573 1010 1107 1451 1501 
(maize) 190 296 264 247 587 876 244 110 85 654 596 
(rice) 13 27 146 315 200 56 587 340 310 508 
(wheat) 870 150 300 1175 166 439 258 100 216 57 200 
(other) 21 7 5 3 86 70 15 213 466 430 197 
Total 243 90 43 11 5 42 19 1 1 
(maize) 39 11 
(rice) 243 90 43 11 5 2 
(other) 3 6 1 1 
-838 -376 -553 -1560 -1 149 -1544 -555 -1010 -1 107 -1451 -1500 
B. Value (million US dollar) 
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 
Total 95 86 76 56 97 97 158 120 68 38 36 53 91 
(maize) 14 6 7 
(rice) 54 74 70 56 83 97 158 120 68 38 36 4 14 
(wheat) 41 12 6 43 70 
(other) 
Total 126 59 117 171 115 98 119 77 35 40 50 44 61 
(maize) 30 36 33 23 26 
(rice) 96 23 84 148 89 98 119 77 35 40 50 44 61 
(other) 
31 -26 42 115 18 1 -39 -43 -33 2 14 -9 -29 
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 
Total 140 76 92 184 206 236 74 255 249 302 280 
(maize) 28 45 40 32 90 122 34 18 15 109 84 
(rice) 4 7 34 80 45 11 180 112 104 134 
(wheat) 110 25 45 118 17 57 26 11 24 7 27 
(other) 2 3 1 1 19 12 3 46 99 82 36 
Total 51 18 7 1 1 5 2 0.09 0.09 
(maize) 4 1 
(rice) 51 18 7 1 1 
(other) 1 0.09 0.09 
-89 -58 -85 -183 -205 -231 -72 -255 -249 -302 -280 
265 
Source) FAO Statistical Database 
From the above discussion, it seems clear that, however inflated official 
(grain) production statistics, the DPRK government has been well aware of the 
country's deteriorating food situation since the mid/late 1980s. 
8.5.3. Famine Relief: International Food Aid and PDS Coping Strategies 
Now let us move to the issue of famine relief. There are no reports that the DPRK 
government provided relief grains during the famine period. In this respect, some 
might argue that the government paid little attention to save famine victims. But this 
argument does not seem wise for two reasons. First, all state policies during the 
famine period focused on maximising international food aid. Second, there existed 
systematic PDS coping strategies to minimise population loss during the famine 
period. 
8.5.3.1. International Food Aid: National Coping Strategy I 
An important aspect of the DPRK famine is that food import gradually increased 
during the famine period. And one of the most important famine policies in the DPRK 
was to maximise international food aid. Both facts make the DPRK famine quite 
different from those of many other socialist countries that blocked international aid 
and even exported grain to outside world during their famine periods. 
Some might challenge this view on two grounds. First, compared with the 
1991-93 level, the DPRK grain import was smaller during the famine period. Second, 
the import sharply fell when the famine first occurred in 1994. Given that the DPRK 
was already a net food importer since the mid 1980s, these trade data might be 
interpreted as showing that the government failed or ignored to increase food import 
during the famine period. But a closer look at the way the country procured foreign 
food in the 1990s suggests that the DPRK government made ongoing efforts to have 
more foreign food shipments even by compromising its political and military interests 
that had surpassed all other economic interests before the famine. 
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After the breakdown of the USSR, as mentioned already, the DPRK mainly 
depended on China for its grain import [Annex table 8-1 ]. It was an inevitable choice 
for the DPRK, which had financially defaulted in international market, in order to 
increase the import because China was the only country that applied concessional 
prices to the DPRK, reportedly one third of international prices. 343 For the same 
reason, however, the cessation of Chinese food supply in 1994 meant that the DPRK 
effectively lost its capability to procure foodgrains from abroad. 
In this circumstance the DPRK government focused on international food aid. 
It asked the ROK and Japan to provide emergency food aid in early 1995 and 
launched an official appeal for international food aid shortly after the July/August 
1995 flood. Since then all the DPRK policies have focused on having more food aid 
from abroad. By 1997 it had opened most of its country, except those areas that are 
bordered with South Korea and so militarily sensitive, to foreign aid workers and 
allowed them to have their own posts in Pyongyang. By 2001 it made the first 
diplomatic ties with many western donor countries, particularly EU countries such as 
Great Britain. -344 It also resumed peace talks with the ROK in return for its economic 
aid, which eventually led to the first South-North Korean Summit Meeting in July 
2000. The government have even hinted that the country could swap military gains 
such as the development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles with hard 
currency to boost its agricultural production and revive the economy. 345 
343 Noland (1997), p. 57 
344 Between 1995 and 1998 EU donated 123 million US dollar of food to the DPRK, appearing the 
third largest donor country in the world after the ROK and US that provided 273 and 17 1 million dollar 
respectively (the ROK Ministry of Unification: Sep. 1998). Taking into consideration the DPRK's 
military confrontation with the ROK and the US, those figures mean that EU countries were the most 
important countries to which the DPRK should normalise its diplomatic relation in order to secure 
international food aid. Indeed Kim Dong Su, a former DPRK diplomat in FAO, stated that the main 
purpose of the DPRK's diplomatic approach to EU countries was to have more food aid from them 
(North Korean Policy Trend, 1998 No. 4: p. 49). Not surprisingly by 2001 the DPRK made normal 
diplomatic relation with most important EU countries, including Great Britain, France and Italy for the 
first time in its history. 
34' In 1999, for example, William Perry, US North Korea policy coordinator and special advisor to the 
President and the secretary of sate, found in his trip to Pyongyang: 
... In its current circumstance of industrial and agricultural decline, the DPRK has on occasion indicated a willingness to "trade" addressing US concerns about its nuclear weapons activities and 
ballistic missile exports for hard currency. For example, the DPRK offered to cease its missile exports 
if the US agreed to compensate it for the foregone earnings from missile exports.... (Dr. William Perry, 
Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations, Washington, 
DC, 12 Oct 1999). 
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Table 8-19. Grain Import and International Food Aid: 1989-97 
Net Grain Import International Food Aid 
Total 
Food Supply 
(million MT) (million MT) 
% of total 
food supply (million MT) 
% of total 
net import 
% of total 
food supply 
1989 0.38 
1990 0.55 
1991 1.56 
1992 8.61 1.15 13 
1993 8.73 1.54 18 
1994 8.10 0.56 7 
1995 7.17 1.01 14 0.32 32 4 
1996 4.22 1.11 26 0.30 27 7 
1997 3.57 1.45 41 0.84 58 24 
1998 3.86 1.50 39 0.75 50 19 
Source: 1. For total food supply, table 8-3 
2. For net grain import, table 8-18 
3. For international food aid, the ROK Ministry of Unification (17 Sep 1999) 
Table 8-19 reports the results of these political and diplomatic efforts. In terms 
of absolute amount, the DPRK grain import reached peak in 1991 (normal year). In 
terms of the share in total food supply, however, it reached peak in 1997 (famine 
year). Moreover, the import tended to fall before the famine (1991-94) while it rapidly 
increased during the famine (1994-98). Most importantly, there was no food aid 
before 1995 while it accounted for more than 50 percent of total grain import in 1997- 
8. 
In short, during the famine period the DPRK faced two fundamental 
constraints in grain import: 1) financial incapability for commercial grain import; 2) 
the cessation of concessional food supply from other socialist countries. Under these 
constraints the government made ongoing efforts to increase international food aid 
even by compromising its political and diplomatic interests. 
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8.5.3.2. PDS coping strategies: National Coping Strategy II 
It may be impressive from humanitarian perspectives that the DPRK government 
made great efforts to have more food aid from abroad. But the reasons for these 
efforts are not necessarily humanitarian. We return to this issue in the final part of this 
section. But first we consider the roles of the aid during the famine period. How was it 
utilised by the government? 
Fig 8-1 illustrates the supply patterns of PDS rations in the agricultural year of 
1998 and of 1999. Note that the depicted line for 1998 does not include international 
food aid while that for 1999 does. By 1998 the DPRK government had provided 
FAO/WFP with monthly PDS rationing data that excluded international food aid 
channelled by PDS. In contrast, the data submitted in 1999 include the aid. Both lines 
have one difference and two similarities. 
Look at the difference first. In 1998 there was a period that no PDS ration was 
supplied. But there was no such a period in 1999. Several factors could be attributed 
to this difference. Domestic production must be different; the authorities might have 
different supply schedules; the amounts and timings of before-harvest-grain- 
distribution might be different. But the main reason seems to be international food 
aid. During the famine period FAOIWFP mission teams persistently reported that 
domestic food reserves in the DPRK were usually depleted in March/April and then 
the country entirely depended on international food aid until new harvest was 
available. It means that, when international food aid was not counted, there would 
appear a period during which no PDS rations were supplied. 
What is striking is that the duration of no PDS rations from domestic sources 
was quite long. In 1998 it was almost half a year: five months from April to June. 
Hence, if there were no international food aid, there must be massive increases in 
death rates in that year. However, as discussed in chapter 6, the DPRK Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs announced that crude death rate was 9.3 per thousand in 1998. 
Although it was considerably higher than 5.5 in 1993, the degree of mortality increase 
does not seem so paramount. Moreover, it was significantly lower than 11.6 per 
thousand, the estimated average death rate in 1994-99 based on official population 
statistics, suggesting that in 1998 the famine had already passed over its peak. 
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Undoubtedly these figures mean that international food aid played a decisive role to 
prevent the upsurge of death rates while no PDS ration was supplied from domestic 
sources in 1998. In this respect it is not surprising that the DPRK government made 
ongoing efforts to have more international food aid during the famine period. 
What should be noted however is that international food aid constituted only a 
part of the strategies that PDS practised in order to cope with scarce state food 
reserves during the famine period. 
Let us now consider the similarities of the two lines in fig. 8-1. First, both lines 
show that PDS ration was extremely low: it did not reach 492 grams per person per 
day, the minimal food requirement by FAO, in any month in 1998 and 1999. This 
suggests that PDS population faced constant health risks in both years. Second, both 
lines divide a year into two seasons: 1) high season between July/Aug and Dec/Jan 
when harvest was available and so PDS ration was relatively more adequate; 2) lean 
season between Jan/Feb and June/Jul when PDS ration was extremely low. It means 
that the authorities set a recovery period in which people temporarily improved their 
worsening health statuses, rather than distributed available food evenly over the year. 
This supply policy might be inevitable given the absolute shortage of state 
food reserves. Under this policy, however, PDS population should face life- 
threatening hunger in every lean season during the famine period. We believe that it 
was one of the reasons why PDS population appeared as the main famine victims. 
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Fig 8-1. Monthly PDS Rations: national average per person per day 
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Source) FAO/WFP(12 Nov. 1998: 8 Nov. 1999) and DPRK/UNDP(1998a) 
Month 
An interesting point however is that PDS took various measures to make 
people survive lean season and thus prevent possible high increases in mortality rates 
during the famine period. Of them, undoubtedly getting and channelling international 
food aid was the most important. But there were other three distinctive measures as 
well. First, PDS provided so-called `alternative' foods'346 most of which were made of 
the mixtures of grass and small amount of grains or vegetables. 
What has been certain are extensive Government efforts to mobilise the population to consume 
non-staple and `alternative' foods, such as fruits, roots and tubers, mushrooms, leaves and grasses. Some 
estimates suggest that in 1995/96 almost 30 percent of calorie intake during the critical, lean supply, 
period came from such sources. 347 
46 The ingredients of alternative foods range widely and include, for example, acorn flour, sea and 
river-weed, edible grasses, ground corn cobs, etc. They often include a small amount of maize or wheat 
(lour to facilitate digestion, though they are composed largely of cellulose, which has little nutritional 
value (FAO/WFP: 29 June 1999). 
347 FAO/WFP (6 Dec. 1996) 
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Second, the government encouraged local administrators and state firms to provide 
additional foodgrains to PDS population. 348 To do this provincial and even county 
administrators were empowered for the first time to carry out foreign food trade 
independently, and state firms were ordered to allocate official farming hours (20 
hours per year per person) and lands for the employees and organise their collective 
farming activities. Third, the government allowed PDS population to produce and 
trade foodgrains privately. Like farm households, PDS population were given private 
plots with the maximum of 50 pyung and allowed to produce grain. And all the 
regulations concerning farmers' markets, including the prohibition of grain trade, 
were effectively lifted. 
These measures had many adverse effects from the viewpoint of both PDS 
population and the government. Poorly made substitute-foods could expose PDS 
population to many diseases, 349 and increasing farming activities of state firms might 
damage the already deteriorated industrial production. Foreign trade by local 
administrators could hamper the central control over the economy. Nevertheless, these 
measures were taken simply because they could help PDS population to survive lean 
season to new coming high season. 
From the above discussion two conclusions can be drawn. First, during the famine 
period PDS exercised various coping strategies to prevent possible high increases in 
mortality rates. Second, international food aid took a vital role in the strategies: hence 
the government made ongoing efforts to increase the aid. Surely both famine policies 
were unique in the DPRK in the sense that many other socialist countries failed to 
348 For instance, Hwang Jang Yop, a former ideology secretary of Korean Workers Party, stated that in 
the mid 1990s the DPRK government effectively dismantled the responsibility of the central 
government to provide food rations to PDS population, announcing that food rations must be provided 
by the central government for one third of year, by local government or workplaces for another one 
third, and by PDS population for the remaining one third. This emphasis on local governments 
(enterprises) and PDS population themselves was also observed by many outside visitors (Lautz 1996; 
Natsios 1999). 
49 For example, a US congressman who visited country stated: 
"So-called `alternative food' is to blame for a lot of the problems. Everyone seems to be eating a 
Inixture of corn, cut with a lot of dried leaves and twigs. That may fill your belly, but it robs you of 
your health. There is no `alternative' to food.... " (Deborah DeYoung, Epidemics Threaten North 
Korea, U. S. Congressman warns, 30 August 1999, Daily Report, Nautilus Research Institute) 
272 
organise appropriate famine relief programs and secure humanitarian aid from abroad 
during their famine periods. 
8.5.4. Controlled and Effective Food Distribution 
Consider finally the possibility of food distribution failures. During the famine period, 
as discussed already, there were significant differences between farm household 
rations and PDS rations. And these differences made PDS population suffer more 
from the famine. One could therefore argue that the government failed to distribute 
food evenly, exacerbating the famine. We would not challenge this argument. At the 
same time, however, we would point out that the uneven food distribution between 
farm households and PDS population was the result of well-designed food distribution 
policies to alleviate the famine: hence it is equally possible to argue that the 
government made no distribution failures. 
8.5.4.1. Supply of Minimal Food Requirements to Farm Households 
National Coping Strategy III 
Table 8-20 presents the 1997 net harvest, which refers to the harvest after deducting 
before-harvest-grain distribution, as well as state grain collection and farm household 
allocations. The figures are interesting in several respects. First, the government did 
not procure grains from farm households in some regions. In North East and South 
East, for instance, it sold significant amounts of grains to farm households, instead of 
procuring their grains. Second, state grain collection/sale was carried out strictly 
according to regional production level: the more produced, the more collected. South 
Hwanghae, Pyongyang and Nampo, three provinces with the highest production per 
farmer, had the greatest state collection while South Hamgyung, North Hamgyung 
and Kangwon, three provinces with the lowest production per farmer, commonly saw 
state grain sale to farm households. Third, state grain collection/sale normalised 
regional differences in grain production so that farm household grain allocation did 
not differ greatly by regions. For instance, grain production per farmer reached 442 kg 
in South Hwanghae, more than five times 86 kg in South Hamgyung. Due to state 
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grain collection/sale, however, per capita farm household grain allocation dropped to 
168 kg in South Hwanghae, which was not significantly different from 164 kg in 
South Hamgyung. 
Table 8-20. Food Production, Procurement and Allocation to Farmers 
With Provincial Breakdown: 1997 
1997 Net 
Harvest 
(1000 MT) 
Special Cities 
Pyongyang 
Kaesung 
Nampo 
North West 
South Pyongan 
North Pyongan 
Chagang 
North East 
South Hamgyung 
North Hamgyung 
Ryanggang 
South West 
South Hwanghae 
North Hwanghae 
South East 
(1) 
195.6 
100.7 
34.2 
60.7 
545.1 
250.1 
229.8 
65.2 
207 
77.9 
79.1 
50 
653.4 
495.7 
157.7 
46.9 
Government 
Collection 
(1000 MT) 
(2) 
1 10.1 
58.2 
13.3 
38.6 
205.4 
1 14.1 
78.7 
12.6 
-57.6 
-71.4 
-0.5 
14.3 
353.9 
307.7 
46.2 
-30.8 
Grain left in 
Village 
(1000 MT) 
(3) = (2)-(1) 
85.5 
42.5 
20.9 
22.1 
339.7 
136 
151.1 
52.6 
264.6 
149.3 
79.6 
35.7 
299.5 
188 
111.5 
77.7 
harvest 
(kg) 
(4) 
372 
414 
253 
414 
244 
299 
219 
189 
134 
86 
161 
339 
360 
442 
227 
103 
Per Farmer* 
collection 
(kg) 
(5) 
210 
239 
98 
263 
92 
136 
75 
37 
-37 
allocation 
ýkg) 
(6) 
163 
175 
155 
151 
152 
162 
144 
152 
171 
-79 
-1 
97 
195 
274 
67 
-68 
164 
162 
242 
16.5 
168 
161 
171 
Kangwon 46.9 -30.8 77.7 103 -68 171 
DPRK Total 1648 581 1067 251 88 162 
* The official provincial populations dated of 31 August 1999 are used to obtain per capita figures 
Source) Annex table 8-4-A 
As pointed out already, farm households are entitled to keeping their food 
rations from their production ahead of state collection: hence, when there is a national 
standard of state food ration, farm household grain allocation should not differ greatly 
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by regions. Clearly this entitlement provided a reason why farm household allocation 
did not have huge regional differences. But the above figures tell more than this 
entitlement factor does. According to the DPRK entitlement system, farm households 
are not entitled to purchasing grains from the government. Nevertheless, the 
government sold grains to farm households in North East and South West, particularly 
when PDS population in these regions suffered more from food shortages than farm 
households. Then, why? 
It is important to keep in mind that farm household grain allocation includes 
not only their food rations but also other grain requirements for agricultural 
production such as seeds and animal fodder. It means that state grain sale to farm 
households was mainly intended to meet the requirements for agricultural production. 
Indeed South Hamgyung in North East, the greatest beneficiary of state grain sale to 
farm households, saw that the production was too low to provide even farm household 
rations, not mentioning grain requirement for agricultural production. In this province 
the 1997 net harvest was mere 86 kg per farmer while the norm of farm household 
ration in that year was 135 kg per head (or 370 grams per day) [see table 8-14]. 
Owing to state grain sale, however, farm households received 164 kg per head so that 
they secured not only their assigned food rations but also some grains for the 1998 
production. It was also the case in Kangwon in South East, another main beneficiary 
of state grain sale to farm households. 
The implication of this distribution policy was clear: during the famine period 
the government attempted to minimise the adverse impacts of food shortages on 
agricultural production and thus provided `minimal food requirements for 
production', including farm household rations, seeds and fodder, to all farm 
households across the country. As the result, food was quite evenly distributed among 
farm households, in spite of huge variations in regional production. 
Undoubtedly this policy helped boost grain production and so alleviate the 
famine in rural areas. A negative aspect of the policy however is that it made state 
grain collection extremely volatile by regions: hence PDS population in some regions, 
who were entirely dependent on PDS rations, should be quite vulnerable to food 
shortages. How did the government respond to this negative effect? 
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Table 8-21. Food Procurements and PDS Rations to Non-Farmers 
With Provincial Breakdown: Nov. 1997-Feb. 1998 
Government PDS Food Local PDS Per Non-farmer* 
Procurement Rations to Stock Changes 
(1000 MT) Non-farmers (1000 MT) Procurement ration 
(1000 MT) (k(, ) (kr) 
(1) (2) (3) = (1)-(2) (4) (5) 
Special Cities 110.1 111.5 -1.4 30 30 
Pyongyang 58.2 90.1 -31.9 21 32 
Kaesung 13.3 6.6 6.7 53 26 
Nampo 38.6 14.8 23.8 58 22 
North West 205.4 112.0 93.4 43 23.7 
South Pyongan 1 14.1 48.7 65.4 50 22 
North Pyongan 78.7 33.0 45.7 50 21 
Chagang 12.6 30.3 -17.7 14 34 
North East -57.6 104.8 -162.4 -13 24 
South Hamgyung -71.4 44.2 -115.6 -35 22 
North Hamgyung -0.5 43.6 -44.1 0 25 
Ryanggang 14.3 17.0 -2.7 26 31 
South West 353.9 57.4 296.5 160 26 
South Hwanghae 307.7 33.4 274.3 263 29 
North Hwanghae 46.2 24.0 22.2 44 23 
South East -30.8 18.3 -49.1 -30 18 
Kangwon -30.8 18.3 -49.1 -30 18 
DPRK Total 581 404.0 177 36 25 
Source) Annex table 8-4-B 
8.5.4.2. Centrally Controlled Food Distribution Among PDS Population: 
National Coping Strategy IV 
Table 8-21 reports food distribution between November 1997 and February 1998 
among PDS population. The figures are as interesting as those for farm households. 
As expected, there were huge regional differences in state grain collection. In South 
Hwanghae, for instance, state grain collection reached 263 kg per PDS population: 
hence, even without central intervention, the province was able to supply `minimal 
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food requirement for human survival' set by UN, 167 kg per person per year. In South 
Hamgyung, however, there was state grain sale to farm households so that the 
provincial grain reserve fell by 35 kg per PDS population. Without central 
intervention, therefore, the province would not be able to provide any PDS rations. 
Table 8-22. Food Production, Distribution and Transfer by Province: Nov. 1997-Feb. 1998 
(kg) 
Per Head Per Head 
Harvest Distribution (l) - (2) 
(1) (2) 
[Group I] 
South Hwanghae 216 111 105.4 
Nampo City 75 59 15.4 
South Pyongan 81 67 13.4 
North Pyongan 88 76 11.4 
Kaesung City 89 84 4.9 
Average of Group I 110 79 30 
[Group II] 
North Hwanghae 91 93 -2.0 
Pyongyang City 33 45 -12.4 
Ryanggang 71 85 -14.4 
Chagang 53 71 -17.7 
North Hamgyung 36 60 -24.4 
Kangwon 32 73 -41.0 
South Hamgyung 27 70 -43.5 
Average of Group II 44 72 -28 
Source) Annex table 8-4-A and B 
Interestingly however there were no such huge provincial differences in the 
actual PDS rations between November 1997 and February 1998. It is true that those 
provinces in which no grain collection from farm households was made, notably 
South Hamgyung in North East and Kangwon in South East, provided significantly 
lower PDS rations than other provinces. But the differences were not so paramount as 
277 
in state grain collection. It means that the central government did intervene in 
provincial food supply by redistributing state food reserves among provinces. 
8.5.4.3. Regionally Even Food Distribution 
Because the government supplied minimal food requirements to all farm households 
across the country and mitigated regional differences in state food reserves, regional 
food distribution was made relatively evenly. 
Table 8-22 illustrates this point. Between November 1997 and February 1998 
the DPRK provinces were divided into two groups. Group I included mainly southern/ 
western provinces where per head grain production was relatively higher. In contrast, 
group TI consisted of northern/eastern provinces that suffered lower grain production. 
Between November 1997 and February 1998 group I produced 110 kg of grain per 
head on average and, of the production, distributed 79 kg for local residents, including 
both farm households and PDS population,. The remaining 30 kg went under the 
control of the central government, being subject to inter-provincial grain transfer. 
Using this inter-provincial grain transfer the central government provided additional 
grain supply, 28 kg per head, to the residents in group II that produced only 44 kg per 
head. As the result, those who resided in group II were also distributed 72 kg per 
head, which was not greatly different from 79 kg in group I. 
8.5.4.4. Controlled and Effective Distribution of Food 
The above discussions can be summarised as follows. First, in the agricultural year of 
1998 the government provided all farm households with minimal food requirements 
for agricultural production, regardless of their production and food situations. The 
purpose of this policy was to minimise the adverse impacts of food shortages on 
production. Second, this policy brought about even distribution of available food 
among farm households but at the same time it caused the problem that state grain 
collection varied immensely by regions: hence some provinces could not afford to 
provide PDS rations at all. Third, to solve the problem the central government 
redistributed state food reserves among regions. Fourth, this intervention did not lead 
to regionally even distribution of food among PDS population but still mitigated huge 
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differences in regional food situations. Fifth, consequently in overall sense food was 
relatively evenly distributed among regions, despite that there were huge differences 
in regional food production. 
Those five facts suggest that the DPRK government developed a well- 
designed distribution policy to increase grain production and at the same time 
alleviate the famine. It is this distribution policy that made the significant differences 
between farm household rations and PDS rations. In this regard it is difficult to say 
that the government failed to distribute food appropriately simply because it provided 
more favourable food supply to farm households so that PDS population relatively 
suffered more from the famine. 
8.5.5. National Coping Strategies and Famine in Slow Motion 
In this section we have identified three common policy mistakes that many socialist 
countries made during their famine periods, and discussed whether the DPRK 
government made similar mistakes. An interesting point is that, when we have studied 
various factors possibly leading to such policy mistakes, we have paradoxically found 
that the DPRK government developed well-designed national coping strategies during 
the famine period. Now let us describes the strategies as a whole. 
Concerning the famine policies the DPRK government seemed to have two 
objectives: 1) to prevent further production failures in agriculture; 2) to minimise the 
loss of (urban) PDS population. Because the famine was caused by the dramatic 
decline in food production, the most effective way to ease the famine was to increase 
the production. But the problem was that the famine was already damaging the 
production in terms of weakening physical conditions of farmers and the shortages of 
seeds and animal fodder and so forth. To solve this problem, the government provided 
farm households with minimal food requirements for agricultural production, 
including farm household rations, seeds and fodder, to all farm households across the 
country. Owing to this policy farm households received more favourable and evenly 
distributed food rations during the famine period than their counterparts in industry. 
But this strategy made state grain collection/PDS food reserves extremely 
vulnerable to ongoing production failures. The vulnerability was particularly severe in 
279 
those provinces where grain production was far short of PDS ration requirements. To 
minimise this adverse impact the government took three measures. 
First, it mitigated the differences in provincial PDS food reserves by 
organising inter-provincial grain transfer. Second, a variety of PDS coping strategies 
were developed, including the supply of alternative foods and international food aid. 
Third, the government implemented a variety of economic reforms to provide people 
with the opportunities to get additional food other than state rations. For instance, 
private grain production was tolerated, farmers' markets were deregulated and local 
administrators and state enterprises were given responsibilities to feed the population. 
In section 5.3 we quoted an international aid worker saying that the DPRK 
famine claimed relatively little lives but caused serious long-term health risks to the 
whole population because it happened in a highly organised country. The above 
national coping strategies demonstrate what this highly organised country means. 
That is, the government tightly controlled food production and distribution, 
developing well-designed coping programs to prevent people from perishing away 
even during the period of great hunger. We believe that these national coping 
strategies constituted the basic reason why there was `famine in slow motion' in the 
DPRK. 
The final question is: why was the DPRK government so interested in alleviating the 
famine? Clearly it is not because the government was humanitarian. For the last five 
decades it has been regarded as one of the worst governments in the world in terms of 
human right violation. And this violation got reportedly worse during the famine 
period. 350 The real reason seems rather obvious: the famine hit urban population who 
was vital for the DPRK regime survival. 
From the very beginning of its establishment the DPRK government 
controlled urban population using state food ration. There were no opportunities for 
urban population comprising around 60 percent of total population to obtain 
foodgrains except state rations. Those who refused to work in the workplaces 
assigned by the authorities had their rations immediately ceased. Even when they 
travelled, they should bring rationing coupons to buy food: hence the authorities 
350 Natsios (l 999) 
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controlled every population movement in the country. It is this control power of the 
government that has maintained socialist regime in the DPRK. 
But the famine decisively undermined the control power. In search of food 
urban population travelled all across the country without official permission and even 
fled to neighbouring countries. Industrial workers left their workplaces for private 
farming or profit seeking activities in farmers markets. It means that the famine was 
directly threatening the stability of the regime. It would be quite strange in this 
situation if the government ignored the famine, making no response or simply 
attempting to hide its existence from outside world. 
8.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter we discussed the causation, patterns and features of the 1994-99 DPRK 
famine, finding that the famine was unique in all its aspects in comparison with those 
in other socialist countries. The discussion of this chapter can be summarised as 
follows. 
1. The famine was FAD famine. Before and during the famine period there was a 
clear FAD the degree of which was much greater than those in the 1959-61 
Chinese famine and the 1932-33 Soviet famine. And FAD pre-dated and triggered 
every stage of the famine, generating its geographical movement. Regional food 
availability also corresponded to the regional distribution of famine victims. 
Above all, in the last stage of the famine FAD was so great that there was no 
feasible division of available food to prevent the famine. 
2. Although FAD was the causation of the famine, it had two distinctive features that 
can not be explained by FAD. One is that it hit mainly urban industrial population 
in north eastern part of the country. Another is that it did not cause eruptive 
population losses in a relatively short space of time. Rather it imposed a long-term 
health risk on the whole population. In this sense the famine was urban famine as 
well as famine in slow motion. 
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3. In the DPRK rationing system, farm households have stronger entitlement than 
their counterparts in industry in two respects. First, farm household rations are 
relatively safer from adverse changes in production. Second, farm household 
rations are also safer from adverse seasonal changes in food situation. Due to this 
fact farm household received far greater and more stable rations than PDS 
population during the famine period. It was the basic reason why the famine hit 
mainly urban areas (PDS population). 
4. Despite this overall trend, however, farm households received relatively lower 
rations in the agricultural year of 1996, which drove them into main victims in the 
second stage of the famine. It was because the July/August 1995 flood mainly 
destroyed the grain reserves of farm households, hence adversely affecting their 
rations in that year. 
5. Because the famine hit mainly urban (PDS) population who were important for 
the regime to survive, the government's attitudes to famine was quite different 
from those of other socialist governments. The government was well aware of the 
country's real food situation from the beginning of the famine, was concerned 
about famine relief and particularly made optimal food distribution policies in 
order to ease the famine. In this sense there were no such policy failures in the 
DPRK famine as frequently found in many other socialist famines. 
6. During the famine period the government developed national coping strategies 
that have two purposes: 1) increasing grain production; 2) at the same time 
minimising the population losses caused by the famine. To achieve the first 
purpose the government supplied `minimal grain requirement for agricultural 
production' to all farm households evenly across the country. Due to this policy, 
however, there were great shortages of available food for PDS population and 
moreover the shortages varied greatly among regions. To mitigate the problems, 
on the one hand, the government emphasised the inter-provincial grain transfer, 
reducing the regional differences in PDS rations. On the other hand, it developed 
PDS coping strategies consisting of four parts: 1) maximising international food 
aid; 2) providing alternative food; 3) emphasising the responsibility of local 
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administrators and state firms to feed PDS population; 4) expanding the 
opportunities for the population to have additional food 
7. The national coping strategies had many problems, including the worsening health 
status of the population. But it did help people survive lean season, thus reducing 
the population losses during the famine period. It was the basic reason why the 
famine did not cause the sharp increase in the number of famine deaths, in spite of 
massive scale FAD, and resulted in the long-term health crisis of the population. 
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Annex Table 8-1. DPRK Grain Trade: USDA Estimate 
(MT) 
1985 1990 1991 1'992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Rice: 
China 16 12,503 28,549 2,396 34,000 
Hong Kong 800 
South Korea 5,000 150,000 
Thailand 51,594 10,000 100,000 177,000 75,000 
Vietnam 103,606 67,000 
Other 38,951) 
Maize: 
Yugoslavia 
China 264,609 216,790 586,577 876,218 209,478 9,000 139,474 
Thailand 5,000 
USA 85,500 
Barley: 
Australia 
China 200 276 100 976 
Hong Kona 515 
Syria 20,000 
Wheat: 
Australia 12,600 188,201 203,963 63,000 83,000 
Canada 454,988 293,315 
China 1,230 60,314 37,374 8,966 239,655 
Hong Kong 198 102 147 69 
India 145,668 14,000 
Turkey 180,235 
EU countries 71,781 33,000 
Russia 
Yugoslavia 75,012 
Other 100,000 120,000 
Total 19,958 524,640 1,259,893 923,650 1,349,610 401,299 893,707 968,723 
Source) Kim, Lee and Sumner (1999) 
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Annex table 8-2. Per Capita Provincial Rice and Maize Production: 1989-97 
(Kg) 
Ave. 89-92 93 94 95 96 97 Ave. 93-97 
Special Cities 213 247 147 102 76 79 130 
Pyongyang 168 201 117 77 58 58 102 
Kacsun<g 448 478 179 209 119 149 227 
Nampo 274 315 246 150 123 123 191 
North West 458 517 417 152 112 133 266 
S. Pyongan 492 555 467 188 119 146 295 
N. Pyongan 554 640 464 148 123 144 304 
Chagang 174 165 191 69 69 78 114 
North East 252 153 184 110 70 44 112 
S. Harngyung 329 209 260 132 84 40 145 
N. Hamgyung 213 107 121 107 68 53 91 
Ranggang 47 63 63 31 16 31 41 
South West 764 846 534 321 193 290 437 
S. Hwanghae 925 1049 691 418 244 388 558 
N. Hwanghae 549 575 324 192 126 159 275 
South East 276 238 245 138 61 54 147 
Kangwon 276 238 245 138 61 54 147 
DPRK Total 395 410 314 159 106 122 222 
* Per capita production = each year's grain production/the 1993 population 
Source) 1. For the 1989-97 provincial grain production, DPRKIUNDP (1998a) 
2. For the 1993 population, DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics (1995) 
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Annex table 8-3. Reported DPRK Food Rations 
A. Nov. 1995 - Oct. 1996 
(gram per person per day) 
Nov. 95-Mar. 96 Apr. 96-June. 96 Jul. 96-Oct. 96 
Non-farmers 452 250-300 200 
Farmers 100 kg (below half of normal level) for annum 
*In May 1996 many farmers were reportedly included in the PDS 
'"In May 1996 potatoes were included in food items rationed by the PDS 
'*In August 1996 maize was harvested early before normal harvest season, 
being channelled into PDS 
Source) FAOWFP (3 May 1996: 6 September 1996: 6 December 1996) 
B. Nov. 1996 - Oct. 1997 
Nov. -Dec. 96 Jan. 97-June. 97 Jul. 97-Oct. 97 
Non-fanners 450-500 100-200 0 
Farmers around 80 kg for annum* 
* 40 percent of normal allocation (200 kg). 
Source) FAO/WFP (6 December 1996: 3 June 1997: 11 September 1997) 
C. Nov. 1997 - Oct. 1998 
Nov. -Dec. 97 Jan. 98 Feb. 98 Mar. 98 Apr. -Aug. 98 Sep. -Oct. 98 
Non-farmers 400 300 200 100 0 100 
Farmers 130-160 kg (135 kg as norm) for annum 
Source) FAO/WFP (June 1998: 12 November 1998) 
D. Nov. 1998 - Sept. 1999 
Nov. -Dec. 98 Jan. 99 Feb. Mar. -June July-Sept. 99 
Non-farmers 350 225 240 175 360 
Farmers 146 kg for annum 
Source) FAO/WFP (8 November 1999) 
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IX. The Food Crisis and Institutional Changes 
in Agriculture: From 1987 to Present 
9.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we consider the final issue of the recent food crisis in the DPRK: has it 
changed and will it change the DPRK agriculture? 
Compared with the previous two issues, this final issue has several difficulties 
to deal with. First, although there were reportedly many important changes in the 
current DPRK agricultural institutions during the food crisis, the government made 
little official announcements about the changes. It is therefore unclear in many cases 
if the changes were real institutional changes or simply the signs that the current 
institutions did not work properly. Second, there were indeed made many 
contradictory changes. For instance, on the one hand, the government widely tolerated 
private food production and trade during the food crisis. Hence, as we shall see below, 
some outside organisations have argued that private plots and farmers markets have 
appeared as the two main food sources for ordinary DPRK households, being far more 
important than state food ration. It is however also true that the government took 
frequent actions to control and discourage private food production and trade. In this 
respect it is difficult to judge what was the genuine trend during the food crisis - the 
changes, say, increasing private food production and trade or the counter-changes, 
say, the government's actions to prevent them. Third, the main information source 
about the institutional changes in the DPRK agriculture during the food crisis was 
media reports, particularly western media reports. As in many other DPRK issues, 
however, the media reports were in some cases not accurate, contradictory to each 
other, and too vague to have important implications from. 
Due to these difficulties we do not attempt in this chapter to make any robust 
arguments about the institutional changes caused by the food crisis. Instead, we 
simply review all the reported changes, identify what is important, and what is not, in 
terms of the current institutions, and discuss the possible government's intentions to 
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make such changes. The conclusion of this chapter is simple: it is too early to judge 
whether the food crisis has really changed the DPRK agriculture, in other words, 
whether it has made the current agricultural institutions collapse and thus made it 
inevitable for new institutions such as market institutions to replace the current ones. 
To reach this conclusion we examine how the food crisis has influenced four 
basic current agricultural institutions: centralised administrative planning in 
agricultural production, state food rationing, state grain marketing and supplementary 
food supply channels. Above all, section 9.2 identifies the strengthening of the 
existing supplementary food supply channels with increasing private food production 
and trade, discussing whether the changes mean real market reforms. In section 9.3 
we study the weakening of state food rationing and consider the possibility that the 
rationing system will be abolished. Section 9.4 examines the new sub-team contract 
system in which farm households could keep a share of their surplus grains, but 
discuss whether it really means the end of state grain marketing that the government 
collects all surplus grains from producers. Section 9.5 deals with two seemingly 
contradictory changes in the ways the government controls agricultural production: 1) 
the liberalisation of farm operations from agricultural administrative organisations; 2) 
but at the same time the intensified central control within agricultural administrative 
organisations. In section 9.6 we summarises this chapter by presenting two extreme 
views about the impacts of the food crisis on the current DPRK agricultural 
institutions: one view that the crisis changed the institutions from the bottom, and 
another view that it did not make any significant changes. 
9.2. Private Food Production and Trade: Prelude to Market Reform? 
Perhaps the most visible change in agriculture during the food crisis was that private 
food production and trade flourished. According to the survey by the ROK Ministry 
of Unification (Dec. 1998), for instance, the DPRK defector families purchased 60 
percent of their staple foodgrains from farmers' markets in 1998. The survey by 
KBSM (1998) also shows that the DPRK food refugee families had almost entirely 
relied for their food consumption in 1995-97 from private channels such as private 
plots and farmers' markets. It is of course difficult to say that these figures reflect the 
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Table 9-2. Policy Changes on Farmers' Markets during the Food Crisis 
Definition Markets to circulate the products from the private plots of farm households. Grains and 
industrial products not allowed to be traded. City/County Administration and Economy 
Committee being in charge of establishing the markets and overseeing their operations. 
But market prices being solely dependent on supply and demand 
before 1959 daily market in every county (rural area) and labour district (city) 
{959-1981 1 0-days-market (I", 1 I"', and 21 s` every month), no market in Special Cities including 
Pyongyang 
1982 daily market. new markets opened in special cities 
1984 the government's order to open 1-2 additional market in every county, increasing the 
number of market to 3-4 per county 
1987-89 the government's over the number and operation of the markets, closing down 
unofficial markets, transforming daily markets into weekly markets in 1987 and into 
10-days-market again in 1989 
1989-93 markets tended to be transformed into black market called `yudong-jang [floating 
market]' where sellers constantly moved to escape state control. To control black 
markets, "anti-socialist activities breaking-up group" were organised in 1992 
1993 market liberalisation. 10 days market were transformed into daily markets. All food 
items, including grains, were effectively allowed to trade. 
1994-1998 the number of markets increased to 300-350, and trading items expanded to all 
commodities including even grains and industrial products 
1999 Kim Jong II ordered to punish illegal market trade and got people from the markets to 
their work places 
2002 prohibited grain trade again 
Source) see text 
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situation of the ordinary DPRK households correctly because, as discussed in chapter 
7, the refugee families are usually those with the weakest entitlements in the DPRK. 
Nevertheless, given that virtually all food supply had been previously provided by the 
government, both figures seem enough to show that private production and trade was 
increasingly important during the food crisis. 
Increasing private food production and trade do not mean that the country 
gave up collective farming and state food rationing. Rather, it means that the 
government liberalised all farming and trading activities outside official food 
production and distribution. As discussed in chapter 2 and 4, the DPRK agricultural 
institutions have entailed supplementary food supply channels, including farm 
households' private plots, farmers' markets and the food production facilities of state 
firms, through which people have obtained additional food supply other than the 
official one. During the food crisis the government implemented several important 
policies to strengthen those supplementary food supply channels and thus effectively 
liberalise all private food production and trade. They include: 1) allocating private 
plots for PDS population (state firms); 2) allowing people to cultivate foodgrains in 
their private plots; 3) tolerating illegal private plots; 4) encouraging farmers' markets 
and tolerating illegal market grain trade. 
First of all, the government institutionalised for PDS population (state firms) 
to have private plots and produce grains in their plots. Until the 1970s, although state 
firms had some food production facilities such as meat factories, they had no lands for 
grain production. But the situation was changed in the autumn of 1982 when the 
government allowed PDS population to collectively cultivate new lands and grow 
some minor grains, mainly beans, by their firms. By the early 1980s the share of rice 
and maize had risen up to 85 percent of the country's grain production while the 
import of wheat and other minor grains had continually fallen [see table 6-7 in chapter 
6 and 8-18 in chapter 8]. Consequently the country's food diet had been increasingly 
dependent on only rice and maize. In this circumstance the government allowed PDS 
population, who had entirely relied on PDS rations, to privately grow some minor 
grains other than maize and rice and diversify their food diets. Lee Min Bok, a 
defector who had been an agronomist in the DPRK, described the policy as follows: 
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In this circumstance Kim family made an order in the autumn of 1982 to collectively, not 
individually, cultivate new lands and carry out side-farming, supplementing official food supply 
and improving food diet. The order gave the people, who had eaten only maize and doeiljani 
[traditional Korean cuisine] made of maize, the rights to eat five-grains and doenjang made of 
beans.... As the people acknowledged that the products from collective side-{arming directly 
belong to them, they were not only eager for the Farming but also gradually started individual 
351 side-larm1nýt. 
These private plots were officially incorporated into the existing supplementary food 
supply channels in 1987 when the government ordered all state firms to allocate 50- 
100 pyung of land and 20 hours of farming hours per employee, allowing their 
employees to produce grains for their own consumption. 352 And the purpose of the 
plots was changed into compensating for the reduction of state food rations: hence it 
was tolerated to grow maize, one of two staple grains rationed by the government, in 
the plots. In February 1995 private plots were also given to military population, 100 
pyung per the family of military personnel and 40 pyung per soldier, and 
consequently the whole PDS population had their own plots. 353 And finally the private 
plots of PDS population were approved as an economic institution by the newly 
adopted Socialist Constitution of September 1998. Until 1998 the DPRK Constitution 
had not recognised the private plots of PDS population by stipulating that only farm 
households had private plots called tut-bat. But the new Constitution deletes this 
qualification for having private plots, enabling the whole population to have them. 354 
; s' Lee, Min Bok (1996), p. 95-96 
352 Naewae News Agency (1995), p. 230 
35; Oh, Gyung Chan (1997), p. 142 
354 Jang, Myung Bong (1998). The DPRK Constitution of 5 September 1998 reads: 
article 24: Private property is the property of citizens for their individual and consumption purposes. 
The products from individual sideline activities, including those from tut-bat, and income 
from other legal economic activities shall also belong to private property (the DPRK Constitution of 5 
September 1998 available from the ROK Ministry of Unification web site: http: //www. unikorea. go. kr/ 
kr/unipds/unipds_n_law. php? cur_page=2& pdm=&pmd=view&num=1) 
In contrast, the DPRK Constitution before 5 September 1999 reads in the same article: 
article 24: Private property is the property of citizens for their individual and consumption purposes. 
The products from individual sideline activities, including those fron, coolwi-alive fcrrnlers" 
tut-bat shall also belong to private property. (the DPRK Constitution before 5 September 1998 
available from Chosun Shinbo [People's Korea] weh-site: http: //www. korea-np. co. jp/pk/ 062nd issue! 
98092413. htm). (italics added) 
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Secondly, the government allowed both PDS population and farm households 
to grow grains in their private plots. Until the 1970s farm households' private plots 
had been allowed only for the cultivation of vegetables, as proclaimed by the 1958 
Standard Charter of Agricultural Cooperative. 155 As mentioned above, however, the 
private plots of PDS population were mainly introduced for the cultivation of grains. 
In particular, maize production was effectively allowed in the plots in 1987. Due to 
this change farm households also have been allowed to grow any foodgrains in their 
plots since. 
Thirdly, the government tolerated illegal private plots called teogi-bat. Illegal 
plots reportedly first appeared in the late 1980s when some individuals in urban areas 
cultivated unused lands near their residences or workplaces without official 
permission mainly for their own food consumption. However, as food situation 
worsened in the early 1990s, virtually the whole population, including individual farm 
and non-farm households, cooperative farms and state firms, set out to expand their 
private plots without official permission; and consequently there appeared various 
forms illegal plots, teogi-bat, that were regularly cultivated individually or 
collectively in hillsides, riversides and mountains. The scale of teogi-bat reportedly 
grew up to many thousand pyung per household, and it was frequently reported that 
some households conducted commercial farming activities using their teogi-bat 
during the food crisis. 
... 
So-called teogi-bat is the unofficial form without the government's permission. It is 
the form of land that individuals privately cultivate in mountains, riversides and other 
areas without roads and railways, being called `sotoji' according to regions.... Choi 
Dong Cheol, the defector who had worked in 4.25 Tobacco Farm in Onsung, North 
Hamgyung, stated that the size of teogi-bat he himself had managed in North Korea 
was around 1,000 pyung in which he had produced about 400 kg of maize, 100 kg of 
Judas-bean and 150 kg of Dubu-bean. Lee, Min Bok, another defector also said that an 
average farm member could produce 200 kg of foodgrain when he spent 2-3days in his 
teogi-bat while he received only 180 kg of food grains for the 356days of work in 
356 cooperative farm. 
Fourthly, the government encouraged farmers' markets and tolerated (illegal) 
market grain trade. Since private grain trade was prohibited in 1957, the role of 
farmers' markets had been reduced to circulating the agricultural products from farm 
355 see Section 4.2.4 in chapter 4. 
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households' private plots, and their operations had been discouraged until the 1970s, 
During this period farmers' markets were forcefully transformed into 10-days- 
markets, and those in special cities such as Pyongyang were closed. Paralleled with 
the introduction of the private plots of PDS population, however, the government 
began to revive farmers' markets from the early 1980s. In 1982 the existing 10-days- 
markets were changed into daily markets with greater scales, and those in special 
cities were allowed to reopen. 357 In May 1984 additional markets were allowed to 
open in most counties so that the number of markets reportedly increased up to 3-4 
per county. 358 In particular, the government began to tolerate private grain trade in 
farmers' markets in the early 1990s. Initially market grain trade appeared only in 
sonne special cities such as Nampo where state food rations were delayed due to 
overall food shortages and transportation problems. However, as it was widely 
acknowledged among the public that the government did not punish the trade, they 
spread to the whole country between 1994 and 1996.359 As a result, farmers markets 
appeared as the most important institution in which people obtained foodgrains other 
than state rations during the food crisis. According to the survey by the ROK Ministry 
of Unification (Dec. 1998), the number of farmers markets reached 300-350 in 1998, 
covering all counties in the DPRK; the trading items expanded from traditional 
agricultural products from farm households' private plots to foodgrains and industrial 
products the trade of which had been strictly prohibited before; and their participants 
varied from ordinary farm households to Korean-Chinese professional merchants. 
Increasing private food production and trade were undoubtedly important changes in 
the DPRK agricultural institutions in which the government is supposed to control all 
food production, distribution and consumption. In particular, Jeong Jang Si, the head 
of agricultural department in the DPRK Agricultural Commission, announced on 24`x' 
November 1997 that the country would introduce some market mechanisms in 
agriculture, including both the liberalisation of small-scale agricultural markets and 
the overall price reforms of agricultural products . 
360 In this respect one could think 
356 Oh, Gyung Chan (1997), p. 159-160 
'ý' Hong, 5eong Kuk (1999); Cho, Myung Cheol (1996), p. 42-43 
359 Kim, Yeon Cheol (1997) 
359 Chun, Hong Tack (1997b) 
360 Hwang, Dong Un (1998) 
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that the recent food crisis has already triggered and will reinforce market reforms in 
the DPRK. But were the increasing private food production and trade really 
fundamental changes in the DPRK agriculture? Or will they be really followed by 
wider-scale market reforms such as the dissolution of cooperative farming into private 
farming? 
Consider the private plot of PDS population. Of the four changes above, it was 
the only change that was institutionalised during the food crisis. Interestingly however 
it is nothing new in the DPRK history that PDS population have and cultivate private 
plots. In chapter 4 we have seen that during the Korean War the government officially 
allocated cultivating lands among state institutions that were receiving state food 
rations, encouraging them to privately grow grains in compensation for the reduction 
of the rations. 361 This practice continued until food production recovered the pre-war 
level in the mid 1950s. Hence it was hardly surprising that the government allowed 
the private plots of PDS population in the 1980s/90s when the country faced the worst 
food shortage in history, even worse than during the Korean War. By the same token, 
it would not be surprising either even if the government re-collect the plots from PDS 
population as the country's food situation improves and thus the government regains 
its capability to supply appropriate food rations to the population. It raises a 
possibility that the private plots of PDS population might be neither fundamental nor 
permanent change that will trigger another market reforms in agriculture. 
Apart from the private plots of PDS population, all the other changes above 
have not been institutionalised until this time. It means that, although private 
production and trade have been effectively tolerated, they remain still illegal: hence 
the government could always punish them. Indeed the government tightened its 
regulation on private food production and trade almost periodically even during the 
food crisis. Let us look at farmers' markets. As the influences of farmers' markets 
increased after they had been transformed into daily markets in 1982, the government 
changed them into weekly markets (or 10-days markets) again between 1987 and 
1989 and forcefully closed some markets in cities. 362 Between 1989 and 1992 trading 
illegal items such as grains and industrial products was actually punished. 363 And in 
301 see section 4.3.2.3 in chapter 4 
362 Cho, Myung Cheol (1996), p. 45 
; 03 Chun, Hong Tack (1997b) 
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January 1999 Kim Jong 11 ordered the government to reinforce state control over 
farmers' markets and prevent labour force from moving from regular workplaces to 
farmers' markets. 364 In particular, private grain trade was banned from farmers' 
markets again in July 2002; since then the market operations have significantly 
shrank. 
165 
The situation was similar in illegal private plots, teogi-bat, as well. In 1989, 
two years after teogi-bat reportedly first appeared, the government announced to 
punish any individuals to have and cultivate teogi-hat. And in 1992 so-called `non- 
socialist activities breaking-up groups' were organised to take actual actions. In 
particular, the government actually confiscated individual households' teogi-bat and 
redistributed it among state firms in May 2002.366 
Of course, those counter changes against private food production and trade do 
not mean that market reform is impossible in the DPRK. If the food crisis lasts for a 
long period to come, private food production and trade may not disappear and another 
market-oriented policies may be implemented, regardless of the government's true 
attitudes toward agricultural market. Nevertheless, what available evidence has 
suggested so far is that it is at least not the intention of the government to permanently 
allow increasing private food production and trade. In this sense it seems too early to 
make any robust conclusion about the meanings and implications of increasing private 
food production and trade during the food crisis concerning the future of the DPRK 
agriculture. 
9.3. State Food Rationing: Collapse or Revival? 
The corollary of increasing private food production and trade was the weakening of 
state food rationing system. 
It is unmistakable that the DPRK food rationing system failed to provide 
appropriate food supply to the population during the food crisis. As shown by tale 9-3, 
state food rations persistently fell since 1987 and particularly it declined below the 
364 the ROK Ministry of Unification (8 Oct 1999) 36" Chosun Daily News (27 August 2002) 
166 Chosun Daily News (9 June 2002) 
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minimal food requirement for human survival set by UN, 457 grams per day or 167 
kg per year, between 1995 and 1999. Moreover, state food rations stopped being 
provided for several months in 1996-98 and consequently PDS population had to 
entirely rely on international food aid or other non-official food sources. Due to this 
failure the government changed the existing food rationing system in several aspects 
during the food crisis. The changes mainly intended to reduce the rationing burden of 
the central government by decentralising the powers and responsibilities of providing 
food rations from central bureaucrats to local administrators and state firms. 
Table 9-3. The Changes of Food Rations during the Food Crisis 
Daily Ration Duration for no ration supply 
1987-1992 547 grams 
1992-1994 492 grams - 
1994-1995 n. a n. a 
Nov. 95-Oct. 96 299 grams - 
Nov. 96-Oct. 97 187 grams 4 months 
Nov. 97-Oct. 98 252 grams 5 months 
Nov. 98-Sept. 99 334 grams n. a 
* The daily rations between 1987 and 1994 are rationing norms while those between November 1995 
and September 1999 are actual rations. 
** The daily rations between November 1995 and September 1999 are simple averages of PDS rations and 
Farm household rations. 
Source: 1) For Daily Ration, table 6-1 in chapter 6 and table 8-14 in chapter 8 
2) For duration for no ration supply, annex table 8-3 in chapter 8 
First, as mentioned above, state firms have got formally responsible for 
providing cultivating land for their employees and thus effectively sharing the burden 
of state food rations to PDS population since 1987. 
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Second, the government announced the years of 1995-97 as the period of so- 
called `arduous march' during which each province, city and county should be in 
principle self-sufficient on food without central support. 367 During this period 
province and county administrators were reportedly empowered to conduct food trade 
independently with other provinces, counties and even neighbouring countries; and, 
when the trade was successful, the regions were excluded from central food 
support. 368 
Third, the government experimentally abolished state food rationing in some 
regions in 1997.369 According to the DPRK defectors, there was a drastic price reform 
in the Rajin-Sunbong special economic zone in that year. All the state (rationing) 
prices of grains were abolished and the supply of state food rations was completely 
stopped. Instead, the government raised the salaries of ordinary workers up to 3,000- 
4,000 won by around 3-40 times. Since then the residents in the Rajin-Sunbong zone 
have reportedly bought all their foodgrains from farmers' markets, say, at the market 
price of around 60 won per kg for rice. 
Fourth, it was officially announced that there was a nation-wide price reform 
in July 2002 in which the government drastically increased both the rationing prices 
of grains and the salaries of industrial workers. 37() For instance, the state price of rice 
rose from 0.08 won per kg up to 44 won by more than five hundred times. And the 
price of maize went up from 0.49 won per kg to 20 won by around twenty times. To 
help PDS population purchase their rations at new state prices, the government also 
increased the standard salary of an ordinary office worker from 150 won per month to 
2,000 won by around seven times. But this increase in the salary was far short of the 
increase in state food prices. Moreover, because this price reform was quite similar to 
that leading to the abolishment of state food rationing in the Rajin-Sunbong special 
economic zone in 1997, it was widely regarded as an important signal that the 
government would eventually abolish the country's long-lasting food rationing. 
From the above changes it seems clear that the DPRK food rationing system 
significantly weakened during the food crisis. But the question is whether this 
367 Kim, Byung Ro (1998) p. 141-149 368 
69 
Natsios (1999); Lautze (1996) 
3 ý`'`' Chosun Daily News (19 July 2002) 
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weakening is temporal or permanent. In other words, whether will the rationing 
system survive or be eventually abolished? 
On the one hand, there are many reasons to believe that the DPRK government 
might be actually considering to abolish the rationing system. Perhaps the most 
compelling reason is the path of the changes in the rationing system: the ongoing 
reductions of state food rations the stress of food-self sufficiency at state firm (or 
household) level the decentralisation of the rationing system the experimental 
price reform and corresponding abolishment of food rationing in some regions a 
similar price reform at national level. On the other hand, however, there are also many 
other reasons to believe that the government will reinforce food rationing as soon as 
the country's food situation improves. 
Consider the private plots of PDS population and the decentralisation of the 
food rationing system. As pointed out already, it is nothing new in the 1980s and 90s 
that PDS population was allowed to have and cultivate private plots. In addition, we 
have seen in chapter 3 and 4 that the rationing system has operated basically at 
provincial levels with locally available food sources from its very beginning in the 
1950s. This means that both changes can not be the good evidence to show that the 
rationing system fundamentally changed during the food crisis. 37' 
One might emphasise that food rationing was already abolished in the Rajin- 
Sunbong special economic zone. But its implication seems very limited. The special 
economic zone is a completely separate area not only socially and economically but 
also physically. It aims to encourage foreign investments, particularly western 
investments, and so constitutes the only area in the DPRK that is supposed to be run 
by market mechanism. And it is strictly prohibited for the DPRK citizens to travel in 
and out of the zone without official permission. [Indeed there are iron fences 
surrounding the zone to prevent such travels]. It is therefore doubtful how important 
370 Chosun Shinbo [People's Korea] (17 August 2002) 
371 It is of course an important change that provinces and even counties were empowered to conduct 
international food trade independently for the first time. Note however that this policy has mainly 
aimed at the northern provinces of the country bordering China. During the food crisis those provinces 
suffered the most severe food shortages due to both mountainous geography and high industrial 
population shares. However both factors also meant that they had relatively various non-food tradable 
resources. Hence it might be unavoidable that the central government allowed the provinces to import 
food from China independently when it reduced or even shut down domestic food shipments to the 
provinces. However, because these provinces are the most industrialised regions in the country, it 
301 
the abolishment of food rationing in this area was in terms of the institutional changes 
of the existing rationing system. 
That the abolishment of food rationing in the Rajin-Sunbong zone had little 
influences is well confirmed by the fact that the nation-wide price reform of July 2002 
was actually intended to strengthen the existing rationing system. In contrast to the 
outside expectation that the country will abolish the rationing system soon after the 
price reform, the government recently made it clear that state food rationing will 
continue: ' Moreover, it has become evident that the primary purpose of the price 
reform was to regain state control over grain circulation in the economy that was 
necessary for the operation of the existing rationing system. Until the price reform 
was implemented, there had been great differences between the state procurement 
prices and market prices of grains. According to the DPRK defectors, for instance, the 
market price of rice had been around 40-60 won in 2002 while its state procurement 
price had been only 0.8 won. Undoubtedly these price differences had driven grain 
producers to sell more grains to farmers' markets, making state grain collection quite 
difficult during the food crisis. The July 2002 price reform was to resolve this 
difficulty by increasing the state procurement prices up to the market levels and at the 
same time to ensure PDS population to buy state food rations by increasing their 
salaries accordingly. Indeed, shortly after the price reform was implemented, the 
government banned private grain trade in farmers' markets, showing what was the 
real purpose of the price reform. 
From the above discussions we can make two conclusions. First, during the 
food crisis the government took several measures to reduce the rationing burden of 
the central government, which resulted in the weakening of the existing food rationing 
system. Second, however, it is still not clear whether such measures are permanent, 
eventually leading to the abolition of food rationing, or only temporary, mitigating the 
crisis and so eventually fading away as the crisis ends. 
would not be surprising if the central government prohibit such independent food trade when the 
country's food production improves and so domestic food shipments to these provinces recover. 372 Chosun Daily News (31 July 2002) 
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9.4. The End of State Grain Marketing? 
Another important change in agriculture during the food crisis was that in principle 
the government gave up collecting all surplus grains from producers (cooperative 
farms). In the late 1950s, as discussed in chapter 4, the country established state grain 
marketing system in which the government protected farm households' food rations in 
cooperative farms but instead procured all their surplus grains. 373 In 1996, however, 
this system was fundamentally changed as a new sub-team contract system was 
introduced. 
Table 9-4. The New Sub-team Contract System 
Sub-team Contract System New Sub-team Contract System 
Member of 10-25. Each sub-team consists of old, 
Sub-team senior and junior members to consider 
members' capabilities by ages 
Production determined by annual state production 
Targets targets 
7-10, Each sub-team consists of 
family members or relatives. 
[last 3 years' average harvest + the 
10 years' average harvest before 
1993]/2 
Disposal of Surplus products exceeding 
Surplus production targets should be sold to 
Surplus products exceeding 
production targets should be directly 
state procurement agencies distributed in kind to each sub-team 
Source) Kim, Yeon Cheol (1997) 
In comparison with the old sub-team contract system, the new system has several 
interesting features. For instance, the number of members in one sub-team have been 
reduced to 7-10 from 10-25 persons, making it possible that one sub-team consists of 
only family members and relatives. In addition, the production targets imposed on 
sub-teams have been effectively fixed at the previous years' production, that is, the 
average of the last 3 years' average harvest and the 10 years' average harvest before 1993. 
373 see section 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2 in chapter 4 
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Given that the targets in the old system had been determined year by year according 
to the country's needs, usually far exceeding actual production, the new system seems 
to impose more realistic targets. Needless to say, the purpose of this new system is to 
motivate farm households to increase the country's grain production. 
Of the various features of the new system, however, the most distinctive is that 
now sub-teams (or their members) have the rights to keep their products, particularly 
grains, exceeding the production targets. In the old system, sub-teams (or their 
members) could keep only the amounts of grains for their food rations, regardless of 
their production. When they over-fulfilled their production targets, they received more 
money from the cooperative farm. But the farm still collected all their products 
exceeding their food rations and sold them to state procurement agencies. By contrast, 
when they under-fulfilled their production targets, they should pay the differences 
between the targets and actual production to the cooperative farm by money. 
Nevertheless, they still secured the amounts of grains for their food rations. Therefore, 
although their money income varied according to their production, they could have 
neither more nor less products in their hands than their food rations. But the new 
system allows sub-teams to keep all their products exceeding the production targets. 
In principle, therefore, farm households now have a part of surplus products in their 
hands; and particularly the ratio of the surplus kept by farm households in total 
production should rise up when the production increases year by year. 
It means that the government is not the only economic agent being able to 
provide surplus grains to the economy any more. Moreover, if the government 
institutionalises private grain trade in farmers' markets, it would not be the sole grain 
trader in the economy either. In other words, due to the introduction of the new sub- 
tearn contract system the existing state grain marketing system has in principle 
collapsed. 
Interestingly, however, there are still many reasons to believe that despite the 
new sub-team contract system the government has not actually intended to leave any 
significant amount of surplus grains in the hands of farm households. First of all, 
where the new system has been put in place, the government has stopped protecting 
farm households' food rations. 374 That is, when a sub-team under-fulfils production 
374 Kwon, Tae Jean (1999) 
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target, now it has to pay the difference between the target and actual production to the 
cooperative farms by grains, not by money. Because the target is largely determined 
by the average harvest before 1993, and because the country's agricultural 
infrastructure has dramatically collapsed since, most sub-teams are likely to under- 
fulfil their targets rather than to over-fulfil them. It means that the new system is 
likely to procure more grains from farm households rather than to leave them more 
surpluses. Second, the DPRK related media has announced that most sub-teams over- 
fulfilling the production targets have used the surplus grains left in their hands to buy 
more agricultural inputs such as fertilisers exclusively supplied by the government. 375 
It suggests that many farm households might have been forced to sell their surplus 
grains to the government, in contrast to the official claim that they could dispose them 
at their free will, including selling them in farmers' markets. Third, it is not clear how 
widely the new system has been applied. Indeed many DPRK defectors who had been 
engaged in farming activities were unaware of the new system until they defected. 
To sum, although the government allowed in principle farm households to 
keep a part of their surplus products during the food crisis, it is too early to conclude 
whether this policy will really lead to the collapse of state grain marketing system in 
which the government collect all surplus grains from producers. 
9.5. Agricultural Planning: Deregulation or Regulation? 
Finally we consider how the food crisis has influenced the ways the government has 
controlled farm operations. As discussed in chapter 2, agricultural production in the 
DPRK has been organised in highly centralised and administrative manners. The 
central government has imposed quantitative output targets and corresponding 
resource allocation plans up to cooperative farms through centralised administrative 
hierarchy; and local administrative organisations (PREC and CCMC) have directly 
controlled all farm operations from the selection of crop items to the choice of 
375 Chosun Shinho [People's Korea] (30 July 1997), which is electronically available from 
llp: //tivww korea-np co ip/tpk/ 157 th issue/002nd issue/97073004 htm 
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technologies involved. During the food crisis, however, the government liberalised 
farm operations in several aspects. 
First, many cooperative farms were reportedly given back their rights of crop 
selection. 376 Since 1997 the DPRK government has diversified the country's crop 
composition which had mainly consisted of rice and maize. In intermediate and 
mountainous areas, potatoes have been emphasised as the main crop items to replace 
maize; and in some mountainous areas, beans and other minor grains have been also 
encouraged to grow. And the government has emphasised that cooperative farms 
should determine what they grow and thus initiate this crop diversification. 377 Indeed 
FAOIWFP mission teams have found that many cooperative farms have now actually 
exercised their rights of crop selection. In particular, those cooperative farms in the 
Rajin-Sunbong special economic zone have reportedly had little intervention by the 
local authorities concerning their crop selection. 378 
Secondly, cooperative farms have been officially given the rights to own farm 
machinery such as tractors. As discussed in chapter 4, one of official reasons why the 
government controls the operations of cooperative farms has been that it has 
exclusively owned and supplied all agricultural inputs. Of those inputs, farm 
machinery has been particularly important in the sense that all agricultural production 
procedures have been organised around the machinery, thus being directly influenced 
by the machinery supply of the local authorities. But the New Socialist Constitution of 
August 1998 stipulates: 
Article 22. The property of social cooperatives refers to the collective property of 
working peoples within the cooperatives concerned. Social cooperatives can possess such 
property as land, agricultural machinery, ships, medium and small sized factories and 
; '9 enterprises..... 
i"' Kim, Won Keun and Jeon, Hyung Jin (1999b), p. 7-9 
377 For instance, Han Deok, the vice-Minister of agriculture, said through Pyongyang media that "the 
agricultural reform should focus on farmers' needs and willingness to choose and cultivate high-yield 
agricultural items", emphasising that the government allowed farm households to choose their crops by 
themselves (Kim, Woon Keun and Jeon, Hyung Jin, 1999b: p. 8) 
; 'R Ryu, Tae Young (1998) 
379 The DPRK Constitution of 5 September 1988 (http: //www. unikorea. go. kr/kr/unipds/unipds_n_law 
. php? cur_page=2& pdm=&pmd=view&num=1). In particular, the new constitution deletes `draft 
animals' from the objects of the property of social cooperatives, suggesting that now individuals can 
own draft animals (Jang Myung Bong: 1998). Given that under the new sub-team contract system those 
farm households with blood-ties can carry out agricultural production separately and keep their 
products aller meeting state production quotas, this individual ownership of draft animals undoubtedly 
intensifies the influences of individual members within cooperative farms. Moreover, the new 
306 
It means that now agricultural production could in principle proceed within 
cooperative farms with relatively little influences of the local authorities. 
Thirdly, the government allowed cooperative farms to introduce their own 
incentive systems to increase production. In 1999, for example, FAO/WFP mission 
teams found that the members of cooperative farms were newly allowed to elect their 
farm chairmen from those who offer more production merits. 380 
It seems straightforward that the basic reason why the government liberalised farm 
operation during the food crisis was to increase agricultural productivity. Perhaps the 
liberalisation was the only option to boost farm outputs given that the government lost 
its capability to provide appropriate state resources to agriculture. An interesting point 
is however that, in contrast to this liberalisation at farm level, the government 
intensified central control within agricultural administrative organisations. 
In September 1998, for instance, the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly 
(SPA) carried out an administrative reform, replacing Agricultural Commission with 
Ministry of Agriculture and thus reviving ministerial hierarchy in agriculture that had 
disappeared in 1961.381 There was no change in local agricultural administrative 
organisations (PREC and CCMC). A distinctive feature of the reform is that now the 
central ministry in agriculture has an official purpose to oversee detailed agricultural 
planning. Indeed, due to the reform the Department of Agricultural Planning has 
appeared as one of the most important departments in the Ministry of Agriculture with 
more than 30 professional planning staff in Pyongyang and 10-12 staff in each 
province. 382 It is true that Agricultural Commission also had had a planning 
constitution allows even cooperative farms to engage in foreign trade by stipulating that not only the 
state but also social cooperatives can conduct the trade. 
Article 36. In the DPRK the state and social cooperatives shall conduct foreign trade activities. 
The state shall develop foreign trade on the principles of complete equality and mutual benefit (The 
DPRK Constitution of 5 September 1998). 
Although it is questionable whether the farms can actually carry out foreign trade without state 
intervention, it also reflects that the authorities have gradually liberalised farm operations. 380 FAQtWFP (8 Nov. 1999) 
391 see "Agricultººral Sector Institutions in the DPRK". Chosun Shinbo Ineonle's Koreal (19 Feh 199N' 
available from http: //www. korea-np. co. jp/pk/082nd issue/99O21802. htrn 
. 192 see "Agricultural Sector Institutions in the DPRK (II)", Chosun Shinbo [people's Korea] (24 Feb 
1999) available from http: //www, korea-np. co. jp/pk/083rd issue/99022405. htm 
307 
department and particularly it established Staff department in 1979, overseeing both 
agricultural planning and resource allocation. Nonetheless, it had nominally still no 
planning-related-powers, as discussed in chapter 4, which had not changed until it was 
replaced by Ministry of Agriculture. In this respect the 1998 administrative reform 
suggests that at least the DPRK government has no intention to decentralise 
agricultural administrative organisations. 
What is interesting is the timing of the administrative reform. As seen in 
previous sections, the DPRK government made a series of liberalisation and 
decentralisation policies in agriculture between 1987 and 1996; and consequently 
private food production and trade flourished while state food rationing and grain 
collection weakened significantly. Hence there were many speculations that the 
country would eventually give up or at least play down its socialist planning in 
agriculture. But the 1998 administrative reform suggests that the government has not 
intended to change the existing socialist planning in agriculture but, on the contrary, 
to reinforce it. Indeed, shortly after the administration reform was completed, the 
authorities announced `People's Economic Planning Law' in 1999, making it clear 
that the country will not make any change in its socialist economic planning. 
The adoption of Peoples' Economic Planning Law is a huge blow to all wicked 
attempts to destroy the socialist economy in our country. History shows that socialism will 
collapse when socialist planned economy is abandoned. When imperialists are trying all 
attempts to destroy our socialist economy...... the adoption of Peoples' Economic Planning 
Law is the announcement of our people's faith and willingness to follow the socialist way to the 
end as well as the serious warning to the attempts to destroy the socialist economy. 383 
More interesting is the fact that the central government has launched another Juche 
Nongbub campaign since 1998. Between late 1998 and early 1999 Kim Jong 11 
highlighted the importance of Juche Nongbub in agriculture, on the one hand, but at 
the same time emphasised that some technical aspects of Juche Nongbub should be 
changed according to the situation, presenting several new agricultural policies that 
had great differences with the existing ones. They include: 1) potato production 
38; Kim, Jin Kuk "The Implications of People's Economic Planning Law", Rodonýg Shinmun [Workers' 
Daily] (27 April 1999), quoted by Buklian Nongup Donghyang [North Korean Agricultural Trend/ 
Vol. 1. No 2.1999, P. 36 
308 
(instead of maize production); 2) seed revolution; 3) double cropping (instead of 
mono-cropping of maize); 4) organic fertiliser (instead of chemical fertiliser); 5) land 
rehabilitation; 6) making grass lands for animal rearing (instead of increasing sown 
area); 7) expanding rice production in flat areas etc. 384 Since then its has been the 
most important task of all state agricultural agencies to implement this new version of 
Juche Nongbub, that is, Kim Jong I1's new agricultural policies. 
An interesting point is that the new Juche Nongbub campaign has proceeded 
in a quite similar way to the old one in 1973-78. Let us take an example of potato 
production. New Juche Nongbub encourages potato production, instead of maize, for 
various reasons. While maize is a high-fertiliser-consuming-crop, it does not require 
much fertiliser; it is harvested before rice and maize, helping people survive lean 
season; it is also suitable for double cropping with other minor grains. In these 
reasons Kim Jong 11 visited Daehongdan county, Ryanggang province, the greatest 
potato production area in the country, in October 1998, praising the county's 
performance and ordering the government to spread its experiences to the whole 
country. 385 Due to his order Potato Research Centre, which was newly established in 
Agricultural Science Academy in May 1998, has been given the task to develop new 
high-yield potato varieties and establish standard production processes. And the 
Ministry of Agriculture has been responsible for spreading the varieties and processes 
to cooperative farms across the country. It means that the central government has 
standardised farming practices concerning potato production and imposed them on 
local governments and cooperative farms. Of course, as quoted above, the government 
has claimed that it is up to cooperative farms whether and how they carry out potato 
production. Note however that, as discussed in chapter 5, the same procedures for 
maize in 1973-78 resulted in the establishment of the highly centralised current 
agriculture where the central government controls all planning and farming activities 
of both local government and cooperative farms. In this reason, we believe, the new 
Juche Nongbub campaign may play the decisive role for the central government to 
regain its control power in agriculture that had been shattered by the food crisis. 
84 Rodong Shinmun [Workers' Daily], the official newspaper of the Korean Workers' Party, published 
11 articles about the new agricultural policy under the title of "The Explanation of the Agricultural 
Policies Presented by Dear General" between 13 May 1999 and 13 June 1999. The seven agricultural 
policies mentioned in the text are based on these newspaper articles. gis; Bukhan Nongiip Donghyang [North Korean Agricultural Trend] Vol. 1. No 1.1999, P. 44 
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The above discussion can be summarised as follows. First, during the food 
crisis the government liberalised farm operation in several aspects in order to boost 
agricultural production. Second, however, the government made it clear that it will 
not change the existing socialist planning in agriculture. Moreover, it intensified 
central control within agricultural administrative organisations. Third, therefore, it is 
difficult to make a robust conclusion concerning whether the food crisis really 
changed the way and degree of state control over agriculture. 
9.6. Conclusion 
So far we have seen that the recent food crisis brought many important changes to the 
existing agricultural institutions in the DPRK. But we have also seen that there were 
many counter-changes to reinforce the existing institutions: hence it is difficult to 
judge whether the changes (and the counter-changes) will last and whether new 
agricultural institutions such as markets will replace the existing institutions. In this 
respect it seems quite natural that there exist many different views about the future of 
the DPRK agriculture after the food crisis. We conclude this chapter by presenting 
two possible extreme views on the issue. 
One extreme view focuses only on the changes of the existing institutions. 
According to this view, the food crisis has dismantled the institutions from the 
bottom. It has rapidly developed private food production and flourished market food 
trade outside the official economy in which all food production and distribution have 
been controlled by the government. Because the official economy has lost its 
capability to provide appropriate food supply, that is, because state food rationing 
system has collapsed, the population has faced a new situation where their food 
consumption has been increasingly dependent on market factors such as their private 
production, income and market prices. The food crisis has changed the ways the 
official economy has been organised, too. In order to increase food production in the 
official economy, the government has introduced more individual incentives and 
liberalised farm operations. In consequence, state intervention in agriculture has been 
weakened while individual farm households have increased their influences on farm 
operations. Needless to say, this view may see that the above changes are not 
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reversible and thus the existing socialist agricultural institutions in the DPRK will be 
eventually replaced by markets. 
But another extreme view emphasises the counter-changes to reinforce the 
existing institutions. According to this view, although private food production and 
trade have increased, they are only temporal phenomena because the government has 
still illegalised such activities and punished them whenever the food situation 
improves. In particular, as private food production and trade flourished, the 
government stepped up its efforts to transfer private resources to state resources by 
taking such measures as confiscating illegal private plots and closing down grain 
markets. In this respect, when food production in official economy improves, it may 
be not so difficult to revive state rationing system and, at the same time, terminate 
private food production and trade. The same policy has been applied to the official 
economy as well. Although the government has liberalised farm operations, it has also 
reinforced the existing agricultural administrative organisations and intensified central 
control within the organisations. It suggests that the government is likely to recover 
the existing agricultural planning institutions in which the central government controls 
all farm operations through centralised administrative hierarchy, rather than further 
liberalise farm operation and reduce state intervention in agriculture. From this view, 
therefore, the impacts of the food crisis should be temporal: hence the existing 
agricultural institutions will eventually survive without significant changes. 
It is of course extremely difficult, perhaps practically impossible at present, to 
judge which views are more realistic. Undoubtedly the issue largely depends on how 
long and severe the food crisis will last. For example, even when the government 
intends to recover the existing institutions, it would not be feasible if the country's 
food situation worsens for a long period to come. To judge both views, therefore, we 
must know how the food situation will be unfolded, how the changes and counter- 
changes of the existing agricultural institutions will affect the food situation, and how 
the government will react if the food situation improves or worsens. But there is little 
information available concerning those questions. It seems therefore too early to make 
any conclusions about the real impacts of the food crisis on the DPRK agricultural 
institutions. 
311 
X. Conclusion 
In this thesis we have tried to understand the food crisis that hit the DPRK particularly 
badly in the mid/late 1990s. The motive of the study was that, although the food crisis 
has drawn many academic, humanitarian, economic and political concerns from 
international society, surprisingly little is known about it. And the primary questions 
of the study were the followings. First, when and why did the food crisis occur? 
Second, how severe was it? Third, was it different from food shortages or famines in 
other countries? 
Our starting point was a simple fact that the country has experienced almost 
periodic food shortages, which has been interestingly accompanied by corresponding 
institutional changes in agriculture. As a preliminary but necessary step to proceed 
with the food crisis in the 1990s, therefore, we have studied first the relation between 
food shortages and agricultural institutions in the DPRK history. This study has 
produced two findings. 
First, the institutional evolution of the DPRK agriculture was triggered and 
motivated by repeated food shortages. In 1945-46, shortly after its independence, the 
country faced a serious urban food shortage, which highlighted two fundamental 
issues in the economy: 1) how to establish secure food supply channels for newly 
established urban socialist sector; 2) how to increase the country's foodgrain 
production. To resolve the first issue two grain marketing institutions, agricultural 
tax-in-kind and the voluntary grain purchase by Consumer Association on behalf of 
the government, were established. And state food rationing commenced to protect the 
food consumption of socialist sector. Concerning the second issue the state 
monopolised agricultural resource supply and, on this basis, induced individual farm 
households to increase food production. After the Korean War agriculture was 
collectivised for the purpose of recovering production from war damages as quickly 
as possible. In 1954-55 however rural food crisis occurred, demonstrating that the 
country still suffered grain collection problem and low production. The crisis resulted 
in the new agricultural institutions based on collective farming. Now the state 
monopolised all grain marketing and, in return, expanded state food rations to the 
whole population, including farm households. To increase food production agriculture 
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was decentralised and localised planning institutions were put in place. But this 
decentralised agriculture did not prevent agricultural stagnation and corresponding 
food shortage in 1970-73. To overcome the shortage Juche Nongbub was introduced, 
and in terms of institutions it enabled the central government to directly control local 
administrators and farm households concerning agricultural planning and resource 
allocation. In consequence, agriculture was re-centralised. 
Second, the current agricultural institutions in the DPRK have been organised 
so as to prevent unexpected food shortages. The underlying idea of the institutions is 
that the central government plans and controls all economic activities concerning food 
production, distribution, consumption and trade, maintaining national food balance. 
Agricultural production is carried out under the close supervision of centralised 
administrative organisations that impose quantitative output targets on producers and 
control all resource allocation in agriculture. Food distribution is made only by state 
agencies, and food consumption is controlled according to clearly defined national 
rationing norms. Food trade is conducted by only the central government. 
With these two findings we have proceeded to the detailed study of the food 
crisis in the 1990s. Naturally the focus of the study has lied in the relation between the 
food crisis and the current agricultural institutions. 
We began by establishing two basic facts about the food crisis. One is that the 
crisis actually started from 1987 but its contents fundamentally changed from 1994 
when the country began to face famine situation. Another is that the country's 
agricultural policies to increase grain production, including the expansion of sown 
areas, the transformation of crop composition to high yield grain items, the 
maximisation of input supply, the introduction of dense planting and the 
establishment of farming practices to prevent the problems of dense planting, have all 
collapsed since 1987, which was the main reason for the food crisis. Then, we have 
identified three controversial issues surrounding the food crisis. First, did the food 
crisis escalate into famine? Second, if so, what were the main features of the famine? 
Third, has the food crisis changed the DPRK agriculture? 
To study the first issue we have estimated the number of excess deaths in the 
1990s using official population statistics. And this estimation has led us to several 
interesting conclusions. Above all, we have found that there was famine between 
1994 and 1998(9). But it was not such a great famine as frequently reported by 
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international media. In 1994-99 total excess deaths numbered 688 thousands and, on 
annual average, the number of excess deaths comprised only 0.53 percent of total 
civilian population. Compared with other socialist famines such as the 1959-61 
Chinese famine and the 1932-33 Soviet famine, therefore, the DPRK famine was a 
relatively mild one. In terms of duration, however, the famine was not mild at all 
because it lasted over 5 years while other socialist famines lasted 2-3 years at 
maximum. From regional perspectives, the famine tended to be severer in the northern 
and eastern parts of the country. At provincial level it was severest in North and South 
Hamgyung and relatively milder in North and South Hwanghae. 
Concerning the second issue we have examined three aspects of the famine: its 
causation (category), victims and main impacts. The findings we have made 
concerning the DPRK agricultural institutions have been mainly utilised for this 
examination. And the conclusion is that the DPRK famine was unique in its every 
aspect, compared with other socialist famines. Above all, it was a rare national FAD I 
famine in which there were no feasible policies to prevent the famine given the level 
of food availability decline. In addition, it was primarily an urban famine. Its impact 
was quite distinctive, too. Despite massive FAD the famine did not cause massive 
population loss in a short space of time. Rather, it resulted in the ongoing health risks 
of the whole population for a long period. In this sense it seems most appropriate that 
UN aid agencies described the famine as "famine in slow motion". Those distinctive 
features of the famine came from the very character of the current DPRK agricultural 
institutions. In the DPRK food rationing system, for instance, farm households have 
stronger entitlements than their counter parts in industry, which made the famine 
urban famine. In addition, as the famine hit mainly urban population that was vital for 
regime survival, the government was sensitive to the impacts of the famine. This 
sensitivity led to the establishment of national coping strategies initiated by the 
government, which efficiently prevented massive population loss during the famine 
period. As the result, during the famine period many victims got physically gradually 
weaken for a long period, rather than perished away for a short period of shock. 
Unlike in the first and second issue, we have not drawn definite conclusions 
about the third issue. It is mainly due to the institutional confusions the DPRK 
government showed during the food crisis. Indeed, on the one hand, the government 
has encouraged private food production and trade, reduced the importance of state 
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food rationing, allowed farm households to keep surplus grains and deregulated farm 
operations since the 1980s. Undoubtedly it suggests that the food crisis has changed 
the DPRK agriculture. But the government has not institutionalised private food 
production and trade yet. Further, it has frequently punished them whenever food 
situation improves. It has also made several attempts to reinforce state control over 
grain circulation and intensify central control within agricultural administrative 
organisations. This means that the government might not have genuine intentions to 
change the existing institutions so that the above changes made during the food crisis 
might disappear as the food crisis ends. In this sense we have argued that it is too 
early to judge whether and how the food crisis has changed agriculture. 
Like most other studies about the DPRK economy, this thesis has one thorny problem: 
it can not be completely free from the lack of data and the reliability concerns of 
available data. Although this thesis has mainly utilised official DPRK data, they are 
far short of the amount that modern economics normally requires in order to analyse 
economic phenomena. Hence we can not have used any econometric methods to test 
our conclusions. Furthermore, there are still great concerns about the reliability of 
official DPRK data. When someone ignores the official data due to this reliability 
problem and uses other data made outside the DPRK, he or she might reach quite 
different conclusions from those of this thesis. The conclusions of this thesis should 
therefore be interpreted under this limit. Nonetheless, what we have tried so far is to 
show that it is much more feasible to study the DPRK economy using official DPRK 
data as generally conceived. We believe that this approach is one way to flourish 
productive controversies among the DPRK students and so deepen our understandings 
about the country. 
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Appendix I. 
Population Projection Results: 1994- 1999.8.31. 
1. Estimation Results using the 1993 Census Death and Birth Rates 
1-1. Estimated Population 
A. Total 
Age 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
0 416088 455507 468132 477146 480370 476189 469557 
1 430828 410250 449116 461563 470451 473630 471828 
2 417751 428602 408129 446795 459178 468020 470271 
3 411963 416148 426957 406564 445080 457416 463453 
4 411878 411043 415219 426004 405656 444086 452386 
5 375776 411368 410534 414704 425476 405153 430753 
6 375229 375458 411020 410187 414354 425116 411604 
7 375550 374953 375182 410718 409885 414049 421233 
8 365661 375365 374769 374998 410515 409683 412463 
9 374367 365516 375216 374620 374849 410352 409801 
10 351889 374226 365379 375075 374479 374708 398342 
11 362999 351774 374104 365259 374952 374357 374511 
12 350896 362890 351669 373991 365149 374840 374446 
13 354202 350802 362793 351574 373891 365052 371501 
14 347126 354103 350704 362691 351476 373787 367899 
15 323772 347011 353986 350588 362571 351360 366207 
16 280258 323653 346884 353856 350459 362438 354970 
17 278596 280135 323509 346730 353699 350303 358272 
18 320888 278459 279996 323347 346556 353521 351262 
19 324784 320732 278323 279857 323185 346382 351009 
20 302547 324589 320540 278156 279687 322987 338419 
21 393602 302348 324373 320326 277970 279498 308318 
22 377700 393383 302182 324190 320145 277813 278823 
23 390744 377452 393126 301987 323976 319934 291757 
24 398396 390453 377172 392834 301765 323733 321046 
25 429689 398108 390172 376900 392551 301549 316162 
26 470910 429336 397787 389858 376597 392238 331690 
27 388589 470539 429001 397482 389561 376311 386710 
28 371421 388239 470116 428617 397135 389223 380404 
29 358916 371070 387873 469672 428216 396772 391507 
30 367584 358565 370708 387494 469213 427802 406892 
31 335844 367246 358236 370369 387139 468783 441233 
32 294910 335540 366915 357913 370035 386791 441097 
33 313079 294590 335175 366516 357525 369634 380782 
34 296512 312743 294274 334814 366122 357141 365194 
35 351522 296184 312397 293949 334441 365716 359744 
36 352542 351146 295870 312065 293636 334083 354898 
37 222207 352205 350811 295589 311768 293356 320249 
316 
38 246715 221937 351778 350386 295232 311391 299140 
39 213468 246404 221657 351335 349944 294862 305610 
40 180550 213198 246093 221377 350891 349501 312846 
41 145761 180287 212887 245734 221053 350378 349451 
42 149183 145542 180018 212568 245365 220720 306687 
43 257661 148822 145188 179581 212050 244768 228415 
44 257632 257167 148538 144910 179238 211643 233392 
45 257761 257106 256642 148236 144614 178873 200404 
46 253712 257151 256497 256034 147886 144271 167033 
47 254808 253024 256453 255802 255340 147487 145081 
48 241643 254097 252319 255739 255089 254628 182948 
49 235153 240926 253342 251570 254979 254331 254021 
50 233965 234439 240195 252572 250806 254205 253704 
51 271929 232962 233435 239168 251490 249733 252016 
52 243088 270890 232071 232542 238254 250528 249342 
53 233292 242065 269750 231093 231564 237253 245355 
54 226528 232103 240834 268378 229916 230385 234131 
55 258953 225238 230780 239462 266849 228605 228828 
56 224520 257057 223559 229056 237676 264859 239469 
57 210963 222635 254924 221674 227121 235672 253635 
58 196354 209047 220612 252637 219650 225045 230655 
59 172867 194391 206930 218376 250110 217415 220888 
60 185541 170859 192067 204422 215727 247117 225286 
61 161514 182651 168185 188987 201104 212224 232864 
62 136018 158819 179578 165341 185702 197560 204815 
63 142377 133514 155918 176271 162279 182164 189891 
64 123144 139599 130869 152853 172777 159045 171986 
65 118885 120445 136521 127942 149458 168910 159894 
66 103963 116240 117735 133431 125004 146051 158677 
67 99774 101240 113189 114612 129872 121623 135405 
68 95786 97126 98543 110169 111524 126355 120807 
69 87653 92745 94015 95375 106620 107895 117522 
70 77504 84701 89614 90815 92117 102971 103668 
71 77503 74432 81317 86025 87152 88389 95417 
72 72434 74301 71358 77930 82435 83487 84290 
73 61664 69287 71123 68306 74572 78875 79481 
74 50428 58608 65893 67683 65004 70944 73647 
75 46371 47612 55310 62225 63960 61429 65110 
76 47283 43254 44388 51541 58022 59683 58184 
77 35645 44283 40499 41542 48214 54310 55350 
78 29303 33101 41153 37627 38573 44745 48538 
79 28658 26789 30262 37651 34415 35261 39156 
80 23003 26060 24375 27536 34280 31327 31787 
81 22435 20505 23228 21742 24562 30601 28889 
82 15258 20127 18358 20792 19480 22008 25775 
83 12299 13507 17856 16265 18420 17269 18862 
84 8337 10827 11896 15752 14334 16233 15503 
85 6774 7154 9275 10198 13534 12299 13489 
86 5307 5775 6090 7881 8673 11541 10877 
87 3704 4567 4967 5230 6754 7440 9168 
88 3100 3065 3785 4114 4327 5576 6032 
89 1950 2575 2547 3153 3425 3595 4354 
90 1339 1617 2135 2113 2617 2842 2950 
91 957 1081 1307 1725 1707 2119 2264 
92 866 764 856 1036 1367 1354 1609 
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93 650 684 606 676 819 1080 1100 
94 288 550 579 515 572 693 837 
95 308 214 406 428 384 422 505 
96 228 249 173 328 346 310 334 
97 127 179 194 135 255 269 249 
98 95 89 126 136 95 179 195 
99 60 76 71 100 108 75 125 
100+ 97 145 146 143 165 185 179 
Total 20522351 20867643 21219363 21573970 21925590 22266817 22484810 
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B. Male 
Age 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
0 213149 233161 239633 244205 245914 243738 240257 
1 220786 209937 229647 236022 240526 242209 241322 
2 214576 219650 208857 228466 234807 239288 240477 
3 211464 213757 218812 208060 227594 233911 236970 
4 211979 210991 213279 218322 207594 227085 231331 
5 193007 211700 210714 212999 218035 207322 220304 
6 192598 192830 211506 210521 212804 217836 210709 
7 192717 192429 192661 211321 210336 212617 215979 
8 187220 192605 192317 192549 211198 210214 211736 
9 192041 187128 192510 192223 192455 211095 210441 
10 179774 191955 187044 192424 192137 192368 204778 
11 186063 179708 191885 186976 192354 192066 192221 
12 180004 185995 179642 191814 186907 192283 192095 
13 181345 179951 185940 179589 191758 186852 190429 
14 177578 181286 179892 185880 179531 191696 188426 
15 165840 177502 181208 179816 185800 179454 187551 
16 135916 165771 177428 181133 179741 185723 181494 
17 124312 135842 165681 177332 181035 179643 183623 
18 140549 124241 135764 165586 177230 180931 180003 
19 142173 140463 124165 135681 165485 177122 179582 
20 112805 142074 140365 124079 135587 165370 173112 
21 160319 112720 141967 140260 123985 135485 155305 
22 156829 160209 112643 141870 140163 123900 131550 
23 163840 156705 160083 112554 141758 140053 129229 
24 171686 163697 156568 159943 112456 141634 140503 
25 204918 171552 163569 156446 159818 112368 131778 
26 231737 204717 171384 163409 156293 159662 128093 
27 190989 231514 204520 171219 163252 156143 158378 
28 182409 190774 231254 204290 171027 163069 158336 
29 177042 182190 190545 230977 204045 170822 165525 
30 181888 176816 181958 190303 230682 203785 181689 
31 167219 181672 176607 181742 190077 230408 212516 
32 144533 167021 181457 176398 181527 189852 216671 
33 153209 144324 166780 181195 176143 181265 186804 
34 144268 152993 144121 166545 180940 175895 179300 
35 173559 144059 152772 143913 166304 180679 177323 
36 173750 173309 143852 152552 143706 166065 175629 
37 109842 173513 173073 143656 152344 143510 158375 
38 121100 109667 173237 172798 143428 152102 146222 
39 104739 120891 109478 172939 172500 143181 148947 
40 87811 104553 120677 109284 172632 172194 152687 
41 71306 87631 104339 120430 109061 172279 171986 
42 72103 71156 87447 104120 120177 108832 150823 
43 125647 71838 70895 87126 103738 119736 112225 
44 125442 125300 71640 70699 86885 103451 114078 
45 125313 125071 124929 71428 70490 86628 97627 
46 123151 124886 124645 124504 71185 70250 80961 
47 123883 122658 124386 124146 124006 70900 70282 
48 116910 123405 122185 123906 123667 123527 88247 
49 113973 116389 122855 121640 123355 123116 123026 
50 113472 113473 115879 122317 121107 122814 122605 
51 131251 112761 112763 115153 121551 120349 121500 
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52 117130 130520 112134 112135 114512 120874 120058 
53 112522 116396 129702 111430 111432 113794 117982 
54 108615 111681 115526 128733 110598 110599 112141 
55 119439 107696 110736 114548 127643 109662 109589 
56 105909 118059 106452 109457 113225 126169 114264 
57 98977 104575 116572 105111 108078 111799 120313 
58 89199 97591 103110 114939 103639 106564 108983 
59 73752 87800 96060 101493 113137 102013 103864 
60 77678 72327 86104 94204 99533 110951 103520 
61 65846 75766 70547 83985 91886 97083 104503 
62 55728 64009 73652 68579 81641 89322 92668 
63 55690 53990 62012 71355 66440 79095 84081 
64 46822 53829 52186 59941 68971 64220 72423 
65 43315 45089 51837 50254 57721 66418 63337 
66 37071 41663 43369 49860 48338 55521 61105 
67 34545 35426 39815 41445 47648 46194 50862 
68 31790 33036 33879 38076 39635 45567 44539 
69 28204 30063 31241 32039 36008 37482 41292 
70 23653 26596 28349 29460 30212 33955 34864 
71 23052 22114 24866 26505 27544 28246 30634 
72 22173 21463 20589 23151 24678 25645 26113 
73 19293 20617 19957 19145 21527 22946 23562 
74 14804 17843 19068 18457 17706 19909 20794 
75 12654 13558 16341 17462 16903 16215 17583 
76 12234 11431 12247 14761 15774 15269 14890 
77 9467 11103 10374 11115 13397 14316 13986 
78 7509 8459 9921 9270 9932 11970 12538 
79 7460 6610 7447 8734 8160 8743 10023 
80 5747 6563 5815 6551 7683 7179 7522 
81 4751 4911 5608 4969 5598 6566 6284 
82 3709 4012 4147 4736 4197 4728 5342 
83 3046 3157 3415 3530 4031 3572 3914 
84 1752 2605 2700 2921 3019 3448 3165 
85 1224 1440 2141 2219 2400 2481 2745 
86 865 986 1160 1725 1788 1934 2003 
87 652 700 798 939 1396 1447 1536 
88 527 508 545 622 731 1087 1126 
89 297 399 385 413 471 554 767 
90 206 237 319 307 330 376 424 
91 97 154 177 238 229 246 271 
92 97 63 99 114 154 148 165 
93 65 68 44 69 80 107 109 
94 20 50 52 33 53 61 74 
95 16 10 25 27 17 27 35 
96 8 12 8 19 20 13 18 
97 4 4 6 4 10 10 8 
98 6 2 2 3 2 6 7 
99 6 6 2 2 3 2 4 
100+ 3 8 7 5 3 4 4 
Total 9677663 9851654 10029015 10207853 10385263 10557312 10667094 
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e. Female 
Age 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
0 202939 222346 228499 232941 234456 232451 229301 
1 210042 200312 219468 225542 229926 231422 230506 
2 203175 208952 199273 218329 224371 228732 229794 
3 200499 202391 208145 198504 217487 223505 226483 
4 199899 200052 201940 207681 198061 217002 221054 
5 182769 199667 199820 201706 207441 197832 210449 
6 182631 182628 199513 199666 201550 207281 200895 
7 182833 182524 182521 199397 199549 201432 205254 
8 178441 182760 182451 182448 199317 199470 200727 
9 182326 178388 182706 182397 182394 199258 199359 
10 172115 182271 178334 182651 182342 182339 193565 
11 176936 172066 182219 178283 182599 182290 182290 
12 170892 176895 172026 182177 178242 182556 182351 
13 172857 170851 176853 171985 182133 178199 181071 
14 169548 172817 170811 176812 171945 182091 179473 
15 157932 169509 172777 170772 176771 171906 178656 
16 144342 157882 169455 172723 170718 176715 173476 
17 154284 144293 157828 169398 172664 170660 174648 
18 180339 154218 144231 157761 169325 172590 171258 
19 182611 180269 154158 144175 157700 169260 171427 
20 189742 182515 180174 154077 144100 157617 165308 
21 233283 189628 182405 180066 153985 144013 153013 
22 220871 233174 189540 182320 179982 153913 147273 
23 226904 220747 233043 189433 182218 179881 162528 
24 226710 226756 220603 232891 189310 182099 180543 
25 224771 226556 226602 220453 232733 189181 184383 
26 239173 224619 226403 226449 220304 232576 203597 
27 197600 239025 224480 226263 226309 220168 228332 
28 189012 197465 238862 224327 226109 226154 222067 
29 181874 188880 197327 238695 224170 225951 225982 
30 185696 181749 188750 197192 238531 224016 225203 
31 168625 185574 181630 188626 197062 238375 228717 
32 150377 168519 185457 181516 188508 196938 224426 
33 159870 150266 168395 185321 181382 188369 193978 
34 152244 159750 150153 168268 185182 181246 185894 
35 177963 152125 159625 150036 168137 185037 182421 
36 178792 177837 152017 159512 149930 168018 179270 
37 112365 178692 177738 151932 159423 149846 161874 
38 125615 112270 178541 177588 151804 159289 152917 
39 108729 125513 112179 178396 177443 151681 156662 
40 92739 108645 125416 112092 178259 177306 160159 
41 74455 92656 108548 125304 111992 178099 177464 
42 77080 74386 92570 108447 125188 111888 155864 
43 132014 76984 74294 92455 108313 125032 116189 
44 132190 131867 76898 74211 92352 108192 119314 
45 132448 132035 131713 76808 74124 92244 102777 
46 130561 132264 131852 131530 76702 74021 86072 
47 130925 130366 132067 131655 131334 76587 74800 
48 124733 130692 130135 131832 131421 131101 94702 
49 121180 124536 130486 129929 131625 131214 130995 
50 120493 120965 124316 130255 129699 131391 131100 
51 140678 120201 120672 124014 129939 129385 130516 
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52 125958 140370 119937 120407 123742 129654 129283 
53 120770 125670 140048 119663 120132 123459 127373 
54 117913 120422 125308 139645 119318 119786 121990 
55 139514 117542 120043 124913 139206 118943 119239 
56 118611 138998 117107 119599 124451 138691 125205 
57 111986 118060 138352 116563 119043 123873 133322 
58 107155 111457 117501 137698 116012 118480 121672 
59 99115 106591 110870 116883 136973 115401 117024 
60 107863 98531 105963 110217 116195 136166 121766 
61 95668 106885 97638 105003 109218 115141 128362 
62 80290 94810 105926 96762 104061 108238 112146 
63 86687 79524 93906 104916 95839 103068 105810 
64 76322 85770 78683 92912 103806 94825 99563 
65 75570 75356 84685 77687 91737 102493 96556 
66 66892 74576 74365 83571 76666 90530 97572 
67 65229 65814 73374 73167 82224 75430 84543 
68 63996 64090 64665 72093 71889 80788 76268 
69 59449 62682 62774 63337 70612 70413 76231 
70 53851 58105 61265 61355 61905 69016 68803 
71 54451 52318 56451 59520 59608 60142 64783 
72 50261 52838 50768 54779 57758 57843 58177 
73 42371 48670 51166 49161 53045 55929 55920 
74 35624 40765 46826 49227 47298 51035 52853 
75 33717 34054 38969 44762 47058 45214 47527 
76 35049 31823 32141 36780 42248 44414 43294 
77 26178 33179 30125 30427 34818 39994 41364 
78 21794 24642 31232 28357 28641 32775 36000 
79 21198 20178 22815 28917 26255 26518 29133 
80 17256 19497 18560 20985 26597 24149 24266 
81 17684 15594 17620 16772 18964 24036 22605 
82 11549 16115 14210 16056 15284 17281 20433 
83 9253 10350 14442 12735 14389 13697 14948 
84 6585 8221 9196 12832 11315 12785 12339 
85 5550 5714 7134 7979 11134 9818 10744 
86 4442 4789 4930 6156 6885 9607 8874 
87 3052 3867 4169 4292 5358 5993 7631 
88 2573 2557 3239 3492 3595 4489 4906 
89 1653 2176 2163 2740 2954 3041 3586 
90 1133 1380 1817 1806 2287 2466 2527 
91 860 928 1130 1487 1478 1873 1993 
92 769 702 757 922 1214 1206 1444 
93 585 617 563 607 739 973 991 
94 268 500 527 481 519 632 763 
95 292 204 381 402 366 395 469 
96 220 237 166 309 326 297 316 
97 123 175 188 131 245 259 240 
98 89 87 124 133 93 173 188 
99 54 70 68 97 105 73 120 
100+ 94 137 139 139 161 181 176 
Total 10844688 11015989 11190348 11366118 11540327 11709505 11817717 
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1-2. The 1993 Age Specific Death Rates 
A. Total 
Age Death Rate Survival Ratio 
0 0.0140328 0.985967157 
1 0.0051678 0.994832196 
2 0.0038368 0.996163201 
3 0.0022331 0.997766933 
4 0.0012391 0.998760879 
5 0.0008455 0.999154467 
6 0.000735 0.99926499 
7 0.0004924 0.999507632 
8 0.0003964 0.999603615 
9 0.0003765 0.999623506 
10 0.0003267 0.999673299 
11 0.0003002 0.999699814 
12 0.0002678 0.999732186 
13 0.0002794 0.999720577 
14 0.0003312 0.999668818 
15 0.0003674 0.999632592 
16 0.0004387 0.999561311 
17 0.0004915 0.99950849 
18 0.0004859 0.999514085 
19 0.0006 0.999399961 
20 0.0006573 0.999342683 
21 0.0005561 0.99944391 
22 0.0006562 0.999343825 
23 0.0007442 0.999255821 
24 0.0007224 0.999277623 
25 0.0008209 0.99917915 
26 0.0007872 0.999212784 
27 0.0008999 0.999100116 
28 0.0009441 0.999055873 
29 0.000977 0.999023011 
30 0.0009187 0.999081327 
31 0.0009044 0.999095636 
32 0.0010839 0.998916099 
33 0.0010721 0.998927939 
34 0.001105 0.998895028 
35 0.0010685 0.998931509 
36 0.000955 0.999044998 
37 0.0012136 0,998786391 
38 0.001259 0.998741023 
39 0.0012632 0.998736771 
40 0.0014545 0.998545459 
41 0.0015002 0.998499794 
42 0.0024207 0.997579324 
43 0.0019174 0.998082555 
44 0.0020414 0.997958622 
45 0.0023687 0.997631331 
46 0.0027122 0.997287757 
47 0.0027904 0.997209623 
48 0.0029708 0.99702925 
49 0.0030398 0.99696019 
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50 0.0042899 0.995710145 
51 0.0038246 0.996175446 
52 0.0042111 0.995788887 
53 0.0051005 0.994899526 
54 0.0057017 0.994298305 
55 0.0073371 0.992662928 
56 0.0084134 0.991586618 
57 0.0091028 0.990897178 
58 0.0100231 0.989976909 
59 0.01 16633 0.988336659 
60 0.0156349 0.984365052 
61 0.0167773 0.983222743 
62 0.0185229 0.981477072 
63 0.019638 0,980362049 
64 0.0220613 0.977938724 
65 0.0223997 0.977600342 
66 0.0263813 0.973618655 
67 0.0266996 0.973300426 
68 0.0320149 0.967985124 
69 0.0339458 0.966054247 
70 0.0399366 0.960063423 
71 0.0416584 0.958341577 
72 0.0437756 0.956224422 
73 0.049876 0.950124035 
74 0.0562033 0.943796672 
75 0.0675822 0.932417759 
76 0.0637771 0.936222873 
77 0.0718656 0.928134358 
78 0.0862515 0.91374848 
79 0.0910014 0.908998636 
80 0.1091015 0.890898528 
81 0.1037472 0.896252796 
82 0.1152218 0.884778197 
83 0.1199284 0.880071556 
84 0.1423722 0.857627816 
85 0.1480317 0.851968306 
86 0.1401491 0.85985094 
87 0.1732143 0.826785714 
88 0.1706795 0.829320492 
89 0.1709184 0.829081633 
90 0.1933735 0.806626506 
91 0.2051495 0.794850498 
92 0.2112933 0.78870674 
93 0.1547464 0.845253576 
94 0.2634271 0.73657289 
95 0.191601 0.80839895 
96 0.221843 0.778156997 
97 0.2983425 0.701657459 
98 0.2016807 0.798319328 
99 0.2105263 0.789473684 
100+ 0,404908 0.595092025 
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B. Male 
Age Death Rate Survival Ratio 
0 0.0150686 0.98493138 
1 0.0051458 0.994854187 
2 0.0038162 0.996183809 
3 0.0022365 0.997763497 
4 0.0013144 0.998685562 
5 0.0009162 0.999083775 
6 0,0008767 0.999123294 
7 0.0005 808 0.9994 191 75 
8 0.0004912 0.999508841 
9 0.0004476 0.999552379 
10 0.000367 0.999633007 
11 0.0003653 0.999634666 
12 0.0002944 0.999705649 
13 0.0003252 0.999674759 
14 0.0004278 0.999572202 
15 0.0004159 0.9995 84109 
16 0.0005442 0.999455842 
17 0.0005708 0.999429182 
18 0.0006115 0.999388488 
19 0.0006959 0.99930415 
20 0.0007529 0.999247055 
21 0.0006857 0.999314338 
22 0.00079 0.999209955 
23 0.000872 0.999127958 
24 0.0007799 0.999220114 
25 0.0009799 0.999020081 
26 0.0009614 0.999038627 
27 0.0011245 0.998875547 
28 0,0011992 0.998800841 
29 0.0012749 0.998725094 
30 0.0011861 0.998813865 
31 0.0011827 0.998817324 
32 0.0014439 0.998556051 
33 0.0014079 0.998592146 
34 0.0014466 0.998553403 
35 0.0014384 0.99856164 
36 0,0013622 0.998637829 
37 0.0015907 0.998409337 
38 0.0017229 0.998277127 
39 0.0017727 0.998227305 
40 0.0020457 0.997954336 
41 0.0020992 0.997900806 
42 0.0036756 0.996324393 
43 0.002762 0.997237986 
44 0.0029567 0.997043254 
45 0.0034038 0.996596178 
46 0.0040034 0.995996636 
47 0.0038597 0.996140331 
48 0.0044536 0.995546397 
49 0.0043852 0.995614763 
50 0.0062617 0.993738341 
51 0.0055688 0.994431228 
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52 0.0062697 0.993730328 
53 0.0074712 0.992528822 
54 0.0084625 0.991537492 
55 0.0115529 0.988447056 
56 0.0125956 0.987404438 
57 0.0140064 0.985993644 
58 0.0156809 0.984319135 
59 0.0193205 0.980679476 
60 0.0246114 0.975388634 
61 0.0279024 0.972097555 
62 0.0311881 0.968811933 
63 0.0334114 0.966588562 
64 0.0370203 0.962979721 
65 0.0381284 0.961871558 
66 0.0443648 0.955635183 
67 0.0436841 0.956315921 
68 0.0543194 0.945680628 
69 0.0570063 0.942993748 
70 0.0650619 0.93493814 
71 0.0689446 0.931055374 
72 0.0701585 0.929841483 
73 0.0751642 0.924835818 
74 0.0841942 0.915805753 
75 0.0966591 0.903340948 
76 0.0924332 0.907566766 
77 0.1064653 0.893534686 
78 0.1196952 0.880304807 
79 0.120283 0.879716981 
80 0.1454275 0.854572491 
81 0.1555279 0.844472094 
82 0.1489215 0.851078476 
83 0.1446223 0.855377703 
84 0.1782364 0.821763602 
85 0.1942067 0.805793285 
86 0.1908326 0.809167446 
87 0.2210275 0.778972521 
88 0.2428161 0.757183908 
89 0.2016129 0.798387097 
90 0.2536232 0.746376812 
91 0.3533333 0.646666667 
92 0.3021583 0.697841727 
93 0.2352941 0.764705882 
94 0.4871795 0.5 1 28205 13 
95 0.2380952 0.761904762 
96 0.5 0.5 
97 0.4285714 0.571428571 
98 0 1 
99 0.25 0.75 
100+ 0.625 0.375 
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C. Fernale 
Age Death Rate Survival Ratio 
0 0.0129426 0.987057393 
1 0.0051909 0.994809082 
2 0.0038586 0.996141438 
3 0.0022294 0.997770556 
4 0.0011592 0.998840759 
5 0.0007709 0.999229129 
6 0.0005855 0.999414462 
7 0.0003991 0.999600888 
8 0.0002969 0.999703071 
9 0.0003016 0.999698433 
10 0.0002846 0.999715388 
11 0.0002317 0.999768331 
12 0.0002399 0.99976014 
13 0.0002314 0.999768648 
14 0.00023 0.99977003 
15 0.0003165 0.999683508 
16 0.0003394 0.999660644 
17 0.0004276 0.9995724 
18 0.000388 0.999611993 
19 0.0005254 0.999474569 
20 0.0006005 0.999399545 
21 0.000467 0,999532975 
22 0.0005611 0.999438901 
23 0.0006518 0.999348167 
24 0.0006788 0.999321179 
25 0.0006758 0.999324213 
26 0.0006184 0.999381584 
27 0.0006827 0.999317268 
28 0.0006979 0.999302119 
29 0.0006868 0.999313183 
30 0.0006566 0.999343444 
31 0.0006282 0.999371781 
32 0.0007376 0.9992624 
33 0.00075 0.999249953 
34 0.000781 0.99921897 
35 0.0007075 0.999292489 
36 0.000559 0.999441004 
37 0.0008447 0.999155255 
38 0.0008113 0.999188654 
39 0.000772 0.999228033 
40 0.0008942 0.999105815 
41 0.0009259 0.999074124 
42 0.0012439 0.99875609 
43 0.0011123 0.99888772 
44 0.0011712 0.998828819 
45 0.0013873 0.998612703 
46 0.0014913 0.998508673 
47 0.0017765 0.998223517 
48 0.0015769 0.998423117 
49 0.0017711 0.998228922 
50 0.0024258 0.997574222 
51 0.0021917 0.997808309 
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52 0.0022892 0.997710837 
53 0.0028815 0.997118536 
54 0.0031449 0.996855053 
55 0.0036992 0.996300846 
56 0,004649 0.995350984 
57 0.0047281 0.995271868 
58 0.0052635 0.994736451 
59 0.0058875 0.994 11 2455 
60 0.0090675 0.990932476 
61 0.0089709 0.991029067 
62 0.0095358 0.990464207 
63 0.0105805 0.989419499 
64 0.012652 0.987347995 
65 0.0131502 0.986849837 
66 0.0161205 0.983879508 
67 0.017458 0.982542026 
68 0.0205393 0.979460651 
69 0.0226062 0.977393792 
70 0.0284689 0.971531148 
71 0.0296188 0.970381195 
72 0.0316546 0.968345407 
73 0.0378974 0.962102634 
74 0.0440616 0.955938389 
75 0.0561807 0.943819281 
76 0.0533438 0.946656223 
77 0.0586839 0.94 131 6073 
78 0.0741323 0.925867709 
79 0.0802274 0.919772639 
80 0.0963079 0.903692066 
81 0.0887354 0.911264557 
82 0.1038256 0.896174439 
83 0.1114845 0.88851546 
84 0.1322967 0.867703255 
85 0.1371269 0.862873134 
86 0.1295316 0.870468352 
87 0.1622289 0.837771068 
88 0.1541749 0.845825115 
89 0.1651515 0.834848485 
90 0.1813584 0.818641618 
91 0.1840607 0.815939279 
92 0.198123 0.801876955 
93 0.1447368 0.855263158 
94 0.2386364 0.761363636 
95 0.1888889 0.811111111 
96 0.2057762 0.794223827 
97 0.2931034 0.706896552 
98 0.2123894 0.787610619 
99 0.2058824 0.794117647 
100+ 0.3935484 0.60645 1613 
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1-3. Estimated Number of Deaths 
A. Total 
Age 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
0 12321 13053 13359 13531 13517 7403 
1 2226 2120 2321 2385 2431 1630 
2 1603 1644 1566 1714 1762 1196 
3 920 929 953 908 994 680 
4 510 509 514 528 502 366 
5 318 348 347 351 360 228 
6 276 276 302 301 305 208 
7 185 185 185 202 202 136 
8 145 149 149 149 163 108 
9 141 138 141 141 141 103 
10 115 122 119 123 122 82 
11 109 106 112 110 113 75 
12 94 97 94 100 98 67 
13 99 98 101 98 105 68 
14 115 117 116 120 116 82 
15 119 127 130 129 133 86 
16 123 144 154 157 156 107 
17 137 139 162 174 177 117 
18 156 136 139 162 174 118 
19 195 192 167 170 198 141 
20 199 217 214 186 189 146 
21 219 166 183 180 157 107 
22 248 257 195 214 212 123 
23 291 281 292 222 242 159 
24 288 282 272 283 216 156 
25 353 321 313 302 314 158 
26 371 336 305 297 286 198 
27 350 424 383 347 338 217 
28 351 367 444 402 363 235 
29 351 362 378 458 414 248 
30 338 329 340 355 430 259 
31 304 331 323 333 349 281 
32 320 365 399 389 401 279 
33 336 316 361 394 384 264 
34 328 346 326 372 406 264 
35 376 315 333 313 358 260 
36 337 335 281 297 280 213 
37 270 427 425 357 377 236 
38 311 280 443 442 370 261 
39 270 311 281 444 443 247 
40 263 311 359 324 513 340 
41 219 270 320 369 333 351 
42 361 354 437 518 597 359 
43 494 284 278 343 407 313 
44 526 525 302 296 365 288 
45 610 609 608 350 343 282 
46 688 697 696 695 399 261 
47 711 705 715 713 712 273 
48 717 756 749 760 758 504 
49 714 731 770 764 774 514 
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50 1003 1004 1027 1082 1073 724 
51 1039 891 892 913 962 635 
52 1023 1140 978 979 1001 702 
53 1189 1232 1373 1177 1179 803 
54 1290 1324 1372 1529 1311 874 
55 1896 1679 1723 1785 1990 1136 
56 1885 2133 1885 1935 2005 1487 
57 1916 2023 2287 2023 2077 1432 
58 1963 2117 2235 2527 2236 1528 
59 2008 2324 2509 2649 2992 1765 
60 2890 2674 3080 3318 3503 2640 
61 2695 3073 2844 3285 3544 2491 
62 2504 2900 3307 3062 3539 2542 
63 2778 2645 3065 3494 3234 2485 
64 2699 3078 2927 3395 3867 2382 
65 2645 2710 3090 2938 3407 2583 
66 2723 3051 3123 3559 3380 2611 
67 2648 2697 3020 3088 3517 2220 
68 3041 3111 3168 3549 3630 2753 
69 2952 3131 3200 3258 3649 2482 
70 3072 3385 3589 3663 3728 2779 
71 3202 3074 3386 3590 3665 2482 
72 3147 3178 3052 3358 3560 2417 
73 3056 3394 3439 3302 3628 2559 
74 2816 3298 3669 3723 3575 2613 
75 3117 3224 3769 4203 4278 2735 
76 3000 2754 2847 3326 3712 2517 
77 2544 3129 2872 2969 3470 2577 
78 2514 2839 3503 3212 3312 2571 
79 2598 2414 2726 3370 3088 2116 
80 2498 2832 2633 2974 3679 2243 
81 2308 2148 2436 2261 2553 2100 
82 1751 2271 2093 2372 2212 1663 
83 1472 1610 2104 1930 2187 1360 
84 1183 1552 1698 2218 2035 1535 
85 999 1063 1394 1525 1993 1217 
86 740 809 860 1127 1233 1074 
87 639 782 853 904 1178 860 
88 525 518 632 689 732 637 
89 333 440 435 536 583 409 
90 258 310 410 405 498 361 
91 193 225 270 358 353 287 
92 182 158 180 217 287 189 
93 100 105 92 104 126 111 
94 74 144 151 131 150 120 
95 59 41 78 82 73 54 
96 49 55 38 73 77 45 
97 38 53 58 40 76 53 
98 19 18 26 28 20 25 
99 13 16 15 21 22 10 
100+ 39 59 59 57 66 49 
Sum 116738 123073 129329 135588 141739 96841 
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B. Male 
Age 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
0 6779 7180 7347 7442 7435 4071 
1 1136 1080 1182 1215 1238 830 
2 819 838 797 872 896 608 
3 473 478 489 465 509 348 
4 279 277 280 287 273 199 
5 177 194 193 195 200 126 
6 169 169 185 185 187 127 
7 112 112 112 123 122 82 
8 92 95 94 95 104 69 
9 86 84 86 86 86 63 
10 66 70 69 71 71 47 
11 68 66 70 68 70 47 
12 53 55 53 56 55 38 
13 59 59 60 58 62 40 
14 76 78 77 80 77 55 
15 69 74 75 75 77 50 
16 74 90 97 99 98 67 
17 71 78 95 101 103 68 
18 86 76 83 101 108 74 
19 99 98 86 94 115 82 
20 85 107 106 93 102 83 
21 110 77 97 96 85 62 
22 124 127 89 112 111 65 
23 143 137 140 98 124 81 
24 134 128 122 125 88 74 
25 201 168 160 153 157 73 
26 223 197 165 157 150 102 
27 215 260 230 193 184 117 
28 219 229 277 245 205 130 
29 226 232 243 294 260 145 
30 216 210 216 226 274 161 
31 198 215 209 215 225 181 
32 209 241 262 255 262 183 
33 216 203 235 255 248 170 
34 209 221 208 241 262 169 
35 250 207 220 207 239 173 
36 237 236 196 208 196 151 
37 175 276 275 229 242 152 
38 209 189 298 298 247 174 
39 186 214 194 307 306 169 
40 180 214 247 224 353 235 
41 150 184 219 253 229 241 
42 265 262 321 383 442 266 
43 347 198 196 241 287 220 
44 371 370 212 209 257 204 
45 427 426 425 243 240 196 
46 493 500 499 498 285 187 
47 478 473 480 479 479 182 
48 521 550 544 552 551 366 
49 500 510 539 533 541 359 
50 711 711 726 766 758 512 
51 731 628 628 641 677 446 
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52 734 818 703 703 718 505 
53 841 870 969 833 833 566 
54 919 945 978 1089 936 623 
55 1380 1244 1279 1323 1475 843 
56 1334 1487 1341 1379 1426 1058 
57 1386 1465 1633 1472 1514 1043 
58 1399 1530 1617 1802 1625 1112 
59 1425 1696 1856 1961 2186 1312 
60 1912 1780 2119 2319 2450 1818 
61 1837 2114 1968 2343 2564 1803 
62 1738 1996 2297 2139 2546 1855 
63 1861 1804 2072 2384 2220 1759 
64 1733 1993 1932 2219 2553 1583 
65 1652 1719 1976 1916 2201 1686 
66 1645 1848 1924 2212 2145 1640 
67 1509 1548 1739 1811 2081 1343 
68 1727 1794 1840 2068 2153 1648 
69 1608 1714 1781 1826 2053 1423 
70 1539 1730 1844 1917 1966 1471 
71 1589 1525 1714 1827 1899 1297 
72 1556 1506 1445 1624 1731 1198 
73 1450 1550 1500 1439 1618 1148 
74 1246 1502 1605 1554 1491 1116 
75 1223 1310 1579 1688 1634 1043 
76 1131 1057 1132 1364 1458 940 
77 1008 1182 1105 1183 1426 1015 
78 899 1013 1188 1110 1189 954 
79 897 795 896 1051 982 700 
80 836 954 846 953 1117 695 
81 739 764 872 773 871 680 
82 552 597 618 705 625 469 
83 441 457 494 510 583 344 
84 312 464 481 521 538 409 
85 238 280 416 431 466 321 
86 165 188 221 329 341 246 
87 144 155 176 207 309 213 
88 128 123 132 151 178 176 
89 60 80 78 83 95 74 
90 52 60 81 78 84 63 
91 34 54 63 84 81 58 
92 29 19 30 35 46 30 
93 15 16 10 16 19 17 
94 10 24 25 16 26 20 
95 4 2 6 6 4 4 
96 4 6 4 10 10 4 
97 2 2 3 2 4 3 
98 0 0 0 0 0 0 
99 2 2 1 1 1 0 
100+ 2 5 5 3 2 2 
Sum 62740 65938 69104 72266 75419 51450 
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C. Female 
Age 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
0 5542 5874 6012 6089 6082 3332 
1 1090 1040 1139 1171 1194 800 
2 784 806 769 842 866 588 
3 447 451 464 443 485 332 
4 232 232 234 241 230 167 
5 141 154 154 155 160 102 
6 107 107 117 117 118 81 
7 73 73 73 80 80 54 
8 53 54 54 54 59 39 
9 55 54 55 55 55 40 
10 49 52 51 52 52 35 
11 41 40 42 41 42 28 
12 41 42 41 44 43 29 
13 40 40 41 40 42 27 
14 39 40 39 41 40 28 
15 50 54 55 54 56 36 
16 49 54 58 59 58 40 
17 66 62 67 72 74 49 
18 70 60 56 61 66 45 
19 96 95 81 76 83 59 
20 114 110 108 93 87 63 
21 109 89 85 84 72 45 
22 124 131 106 102 101 57 
23 148 144 152 123 119 78 
24 154 154 150 158 129 82 
25 152 153 153 149 157 85 
26 148 139 140 140 136 96 
27 135 163 153 154 155 100 
28 132 138 167 157 158 105 
29 125 130 136 164 154 103 
30 122 119 124 129 157 98 
31 106 117 114 118 124 100 
32 111 124 137 134 139 97 
33 120 113 126 139 136 94 
34 119 125 117 131 145 94 
35 126 108 113 106 119 87 
36 100 99 85 89 84 63 
37 95 151 150 128 135 84 
38 102 91 145 144 123 86 
39 84 97 87 138 137 78 
40 83 97 112 100 159 106 
41 69 86 101 116 104 110 
42 96 93 115 135 156 93 
43 147 86 83 103 120 93 
44 155 154 90 87 108 84 
45 184 183 183 107 103 85 
46 195 197 197 196 114 73 
47 233 232 235 234 233 91 
48 197 206 205 208 207 138 
49 215 221 231 230 233 155 
50 292 293 302 316 315 212 
51 308 263 264 272 285 189 
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52 288 321 275 276 283 198 
53 348 362 404 345 346 237 
54 371 379 394 439 375 251 
55 516 435 444 462 515 293 
56 551 646 544 556 579 429 
57 529 558 654 551 563 390 
58 564 587 618 725 611 415 
59 584 628 653 688 806 452 
60 978 893 961 999 1054 822 
61 858 959 876 942 980 688 
62 766 904 1010 923 992 687 
63 917 841 994 1110 1014 726 
64 966 1085 995 1176 1313 799 
65 994 991 1114 1022 1206 897 
66 1078 1202 1199 1347 1236 972 
67 1139 1149 1281 1277 1435 877 
68 1314 1316 1328 1481 1477 1105 
69 1344 1417 1419 1432 1596 1060 
70 1533 1654 1744 1747 1762 1308 
71 1613 1550 1672 1763 1766 1186 
72 1591 1673 1607 1734 1828 1219 
73 1606 1844 1939 1863 2010 1411 
74 1570 1796 2063 2169 2084 1497 
75 1894 1913 2189 2515 2644 1691 
76 1870 1698 1715 1962 2254 1577 
77 1536 1947 1768 1786 2043 1563 
78 1616 1827 2315 2102 2123 1618 
79 1701 1619 1830 2320 2106 1416 
80 1662 1878 1787 2021 2562 1548 
81 1569 1384 1563 1488 1683 1420 
82 1199 1673 1475 1667 1587 1194 
83 1032 1154 1610 1420 1604 1017 
84 871 1088 1217 1698 1497 1126 
85 761 784 978 1094 1527 896 
86 575 620 639 797 892 828 
87 495 627 676 696 869 647 
88 397 394 499 538 554 461 
89 273 359 357 453 488 334 
90 205 250 330 327 415 298 
91 158 171 208 274 272 229 
92 152 139 150 183 240 159 
93 85 89 81 88 107 94 
94 64 119 126 115 124 100 
95 55 39 72 76 69 50 
96 45 49 34 64 67 41 
97 36 51 55 39 72 50 
98 19 18 26 28 20 25 
99 11 14 14 20 22 10 
100+ 37 54 55 55 64 47 
Sum 53998 57136 60226 63322 66321 45391 
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1-4. The 1993 Fertility Rates By Mother's Age 
Age Total Male Female 
20 0.002358 0.00117 0.001188 
21 0.009575 0.004915 0.004659 
22 0.032456 0.016636 0.01582 
23 0.077203 0.039807 0.037396 
24 0.205223 0.104417 0.100806 
25 0.268947 0.141354 0.127593 
26 0.288672 0.144314 0.144358 
27 0.293132 0.150145 0.142987 
28 0.272097 0.138266 0.133831 
29 0.232419 0.118565 0.113854 
30 0.183789 0.094723 0.089066 
31 0.131857 0.067223 0.064634 
32 0.082535 0.042828 0.039707 
33 0.056191 0.029019 0.027172 
34 0.041624 0.021827 0.019796 
35 0.02848 0.014577 0.013903 
36 0.021882 0.011557 0.010325 
37 0.013137 0.006919 0.006218 
38 0.011453 0.00578 0.005673 
39 0.009949 0.005337 0.004611 
40 0.006184 0.003496 0.002688 
41 0.003871 0.002033 0.001837 
42 0.003231 0.001845 0.001387 
43 0.002977 0.001433 0.001544 
44 0.002017 0.001212 0.000805 
45 0.001365 0.000846 0.000519 
46 0.001145 0.000771 0.000374 
47 0.001146 0.000743 0.000404 
48 0.001078 0.000573 0.000505 
49 0.001149 0.000702 0.000447 
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1-5. Estimated Births (By Mother's Age) 
A. Total 
Mother's Ade 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
20 439 428 394 352 356 253 
21 2025 1781 1735 1599 1427 947 
22 7368 6860 6034 5879 5418 3254 
23 17280 17517 16308 14346 13978 8800 
24 46531 45904 46534 43323 38111 24774 
25 60691 60938 60117 60942 56736 33444 
26 66942 65099 65363 64483 65367 41913 
27 63994 67934 66064 66332 65438 43763 
28 52580 59362 63016 61281 61530 40598 
29 43085 44881 50670 53789 52308 34965 
30 33766 34047 35466 40041 42506 27483 
31 23352 24209 24410 25428 28708 20502 
32 13160 14608 15144 15270 15906 11577 
33 8713 8953 9938 10303 10388 7152 
34 6493 6450 6627 7356 7626 5087 
35 4700 4439 4410 4531 5029 3484 
36 3902 3609 3408 3386 3479 2530 
37 1912 2341 2165 2045 2031 1363 
38 1362 1665 2039 1886 1782 1190 
39 1165 1182 1445 1770 1637 1021 
40 623 724 734 898 1099 695 
41 323 389 453 459 561 458 
42 245 270 325 377 383 288 
43 311 225 248 299 347 239 
44 266 211 152 168 202 153 
45 180 180 142 103 114 89 
46 150 151 151 119 86 61 
47 150 150 151 151 119 58 
48 138 141 141 142 141 81 
49 141 147 150 150 151 100 
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B. Male 
Mother's Age 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
20 218 212 196 174 177 126 
21 1039 914 891 821 732 486 
22 3777 3516 3093 3014 2777 1668 
23 8910 9032 8409 7397 7207 4537 
24 23675 23356 23676 22043 19391 12605 
25 31898 32028 31597 32030 29820 17578 
26 33466 32545 32677 32236 32679 20953 
27 32778 34796 33838 33976 33518 22416 
28 26718 30165 32022 31140 31266 20630 
29 21979 22895 25849 27440 26684 17837 
30 17403 17547 18279 20637 21907 14164 
31 11905 12342 12445 12964 14636 10452 
32 6829 7580 7858 7924 8254 6007 
33 4500 4624 5132 5321 5365 3693 
34 3405 3382 3475 3857 3999 2668 
35 2406 2272 2257 2319 2574 1783 
36 2061 1906 1800 1788 1837 1336 
37 1007 1233 1140 1077 1070 718 
38 688 840 1029 952 899 601 
39 625 634 775 950 878 548 
40 352 409 415 508 622 393 
41 170 205 238 241 295 241 
42 140 154 185 215 219 164 
43 150 108 119 144 167 115 
44 160 126 92 101 122 92 
45 112 112 88 64 70 55 
46 101 102 102 80 58 41 
47 97 97 98 98 77 37 
48 73 75 75 75 75 43 
49 86 90 91 92 92 61 
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C. Female 
Mother's Age 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
20 221 215 199 177 179 128 
21 985 867 844 778 694 461 
22 3591 3344 2941 2866 2641 1586 
23 8370 8485 7900 6949 6771 4262 
24 22856 22548 22858 21280 18720 12169 
25 28793 28910 28520 28912 26917 15866 
26 33476 32554 32686 32246 32688 20960 
27 31216 33138 32225 32356 31920 21347 
28 25861 29197 30995 30141 30263 19968 
29 21106 21986 24822 26350 25624 17128 
30 16363 16499 17187 19404 20599 13318 
31 11447 11867 11966 12464 14072 10050 
32 6331 7028 7286 7346 7652 5569 
33 4214 4329 4806 4982 5023 3458 
34 3088 3068 3152 3499 3627 2419 
35 2295 2167 2153 2212 2455 1701 
36 1841 1703 1608 1598 1641 1194 
37 905 1108 1025 968 962 645 
38 675 825 1010 934 882 590 
39 540 548 670 820 759 473 
40 271 315 319 390 478 302 
41 154 185 215 218 266 217 
42 105 116 139 162 164 124 
43 161 117 129 155 180 124 
44 106 84 61 67 81 61 
45 69 68 54 39 43 34 
46 49 49 49 39 28 20 
47 53 53 53 53 42 20 
48 64 66 66 66 66 38 
49 55 57 58 59 59 39 
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1-6. Life Table (Total Population) 
Qx Px 1x dx Lx Tx ex 
0 0.014033 0.985967 100000 1403 99018 7257974 72.580 
1 0.005168 0.994832 98597 510 98342 7158956 72.608 
2 0.003837 0.996163 98087 376 97899 7060614 71.983 
3 0.002233 0.997767 97711 218 97602 6962715 71.258 
4 0.001239 0.998761 97493 121 97432 6865113 70.417 
5 0.000846 0.999154 97372 82 97331 6767681 69.503 
6 0.000735 0.999265 97290 72 97254 6670351 68.562 
7 0.000492 0.999508 97218 48 97194 6573097 67.612 
8 0.000396 0.999604 97170 39 97151 6475903 66.645 
9 0.000376 0.999624 97132 37 97113 6378752 65.671 
10 0.000327 0.999673 97095 32 97079 6281638 64.696 
11 0.000300 0.999700 97063 29 97049 6184559 63.717 
12 0.000268 0.999732 97034 26 97021 6087511 62.736 
13 0.000279 0.999721 97008 27 96995 5990489 61.752 
14 0.000331 0.999669 96981 32 96965 5893495 60.770 
15 0.000367 0.999633 96949 36 96931 5796530 59.789 
16 0.000439 0.999561 96913 43 96892 5699598 58.811 
17 0.000492 0.999508 96871 48 96847 5602706 57.837 
18 0.000486 0.999514 96823 47 96800 5505859 56.865 
19 0.000600 0.999400 96776 58 96747 5409060 55.892 
20 0.000657 0.999343 96718 64 96686 5312312 54.926 
21 0.000556 0.999444 96655 54 96628 5215626 53.962 
22 0.000656 0.999344 96601 63 96569 5118998 52.991 
23 0.000744 0.999256 96537 72 96501 5022429 52.026 
24 0.000722 0.999278 96466 70 96431 4925928 51.064 
25 0.000821 0.999179 96396 79 96356 4829497 50.101 
26 0.000787 0.999213 96317 76 96279 4733141 49.141 
27 0.000900 0.999100 96241 87 96198 4636862 48.180 
28 0.000944 0.999056 96154 91 96109 4540664 47.223 
29 0.000977 0.999023 96064 94 96017 4444555 46.267 
30 0.000919 0.999081 95970 88 95926 4348539 45.312 
31 0.000904 0.999096 95882 87 95838 4252613 44.353 
32 0.001084 0.998916 95795 104 95743 4156775 43.392 
33 0.001072 0.998928 95691 103 95640 4061032 42.439 
34 0.001105 0.998895 95588 106 95536 3965392 41.484 
35 0,001068 0.998932 95483 102 95432 3869857 40.529 
36 0.000955 0.999045 95381 91 95335 3774425 39.572 
37 0.001214 0.998786 95290 116 95232 3679090 38.610 
38 0.001259 0.998741 95174 120 95114 3583858 37.656 
39 0.001263 0.998737 95054 120 94994 3488744 36.703 
40 0.001455 0.998545 94934 138 94865 3393750 35.748 
41 0.001500 0.998500 94796 142 94725 3298885 34.800 
42 0.002421 0.997579 94654 229 94539 3204160 33.851 
43 0.001917 0.998083 94425 181 94334 3109620 32.932 
44 0.002041 0.997959 94244 192 94147 3015286 31.995 
45 0.002369 0.997631 94051 223 93940 2921139 31.059 
46 0.002712 0.997288 93828 254 93701 2827199 30.132 
47 0.002790 0.997210 93574 261 93443 2733498 29.212 
48 0.002971 0.997029 93313 277 93174 2640054 28.292 
49 0.003040 0.996960 93036 283 92894 2546880 27.375 
50 0.004290 0.995710 92753 398 92554 2453986 26.457 
51 0.003825 0.996175 92355 353 92178 2361432 25.569 
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52 0.004211 0.995789 92002 387 91808 2269253 24.665 
53 0.005100 0.994900 91614 467 91381 2177445 23.768 
54 0.005702 0.994298 91147 520 90887 2086065 22.887 
55 0.007337 0.992663 90627 665 90295 1995178 22.015 
56 0.008413 0.991587 89962 757 89584 1904883 21.174 
57 0.009103 0.990897 89206 812 88800 1815299 20.350 
58 0.010023 0.989977 88394 886 87951 1726499 19.532 
59 0.011663 0.988337 87508 1021 86997 1638549 18.725 
60 0.015635 0.984365 86487 1352 85811 1551551 17.940 
61 0.016777 0.983223 85135 1428 84421 1465741 17.217 
62 0.018523 0.981477 83706 1550 82931 1381320 16.502 
63 0.019638 0.980362 82156 1613 81349 1298389 15.804 
64 0.022061 0.977939 80542 1777 79654 1217040 15.111 
65 0.022400 0.977600 78766 1764 77883 1137386 14.440 
66 0.026381 0.973619 77001 2031 75986 1059502 13.760 
67 0.026700 0.973300 74970 2002 73969 983517 13.119 
68 0.032015 0.967985 72968 2336 71800 909548 12.465 
69 0.033946 0.966054 70632 2398 69433 837747 11.861 
70 0.039937 0.960063 68235 2725 66872 768314 11.260 
71 0.041658 0.958342 65509 2729 64145 701442 10.707 
72 0.043776 0.956224 62780 2748 61406 637297 10.151 
73 0.049876 0.950124 60032 2994 58535 575891 9.593 
74 0.056203 0.943797 57038 3206 55435 517356 9.070 
75 0.067582 0.932418 53832 3638 52013 461921 8.581 
76 0.063777 0.936223 50194 3201 48594 409907 8.166 
77 0.071866 0.928134 46993 3377 45304 361314 7.689 
78 0.086252 0.913748 43616 3762 41735 316009 7.245 
79 0.091001 0.908999 39854 3627 38040 274275 6.882 
80 0.109101 0.890899 36227 3952 34251 236234 6.521 
81 0.103747 0.896253 32275 3348 30600 201983 6.258 
82 0.115222 0.884778 28926 3333 27260 171383 5.925 
83 0.119928 0.880072 25593 3069 24059 144123 5.631 
84 0.142372 0.857628 22524 3207 20921 120064 5.331 
85 0.148032 0.851968 19317 2860 17887 99144 5.132 
86 0.140149 0.859851 16458 2307 15304 81256 4.937 
87 0.173214 0.826786 14151 2451 12926 65952 4.661 
88 0.170680 0.829320 11700 1997 10701 53027 4.532 
89 0.170918 0.829082 9703 1658 8874 42325 4.362 
90 0.193373 0.806627 8045 1556 7267 33451 4.158 
91 0.205150 0.794850 6489 1331 5823 26185 4.035 
92 0.211293 0.788707 5158 1090 4613 20361 3.948 
93 0.154746 0.845254 4068 630 3753 15748 3.871 
94 0.263427 0.736573 3438 906 2986 11995 3.489 
95 0.191601 0.808399 2533 485 2290 9010 3.557 
96 0.221843 0.778157 2047 454 1820 6720 3.282 
97 0.298343 0.701657 1593 475 1356 4899 3.075 
98 0.201681 0.798319 1118 225 1005 3544 3.170 
99 0.210526 0.789474 892 188 798 2539 2.844 
100+ 1.000000 0.000000 705 705 1740 1740 2.470 
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2. Estimation Results using Official Population Figures of 31 August 
1999.8.31 
2-1. Estimated Population 
A. Total 
Age 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
0 416088 447905 459973 468486 471313 466884 458538 
1 430828 403560 434421 446126 454382 457124 456264 
2 417751 426050 399085 429604 441178 449343 451453 
3 411963 414312 422543 395799 426067 437546 443294 
4 411878 409989 412326 420518 393902 424025 431847 
5 375776 410783 408899 411230 419400 392855 412949 
6 375229 375094 410037 408157 410484 418639 401011 
7 375550 374637 374503 409390 407514 409837 415308 
8 365661 375153 374241 374107 408958 407083 408647 
9 374367 365350 374834 373923 373788 408609 407366 
10 351889 374065 365055 374531 373621 373486 396665 
11 362999 351642 373802 364799 374268 373359 373274 
12 350896 362765 351416 373561 364564 374027 373428 
13 354202 350694 362557 351214 373347 364355 370650 
14 347126 353990 350484 362339 351004 373123 367129 
15 323772 346879 353738 350235 362082 350754 365467 
16 280258 323517 346606 353459 349959 361796 354246 
17 278596 279994 323208 346276 353122 349625 357491 
18 320888 278302 279696 322861 345903 352743 350416 
19 324784 320553 278011 279398 322513 345531 350063 
20 302547 324366 320141 277652 279033 322089 337390 
21 393602 302120 323901 319682 277254 278629 307279 
22 377700 393132 301765 323510 319296 276918 277818 
23 390744 377168 392580 301346 323051 318843 290643 
24 398396 390120 376567 391956 300872 322533 319738 
25 429689 397778 389516 375984 391350 300409 314803 
26 470910 428932 397090 388845 375337 390679 330215 
27 388589 470115 428212 396437 388209 374725 384910 
28 371421 387839 469207 427392 395694 387486 378514 
29 358916 370669 387053 468256 426533 394919 389459 
30 367584 358164 369893 386243 467275 425648 404652 
31 335844 366859 357458 369165 385483 466356 438686 
32 294910 335192 366149 356767 368452 384739 438477 
33 313079 294224 334409 365295 355936 367596 378424 
34 296512 312359 293547 333636 364453 355116 362862 
35 351522 295809 311617 292850 332840 363585 357387 
36 352542 350716 295134 310905 292181 332076 352532 
37 222207 351820 349997 294533 310271 291584 318071 
38 246715 221628 350905 349087 293771 309466 297040 
39 213468 246049 221028 349956 348143 292980 303410 
40 180550 212889 245382 220428 349007 347198 310510 
41 145761 179987 212223 244614 219737 347914 346706 
42 149183 145292 179409 211540 243827 219028 304082 
43 257661 148409 144534 178476 210436 242554 226161 
44 257632 256601 147801 143939 177744 209570 230883 
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45 257761 256504 255478 147157 143309 176969 198067 
46 253712 256451 255201 254180 146413 142582 164894 
47 254808 252236 254960 253717 252703 145567 143020 
48 241643 253283 250729 253437 252202 251193 180133 
49 235153 240104 251667 249133 251824 250597 249924 
50 233965 233620 238542 250028 247514 250188 249229 
51 271929 231813 231475 236356 247735 245247 247076 
52 243088 269699 229912 229579 234424 245708 244022 
53 233292 240893 267267 227838 227511 232318 239691 
54 226528 230741 238266 264354 225354 225035 228156 
55 258953 223760 227921 235361 261134 222608 222222 
56 224520 254885 220187 224280 231611 256978 231498 
57 210963 220474 250356 216217 220235 227444 244076 
58 196354 206852 216186 245559 212008 215947 220603 
59 172867 192142 202370 211510 240329 207420 209833 
60 185541 168557 187230 197139 206054 234231 212238 
61 161514 179340 162920 180831 190337 198956 217270 
62 136018 155730 172899 157063 174171 183251 188778 
63 142377 130646 149667 166147 150925 167189 172997 
64 123144 136416 125132 143439 159213 144620 154964 
65 118885 117352 130009 119211 136742 151758 142391 
66 103963 113209 111731 123790 113465 130237 139743 
67 99774 98120 106882 105467 116860 107067 117924 
68 95786 94092 92557 100853 99501 110257 103776 
69 87653 89260 87676 86274 94044 92763 99633 
70 77504 81319 82857 81381 80107 87356 86394 
71 77503 70912 74408 75860 74504 73362 78015 
72 72434 70632 64688 67881 69249 68006 67392 
73 61664 65682 64211 58861 61771 63052 62237 
74 50428 55107 58834 57655 52897 55515 56301 
75 46371 44385 48503 51911 50999 46832 48341 
76 47283 39682 37981 41504 44529 43855 41658 
77 35645 40845 34298 32827 35872 38572 38258 
78 29303 30186 34696 29155 27903 30491 32123 
79 28658 23908 24670 28437 23911 22883 24556 
80 23003 23083 19312 19956 23058 19398 18832 
81 22435 17643 17730 14885 15408 17853 16097 
82 15258 17482 13717 13808 11642 12077 13595 
83 12299 11500 13281 10406 10486 8865 9239 
84 8337 9140 8569 9951 7789 7855 7024 
85 6774 5798 6338 5965 6979 5456 5635 
86 5307 4631 3959 4314 4078 4813 4175 
87 3704 3718 3250 2776 3016 2862 3305 
88 3100 2332 2359 2065 1762 1910 1931 
89 1950 1974 1496 1528 1340 1142 1261 
90 1339 1236 1255 953 976 857 788 
91 957 786 729 744 567 585 560 
92 866 544 441 413 427 328 360 
93 650 476 307 249 233 242 219 
94 288 435 322 210 170 160 162 
95 308 131 197 149 101 81 89 
96 228 181 78 117 88 60 53 
97 127 123 97 43 65 49 38 
98 95 46 46 36 16 24 25 
99 60 54 25 25 20 9 13 
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100+ 97 130 49 21 17 14 10 
Total 20522351 20733755 20956875 21187517 21419153 21644079 21787000 
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B. Male 
Age 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
0 213149 228985 235164 239475 240977 238678 234263 
1 220786 206257 221581 227560 231731 233185 232849 
2 214576 218348 203979 219134 225047 229173 230285 
3 211464 212819 216560 202309 217340 223204 226107 
4 211979 210449 211798 215521 201338 216297 220285 
5 193007 211381 209856 211200 214913 200770 210749 
6 192598 192628 210966 209443 210785 214490 205091 
7 192717 192236 192265 210569 209049 210388 212882 
8 187220 192477 191996 192026 210306 208788 209688 
9 192041 187023 192274 191794 191823 210085 209079 
10 179774 191857 186843 192089 191610 191639 203796 
11 186063 179632 191705 186696 191938 191459 191478 
12 180004 185917 179492 191555 186550 191788 191475 
13 181345 179890 185800 179378 191434 186432 189915 
14 177578 181218 179765 185670 179253 191301 187962 
15 165840 177415 181052 179600 185500 179088 187105 
16 135916 165692 177257 180891 179439 185334 181057 
17 124312 135757 165499 177050 180679 179230 183149 
18 140549 124160 135591 165296 176833 180458 179490 
19 142173 140365 123997 135413 165079 176601 179005 
20 112805 141961 140155 123812 135211 164832 172491 
21 160319 112623 141731 139929 123612 134992 154696 
22 156829 160083 112457 141523 139723 123430 130993 
23 163840 156563 159812 112266 141283 139486 128646 
24 171686 163533 156270 159513 112056 141019 139830 
25 204918 171399 163260 156009 159246 111869 131118 
26 231737 204487 171038 162916 155681 158911 127415 
27 190989 231259 204065 170685 162580 155359 157495 
28 182409 190528 230701 203573 170274 162188 157383 
29 177042 181940 190038 230107 203049 169835 164456 
30 181888 176558 181442 189518 229478 202494 180431 
31 167219 181425 176108 180980 189036 228894 210960 
32 144533 166795 180965 175661 180521 188556 215023 
33 153209 144085 166278 180404 175117 179961 185303 
34 144268 152746 143650 165776 179859 174588 177804 
35 173559 143820 152272 143204 165261 179301 175800 
36 173750 173023 143376 151802 142762 164751 174085 
37 109842 173242 172518 142957 151358 142345 156940 
38 121100 109467 172651 171929 142469 150842 144845 
39 104739 120652 109062 172013 171293 141943 147500 
40 87811 104341 120193 108648 171358 170642 151129 
41 71306 87426 103883 119666 108171 170606 170127 
42 72103 70985 87032 103415 119127 107683 149045 
43 125647 71534 70425 86345 102599 118187 110662 
44 125442 124902 71110 70008 85834 101991 112319 
45 125313 124646 124110 70659 69563 85289 95983 
46 123151 124398 123736 123203 70143 69055 79455 
47 123883 122093 123329 122673 122145 69541 68826 
48 116910 122857 121082 122308 121657 121133 86272 
49 113973 115793 121683 119925 121139 120494 120154 
50 113472 112901 114703 120538 118796 11999.8.319 119467 
51 131251 111947 111384 113162 118918 117200 118037 
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52 117130 129683 110610 110053 111810 117497 116327 
53 112522 115554 127938 109122 108572 110305 113999 
54 108615 110718 113702 125887 107372 106831 107929 
55 119439 106643 108708 111637 123601 105422 104919 
56 105909 116478 103999 106013 108869 120537 108591 
57 98977 103047 113330 101188 103147 105927 113501 
58 89199 96002 99949 109924 98147 100047 101801 
59 73752 86198 92772 96586 106225 94844 95941 
60 77678 70694 82624 88926 92582 101821 94237 
61 65846 73576 66961 78261 84229 87693 93547 
62 55728 61904 69170 62952 73575 79186 81343 
63 55690 51998 57761 64541 58739 68651 72221 
64 46822 51697 48270 53620 59914 54527 60785 
65 43315 43103 47591 44436 49360 55155 51813 
66 37071 39771 39576 43697 40800 45322 48908 
67 34545 33542 35985 35808 39537 36916 39830 
68 31790 31307 30398 32612 32452 35831 34090 
69 28204 28085 27658 26855 28811 28669 30806 
70 23653 24754 24649 24274 23570 25286 25199 
71 23052 20351 21298 21208 20886 20279 21380 
72 22173 19642 17340 18147 18070 17796 17523 
73 19293 18835 16685 14730 15415 15350 15240 
74 14804 16181 15797 13994 12354 12929 12924 
75 12654 12129 13258 12943 11465 10122 10488 
76 12234 10029 9614 10508 10259 9087 8445 
77 9467 9807 8040 7707 8424 8224 7582 
78 7509 7304 7567 6203 5946 6499 6443 
79 7460 5580 5428 5623 4610 4419 4810 
80 5747 5535 4140 4027 4172 3420 3342 
81 4751 3954 3807 2848 2770 2870 2550 
82 3709 3165 2634 2537 1898 1846 1972 
83 3046 2524 2154 1792 1726 1291 1310 
84 1752 2101 1741 1485 1236 1190 979 
85 1224 1082 1297 1075 917 763 775 
86 865 714 631 757 627 535 497 
87 652 511 422 373 447 370 344 
88 527 343 269 222 196 235 220 
89 297 252 164 129 106 94 124 
90 206 169 143 93 73 60 57 
91 97 94 77 65 42 33 31 
92 97 23 23 19 16 10 13 
93 65 34 8 8 7 6 5 
94 20 32 17 4 4 3 3 
95 16 0 0 0 0 0 1 
96 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 
97 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
98 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
99 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 
100+ 3 6 3 0 0 0 0 
Total 9677663 9779680 9888161 10000677 10113919 10223704 10293248 
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C. Female 
Abe 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
0 202939 218921 224810 229011 230336 228206 224275 
1 210042 197303 212841 218566 222651 223939 223415 
2 203175 207702 195105 210470 216131 220171 221168 
3 200499 201493 205983 193490 208727 214342 217186 
4 199899 199540 200529 204997 192564 207729 211562 
5 182769 199402 199043 200030 204487 192085 202200 
6 182631 182467 199072 198714 199699 204149 195920 
7 182833 182402 182237 198822 198465 199448 202426 
8 178441 182676 182245 182081 198652 198295 198959 
9 182326 178327 182560 182129 181965 198525 198287 
10 172115 182208 178212 182442 182011 181848 192869 
11 176936 172010 182097 178103 182330 181900 181796 
12 170892 176848 171924 182006 178015 182240 181953 
13 172857 170804 176757 171836 181913 177923 180736 
14 169548 172771 170719 176669 171751 181822 179167 
15 157932 169464 172686 170635 176582 171666 178362 
16 144342 157825 169349 172569 170519 176462 173189 
17 154284 144237 157710 169226 172443 170395 174342 
18 180339 154142 144105 157565 169071 172285 170925 
19 182611 180189 154014 143985 157434 168930 171057 
20 189742 182405 179986 153840 143822 157256 164899 
21 233283 189498 182170 179754 153642 143637 152582 
22 220871 233049 189308 181988 179574 153488 146825 
23 226904 220605 232769 189080 181768 179357 161997 
24 226710 226587 220297 232443 188815 181514 179908 
25 224771 226380 226257 219976 232104 188540 183685 
26 239173 224445 226051 225928 219657 231768 202799 
27 197600 238856 224147 225752 225629 219365 227414 
28 189012 197311 238506 223819 225421 225298 221131 
29 181874 188729 197015 238149 223484 225083 225003 
30 185696 181606 188451 196725 237798 223154 224221 
31 168625 185434 181350 188185 196448 237463 227726 
32 150377 168398 185184 181106 187932 196183 223454 
33 159870 150139 168131 184891 180819 187634 193121 
34 152244 159613 149897 167861 184594 180528 185058 
35 177963 151989 159345 149646 167579 184284 181587 
36 178792 177693 151758 159103 149419 167325 178447 
37 112365 178578 177480 151576 158912 149240 161131 
38 125615 112161 178254 177158 151301 158624 152195 
39 108729 125396 111966 177943 176850 151038 155911 
40 92739 108549 125189 111781 177649 176557 159381 
41 74455 92561 108341 124948 111566 177308 176579 
42 77080 74307 92377 108125 124700 111344 155038 
43 132014 76874 74109 92131 107837 124367 115500 
44 132190 131699 76691 73932 91911 107579 118564 
45 132448 131858 131368 76498 73746 91680 102084 
46 130561 132054 131465 130977 76270 73527 85439 
47 130925 130143 131631 131045 130558 76026 74193 
48 124733 130426 129647 131129 130545 130060 93860 
49 121180 124311 129985 129208 130686 130103 129769 
346 
50 120493 120719 123839 129491 128717 130189 129762 
51 140678 119866 120091 123194 128817 128047 129039 
52 125958 140016 119302 119526 122615 128211 127695 
53 120770 125339 139329 118716 118939 122012 125692 
54 117913 120023 124564 138467 117982 118204 120227 
55 139514 117117 119213 123724 137533 117186 117303 
56 118611 138407 116188 118267 122742 136441 122907 
57 111986 117428 137026 115029 117087 121517 130575 
58 107155 110850 116236 135636 113862 115899 118802 
59 99115 105945 109598 114924 134104 112575 113892 
60 107863 97863 104606 108213 113472 132409 118001 
61 95668 105764 95959 102571 106108 111264 123723 
62 80290 93826 103728 94111 100596 104065 107434 
63 86687 78647 91907 101606 92186 98538 100776 
64 76322 84719 76862 89820 99299 90093 94179 
65 75570 74250 82419 74775 87381 96603 90578 
66 66892 73438 72155 80093 72665 84916 90835 
67 65229 64578 70897 69659 77323 70151 78094 
68 63996 62785 62159 68241 67049 74426 69685 
69 59449 61175 60018 59419 65234 64094 68827 
70 53851 56565 58208 57107 56537 62069 61196 
71 54451 50561 53110 54652 53618 53083 56634 
72 50261 50990 47348 49734 51179 50210 49869 
73 42371 46847 47527 44132 46356 47702 46997 
74 35624 38925 43037 43662 40543 42586 43377 
75 33717 32256 35245 38968 39534 36710 37853 
76 35049 29652 28367 30996 34271 34768 33214 
77 26178 31037 26258 25120 27448 30348 30676 
78 21794 22882 27129 22952 21957 23992 25680 
79 21198 18327 19242 22813 19301 18464 19745 
80 17256 17549 15172 15929 18886 15978 15489 
81 17684 13690 13922 12037 12637 14983 13547 
82 11549 14317 11083 11271 9745 10231 11623 
83 9253 8976 11127 8614 8760 7574 7929 
84 6585 7039 6829 8465 6553 6664 6046 
85 5550 4716 5041 4890 6062 4693 4860 
86 4442 3917 3328 3558 3451 4278 3678 
87 3052 3207 2828 2403 2569 2492 2961 
88 2573 1990 2091 1844 1566 1675 1711 
89 1653 1722 1331 1399 1234 1048 1137 
90 1133 1067 1112 860 903 797 730 
91 860 692 652 679 525 552 529 
92 769 520 419 394 411 318 347 
93 585 442 299 241 227 236 214 
94 268 403 305 206 166 156 159 
95 292 131 197 149 101 81 88 
96 220 174 78 117 88 60 53 
97 123 123 97 43 65 49 38 
98 89 46 46 36 16 24 25 
99 54 48 25 25 20 9 13 
100+ 94 124 46 21 17 14 10 
Total 10844688 10954074 11068714 11186840 11305234 11420375 11493751 
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2-2. Estimated Age Specific Death Rates 
A. Total 
Age Death Rate Survival Ratio 
0 0.0301119 0.969888129 
0.01 10891 0.988910855 
2 0.0082331 0.991766943 
3 0.0047917 0.995208253 
4 0.0026589 0.997341076 
5 0.0018144 0.998185643 
6 0.0015772 0.998422805 
7 0.0010565 0.998943469 
8 0.0008506 0.999149432 
9 0.0008079 0.999192114 
10 0.000701 0.999298961 
11 0.0006441 0.999355856 
12 0.0005747 0.999425321 
13 0.0005996 0.999400409 
14 0.0007107 0.999289345 
15 0.0007884 0.99921 1612 
16 0.0009413 0.99905 8655 
17 0.0010547 0.998945311 
18 0.0010427 0.998957317 
19 0.0012876 0.998712428 
20 0.0014105 0.998589521 
21 0.0011933 0.998806734 
22 0.001408 0.998591971 
23 0.0015969 0.99840313 
24 0.0015501 0.998449914 
25 0.0017614 0.998238608 
26 0.0016892 0.998310781 
27 0.001931 0.998069016 
28 0.0020259 0.997974079 
29 0.0020964 0.997903563 
30 0.0019713 0.998028699 
31 0.0019406 0.998059404 
32 0.0023258 0.997674151 
33 0.0023004 0.997699556 
34 0.0023711 0.997628935 
35 0.0022928 0.997707216 
36 0.0020493 0.997950744 
37 0.0026042 0.997395822 
38 0.0027015 0.99729847 
39 0.0027107 0.997289346 
40 0.0031212 0.996878825 
41 0.0032192 0.996780838 
42 0.0051943 0.994805679 
43 0.0041145 0.995885519 
44 0.0043804 0.995619583 
45 0.0050827 0.994917278 
46 0.00582 0.994 1 8003 1 
47 0.0059876 0,994012369 
48 0.0063747 0.993625322 
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49 0.0065229 0.993477133 
50 0.0092052 0.99079477 
51 0.0082068 0.991793218 
52 0.0090363 0.990963735 
53 0.0109447 0.989055331 
54 0.0122348 0.987765224 
55 0.015744 0.984256008 
56 0.0180536 0.981946447 
57 0.019533 0.980467036 
58 0.0215077 0.97849231 
59 0.0250274 0.974972639 
60 0.0335497 0.966450311 
61 0.0360009 0.963999127 
62 0.0397468 0.960253241 
63 0.0421394 0.95786061 
64 0.0473394 0.952660605 
65 0.0480655 0.9519345 
66 0.0566095 0.943390541 
67 0.0572923 0.942707681 
68 0.068698 0.931302032 
69 0.0728413 0.927158728 
70 0.0856965 0.914303534 
71 0.0893912 0.910608772 
72 0.0939342 0.906065753 
73 0.1070245 0.892975456 
74 0.1206019 0.879398113 
75 0.1450189 0.854981082 
76 0.1368539 0.863146149 
77 0.1542103 0.845789698 
78 0.1850797 0.8 1 492028 1 
79 0.195272 0.804727999 
80 0.2341115 0.765888535 
81 0.2226222 0.777377798 
82 0.2472446 0.752755441 
83 0.2573441 0.742655867 
84 0.3055042 0.694495775 
85 0.3176485 0.682351518 
86 0.3007338 0.699266184 
87 0.3716856 0.628314361 
88 0.3662465 0.633753523 
89 0.366759 0.633240974 
90 0.4149436 0.585056449 
91 0.4402127 0.559787327 
92 0.453396 0.546603964 
93 0.332057 0.667942957 
94 0.5652656 0.434734419 
95 0.4111402 0.588859785 
96 0.4760338 0.523966177 
97 0.6401876 0.359812398 
98 0.4327692 0.56723079 
99 0.4517503 0.548249684 
100+ 0.8688572 0.131142798 
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B. Male 
Aae Death Rate Survival Ratio 
0 0.0323345 0.967665545 
1 0.011042 0.988958042 
2 0.0081888 0.991811163 
3 0.0047991 0.99520088 
4 0.0028205 0.99717946 
5 0.001966 0.998033952 
6 0.0018812 0.998118752 
7 0.0012463 0.998753657 
8 0.0010539 0.998946064 
9 0.0009605 0.999039489 
10 0.0007875 0.999212502 
11 0.0007839 0.999216061 
12 0.0006316 0.999368377 
13 0.0006979 0.999302094 
14 0.000918 0.999082025 
15 0.0008924 0.999107576 
16 0.001 1677 0.998832339 
17 0.0012249 0.998775132 
18 0.0013122 0.998687809 
19 0.0014932 0.998506835 
20 0.0016157 0.998384319 
21 0.0014713 0.998528698 
22 0.0016953 0.998304709 
23 0.0018712 0.998128761 
24 0.0016735 0.99832651 
25 0.0021027 0.997897276 
26 0.0020629 0.997937073 
27 0.0024129 0.997587132 
28 0.0025732 0.997426828 
29 0.0027357 0.997264289 
30 0.0025452 0.997454774 
31 0.0025378 0.997462198 
32 0.0030984 0.996901555 
33 0.003021 0.996979007 
34 0.0031041 0.996895872 
35 0.0030865 0.996913546 
36 0.002923 0.997077035 
37 0.0034133 0.996586733 
38 0.003697 0.996303035 
39 0.0038039 0.996196127 
40 0.0043896 0.995610386 
41 0.0045045 0.99549552 
42 0.0078872 0.992112831 
43 0.0059268 0.994073231 
44 0,0063446 0.993655374 
45 0.007304 0.992696031 
46 0.0085905 0.991409525 
47 0.0082821 0.991717868 
48 0.0095566 0.990443396 
49 0.0094099 0.990590097 
50 0.0134364 0.986563646 
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51 0.0119495 0,98805045 
52 0.0134536 0.986546449 
53 0.0160318 0.983968241 
54 0.018159 0.981841033 
55 0.0247905 0.975209531 
56 0.0270277 0.972972266 
57 0.030055 0.969944966 
58 0.0336482 0.96635178 
59 0.0414583 0.958541749 
60 0.0528114 0.947188585 
61 0.0598735 0.940126543 
62 0.0669238 0.933076209 
63 0.0716947 0.928305269 
64 0.0794386 0.920561367 
65 0.0818165 0.918183455 
66 0.0951986 0.904801354 
67 0.0937379 0.906262091 
68 0.1165593 0.883440732 
69 0.1223248 0.877675186 
70 0.1396107 0.86038935 
71 0.1479423 0.852057656 
72 0.1505471 0.849452872 
73 0.1612884 0.83871 1646 
74 0.1806652 0.819334806 
75 0.2074123 0.792587653 
76 0.1983445 0.801655472 
77 0.2284548 0.771545239 
78 0.2568436 0.743156378 
79 0.258105 0.741895014 
80 0.3120604 0.687939615 
81 0.333734 0.666266042 
82 0.3195579 0.68044211 
83 0.3103325 0.68966745 
84 0.3824622 0.617537842 
85 0.4167315 0.583268512 
86 0.4094912 0.590508834 
87 0.4742839 0.525716141 
88 0.5210382 0.47896183 
89 0.4326238 0.56737621 
90 0.5442282 0.455771812 
91 0.7581876 0.24 181 23 87 
92 0.6483755 0.351624547 
93 0.5048974 0.495102588 
94 1 0 
95 0.5109081 0.489091905 
96 1 0 
97 0,9196346 0.080365429 
98 0 1 
99 0.5364535 0.4635465 
100+ 1 0 
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C. Female 
Agc Death Rate Survival Ratio 
0 0.0277724 0.972227573 
1 0.01 1 1387 0.988861256 
2 0.0082798 0.991720244 
3 0.004784 0.995216029 
4 0.0024875 0.997512485 
5 0.0016541 0.998345854 
6 0.0012565 0.998743545 
7 0.0008564 0.99914358 
8 0.0006372 0.999362846 
9 0.0006471 0.999352894 
10 0.0006107 0.999389275 
11 0.0004971 0.999502882 
12 0.0005147 0.999485305 
13 0.0004964 0.999503562 
14 0.0004935 0.999506526 
15 0.0006791 0.999320868 
16 0.0007282 0.999271804 
17 0.0009175 0.999082451 
18 0.0008326 0.999167409 
19 0.0011275 0.998872522 
20 0.0012885 0.998711535 
21 0.0010021 0.99899785 
22 0.001204 0.998795987 
23 0.0013987 0,998601287 
24 0.0014566 0.998543377 
25 0.0014501 0.998549887 
26 0.001327 0,998672994 
27 0.001465 0.998534984 
28 0.0014975 0.998502477 
29 0.0014738 0.998526219 
30 0.0014088 0.998591152 
31 0.001348 0.998651959 
32 0.0015828 0.998417247 
33 0.0016095 0.998390539 
34 0.0016759 0.998324056 
35 0.0015182 0.998481812 
36 0.0011995 0.998800498 
37 0.0018127 0.998187335 
38 0.001741 0.998259002 
39 0.0016565 0.998343503 
40 0.0019188 0.998081246 
41 0.0019868 0.998013242 
42 0.0026692 0.9973308 
43 0.0023867 0.997613255 
44 0.0025131 0.997486863 
45 0.0029769 0.997023 118 
46 0.0032001 0.996799889 
47 0.003812 0.996187997 
48 0.0033837 0.996616302 
49 0.0038004 0.996199596 
50 0.0052053 0.994794732 
51 0.004703 0.995297038 
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52 0.0049121 0.995087881 
53 0.0061831 0.9938 1 69 15 
54 0.0067485 0.99325153 
55 0.0079377 0.992062303 
56 0.0099759 0.990024076 
57 0.0101457 0.989854307 
58 0.0112946 0.988705403 
59 0.0126336 0.987366424 
60 0.0194572 0.98054278 
61 0.01925 0.980750047 
62 0.020462 0.979537962 
63 0.0227038 0.977296213 
64 0.0271488 0.97285115 
65 0.0282178 0.971782197 
66 0.0345916 0.965408423 
67 0.0374616 0.962538434 
68 0.0440736 0.955926377 
69 0.0485087 0.95 1 49 1 282 
70 0.0610889 0.938911139 
71 0.0635564 0.936443554 
72 0.0679249 0.932075 131 
73 0.0813207 0.9 1 867930 1 
74 0.094548 0.905451978 
75 0.1205534 0.879446627 
76 0.1144658 0.885534176 
77 0.1259248 0.874075209 
78 0.1590741 0.840925892 
79 0.172153 0.827847005 
80 0.2066589 0.793341087 
81 0.1904098 0.809590245 
82 0.2227903 0.777209658 
83 0.2392251 0.760774913 
84 0.2838842 0.7161 15792 
85 0.2942487 0.705751252 
86 0.2779508 0.722049176 
87 0.3481 131 0.651886886 
88 0.3308306 0.669169373 
89 0.3543844 0.645615567 
90 0.3891614 0.610838646 
91 0.3949601 0.605039928 
92 0.4251352 0.574864797 
93 0.3105783 0.689421658 
94 0.5120693 0.48793075 
95 0.4053204 0.594679578 
96 0.4415574 0.558442606 
97 0.6289455 0.37 1 0545 17 
98 0.4557481 0.544251894 
99 0.4417852 0.558214765 
100+ 0.8444816 0.155518361 
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2-3. Estimated Number of Deaths 
A. Total 
Age 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
0 26433 27764 28391 28735 28683 15674 
1 4778 4475 4817 4947 5039 3375 
2 3439 3508 3286 3537 3632 2463 
3 1974 1985 2025 1897 2042 1396 
4 1095 1090 1096 1118 1047 750 
5 682 745 742 746 761 474 
6 592 592 647 644 647 439 
7 397 396 396 433 431 288 
8 311 319 318 318 348 231 
9 302 295 303 302 302 220 
10 247 262 256 263 262 174 
11 234 226 241 235 241 160 
12 202 208 202 215 209 143 
13 212 210 217 210 224 145 
14 247 252 249 258 249 177 
15 255 273 279 276 285 184 
16 264 308 330 337 334 230 
17 294 299 347 372 380 250 
18 335 291 298 348 373 253 
19 418 413 359 365 424 302 
20 427 464 458 398 404 312 
21 470 356 391 386 336 228 
22 532 552 419 459 453 262 
23 624 602 625 475 519 341 
24 618 604 582 606 463 333 
25 757 689 671 647 671 339 
26 795 720 653 636 613 423 
27 750 908 821 743 723 464 
28 752 786 951 859 776 502 
29 752 776 810 980 885 530 
30 725 705 727 760 919 552 
31 652 710 691 713 745 600 
32 686 783 854 831 857 596 
33 720 677 773 843 820 563 
34 703 742 697 796 868 562 
35 806 675 712 669 764 555 
36 722 719 601 635 597 454 
37 579 915 911 763 805 504 
38 666 600 949 944 790 555 
39 579 667 600 949 945 526 
40 563 666 768 691 1093 724 
41 469 578 683 787 709 746 
42 774 758 933 1104 1272 763 
43 1060 607 594 732 865 664 
44 1128 1123 644 630 776 611 
45 1310 1303 1298 744 728 596 
46 1476 1491 1484 1478 847 552 
47 1525 1507 1523 1516 1509 576 
48 1539 1615 1596 1613 1604 1064 
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49 1533 1562 1639 1620 1637 1084 
50 2152 2145 2186 2294 2266 1525 
51 2230 1901 1896 1932 2027 1333 
52 2195 2432 2074 2068 2107 1472 
53 2551 2628 2913 2483 2476 1680 
54 2768 2820 2905 3220 2746 1823 
55 4068 3573 3641 3750 4156 2359 
56 4046 4529 3970 4045 4167 3075 
57 4111 4288 4796 4208 4288 2940 
58 4212 4482 4676 5231 4588 3113 
59 4310 4912 5231 5456 6098 3565 
60 6201 5638 6399 6802 7097 5295 
61 5784 6441 5856 6660 7086 4921 
62 5372 6063 6752 6139 6982 4946 
63 5961 5514 6228 6934 6304 4766 
64 5792 6407 5921 6698 7455 4512 
65 5676 5622 6219 5746 6504 4819 
66 5843 6326 6264 6930 6398 4828 
67 5682 5563 6029 5966 6603 4053 
68 6526 6416 6283 6809 6738 4964 
69 6334 6403 6295 6167 6689 4405 
70 6592 6911 6997 6878 6744 4875 
71 6871 6224 6526 6611 6498 4243 
72 6752 6421 5827 6110 6197 4054 
73 6557 6847 6556 5965 6256 4231 
74 6043 6604 6923 6656 6065 4236 
75 6689 6404 6999 7382 7144 4344 
76 6438 5383 5154 5632 5958 3849 
77 5459 6149 5143 4924 5381 3795 
78 5396 5516 6259 5244 5020 3652 
79 5575 4595 4714 5379 4513 2876 
80 5360 5354 4427 4549 5205 2909 
81 4953 3926 3922 3242 3331 2537 
82 3758 4201 3311 3322 2777 1910 
83 3159 2930 3330 2617 2631 1473 
84 2539 2802 2604 2971 2333 1563 
85 2143 1838 2024 1887 2166 1131 
86 1589 1381 1183 1299 1216 938 
87 1372 1359 1184 1013 1106 694 
88 1126 837 832 725 620 450 
89 714 719 543 551 483 274 
90 553 507 511 385 391 228 
91 413 345 316 318 240 162 
92 390 236 193 180 185 94 
93 215 155 97 79 74 51 
94 157 239 173 110 89 55 
95 127 53 80 60 41 22 
96 105 85 34 52 39 18 
97 81 77 61 27 41 21 
98 41 21 21 16 7 7 
99 27 25 11 11 9 3 
100+ 82 111 42 18 14 8 
Sum 250489 251133 252387 254310 256451 169007 
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B. Male 
Age 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
0 14544 15262 15606 15796 15767 8613 
1 2438 2277 2447 2513 2559 1714 
2 1757 1788 1670 1794 1843 1249 
3 1015 1021 1039 971 1043 713 
4 598 594 597 608 568 406 
5 379 416 413 415 423 263 
6 362 362 397 394 397 269 
7 240 240 240 262 261 175 
8 197 203 202 202 222 146 
9 184 180 185 184 184 134 
10 142 151 147 151 151 100 
11 146 141 150 146 150 100 
12 114 117 113 121 118 81 
13 127 126 130 125 134 87 
14 163 166 165 170 165 117 
15 148 158 162 160 166 106 
16 159 193 207 211 210 144 
17 152 166 203 217 221 146 
18 184 163 178 217 232 158 
19 212 210 185 202 246 176 
20 182 229 226 200 218 177 
21 236 166 209 206 182 132 
22 266 271 191 240 237 139 
23 307 293 299 210 264 174 
24 287 274 262 267 188 157 
25 431 360 343 328 335 157 
26 478 422 353 336 321 218 
27 461 558 492 412 392 250 
28 469 490 594 524 438 278 
29 484 498 520 630 555 309 
30 463 449 462 482 584 343 
31 424 460 447 459 480 387 
32 448 517 561 544 559 389 
33 463 435 502 545 529 362 
34 448 474 446 515 558 361 
35 536 444 470 442 510 368 
36 508 506 419 444 417 321 
37 375 591 589 488 517 323 
38 448 405 638 636 527 371 
39 398 459 415 654 652 359 
40 385 458 528 477 752 499 
41 321 394 468 539 487 512 
42 569 560 686 816 940 565 
43 745 424 417 512 608 466 
44 796 792 451 444 545 431 
45 915 910 906 516 508 415 
46 1058 1069 1063 1058 603 395 
47 1026 1011 1021 1016 1012 383 
48 1117 1174 1157 1169 1163 771 
49 1072 1090 1145 1128 1140 755 
50 1525 1517 1541 1620 1596 1073 
51 1568 1338 1331 1352 1421 932 
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52 1576 1745 1488 1481 1504 1052 
53 1804 1853 2051 1749 1741 1177 
54 1972 2011 2065 2286 1950 1292 
55 2961 2644 2695 2768 3064 1740 
56 2862 3148 2811 2865 2942 2169 
57 2975 3097 3406 3041 3100 2120 
58 3001 3230 3363 3699 3302 2241 
59 3058 3574 3846 4004 4404 2618 
60 4102 3733 4363 4696 4889 3580 
61 3942 4405 4009 4686 5043 3496 
62 3730 4143 4629 4213 4924 3528 
63 3993 3728 4141 4627 4211 3277 
64 3719 4107 3835 4259 4759 2884 
65 3544 3527 3894 3636 4038 3004 
66 3529 3786 3768 4160 3884 2872 
67 3238 3144 3373 3357 3706 2304 
68 3705 3649 3543 3801 3783 2780 
69 3450 3435 3383 3285 3524 2335 
70 3302 3456 3441 3389 3291 2350 
71 3410 3011 3151 3138 3090 1997 
72 3338 2957 2610 2732 2720 1784 
73 3112 3038 2691 2376 2486 1648 
74 2675 2923 2854 2528 2232 1555 
75 2625 2516 2750 2685 2378 1398 
76 2427 1989 1907 2084 2035 1200 
77 2163 2241 1837 1761 1924 1251 
78 1929 1876 1944 1593 1527 1111 
79 1925 1440 1401 1451 1190 759 
80 1793 1727 1292 1257 1302 711 
81 1586 1319 1271 951 925 638 
82 1185 1012 842 811 606 393 
83 945 783 668 556 536 267 
84 670 803 666 568 473 303 
85 510 451 541 448 382 212 
86 354 292 258 310 257 146 
87 309 242 200 177 212 117 
88 275 179 140 115 102 81 
89 128 109 71 56 46 27 
90 112 92 78 51 40 22 
91 74 71 58 49 32 17 
92 63 15 15 12 10 4 
93 33 17 4 4 3 2 
94 20 32 17 4 4 2 
95 8 0 0 0 0 0 
96 8 8 0 0 0 0 
97 4 0 0 0 0 0 
98 0 0 0 0 0 0 
99 3 3 0 0 0 0 
100+ 3 6 3 0 0 0 
Sum 134622 134541 134961 135788 136869 90134 
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C. Female 
Age 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
0 11890 12502 12785 12940 12916 7061 
1 2340 2198 2371 2435 2480 1661 
2 1682 1720 1615 1743 1790 1214 
3 959 964 985 926 999 683 
4 497 496 499 510 479 344 
5 302 330 329 331 338 212 
6 229 229 250 250 251 171 
7 157 156 156 170 170 114 
8 114 116 116 116 127 84 
9 118 115 118 118 118 86 
10 105 111 109 111 111 74 
11 88 86 91 89 91 60 
12 88 91 88 94 92 62 
13 86 85 88 85 90 59 
14 84 85 84 87 85 60 
15 107 115 117 116 120 78 
16 105 115 123 126 124 86 
17 142 132 145 155 158 104 
18 150 128 120 131 141 95 
19 206 203 174 162 178 127 
20 244 235 232 198 185 135 
21 234 190 183 180 154 96 
22 266 281 228 219 216 123 
23 317 309 326 264 254 167 
24 330 330 321 339 275 176 
25 326 328 328 319 337 182 
26 317 298 300 300 291 205 
27 289 350 328 331 331 214 
28 283 295 357 335 338 225 
29 268 278 290 351 329 221 
30 262 256 265 277 335 209 
31 227 250 244 254 265 213 
32 238 267 293 287 297 207 
33 257 242 271 298 291 201 
34 255 268 251 281 309 201 
35 270 231 242 227 254 186 
36 214 213 182 191 179 134 
37 204 324 322 275 288 180 
38 219 195 310 308 263 184 
39 180 208 185 295 293 167 
40 178 208 240 214 341 226 
41 148 184 215 248 222 235 
42 206 198 247 289 333 198 
43 315 183 177 220 257 198 
44 332 331 193 186 231 180 
45 394 393 391 228 220 182 
46 418 423 421 419 244 157 
47 499 496 502 500 498 193 
48 422 441 439 444 442 293 
49 461 472 494 491 497 329 
50 627 628 645 674 670 451 
51 662 564 565 579 606 401 
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52 619 688 586 587 602 419 
53 747 775 861 734 735 502 
54 796 810 841 934 796 531 
55 1107 930 946 982 1092 619 
56 1183 1381 1159 1180 1224 906 
57 1136 1191 1390 1167 1188 821 
58 1210 1252 1313 1532 1286 871 
59 1252 1338 1385 1452 1694 947 
60 2099 1904 2035 2106 2208 1715 
61 1842 2036 1847 1974 2043 1426 
62 1643 1920 2122 1926 2058 1418 
63 1968 1786 2087 2307 2093 1489 
64 2072 2300 2087 2439 2696 1628 
65 2132 2095 2326 2110 2466 1815 
66 2314 2540 2496 2771 2514 1956 
67 2444 2419 2656 2610 2897 1750 
68 2821 2767 2740 3008 2955 2184 
69 2884 2968 2911 2882 3164 2070 
70 3290 3456 3556 3489 3454 2524 
71 3461 3213 3375 3473 3408 2246 
72 3414 3464 3216 3378 3476 2271 
73 3446 3810 3865 3589 3770 2583 
74 3368 3680 4069 4128 3833 2681 
75 4065 3889 4249 4698 4766 2946 
76 4012 3394 3247 3548 3923 2650 
77 3296 3908 3307 3163 3456 2544 
78 3467 3640 4315 3651 3493 2541 
79 3649 3155 3313 3927 3323 2116 
80 3566 3627 3135 3292 3903 2198 
81 3367 2607 2651 2292 2406 1899 
82 2573 3190 2469 2511 2171 1517 
83 2214 2147 2662 2061 2096 1206 
84 1869 1998 1939 2403 1860 1260 
85 1633 1388 1483 1439 1784 919 
86 1235 1089 925 989 959 792 
87 1062 1117 985 837 894 578 
88 851 658 692 610 518 369 
89 586 610 472 496 437 247 
90 441 415 433 335 352 206 
91 340 273 257 268 207 145 
92 327 221 178 168 175 90 
93 182 137 93 75 70 49 
94 137 207 156 106 85 53 
95 118 53 80 60 41 22 
96 97 77 34 52 39 18 
97 77 77 61 27 41 21 
98 41 21 21 16 7 7 
99 24 21 11 11 9 3 
100+ 79 105 39 18 14 8 
Sum 115867 116592 117426 118522 119583 78874 
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2-4. Estimated Number of Births using the 1993 Age Specific Birth Rates 
(By Mother's Age) 
A. Total 
Mother's Age 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
20 439 427 394 351 355 253 
21 2024 1779 1733 1596 1423 944 
22 7366 6854 6025 5867 5405 3245 
23 17275 17501 16284 14315 13940 8773 
24 46514 45855 46456 43226 38000 24690 
25 60668 60868 60006 60793 56565 33324 
26 66917 65023 65237 64314 65157 41759 
27 63970 67860 65940 66157 65221 43595 
28 52559 59292 62899 61118 61320 40435 
29 43068 44827 50570 53646 52128 34822 
30 33753 34006 35395 39930 42359 27370 
31 23343 24182 24363 25358 28607 20418 
32 13155 14591 15116 15229 15851 11529 
33 8710 8942 9918 10275 10352 7122 
34 6490 6442 6613 7335 7599 5065 
35 4699 4433 4400 4517 5011 3469 
36 3900 3605 3401 3376 3465 2519 
37 1911 2339 2161 2039 2024 1357 
38 1362 1663 2035 1881 1775 1185 
39 1165 1181 1442 1765 1631 1017 
40 622 723 733 895 1095 692 
41 323 389 451 458 559 456 
42 245 269 324 376 381 287 
43 311 225 247 298 346 238 
44 266 210 152 167 201 152 
45 180 180 142 103 113 88 
46 150 151 150 119 86 61 
47 150 150 151 150 118 57 
48 137 140 141 141 140 80 
49 141 146 149 149 150 99 
360 
B. Male 
Mother's Age 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
20 218 212 195 174 176 125 
21 1039 913 889 819 731 485 
22 3776 3513 3088 3007 2770 1663 
23 8907 9024 8396 7381 7188 4523 
24 23666 23331 23637 21993 19334 12562 
25 31886 31991 31538 31952 29730 17514 
26 33453 32507 32614 32152 32574 20876 
27 32766 34759 33775 33886 33407 22330 
28 26708 30129 31962 31057 31160 20547 
29 21970 22868 25798 27367 26592 17764 
30 17396 17526 18243 20580 21831 14106 
31 11901 12328 12421 12928 14584 10410 
32 6826 7572 7844 7902 8225 5982 
33 4498 4618 5122 5306 5346 3678 
34 3404 3378 3468 3847 3985 2656 
35 2405 2269 2252 2312 2565 1775 
36 2060 1904 1796 1783 1830 1330 
37 1007 1232 1138 1074 1066 715 
38 687 839 1027 949 896 598 
39 625 633 774 947 875 545 
40 352 409 414 506 619 391 
41 170 204 237 240 294 240 
42 140 154 185 215 218 164 
43 150 108 119 143 166 114 
44 160 126 91 100 121 91 
45 112 111 88 64 70 55 
46 101 102 101 80 58 41 
47 97 97 98 97 77 37 
48 73 75 75 75 75 43 
49 86 89 91 91 92 61 
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C. Fernale 
Mother's Age 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999.8.31 
20 221 215 198 177 179 127 
21 985 866 843 777 693 459 
22 3590 3341 2937 2860 2634 1581 
23 8368 8477 7888 6934 6752 4249 
24 22848 22524 22819 21233 18666 12128 
25 28782 28877 28468 28841 26836 15809 
26 33463 32516 32623 32162 32583 20882 
27 31204 33102 32165 32271 31814 21265 
28 25851 29163 30937 30061 30160 19888 
29 21097 21959 24773 26279 25536 17058 
30 16357 16480 17153 19351 20528 13264 
31 11442 11853 11942 12430 14023 10009 
32 6329 7020 7272 7327 7626 5547 
33 4212 4324 4796 4969 5006 3444 
34 3087 3064 3145 3489 3614 2409 
35 2294 2164 2148 2205 2446 1693 
36 1840 1701 1605 1593 1635 1188 
37 905 1107 1023 965 958 642 
38 674 824 1008 932 879 587 
39 540 547 668 818 756 471 
40 270 314 318 389 476 301 
41 153 185 214 217 265 216 
42 105 116 139 161 164 123 
43 161 117 128 154 179 123 
44 106 84 61 67 80 61 
45 69 68 54 39 43 33 
46 49 49 49 39 28 20 
47 53 53 53 53 42 20 
48 64 66 66 66 66 38 
49 55 57 58 58 58 39 
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2-5. Life Table 
X qK Px lx dx Lx Tx ex 
0 0.030112 0.969888 100000 3011 97892 6281075 62.811 
1 0.011089 0.988911 96989 1076 96451 6183183 63.752 
2 0.008233 0.991767 95913 790 95518 6086732 63.461 
3 0.004792 0.995208 95124 456 94896 5991214 62.983 
4 0.002659 0.997341 94668 252 94542 5896318 62.284 
5 0.001814 0.998186 94416 171 94330 5801776 61.449 
6 0.001577 0.998423 94245 149 94170 5707446 60.560 
7 0.001057 0.998943 94096 99 94046 5613275 59.655 
8 0.000851 0.999149 93997 80 93957 5519229 58.717 
9 0.000808 0.999192 93917 76 93879 5425272 57.767 
10 0.000701 0.999299 93841 66 93808 5331393 56.813 
11 0.000644 0.999356 93775 60 93745 5237585 55.853 
12 0.000575 0.999425 93715 54 93688 5143840 54.888 
13 0.000600 0.999400 93661 56 93633 5050152 53.920 
14 0.000711 0.999289 93605 67 93571 4956520 52.952 
15 0.000788 0.999212 93538 74 93501 4862948 51.989 
16 0.000941 0.999059 93464 88 93420 4769447 51.030 
17 0.001055 0.998945 93376 98 93327 4676026 50.077 
18 0.001043 0.998957 93278 97 93229 4582699 49.129 
19 0.001288 0.998712 93181 120 93121 4489470 48.180 
20 0.001410 0.998590 93061 131 92995 4396349 47.242 
21 0.001193 0.998807 92929 111 92874 4303354 46.308 
22 0.001408 0.998592 92819 131 92753 4210480 45.362 
23 0.001597 0.998403 92688 148 92614 4117727 44.426 
24 0.001550 0.998450 92540 143 92468 4025113 43.496 
25 0.001761 0.998239 92396 163 92315 3932644 42.563 
26 0.001689 0.998311 92234 156 92156 3840329 41.637 
27 0.001931 0.998069 92078 178 91989 3748174 40.707 
28 0.002026 0.997974 91900 186 91807 3656185 39.784 
29 0.002096 0.997904 91714 192 91618 3564378 38.864 
30 0.001971 0.998029 91522 180 91431 3472760 37.945 
31 0.001941 0.998059 91341 177 91253 3381328 37.019 
32 0.002326 0.997674 91164 212 91058 3290076 36.090 
33 0.002300 0.997700 90952 209 90847 3199018 35.173 
34 0.002371 0.997629 90743 215 90635 3108170 34.253 
35 0.002293 0.997707 90528 208 90424 3017535 33.333 
36 0.002049 0.997951 90320 185 90227 2927112 32.408 
37 0.002604 0.997396 90135 235 90018 2836884 31.474 
38 0.002702 0.997298 89900 243 89779 2746867 30.555 
39 0.002711 0.997289 89657 243 89536 2657088 29.636 
40 0.003121 0.996879 89414 279 89275 2567552 28.715 
41 0.003219 0.996781 89135 287 88992 2478277 27.804 
42 0.005194 0.994806 88848 462 88618 2389286 26.892 
43 0.004114 0.995886 88387 364 88205 2300668 26.030 
44 0.004380 0,995620 88023 386 87830 2212463 25.135 
45 0.005083 0.994917 87638 445 87415 2124633 24.243 
46 0.005820 0.994180 87192 507 86938 2037218 23.365 
47 0.005988 0.994012 86685 519 86425 1950280 22.499 
48 0.006375 0.993625 86166 549 85891 1863855 21.631 
49 0.006523 0.993477 85616 558 85337 1777964 20.767 
50 0.009205 0.990795 85058 783 84666 1692627 19.900 
51 0.008207 0.991793 84275 692 83929 1607960 19.080 
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52 0.009036 0.990964 83583 755 83206 1524031 18.234 
53 0.010945 0.989055 82828 907 82375 1440826 17.395 
54 0.012235 0.987765 81921 1002 81420 1358451 16.582 
55 0.015744 0,984256 80919 1274 80282 1277031 15.782 
56 0.018054 0.981946 79645 1438 78926 1196748 15.026 
57 0.019533 0.980467 78207 1528 77443 1117822 14.293 
58 0.021508 0.978492 76680 1649 75855 1040379 13.568 
59 0.025027 0.974973 75030 1878 74092 964524 12.855 
60 0.033550 0.966450 73153 2454 71926 890432 12.172 
61 0.036001 0.963999 70698 2545 69426 818507 11.577 
62 0.039747 0.960253 68153 2709 66799 749081 10.991 
63 0.042139 0.957861 65444 2758 64065 682282 10.425 
64 0.047339 0.952661 62687 2968 61203 618217 9.862 
65 0.048065 0.951935 59719 2870 58284 557014 9.327 
66 0.056609 0.943391 56849 3218 55239 498730 8.773 
67 0.057292 0.942708 53630 3073 52094 443491 8.269 
68 0.068698 0.931302 50558 3473 48821 391397 7.742 
69 0.072841 0.927159 47085 3430 45370 342575 7.276 
70 0.085696 0.914304 43655 3741 41784 297206 6.808 
71 0.089391 0.910609 39914 3568 38130 255421 6.399 
72 0.093934 0.906066 36346 3414 34639 217291 5.978 
73 0.107025 0.892975 32932 3525 31169 182653 5.546 
74 0.120602 0.879398 29407 3547 27634 151483 5.151 
75 0.145019 0.854981 25861 3750 23986 123849 4.789 
76 0.136854 0.863146 22110 3026 20597 99864 4.517 
77 0.154210 0.845790 19084 2943 17613 79266 4.153 
78 0.185080 0.814920 16141 2987 14648 61653 3.820 
79 0.195272 0.804728 13154 2569 11870 47006 3.573 
80 0.234111 0.765889 10585 2478 9346 35136 3.319 
81 0.222622 0.777378 8107 1805 7205 25790 3.181 
82 0.247245 0.752755 6302 1558 5523 18585 2.949 
83 0.257344 0.742656 4744 1221 4134 13061 2.753 
84 0.305504 0.694496 3523 1076 2985 8928 2.534 
85 0.317648 0,682352 2447 777 2058 5943 2.429 
86 0.300734 0.699266 1670 502 1419 3884 2.326 
87 0.371686 0.628314 1168 434 951 2466 2.112 
88 0.366246 0.633754 734 269 599 1515 2.066 
89 0.366759 0.633241 465 171 380 916 1.970 
90 0.414944 0.585056 294 122 233 536 1.822 
91 0.440213 0.559787 172 76 134 303 1.759 
92 0.453396 0.546604 96 44 75 169 1.750 
93 0.332057 0.667943 53 18 44 94 1.786 
94 0,565266 0.434734 35 20 25 50 1.425 
95 0.411140 0.588860 15 6 12 25 1.628 
96 0.476034 0.523966 947 13 1.416 
97 0.640188 0.359812 53361.249 
98 0.432769 0.567231 21131.581 
99 0.451750 0.548250 10111.405 
100+ 1.000000 0.000000 11111.151 
0.868857 
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Appendix II. On the DPRK Grain Statistics 
In this appendix we clarify the manners we use the DPRK grain statistics in this 
thesis. To do this we consider three questions about the statistics. First, how available 
and reliable are official DPRK grain statistics? Second, which outside estimates are 
most appropriate for the study of the DPRK agriculture? Third, given available 
official statistics and the best outside estimates, in what manner should we utilise 
them? The remaining three sections deal with one of these questions separately. 
1. The Official DPRK Grain Statistics 
We begin by discussing the availability, definition, revision, and reliability of the 
official statistics. 
1.1. Availability 
For the period from 1946 to 1962 the DPRK authorities regularly released annual 
harvest figures. ' For some years were also published individual grain production 
figures such as rice and maize as well as other related statistics, including sown areas, 
fertiliser consumption and farm machinery in use. The data are available from various 
sources: statistical chapters of Chosun Joongang Nyungam (DPRK Central Yearbook: 
CYB) official statistical publications (DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics: 1961), 
political leaders' addresses2, and economic literature3. Of them, CYB should be 
particularly noted for three respects. First, it provides the revised statistics, as 
By 1949 the authorities had annually released official grain statistics in physical terms. Between 1950 
and 1954 however statistical announcements became irregular and many competing figures were 
published by different sources. In particular, there were severe conflicts within the government 
surrounding official harvest figures from late 1955 to early 1956. The conflicts were finally resolved in 
1957 when the authorities corrected all the statistics initially release between 1946 and 1954, 
announcing a complete new series. Then, statistical announcements returned normal and annual harvest 
figures were regularly published until 1963 when the authorities stopped releasing all official statistics. 2 Political leaders' addresses in this period are available from two sources: Kim Il Sung Jojakjip 
(Collected Works) and the ROK Ministry of Unification, Chosun Nodongdang Dahoi Jaryojip 
[Collected Materials for the Korean Workers Party Conferences], various years. 3 One of the main sources for official statistics in this period is the articles in official economics 
journal, including Gyungje Jisik (Economy Knowledge) and Gyungje Gunsol (Economy Building). 
These journals published various official statistical reports as well as the articles of government 
officials that contained official statistics. 
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discussed later, while some other sources, particularly political leaders' addresses, 
present the previously released and so inflated figures. Second, it presents time series 
data that are rare in other sources. Third, it also reports various related data such as 
sown areas, agricultural inputs and farm labours that are important to crosscheck the 
reliability of official harvest figures. 
In contrast to the years from 1946 to 1962, there are no statistically significant 
data available from 1963 to 1988. Statistical chapters of CYB have disappeared, and 
the authorities did not release any specified figures that could be interpreted as official 
statistics. Of course, insofar as total harvests are concerned, there are some figures 
available even for this period either in physical terms or in index numbers. These 
figures could be found in Kim Il Sung's new year addresses as well as in other DPRK 
publications such as CYB and economics literature. Yet they are far from statistically 
meaningful numbers. Two quotations would show what these figures typically mean. 
Last year (1976: added) we achieved a great victory in agriculture sector. Despite unfavourable 
natural weather condition affected by cold-weather front, our diligent agricultural labours and 
supporters overcame all obstacles and difficulties, taking over the height of more than 8 million 
tons of algok production. 4 
Algok production increased about two times for the 10 years between 1963 and 1974. In particular, 
we had new take-off from 1973: in that year the production increased to 136% of the year before, 
and in the next year we increased production to 131 % of the 1973 by producing more than 7 million 
tons of algok. 5 
The first quotation says that algok (grain) production exceeded 8 million tons in 1976. 
But the exact figure is not revealed: it could be 8.01 million, 8.5 million, and even 
more. The second quotation also gives some information on the official grain statistics 
of 1963,1972,1973, and 1974; it remarks the production level of 1974 and the 
growth rates for three time intervals with the base year of 1974. Nonetheless, since it 
does not specify the exact figure of 1974, the official statistics for those years still 
could not be obtained. 
As illustrated by these quotations, the DPRK grain figures available between 
1964 and 1988 have two features. First, the figures reporting physical outputs have 
4 Kim Il Sung Jojakjip, Vol. 32, p. 3 
5 Kim Seung Jun (1988), p. 509 
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usually some vague adjectives attached to them; for example, `more', `victorious 
achievements in taking over the heights of ooo tons of grain production' and so on. 
Second, the figures reporting the growth rates have normally for their base years those 
when physical outputs are unknown or hardly specified. Given these features, it is 
questionable that the available figures for 1964-1988 are statistically meaningful data. 
Though existing researches tend to regard them as official DPRK statistics6, we would 
rather conclude that there are no official statistics available for this period. 
This statistical blackout lasted until 1990 when Pyongyang media began to 
announce the country's grain production again. Since then the DPRK authorities have 
regularly announced annual harvests through official media. Those figures were 
compiled by a Japanese research (Hirata 1998) that also obtained the confirmation on 
the figures from a high ranked official in the DPRK government. 
And in 1997 the DPRK Agricultural Commission submitted to UNDP official 
figures about national and provincial production of rice and maize, two main grain 
items of the country, for the period from 1989 to 1997.7 The submitted statistics are 
for several respects distinguished from the other data ever released. First, they have 
clear definitions. Traditionally, for example, the authorities announced rice production 
in unhusked physical weights without any concrete definition, which was a reason 
why outside researchers discounted and revised the officially claimed outputs. By 
contrast, the submitted figures adopt internationally standardised definitions, reporting 
rice production both in paddy rice and in milled equivalents. Second, the figures 
include provincial output figures that had been hardly released since the 1950s. Third, 
they are time series data that have the longest time interval ever released without any 
missing years. 
1.2. The definition of algok 
Appendix table 1 presents the grain statistics released by the DPRK authorities. 
Several questions could be raised against the data, and perhaps the first question 
would be about the definition of grain. 
6 For instance, see the ROK Ministry of Unification, Bukhan Gyungje Tonggyejip [Collected North 
Korean Economic Statistics], Seoul, 1996; Lee Hy Sang (1999); Choi Su Young (1996). 
7 These figures are available from DPRKJUNDP (1998a) 
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Appendix table 1. Official DPRK Grain Statistics 
(1000 metric tons) 
Algok (grain) Rice Rice Maize 
........................................................................... .......................................................................................... ....................... 
Paddy 
................ ......, 
ýrrýilledec equiv. ) 
............................................................................................... 1946 1898 1052 156 
1947 2069 
1948 2668 
1949 2654 1158 375 
1950 
1951 2260 
1952 2450 
1953 2327 1229 224 
1954 2230 
1955 2340 
1956 2873 1392 760 
1957 3201 
1958 3700 
1959 
1960 3803 1535 950 
1961 4830 
1962 5000 
1963 5000 
1964 5000 
1965 
1966 4405 
1967 5110 
1968 5672 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 5343 
1974 7000 
1975 7700 
1976 8000 
1977 8500 
1978 7870 
1979 9000 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 10000 
1985 
1986 
1987 10059* 
1988 
1989 9490* 4320 3240 4340 
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1990 9000 4480 3360 3900 
1991 8900 4090 3067 4200 
1992 8800 4450 3337 3720 
1993 9000 4750 3562 3940 
1994 7100 3110 2177 3550 
1995 3500 2000 1400 1370 
1996 2500 1410 987 830 
1997 2700 1570 1099 1010 
* converted into physical outputs from growth rate figures 
Source) 1. For all figures between 1946 and 1961, Chosun Joongang Nyungam 
2. For total grain production [algok] between 1962 and 1989, ROK Ministry of 
Unification Bukhan Gyungje Tongyejip [Collected North Korean Economic 
Statistics], 1996 
3. For total grain production [algok] between 1990 and 1997, Hirata (1998) 
4. For rice and maize between 1989 and 1997, UNDP[DPRK (1998a) 
Since 1946 the DPRK authorities have announced its grain production under 
the name of algok without a clear definition. The literal meaning of algok is `grain' 
that includes rice, maize, wheat, soybean and other dry-field grains. This literal 
meaning seems to be applied to the data from 1946 to 1960 in the sense that the data 
on other important crop items such as potatoes (Irish and sweet) and vegetables were 
separately collected and announced. 
But there are many doubts about whether this literal meaning has been applied 
to the statistics after 1960. The doubts start from Kim Il Sung's own remarks. For 
instance, he wrote: 
Securing sown areas for algok is important in achieving the target of 10 million tons of algok 
production. Whatever happens, we must secure 600,000 hectares for maize production, 650,000 
hectares for rice, 100,000 hectares for sweet and Irish potatoes, and 50,000 hectares for wheat.... 
Supposing that one-hectare of wheat fields produces four tons, we shall produce 200,000 tons of 
wheat from these 50,000 hectares. If one hectare of potato and sweet potato fields produces 30 tons, 
the total output from the 100,000 hectares will be three million tons of potatoes or 750,000 tons of 
algok in the ratio of four to one between potatoes and algok. About 100,000 to 200,000 tons of 
beans and other dry-field crops can also be produced. 8 
In the mid 1970s Kim Il Sung himself included potatoes in algok, saying that potatoes 
could be converted into algok with one fourth of its physical weights. An interesting 
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point is that this conversion ratio between algok and potatoes was officially 
introduced in the early 1960s and has been widely used since. For instance, a cabinet 
decree dated 20th July 1961 shows that potatoes were added to algok when co- 
operative farms reported their production to the government. 9 And a high government 
official admitted in 1997 that the authorities were adding potatoes to algok figures. 1° 
It seems therefore evident that officially released algok figures have included potato 
production at least since the mid 1970s. 
The question is: whether potatoes were the only item that was added to algok 
figures? The above cabinet decree allows small-scale co-operative farms in 
mountainous areas to add not only potatoes but also vegetables to their algok 
production. And interestingly officially claimed algok production suddenly jumped in 
the early 1970s, reaching 10 million MT in 1984 that was more than three times the 
level of the early 1950's. Both facts combined could raise concerns about whether 
other crop items, mainly vegetables, have been included in algok figures. Actually 
Kim Sung Ho and Kim Woon Keun (1983) argued that the officially released algok 
figures since 1973 could be approximated well when both potatoes and vegetables are 
converted into and added to algok. But there are no further available data or 
information to assess this argument. 
From the above discussion three conclusions can be made. First, official algok 
figures had represented only grain production by 1960. Second, however, they have 
included potatoes at least since the mid 1970s. Third, there is a possibility that 
vegetables have been also added to the figures. 
1.3. Revision 
The second question about the DPRK statistics would be: whether are they officially 
revised or confirmed figures? This question is closely related to the inconsistency 
problem of the data. 
It should be noted that the DPRK authorities have released many numbers that 
are contradictory to the previously released ones. For instance, the 1975 CYB claimed 
g Kim Il Sung Jojakjip, Vol. 34, p. 19 
9 Cabinet Decree No. 116, On rewarding honours to co-operative farms, cities, townships (districts) 
that sell more grains to the state, 20 July 1961. 10 Hirata (1998) 
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that the grain production of 1974 was more than 7 million tons and this was about two 
times the 1963 production. " According to this claim, the 1963 production must be 
around 3.5 million MT. However, Kim 11 Sung's new year address of 1963 said that 
the country already `took over the height of 5 million tons of grain production in 
1962', and Chung (1974) pointed out that in the 1960s the authorities reported the 
1963 production as high as 5.2 million tons 12. How are these numbers, which produce 
more than 1.5 million tons of difference on a single year's output, to be interpreted? 
Though there is inconsistency in the available DPRK statistics, it is unlikely 
that the DPRK economic authorities that need correct numbers to run a highly 
planned socialist economy have had internally inconsistent data. The existence of 
inconsistency therefore suggests that the authorities have continued to review and 
revise initially released figures. Actually there are several reasons to believe that. 
First, there is an actually known case of this revision: the 1957 correction of 
1946-1954 grain statistics. Between 1954 and 1956 confirming official harvest figures 
was a sensitive issue. As discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis, the DPRK authorities 
launched a compulsory grain campaign in November 1954 in order to secure state 
food reserves for increasing urban population after the Korean War. But the campaign 
soon failed, being officially ended by the party order on 2 February 1955. And this 
failure gave rise to political conflicts surrounding agricultural policies within the 
communist party in December 1995 when Kim Il Sung, prime minister, attacked Park 
Chang Ok, the head of the State Planning Commission, for setting up on the desk 
unrealistically high collection targets that cause farmers' resistance. An interesting 
point is that Kim Il Sung argued that such unrealistic targets were made from 
inaccurate and falsified official grain statistics. As a result, from early 1956 the 
statistical authorities began to significantly discount all the initially released harvest 
figures and finally announced a completely new series in 1957.13 This case shows: 1) 
in the 1950s the country already suffered the problems of inaccurate and inflated 
ý1 The DPRK Central News Agency, Chosun Joongang Nyungam [DPRK Central Yearbook] 1975, 
1976. See the same claim of Kim Seung Jun (1988) quoted in the text. 
12 See Table 15 in Chung (1974: p. 48). In this table, he presents the DPRK grain statistics between 
1963 and 1965 that are slightly different from the figures found in other sources, for instance, CYB. It 
is not clear which figures -Chung's or CYB's- are more similar to actual official statistics. For 
consistency, however, we do not use Chung's figures in our appendix table 1, assuming that CYB 
provides official DPRK statistics. 13 For the details of statistical correction procedures, see Suh Dong Man (1996) 
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official statistics, 2) to resolve the problems the authorities attempted to correct and 
revise initially released official statistics. 
Appendix table 2. The Revision of Official Grain Statistics in 1957 
Statistics in Oct. 1954 Revised Statistics in Feb. 1957 
1946 1998 1898 
1947 2178 2069 
1948 2809 2668 
1949 2795 2654 
1950 
1951 2601 2260 
1952 2939 2450 
1953 3288 2327 
1954 2230 
1955 2340 
1956 2873 
Source) Kim Sung Bo (2000), p. 352 
Second, the DPRK leaderships have continuously pointed out the exaggeration 
and falsification of official statistics since the 1960s. This suggests that the correction 
and revision of initially released statistics may not be the phenomena confined to the 
1950s. For instance, Kim Il Sung wrote: 
To make sure the science and objectivity of statistics we have to eliminate the phenomena of false 
reporting. Currently some organisations and firms tend to report false statistics. False reporting is 
not rare in agriculture and fishery sector. And construction and industrial sector happen to report 
false statistics...... In agriculture sector there are found many false reporting in the production of 
algok, vegetables, and fruits.... In particular, there are many cases to exaggerate algok production. '4 
Third, the way that grain statistics have been collected and announced in the 
DPRK raises the possibility of continued revision and correction of the statistics. 
There are two different harvest-figures in the DPRK: the expected ones and the actual 
ones. The expected production figures are calculated from per hectare yields, the data 
of which are obtained from sample field surveys before harvest. And the actual 
figures are collected from the amounts of crops compiled after harvest. By 1957 the 
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authorities had used the expected figures as the basis to calculate agricultural tax-in- 
kind, set collection targets and announce official grain production. And there is no 
evidence that this routine has changed afterwards. The point is that there are various 
exaggerating factors in the expected production figures, notwithstanding the 
inaccuracy caused by surveying only some sample fields15. This suggests that the 
authorities may have two separate production figures with great differences and that, 
when necessary, they would revise and correct one figures by the other ones. 
Particularly Kim 11 Sung's new year addresses, the primary source for the DPRK 
grain statistics between 1963 and 1988, seem to reflect the expected production rather 
than the actual one. If it is the case, the data for this period are more likely subject to 
afterward revisions and corrections. 
This possibility of the continuing revisions and corrections raises a question: 
whether are the available statistics officially revised or confirmed ones? Given scarce 
data and information, it is difficult to answer the question. Nevertheless, several 
implications can be drawn from the above discussion. First, the DPRK statistics until 
1957 are more likely the revised and confirmed data in the sense that they were 
already through the revision. Second, it is not clear whether the algok figures between 
1958 to 1997 are officially revised and confirmed ones for two reasons: 1) they have 
been released annually separately, 2) lots of them seem to be the expected production 
figures. Third, the rice and maize data between 1989 and 1997 are likely the revised 
figures with official confirmation, 1) because they are time series data released at 
once in recent year, and 2) because they constitute the basis for the DPRK to appeal 
for international agricultural aid. 
1.4. Reliability 
Not considering production collapse in the 1990s, one could find two interesting 
points suggested by the DPRK statistics: 1) grain production grew rapidly for the last 
four decades on annual average rate of around 9 percent, 2) the growth rate 
accelerated after important institutional changes. For instance, the rate rose up from 
14 Kim Il Sung Jojakjip, Vol. 24, p. 207-208 
15 For instance, Choi Su Young (1996) and Lee Hy Sang (1999) argue that the expected production is 
exaggerated in the following ways: 1) calculating per hectare expected yields from sample fields with 
the best conditions, 2) exaggerating sown areas such as including land borders where no production is 
carried out, 3) ignoring losses in harvesting and milling processes. 
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5.4 percent in the early 1950s to 15.4 percent on annual average between 1958 and 
1961 shortly after agricultural cooperativisation was completed. And it further 
increased to 20.5 percent between 1974 and 1975, just after Kim Il Sung was claimed 
to create Juche Nongbub in 1973. 
Ironically however these two facts have raised many critiques that the DPRK 
statistics highly exaggerate actual production. The critiques, though not providing 
solid evidences, stand on two grounds. First, given the secrecy of the DPRK statistical 
system, the government's desires to justify its agricultural policies internally and 
make its achievements look more attractive externally must lead to exaggerating the 
actual production (Kim Sung Ho and Kim Woon Keun 1983). Second, as the 
government admits, it suffered permanent over-reporting from below, which 
intrinsically inflates actual production (Lee Hy Sang 1994: Choi Su Young 1996). 
In most socialist countries official statistics had similar exaggeration 
problems, and there is no reason to assume that the DPRK statistics are exception. But 
the problem is that in the DPRK little data and information are available to assess the 
reliability of official statistics while in some other socialist economies a variety of 
information have allowed many independent researches to evaluate and correct 
official statistics. 16 
As an alternative, therefore, we consider institutional frameworks where 
economic agents are involved in making official statistics in the DPRK. We assume 
three players (the central government, local cadres, and farmers) who have interests in 
official grain statistics, and examine how their interests have been connected to the 
statistics. This allows us a small opportunity to peek at the reliability of the 
statistics'7. 
The period between 1947 and 1957 
It helps to begin with the period between 1947 and 1957 when individual farm 
households still controlled their grain marketing. At this time, the central government 
seems to have two interests concerning official grain statistics. First, it had to justify 
its socialist agricultural policies, including socialist land reform in 1946 and the 
16 Regarding the official Soviet Statistics, for instance, see the researches of Wheatcroft, Harrison, and 
Davis (1994: p. 24-37) and Wheatcroft and Davis (1999) 17 For the detailed discussion of the institutions, see chapter 3-5 and chapter 9 of this thesis 
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beginning of agricultural cooperativisation in 1953-54. Second, it had to collect 
surplus grains from farm households in order to feed newly established urban socialist 
sector and spur industrialisation. Obviously both interests should make the 
government favour more inflated figures. The interests of local cadres who reported 
regional production to the centre might not be different. Inflated figures could be an 
easy and effective way to demonstrate their administrative and political abilities to the 
centre. But farm households' interests seem quite contradictory. At this time 
individual farm households had to pay 25 percent of their production for agricultural 
tax-in-kind and meet, though not compulsory in principle, NKCA (North Korean 
Consumer Association) grain procurement targets imposed by the authorities. Because 
their taxes and procurement targets were based on official assessment on their 
production, they should be strongly against the authorities to exaggerate actual 
production. This institutional framework suggests that, although the DPRK grain 
statistics in 1946-57 might be inflated, the extent of inflation must be limited. For, as 
we see in the 1957 statistical revision, exaggerated statistics must cause farm 
households' unrest, which in turn should cause political and economic burdens to the 
government. 
The period between 1958 and 1995 
From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, however, basic changes took place in 
this institutional framework. By the early 1960s the government abolished agricultural 
tax-in-kind and NKCA procurement, two basic institutional channels for state grain 
collection. Instead, it prohibited farm households from privately selling their grains 
and confiscated all their surplus grains above their consumption requirements. 
Cooperative farms that absorbed all farm households in rural areas appeared as the 
new institutional channel for state grain collection. In cooperative farms, farm 
households were entitled to keeping aside from their production a fixed amount of 
grains for their food rations. In return, all the remaining grains were collected by 
cooperative farms, being eventually sold to state procurement agencies. This means 
that farm households did not have interests to oppose inflated official grain statistics 
any more. Quite contrary, now they had strong incentives to exaggerate their 
production. For cooperative farms grouped individual farm households into several 
work-teams (and sub work-teams) and gave each team the rights to claim higher share 
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of total farm income when it produced more grains than targets. Assuming no 
significant changes in the central government's and local cadres' interests, these farm 
households' interests mean that there appeared a new institutional framework where 
all players engaged in making official statistics tended to exaggerate actual 
production. 
This institutional framework had remained surprisingly stable until 1995 when 
the government officially admitted the food shortages of the country and appealed for 
international food aid. It suggests that the grain statistics between 1958 and 1995 are 
more likely overestimated than those between 1947 and 1957. Of course, it is unlikely 
that official statistics could be inflated unlimitedly even when all economic agents 
have incentives to exaggerate actual performances. Exaggerated statistics would 
eventually claim another costs: for instance, the central government may suffer 
planning failures, and local cadres and farmers would be given more increased targets 
and be in the long run forced to show actual performances matching the reported 
figures. Nevertheless, economic agents' sharing interests to overestimate actual 
production provides a good reason to believe that the DPRK statistics for this period 
are likely most unreliable. 
Ater 1995 
Official grain statistics have been made in a quite different situation since 
1995. Above all, it seems evident that the central government has not preferred to 
exaggerate actual production any more, because inflated official statistics would 
hamper international food aid that accounted for up to 60 percent of total grain 
imports and 40 percent of total grain consumption in the country between 1995 and 
1998. One might think that underestimation is now the primary concern of the 
government. Yet underestimation is also unlikely in the sense that the government has 
faced an external constraint in making official statistics. Since 1995 the government 
has allowed FAOIWFP field survey teams to visit the country every year and carry 
out their own surveys on agricultural production. Given that FAO and WFP are two 
major channels for international food aid, their detection of underestimated official 
statistics would damage the government's credibility and so weaken its position in aid 
negotiation. The government therefore should concern more about actual figures, 
rather than deliberately falsified figures. 
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Local cadres also seem to become more genuinely interested in actual 
production figures. Since the mid 1990s local cadres have been increasingly 
responsible for feeding the population without central support. They have been 
allowed to independently trade grains with other regions and even with other 
countries, but instead, when the trade is successful, they had been excluded from 
central food support. This has several interesting implications on local cadres' 
interests in official statistics. First, they should now need actual grain production 
figures to feed the population efficiently. Second, over-reporting is not necessarily 
beneficial to them in the sense that it would cause more procurement to/less supports 
from the centre, reducing the amount of grains regionally available. Third, given 
ongoing food shortages since the late 1980s, under-reporting also has a clear limit: 
repeated under-reporting could cost local cadres' jobs. It seems therefore evident that 
local cadres also should be more concerned about accurate official grain statistics. 
Exaggerating production is certainly not for farm households' interests, either. 
In 1996 the government introduced the new sub work-team management system that 
allows farmers to freely sell their surplus grains when they produce more than their 
production targets. Because the new system sets production targets on the basis of 
previous years' production, over-reporting would increase the targets and so reduce 
the disposable grains of farm households. On the other hand, under-reporting also 
seems to have a clear limit in the sense that farm households' food rations and 
incomes obviously depend on their fulfilment of production targets. 
In sum, since 1995 all economic agents have been more likely interested in 
making accurate official grain statistics. It suggests that the grain statistics available 
after 1995 may provide relatively more reliable figures. 
Now it seems safe to make the following conclusions. First, the DPRK grain statistics 
in 1946-57 could exaggerate actual production, but the extent of the exaggeration 
must be limited. Second, those between 1958 and 1994 are likely to provide most 
inflated figures. Third, it is the statistics since 1995 that seem to reflect actual 
production most accurately. 
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Appendix table 3. Assessment on the DPRK Grain Statistics 
Period I Period II Period III 
Availability <1946 -1962> <1963-1988> <1989-1999> 
algok, rice, maize figures algok figures only algok, rice, maize 
etc for some years figures 
Definition <1946 -1960> 
of Algok grains 
< after 1960 > 
potatoes added, but 
exact definition 
unknown 
Revision <1946 -1957> 
revision in 1957 
revised figures available 
<1964-1988> 
revision unknown 
but likely. 
Existing figures are 
not revised figures 
<1989-1999> 
revision unknown. 
Rice and maize 
figures are likely 
revised/confirmed 
figures 
Reliability <1946 -1957> <1957-1994> <after 1995> 
likely exaggerated but not relatively most relatively most 
so much exa erated accurate 
1.5. Summary 
Appendix table 3 summarises the discussion of this section. In terms of availability, 
we have relatively complete DPRK grain statistics for two time periods: the period of 
1946-62 and that of 1989-99. But the data are rare between 1964 and 1988. In terms 
of definition, the DPRK algok statistics had referred to grain production by 1960. But 
it has not been the case since then. In terms of revision, the algok statistics between 
1946 and 1957 and the rice and maize statistics between 1989 and 1997 seem 
officially revised and confirmed data whereas other available statistics do not. In 
terms of reliability, the DPRK statistics between 1946 and 1957 and those since 1995 
seem to provide relatively accurate figures on actual production. 
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2. Outside Estimates 
The discussion of previous section shows that no reliable official statistics are 
available at least between 1963 and 1988. This absence of official statistics has made 
it unavoidable for many researchers to use outside estimates in order to study the 
DPRK agriculture. In this section we consider two questions concerning those outside 
estimates: 1) which estimates would be the best alternatives for the missing official 
statistics, 2) to what extent and in what manner can we utilise the estimates? 
2.1. Availability 
Currently available are six estimated series made outside the DPRK. First, the ROK 
Ministry of Unification (MOU) has annually released its estimates since 1975. MOU 
series is available from the ROK National Statistical Office, Comparison of Economic 
and Social Aspects Between North and South Korea, various years and numerous 
MOU publications. MOU says that it has utilised four related data for the estimation: 
officially announced DPRK figures; weather data; the estimated data on the DPRK 
agricultural inputs; and particularly per hectare yield data coming from experiment 
farms that have similar lands, weather conditions, seeds and technologies to those in 
the DPRK1$. Second, FAO has published the DPRK production statistics through 
FAO Production Yearbook since the early 1950s. Though FAO is supposed to publish 
member countries' official statistics, the statistics should be regarded FAO's estimates 
(henceforth the FAO I series) for two reasons: 1) in most figures published between 
1961 and 1989 FAO put the footnotes saying that they are FAO's estimates, 2) FAO 
has corrected and revised the previously released figures almost every year. FAO's 
18 The ROIL Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes MOU's estimation as follows: 
We have collected from various routes the information on annual sown areas for each grain items, 
per hectare yields, regional harvests. We have also considered weather conditions such like rainfalls, 
imported or domestically produced fertilisers and pesticides. In addition, we have run experiment 
farms in Cholwon, the nearest area to the DPRK, which have planted the DPRK varieties of rice and 
maize.... the outputs of the experimental farms have been used for actual estimation. 
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estimation process is unknown. Nonetheless, it is generally assumed that FAO1 series 
is more likely dependent on the DPRK data submitted to FAO. 19 In fact the DPRK has 
been a member country of FAO since 1971, and researches have found that among 
various estimated series, FAO1 series provides the most similar figures to the DPRK 
statistics. 20 Third, another FAQ series is available from FAQ statistical database. 
Recently FAO revised all its DPRK related statistics already published between 1961 
and 1997 and replaced them with a complete new series (FA02 series). As discussed 
later, this new series has two features: 1) for the figures since 1991 it provides the 
official DPRK statistics, 2) for the figures before 1991 it significantly discounted 
previously released estimates. Fourth, United State Agricultural Department has made 
public its estimates on the DPRK rice and maize production between 1980 and 1997. 
Though the estimates (USDA series) do not include total harvest figures, they also can 
be used as an approximate for the DPRK grain production in terms that rice and maize 
are two main grain items dominating the DPRK agriculture. Fifth, Lee Hy Sang 
(1999) made an independent estimation on the DPRK production between 1982 and 
1993 (LHS series). Based on Kim 11 Sung's remarks on the country's agricultural 
production and statistical reporting routines, he identifies factors that could inflate 
actual production in the DPRK statistics. LHS series is eliminating these factors to 
reach more realistic figures. Sixth, another independently estimated series is available 
from Kim Sung Ho and Kim Woon Keun (1983), Kim Woon Keun (1996: 1997: 1999) 
and Kim Woon Keun and Jeon Hyung Jin (199a). This series (KWK series) is 
particularly notable for two respects: 1) it provides the estimates with the longest time 
period from 1960 to 1998,2) it is one of the first independent attempts to estimate the 
DPRK grain production by organising various related information and data in 
reasonable manners. It utilises similar data and process to those of MOU series. The 
difference is that KWK series takes the production trends implied by the official 
DPRK statistics between 1946 and 1960 and uses it for the projection afterwards. 
Appendix table 4 presents the currently available estimated series21. Among 
these series, we rule out LHS series from further discussion. This series is directly 
19 Smith, Heather (1997) 
20 Kim Woon Keun (1996): Kim Sung Ho and Kim Woon Keun (1983) 
21 Besides, there are also some other estimates available: for instance, Choi Su Young (1996), various 
FAO/WFP's reports about the DPRK food situation in the 1990s, Lee Chan Woo etc (1995). But they 
are preliminary estimates (FAO/WFP's) that are subject to correction afterward, or employ similar 
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driven from the officially released algok figures between 1981 and 1989. But the 
algok figures are not specified, definable, officially confirmed ones, as discussed in 
the previous section, notwithstanding the question of their reliabilities. We do not 
believe that the series driven from such figures is statistically meaningful. 
Furthermore, LHS series is not based on any officially released figures for the period 
from 1989 to 1993. Given these two facts it seems unlikely that this series is reliable. 
We do not further discuss FAOl series, either. This is mainly due to 
technical reasons: as already mentioned, since FAO has revised its figures in FAO 
Production Yearbook almost every year, it is difficult to identify its actual estimates 
for certain years22. Particularly there are three breaks in the series: in 1961,1988 and 
1994. In those years FAO revised all its previously published estimates and began to 
make completely new series afterwards. In consequence, FAO1 series consists of four 
sub-series that have quite different implications for the DPRK production trends: sub- 
series 1 between 1953 and 1960; sub-series 2 between 1960 and 1991; sub-series 3 
between 1988 and 1993; sub-series 4 between 1994 and 1997. Obviously it is difficult 
and perhaps unwise to establish a consistent series using such different sub-series. 
Henceforth, therefore, we regard FAO 2 series available from FAO statistical 
database as the only FAO series. 
2.2. Correlation between the DPRK statistics and the estimated statistics 
To assess the remaining four outside estimates, we first consider the question of how 
well they approximate the production trends implied by available DPRK statistics. To 
do this we construct the index series that reveals the production trend implied by 
available algok figures between 1961 and 1997, and conduct simple correlation tests 
on this index series and the remaining outside estimates. 
As pointed out above, the algok figures released after 1963 are not statistically 
meaningful data. Nonetheless, we assume that these figures could be a rough indicator 
of actual production trend in the following senses. First, the fact that the DPRK 
government did not release any figures for many years suggests that it preferred 
estimation processes to those already developed by other researches (Choi's), or make estimation for 
only some years (Lee's). Thus we do not consider them in this appendix. 22 The figures of FAO1 series in table 4 represent those that appeared latest in FAO Production 
Yearbook. 
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Appendix table 4. Outside Estimates on the DPRK Grain Production 
(1000 metric tons) 
MOU FAO1 FAO2 USDA LHS KWK DPRK 
(1993= 
I II III 100) 
.............. ,............... ... ... ............... ... _.... ............... _ 1961 _....... _.... _.... _... _............. _. ....................................... _..... 4692 .................... ............... _....... ... _.. _............ _....... _.. _.............. _..,.... _...... _.,....,........... 3583 . _.. _............ _... _... __. _............ ........ __.............................. .... _.. _........... _.......................... 3803 ........... . .. . 54 
1962 5106 3725 3568 56 
1963 5243 4053 3538 56 
1964 5102 4212 3655 56 
1965 4923 3707 3788 
1966 5083 4073 3925 49 
1967 4623 3787 4058 57 
1968 4588 3662 4199 63 
1969 5340 4378 4282 
1970 4644 5287 4364 4374 
1971 5432 4499 4475 
1972 5827 4309 4633 
1973 6147 4816 5010 4678 59 
1974 6547 5068 5790 4781 78 
1975 4953 6745 5246 6360 4869 86 
1976 5032 7329 5490 6610 4962 89 
1977 5029 7790 5798 7020 5080 94 
1978 4988 7780 5798 6520 5208 87 
1979 5177 8255 6006 7440 5331 100 
1980 3982 8730 5752 3650 7440 5460 
1981 5639 8735 6254 4255 7350 5585 
1982 5996 9000 6523 4420 7850 5715 
1983 5785 9718 6707 4541 7700 5841 
1984 6267 10230 7128 4825 8260 5600 111 
1985 10745 7096 4649 8090 5030 
1986 11148 7650 5251 8090 4825 
1987 11564 7558 4882 7930 4952 112 
1988 6026 11872 10400 7517 4683 7930 5210 
1989 10345 7824 4822 7770 5482 105 
1990 4812 10205 8071 4180 7540 4812 100 
1991 4427 10180 8836 3720 7310 4427 99 
1992 4268 9872 8681 3600 7090 3898 98 
1993 3884 4593 9137 3300 7230 2923 100 
1994 4125 4591 7215 3700 3768 79 
1995 3451 4245 3787 3300 2006 39 
1996 3690 4480 2596 3100 2447 28 
1997 3489 3664 2866 3000 2559 30 
* USDA series is about the sum of rice and maize production. All other series are about total grain 
production. 
Source) 1. For MOU series, the ROK National Statistical Office, Comparison of Economic 
and Social Aspects Between North and South Korea, various years and Korea Development 
Institute, Bukhan Gyungje Jipyojip [Collected North Korean Economic Indicators], 1996 
2. For FAOI series, FAO Production Yearbook, various years. 
3. For FAO2 series, FAO statistical database 
4. For USDA series, USDA web site (http: //www. usda. gov/) 
5. For LHS series, Lee Hy Sang (1999) 
6. For KWK series, Kim Sung Ho and Kim Woon Keun (1983), Kim Woon Keun 
(1996: 1997: 1999) and Kim Woon Keun and Jeon Hyung Jin (199a) 
7. For DPRK series, Appendix table 1 
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omitting figures rather than making deliberately falsified figures just for the purpose 
of announcements when it had bad harvests. Thus officially released figures, though 
they might be exaggerated, could be assumed as reflecting the statistics the DPRK 
government actually had. Second, even when officially released figures exaggerate 
actual production, the exaggerating factors should exist in the same manner between 
the early 1960s and the mid 1990s when the DPRK agricultural institutions had 
remained stable concerning the collection and making of official grain statistics. This 
suggests that the exaggeration problem may not matter when we consider only the 
trend, not the level. Third, the algok figures released between 1963 and 1988 can not 
be specified due to vague adjectives attached to them. But the risks that occur when 
we employ the figures ignoring such adjectives could be minimised by transforming 
the figures into index numbers. Fourth, the figures might be corrected after they were 
released. But this risks of using the existing figures could be minimised when we set 
the base year of the index series as late as possible, utilising the growth rate figures 
released as recently as possible. Fifth, the definition of algok has been unknown since 
1963. But the available algok figures should mainly represent the trend of grain 
production in the sense that grain must account at least more than 60 percent of total 
algok production even when potatoes, vegetables and even fruits are included in the 
23 24 definition. 
The production trends implied by officially released algok figures are 
represented by DPRK series, the index series, in Table 4. The question is, how well 
do the estimated series approximate this series? 
Table 5-A reports simple correlation coefficients between DPRK series and 
four estimated series. All the estimated series have strong positive correlation with 
DPRK series. Of them, FAO series has the highest correlation. Interestingly MOU, 
USDA and KWK series have much higher correlation with each other than they have 
with DPRK series and FAO series. By contrast, FAO series has relatively low 
23 According to Kim Sung Ho and Kim Woon Keun (1983)'s estimates, grain production accounted 
roughly for more than 80 percent of algok production in the 1960s and the early 1970s under the 
assumption that only potatoes were added to algok figures. And with the new assumption that not only 
potatoes but also vegetables and fruits were added to algok figures since the early 1970s, grain 
production comprised around 60 percent of algok figures. 
24 Obviously however there remains a problem that the definition of algok might be changed even 
between 1961 and 1997. If it is the case, there must be breaks in the series of the algok figures so that 
we can not establish a consistent trend from the data. In this note, because no information is available 
about this issue, we simply assume that for the concerning period the definition of algok has not 
changed. 
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correlation with other estimated series. This suggests that MOU, USDA and KWK 
series share similar information and estimation processes that FAO series does not 
adopt. 
Though all the estimated series have high correlation with DPRK series, it 
does not necessarily mean that they all approximate the production trends implied by 
officially released statistics well. For most economic variables tend to have time 
trends that could sometimes produce high correlation among them even when they do 
not actually have any significant economic relationship. The four estimated series and 
DPRK series prove to have strong time trends: in econometric terms they are I(1) 
series. This means that high correlation between DPRK and four estimated series 
could be largely affected by the time trends they share. To eliminate the time trends 
and obtain genuine correlation, we generate first difference series from the original 
series and carry out correlation tests on them once more. In econometric terms, first 
differencing has transformed the original series into 1(0) series. In economics terms, 
first-difference means annual production change. Thus correlation tests on first 
difference series would reveal which estimated series explain the DPRK annual 
harvest changes best. 
Table 5-B presents simple correlation coefficients among first difference 
series. The results are somewhat surprising. FAO series has still very high positive 
correlation with DPRK series: the coefficient is 0.85. But both MOU and USAD 
series prove to have little relationship with DPRK series, showing the coefficient of 
0.36 and -0.12 separately. The coefficient of KWK series is slightly higher, but still 
not enough to show its close relationship with DPRK series as FAO series does. As in 
original series, MOU, USDA and KWK series have higher correlation with each other 
than they have with DPRK series and FAO series. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, the estimated series 
could be divided into two groups: one group of FAO series and another group of 
MOU, USAD, and KWK. series. They have high correlation within group, but low 
correlation outside group. Second, it is FAO series that approximates officially 
released grain statistics between 1961 and 1997 best. That the correlation coefficient 
between DPRK series and FAO series is above 0.85 both in their original series and in 
their first difference series suggests that two series are almost identical in terms of the 
trend they represent. Third, another group of estimated series, including MOU, 
USAD, and KWK series, has little relationship with DPRK series. Those series have a 
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similar time trend with DPRK series but fail to approximate the latter in terms of 
annual production changes. It suggests that statistically they are not directly 
dependent on officially released DPRK statistics. 
Appendix table 5. Correlation Coefficients: DPRK series and Estimated Series 
A. Original Series 
DPRK FAO MOU USDA KWK 
DPRK 1 
FAO 0.882 1 
MOU 0.741 0.360 1 
SDA 0.767 0.513 0.969 1 
KWK 0.752 0.474 0.851 0.795 1 
B. First Difference Series 
DPRK FAO MOU USDA KWK 
DPRK 1 
FAO 0.856 1 
MOU 0.368 0.292 1 
SDA -0.129 0.223 0.842 1 
KWK 0.413 0.371 0.401 0.522 1 
2.3. Assessment on MOU, USDA, KWK statistics 
With the correlation test results above, we proceed into the assessment of the four 
estimated series. 
Consider first MOU, USAD, and KWK series. These series have been most 
frequently quoted to discuss the DPRK agriculture, particularly its recent food crisis, 
which demonstrates that they have been widely assumed as reliable estimates for the 
DPRK grain production. But the above correlation test cast doubts on this assumption. 
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Appendix table 6. Grain Production Estimates and the DPRK Food Crisis 
(1000 MT) 
92 93 94 95 96 97_ 
DPRK Algok 8800 9000 7100 3500 2500 2700 
Rice+Maize 7057 7502 5727 2770 1817 2109 
Production FAO Cereal 8681 9137 7215 3787 2596 2866 
MOU Cereal 4268 3884 4125 3451 3690 3489 
USDA Rice+Maize 3600 3300 3700 3300 3100 3000 
Kim Cereal 3898 2923 3768 2006 2447 2559 
Death Rates (per 1000) 5.5 6.8 9.3 
* the 1998 rate 
Source) 1. For production statistics, table 1 and table 4. 
2. For the death rate of 1993, the DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics (1995) 
3. For the death rates of 1994 and 1998, Watts (1999) 
To understand the implications of the correlation test results, we briefly 
compare these three estimated series with available DPRK statistics and FAO 
estimates in the country's actual food situation in 1994-1998. Appendix table 6 
presents five different sets of statistics on the DPRK production with officially 
claimed death rates in the 1990s. It is already well recognised that the DPRK has 
suffered great food shortages since the early 1990s. And increasing death rate show 
that due to the food shortages the famine condition took place first in 1994 and lasted 
at least until 1998. 
The question is; what implications do MOU, USAD, and KWK series have 
concerning this food crisis? Consider the production of 1993 that determined the food 
supply of 1994 when the famine condition first emerged. MOU, USAD, and KWK 
series commonly provide the figures that grain production sharply declined in 1993 by 
around 10 percent. Hence, the researches based on these series would conclude that 
the DPRK famine started with production failures. Quite contrary, however, officially 
released figures and FAO estimates show that grain production increased significantly 
in 1993: the production reached its peak in that year. The researches using official 
figures or FAO series would therefore make a quite opposite conclusion that the 
famine first appeared in the country without production failure. 
What about the production trend in 1994-97? According to MOU, USAD, and 
KWK series, compared to the 1993 production, grain production between 1994 and 
1997 declined by up to around 15 percent. Of course, supposing the bad harvest in 
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1993, this decline could be disastrous to the already worsened food situation. 
Nonetheless, it seems far from production collapse. During this period however the 
famine reportedly hit the whole country, which is consistent with officially claimed 
death rates doubling up in this period. Reflecting this, most researches based on 
MOU, USAD, and KWK series tend to argue that the DPRK famine was attributed 
not to massive production failures but to other factors such as distribution failures25, 
the absence of government's will to save victims and resource wastes for military 
purposes26 and so on. By contrast, officially released figures and FAO estimates show 
that grain production completely collapsed between 1994 and 1997. For instance, the 
production of 1997 was less than one third of the 1993 level. Naturally the researches 
utilising both figures would argue that the absolute shortages of food caused by 
massive production failures were the main immediate factor which made the DPRK 
famine develop in a full scale. 
We do not intend to judge which estimates are more realistic. Nevertheless, 
the above discussion reveals what the correlation test results of MOU, USAD, and 
KWK series actually mean: 1) those series have different implications on the DPRK 
production trend from those implied by officially released figures; 2) consequently 
they would lead to the conclusions that might be quite contradictory to those obtained 
from officially released figures. 
Now the question arises: is it really appropriate to use these series? Of course, 
an estimated series that has different from official statistical series does not 
necessarily fail to reflect actual production, particularly when the reliability of the 
official series is questionable. Nonetheless, we argue, it would be inappropriate and 
even dangerous to employ MOU, USAD, and KWK series for the study of the DPRK 
agriculture. There are three simple reasons. 
First, it is intuitively difficult to accept that there could be reasonable ways not 
based on officially released statistics to estimate production in the country like the 
DPRK that had been almost completely isolated from outside world for more than 
four decades. For outside researchers to make independent estimation are necessary 
not only detailed data such as inputs and technologies but also in-depth information 
about agricultural institutions. In case of the DPRK these data and information are 
25 For instance, Han (2000) 
26 For instance, MOU (September 1998) 
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mostly missing. Given that, it is highly questionable to make reasonable estimation 
not utilising officially released figures. 
Second, though the DPRK is not a geographically large country, its natural 
conditions for agriculture vary greatly according to regions from highly mountainous 
North East with cold climates to flat South West with mild climates. This regional 
variation could lead to significant estimation errors when the estimation is made 
simply at national level. But no regional information is available to outside world, and 
so it is questionable the reliability of the estimates that are significantly different from 
officially released figures. The production of 1993 provides a good example. In 1993 
the DPRK's neighbour countries, including the ROK and China, suffered large 
amounts of production losses due to abnormally cold weathers that hit Far East Asia. 
On the basis of this fact, most outside researchers claimed that the DPRK production 
must be significantly lower in that year than in the previous years, estimating the 
decline of 8-10 percent. Even though the DPRK government announced an 
`unprecedented good harvest' in 1993, they discredited it highly unreliable without 
reporting any concrete figures. But the DPRK regional production figures submitted 
to UNDP (1998a) establish two facts: 1) in 1993 the north-eastern part of the country 
that were directly hit by cold weathers, North and South Hamgyung provinces, 
suffered drastic decline of grain production by more than 30 percent, but 2) due to 
good harvests of other provinces the national harvest increased by more than 10 
percent in that year. Though there could be still challenges to these official figures27, 
this example illustrates how biased outside estimates could be when they are made 
simply at national level without appropriate regional information. 
Third, agricultural production in the DPRK have been carried out in a quite 
unique way called Juche Nongbub that encourages dense planting and develops 
various farming practices to prevent the problems of the dense planting. Given that 
little is known about Juche Nongbub and its results, it is questionable how accurately 
27 It is still arguable how good (or bad) the 1993 harvest actually was. Nevertheless, it is at least certain 
that the DPRK authorities have made consistent announcements on that harvest. From July to August 
1993 Pyongyang media announced the bumper harvest, mainly based on the grain outputs of South 
West. It was also this region that foreign observers were allowed to visit to see the actual harvest 
situation. At that time, by contrast, few reports were made on the situation of North East. (For the 
details, see Radio Press 1993 p. l-5). These reports are quite consistent with the regional output figures 
submitted to UNDP later in 1997 showing that in 1993 South West had output increase more than 20 
percent, and that this increase surpassed the disastrous output decline of North West, leading to 
national bumper harvest. In this sense, the official announcement of the 1993 bumper harvest seemed 
to be made at least from the figures the authorities actually had. 
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outside researchers could estimate the DPRK's agricultural performances, not 
depending on officially released figures. 
In short, we do not believe that there are reasonable ways to estimate the 
DPRK production independently outside the country, not based on official figures. In 
this respect we do not think that it would be appropriate to utilise for the study of the 
DPRK agriculture outside estimates such as MOU, USDA, and KWK series that are 
significantly different from official figures. 
2.4. Assessment on FAO statistics 
The above correlation tests show that FAO series approximates well the production 
trend implied by DPRK series. Given that other estimated series are inappropriate for 
the study of the DPRK agriculture, this means that FAO estimates may be the only 
alternative for the missing official DPRK statistics. Further, FAG is the only 
organisation that has provided a wide range of other DPRK agriculture related 
statistics from agricultural trades to domestic food distribution. Thus the utilisation of 
FAQ estimates could be practically beneficial as well. 
The difficulty however is that we can not use all FAO estimates in the same 
manner. Appendix table 7 compares FAO statistics with the DPRK statistics. It 
reveals an interesting point: FAO estimates since 1991 should be regarded as official 
DPRK statistics whereas those until 1990 should not. 
Take a look at the estimates since 1991. Both official figures and FAO 
estimates provide almost the same figures in maize and paddy-rice. Though rice 
figures expressed in milled equivalents are significantly different, it is simply because 
the DPRK and FAO have applied different milling losses in the process of conversion 
of paddy rice into husked one. This suggests that FAO has actually provided official 
DPRK statistics. Of course, officially released algok figures are different from FAO 
cereal statistics. But the differences seem natural in the sense that both figures have 
different definitions and apply different milling losses and conversion rates, 
notwithstanding the fact that the algok figures are preliminary ones reflecting the 
expected production and so they are likely subjected to afterward revision. 
There are also other evidences that FAO estimates are actually official DPRK 
statistics. For example, as already pointed out, FAO has paid field visits to the DPRK 
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every year to assess the country's production and collect field data since 1995. This 
means that FAO has obtained much better and more detailed information on official 
DPRK statistics than before. Because FAO is supposed to publish member countries' 
official statistics, this information must be reflected in FAQ statistics. Furthermore, 
the footnotes saying that the DPRK related statistics are FAO's estimates have 
disappeared in FAO Production Yearbook since 1991, which suggests that FAO has 
attempted to publish the official DPRK statistics. In this respect we believe that, 
insofar as the data since 1991 are concerned, currently available FAO estimates are 
actually official DPRK statistics or at least their best approximates. 
By contrast, FAO estimates between 1960 and 1991 do not seem to represent 
official DPRK statistics at all. Both official figures and FAQ estimates share a similar 
trend. In absolute physical terms, however, they do not have any similarity. For 
instance, the announced algok production reached 10 million tons in 1984 when FAO 
statistics report mere 7.1 million tons of cereal production. It is difficult to believe that 
only different definitions and methods of calculation applied to both figures could 
generate many million tons of gaps between them. Both figures have significant 
differences in rice and maize production as well. It seems therefore fair to say that 
FAO estimates between 1961 and 1991 are not official DPRK statistics, even though 
they might be driven from the latter. 
In short, there exists a break in FAO series. Thus we use FAO estimates in 
different manners according to the time period they represent. First, we regard FAQ 
estimates since 1991 as official DPRK statistics and use them in the same manner 
with other official DPRK statistics such as algok figures between 1946 and 1963 and 
rice and maize figures between 1989 and 1997. For these statistics, we discuss not 
only the trend but also the level they represent. Second, we assume that FAO 
estimates between 1960 and 1991 are completely different statistics from official 
DPRK statistics. For them, we attempt to identify only the trend they imply. Even the 
identified trend will be used only when we can provide other related information and 
data to support them. 
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Appendix table 7. DPRK Statistics and FAO Estimates 
(million metric tons) 
DPRK FAO 
Algok Rice Rice Maize Cereal Rice Rice Maize 
.......................................... ................... _........................ ........ 
(. p add 
....... ....... 
milled)............. 
................. ............................ ..... _ 
paddY 
...... ....... 
paddY 
....... ....... 
mla. e......... 
................. ............................ 1961 4.83 3.58 1.81 1.21 1.25 
1962 5.00 3.73 1.90 1.27 1.31 
1963 5.00 4.05 2.07 1.38 1.43 
1964 5.00 4.21 2.18 1.45 1.51 
1965 3.71 1.91 1.27 1.32 
1966 4.41 4.07 2.13 1.42 1.47 
1967 5.11 3.79 1.98 1.32 1.37 
1968 5.67 3.66 1.91 1.28 1.32 
1969 4.38 2.34 1.56 1.62 
1970 4.37 2.33 1.55 1.61 
1971 4.50 2.41 1.61 1.67 
1972 4.31 2.31 1.54 1.60 
1973 5.34 4.82 2.60 1.73 1.79 
1974 7.00 5.07 2.71 1.81 1.92 
1975 7.70 5.25 2.81 1.88 2.00 
1976 8.00 5.49 2.85 1.90 2.20 
1977 8.50 5.80 3.06 2.04 2.30 
1978 7.87 5.80 2.96 1.97 2.40 
1979 9.00 6.01 3.06 2.04 2.50 
1980 5.75 2.65 1.77 2.70 
1981 6.26 3.05 2.03 2.80 
1982 6.52 3.20 2.14 2.90 
1983 6.71 3.29 2.19 3.00 
1984 10.00 7.13 3.50 2.33 3.20 
1985 7.10 3.37 2.25 3.30 
1986 7.65 3.81 2.54 3.40 
1987 10.06 7.56 3.54 2.36 3.50 
1988 7.52 3.39 2.26 3.60 
1989 9.49 4.32 3.24 4.34 7.82 3.50 2.33 3.80 
1990 9.00 4.48 3.36 3.90 8.07 3.57 2.38 4.00 
1991 8.90 4.09 3.07 4.20 8.84 4.12 2.75 4.20 
1992 8.80 4.45 3.34 3.72 8.68 4.50 3.00 3.72 
1993 9.00 4.75 3.56 3.94 9.14 4.79 3.19 3.94 
1994 7.10 3.11 2.18 3.55 7.22 3.18 2.12 3.55 
1995 3.50 2.00 1.40 1.37 3.79 2.02 1.34 1.37 
1996 2.50 1.41 0.99 0.83 2.60 1.43 0.95 0.83 
1997 2.70 1.57 1.10 1.01 2.87 1.53 1.02 1.01 
Source) 1. For the DPRK statistics, table 1. 
2. For FAO statistics, FAO database electronically accessed at www. fao. org 
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3. How to use the Statistics 
From the above discussion, we can summarise the manners to use the DPRK grain 
related statistics as follows. 
1. For the study of the DPRK agriculture in 1946-1963 we rely on official grain 
statistics. We employ not only the trends but also the levels the statistics represent. 
A problem is that the statistics, especially those between 1958 and 1963, might be 
exaggerated. Thus, when we discuss this period, we provide other related data and 
information to crosscheck the reliability of the statistics, including official 
statistics in other related fields such as agricultural inputs, technologies, 
investments and so forth. 
2. There are no official grain statistics available between 1964 and 1988: the existing 
algok figures should not be regarded as official statistics. Thus, we depend on 
FAO estimates. In this case, however, we consider only the trends the estimates 
imply - not the levels. 
3. For the period after 1990 we employ two statistics: FAO estimates on total grain 
production since 1991, and official rice and maize production statistics. We 
assume that FAO estimates are equivalent to official statistics in the 1990s. For 
those since 1995 we consider both the levels and trends they imply. Rice and 
maize statistics are mainly used to identify regional production trends. 
4. The algok figures available between 1963 and 1997 are regarded only as a rough 
indicator of the production trends under the assumption that they separately fail to 
reflect actual production. And we do not make any important arguments based on 
these figures. 
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